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**DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES:
A LOOK AT THE RECORD
PART V**

September 1986

**A history of party differences
on 105 key Senate votes:
99th Congress, 1st Session**

Prepared by the Staff of the Senate Democratic Policy Committee

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DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES:

A LOOK AT THE RECORD

PART V

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INTRODUCTION

During 1985, on many occasions, the actions of Senate Democrats on issues of major importance to the nation and its citizens were at substantial variance with the actions of the Republicans who controlled the Senate as its majority party. This volume of the "Democratic Alternatives" series highlights 105 record votes during 1985 on which at least two-thirds of Senate Democrats took a position opposite to that of at least two-thirds of Republican Senators. The accompanying text describes the issues that were at stake in these votes and the justification for the Democratic stance taken on those issues. In this way, some of the most important "Democratic Alternatives" to the policy objectives of the Republican Senate majority can be seen and understood.

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An Overview of the First Session of the 99th Congress From the Perspective of Senate Democrats

The Budget

Perhaps no more important issue confronted the Congress in 1985 than reducing the record deficits amassed over the four previous years. Between 1981 and 1985, there were three record deficits, the last of them in FY 1985 when the Administration added \$211.9 billion in red ink to the national ledger.

When the Senate considered the FY 1986 budget resolution, Democrats offered two major budget alternatives, both of which reduced the deficit by more than did the budget supported by the majority party. The Democratic budget proposals achieved their deficit reduction in a way that encouraged economic growth and investment in the future, while providing a strong national defense and ensuring that all persons, including profitable corporations that currently escape Federal income taxes, would bear their fair share of the deficit reduction burden.

Beyond offering budget alternatives, as the budget debate continued, Democrats also sought to reorder the spending priorities of the Republican budget by persistent strong support for such programs as Social Security and medicare, education, child nutrition, economic development, basic research and scientific efforts, and assistance to family farmers. While these efforts did not always meet with complete success, they often helped moderate excessive or misdirected spending reductions advanced by the majority. As a result, the budget that ultimately passed the Senate was fairer, more progressive, and better for our nation's future than it otherwise would have been.

Help for Farmers

The nation's farmers entered 1985 suffering their worst distress since the depression of the 1930's. This distress threatened—and continues to threaten—not only individual farmers and their families, but also the entire economy of those regions of our nation where agriculture is a central economic component. Further, we are faced with the disappearance of the family farm and with the concentration of our food and fiber production in the hands of large corporations, which may pose significant and unwelcome changes in the lifestyle and well-being of many if not all of our nation's citizens.

In 1985, Democrats first came to the aid of our farmers in February with a proposal for emergency credit assistance. The Administration and its allies in Congress at first resisted the need for such aid. Yet, following nationwide media attention, and Democratic threats to delay confirmation of Presidential Assistant Edwin Meese as Attorney General, the Republicans relented and a farm credit assistance bill finally passed the Senate.

Unfortunately the President vetoed that bill, claiming that there was no need for such assistance. But before the President's veto, Democrats had succeeded in obtaining for farmers concessions in existing credit programs that the Administration previously had been unwilling to provide. Thus, Democrats were successful in prodding the Administration and the Republicans into providing at least some needed help to farmers who were in danger of losing their farms.

Democrats demonstrated their resolve to aid America's farmers later in the session during the consideration of the 1985 farm bill. Democrats succeeded in the Agriculture Committee in resisting the Administration's and Republican Senators' efforts to begin immediate reductions in government support (by reducing crop target prices after a one-year freeze of current targets). The bill reported from the Agriculture Committee provided for a four-year freeze in target prices. While this was not seen then or now to be a panacea for distressed farmers, it would give them some time in which to help themselves out of the chaos created by the last four years of this Administration's farm policies.

On the Senate floor, Democrats again successfully prevented the Administration and its Senate allies from dropping back to their original plan that would cut farm income after only one year—at a time when many farmers already are having difficulty meeting their financial commitments. Eventually, recognizing that Democrats would not be overcome, the Republican-controlled Senate passed a more nearly adequate three-year freeze.

Defense and Arms Control

Senate Democrats began the 99th Congress by establishing that their paramount priorities in national security would be reforming the Pentagon's wasteful procurement process, strengthening our conventional forces, modernizing our nuclear deterrent in a manner contributing to nuclear stability and arms control, and pressing our allies to bear a fairer share of the common defense burden.

Democrats have been concerned that, over the last few years, the Soviet-American relationship has been overly characterized by harsh rhetoric and unproductive finger-pointing. We have made every effort to be helpful in putting that relationship back onto a more productive track. On the first day of the 99th Congress the Senate demonstrated the importance it attaches to the achievement of mutual, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms control agreements between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Majority Leader Robert Dole joined Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd in proposing, and the Senate created, a bipartisan Senate arms control observer group to monitor the Geneva negotiations on a regular basis. This group was conceived to enable avoiding a repetition of the problems of the 1970's, when three successive arms control treaties were signed by three presidents, but never ratified by the Senate.

Later in 1985, Senate Democrats underscored the principle that prudent defense programs and careful arms control arrangements both are important components of our national security. Toward this end, Democrats led the Senate simultaneously to support reasonable strategic nuclear modernization and a continuation of pro-arms control policies.

Senators Byrd, Gore, Boren, and Nunn won Senate approval of a plan to deploy no more than 50 MX intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in a vulnerable basing mode and to shift the Administration's land-based missile priorities toward more survivable and effective forces.

Under the leadership of Democratic Senators Leahy and Bumpers, the Senate emphatically urged the President to continue in 1986 the U.S. policy of refraining from actions which would undercut the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) accords as long as the Soviets show similar restraint and continue to negotiate in Geneva. That action also urged the President to pursue vigorously the issues surrounding Soviet noncompliance with some aspects of these accords.

In leading this effort, Senate Democrats recognized that abandonment of the "no undercut" policy in 1986 would hurt U.S. security more than Soviet security that year—because the U.S.S.R. no longer would be required to dismantle more strategic warheads than the U.S.

The first session of the 99th Congress found Senate Democrats pushing hard to eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse in defense programs. The long trail of cost overrun scandals and questionable budgeting procedures at the Pentagon has served to erode much of the national consensus underlying a vigorous defense program. Major weapons procurement process reforms were crafted under the leadership of Senators Levin and Pryor, intended to enhance our national security by stretching the defense dollar further and achieving better results.

Foreign Policy

During 1985, Senate Democrats were in the forefront of initiatives to address the security and foreign policy challenges America faces in the Philippines, the Middle East, and Central America.

Senators Sasser and Kerry were early, thoughtful critics of the policies of the Philippine government under Ferdinand Marcos which prevented that nation from defeating a growing communist insurgency that threatens the long-term existence of two of the U.S.'s most important overseas military bases.

Regarding the Middle East, Senators Kennedy, Dixon, and Cranston highlighted the lack of a convincing national security justification for proposals by the Administration to sell additional sophisticated weapons to Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

American policy in the Middle East must be guided by the need to build on the success of the Camp David process, and the hope it offers for comprehensive solutions in the region. The arms sales that this Administration has been promoting for several years do not represent a policy which can facilitate or advance this process.

In 1985, Senate Democrats became increasingly concerned over the activities of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Because Democrats believed—and continue to believe—that every effort must be made on both the political and diplomatic fronts to find a peaceful solution to our differences between the U.S. and Nicaragua—and, indeed, between that government and its own people, Democrats consistently supported the Contadora process, and encouraged the reopening of negotiations between the U.S. and Nicaragua. They sought to effect their view that military options should be kept on the back burner, and used only as a last resort.

During 1985 Democrats tried to negotiate with the White House on a reasonable program of overt humanitarian aid to those forces in Nicaragua who oppose the repressive Sandinista regime. Unfortunately, the Administration rejected efforts to reach a reasonable compromise.

In 1985 we saw South Africa caught up in a cycle of despair and growing violence. Recognizing that South Africa was drifting into chaos, and that the Administration's policy was translating into destructive disinterest rather than constructive engagement, Senate Democrats called for meaningful steps that would focus the attention of that country's leadership on the need to carry out

basic reforms. Democratic legislation calling for specific responses keyed to progress in South Africa was frustrated when Senate Republicans removed the conference report from the Senate chamber in an unprecedented one-Senator veto. Senate Democrats successfully pressed for a return of those papers. In the meantime, however, the Administration accepted substantially all of the points raised in the Democratic legislation and issued much of the Democratic bill as an Executive Order, thereby notably altering our public posture in the sight of the international community and putting pressure on South Africa's government to achieve meaningful reforms of apartheid.

The Environment

Legislation expanding and reauthorizing the nation's "Superfund" law was passed overwhelmingly (86-13) by the Senate on September 26, 1985. The Senate bill contained a \$7.5 billion program to protect the American public from the health threat posed by the thousands of abandoned toxic waste dumps located around the nation. Democrats played an important role in improving and strengthening the Superfund legislation during deliberations in the Committees, and during consideration on the floor. Democrats played a similar role both in Committee and on the Senate floor as legislation reauthorizing and improving the nation's Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act moved to Senate passage in 1985.

Human Services

Reauthorization of child nutrition programs: The major child nutrition programs—the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) feeding program, the summer school feeding programs, and parts of the School Lunch and Breakfast program—had been operating without authorization through most of the 2nd session of the 98th Congress and the 1st session of the 99th because the Majority Party that chairs the Agriculture Committee and determines the Senate floor schedule, would not schedule the bill for action. During this time, the House of Representatives passed and sent to the Senate three bills in an attempt to prod the Senate into action. Finally, late in the first session, after innumerable Democratic attempts to secure action on the bill, Senators Harkin and Kennedy were able to spotlight the issue sufficiently on the floor so that the Republicans agreed to offer a simple bill reauthorizing the programs. That bill passed the Senate and is in conference with the House-passed bill.

Education/employment/programs dealing with protecting vital human resources: During consideration of the 1986 congressional budget, Democrats demonstrated unequivocally that it

was necessary for any budget to meet Democratic objectives for education, employment, and other human resources programs if it were to receive any Democratic support. This push by Democrats assured that the budget passed by the Senate would not contain the very serious cuts in education and employment programs proposed by the President.

Social Security/Medicare: The First Session of the 99th Congress was the scene of several Republican proposals—from the Administration as well as from the Senate—to cut Social Security benefits by freezing cost-of-living adjustments, in order to provide funds to reduce the budget deficit. Likewise, the Administration proposed severe changes and cuts in the Medicare program which would have drastically increased the amount beneficiaries must pay in order to participate in the program. All of these changes were efforts to balance the budget on the backs of America's elderly.

Due to the degree to which Democrats in the Senate and the House were united in refusing to consider cuts in social security benefits, such efforts were thwarted as the FY 1986 budget was adopted by both Houses. Later, when the Gramm/Rudman/Hollings proposal for automatic budget cuts was advanced, the efficacy of Democratic support for protecting social security resulted in the authors of that proposal excluding Social Security from the list of programs subjected to automatic cuts.

In Medicare, Democrats were successful in assuring that the most onerous proposals affecting out-of-pocket health care costs for the elderly and disabled were removed from the Republican leadership budget.

As the debt limit crisis loomed over the Congress, the Administration disinvested Social Security Trust Funds in order to provide operating cash for the government. In reaction, Democrats acted to instruct the Treasury to restore to those trust funds all amounts of principal plus interest which were lost during the time the funds were disinvested.

Trade

In 1985, the trade deficit climbed toward \$150 billion—beyond the record \$123 billion of 1984 and by far the largest trade shortfall of any nation in history. In 1985 also, the Reagan Administration's high dollar and high deficit policies resulted in our becoming a debtor nation for the first time since World War I. Taken in conjunction, these grim records reveal this Administration's fundamental failure to maintain America's global economic leadership—which translates into a loss of jobs and decline in

our industrial base. During 1985, traditional industries such as steel, textiles, autos, and footwear continued to suffer from Administration indifference, but new technologies, such as computers and related technologies, also began to feel the pinch.

Senate Democrats made major contributions to the trade debate in 1985. Early in the year, Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd appointed Senator Lloyd Bentsen to head a Democratic working group to examine current trade policy alternatives and recommend a course of action. That working group called for a strategic approach to trade in its April 1985 preliminary report entitled "The New Global Economy: First Steps in a United States Trade Strategy." Their report was followed by introduction of "The Trade Policy Act of 1985" (S. 1837). That legislation—endorsed by the Democratic Caucus and cosponsored by all Senate Democrats—offers the framework for a tough, comprehensive approach to the challenge of global competition.

Through the actions of the working group and the initiatives of many Senate Democrats, the White House was forced to begin to respond to the trade crisis. Senators Moynihan, Baucus and Bradley have introduced legislation to require adjustment in the over-valued dollar that acts as a tax on American exports. Over Republican objections, the Senate passed Senator Bradley's resolution calling for coordination in macroeconomic policy and concerted action with our allies to reduce the artificially bloated dollar. Within months of passage of the Bradley resolution, the Administration announced that it had begun negotiations with major trading partners to realign the dollar to improve American competitiveness.

AGRICULTURE

Introduction

The first session of the 99th Congress demonstrated the clear differences between Democrats and Republicans on the issue of farm policy. In the midst of the worst crisis in the agricultural economy since the depression, Democrats sought repeatedly to provide assistance—a "safety net"—to farmers threatened with the loss of their crops and even their land.

The battle to protect the family farm was joined early as Democrats were forced to hold up confirmation of Edwin Meese as Attorney General in order to secure an agreement from the Republican leadership that the Senate could consider legislation providing emergency credit assistance to hard pressed farmers. Despite initial opposition from Republican leaders, Democratic efforts eventually proved successful and the legislation was brought up and passed. Even so, Democrats, aided by a few farm state Republicans, had to fight for every important provision. However, any hope that farmers might have had following congressional adoption of the emergency farm credit measure was quickly dashed when the President vetoed the legislation, claiming that it was completely unnecessary. Despite the veto, Democratic pressure on the Republicans had succeeded in forcing the Administration to make some concessions in expanding credit assistance.

Later in the session, as the Senate began consideration of the quadrennial farm bill, Democrats sought to defend their hard-won gains in the Agriculture Committee. The farm bill reported from the committee contained a Democratic provision for a four-year freeze on target prices as one of its central features. However, once the measure was considered by the full Senate, the Republican leadership engaged in a series of parliamentary maneuvers to defeat that provision and substitute a provision calling for a one-year freeze with five percent cuts in subsequent years.

While Democrats fought that effort, the Republican majority eventually succeeded in weakening the farm bill, although not as severely as they had intended. Shortly thereafter, Democrats continued their fight for family farms by attempting to amend a farm credit measure to give more control over local farm credit banks to the local shareholders/borrowers and to encourage the preservation of family farms. However, Republican opposition to these efforts led to their defeat.

The Record

The major differences between Democratic and Republican farm policies became apparent early in 1985 during consideration of legislation to provide African famine relief. After overcoming Republican resistance to considering any legislation that might be used as a vehicle to provide emergency credit assistance to American farmers, Democrats successfully amended the relief bill to provide such aid.

- 1) Melcher-Andrews, et al, substitute amendment (for the Zorinsky-Andrews, et al, amendment—Vote No. 14—to the African Relief and Farm Credit Assistance bill described below) which contains farm credit assistance provisions identical to the Zorinsky-Andrews amendment (see description below) except that it includes the existing requirement that lenders write off a portion of the principal or interest on farm loans as a prerequisite to securing an FmHA loan guarantee. (Vote No. 13—99th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

85% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 54-45.

February 27, 1985.

- 2) Zorinsky-Andrews, et al, amendment, as amended (by the Melcher-Andrews, et al, amendment—Vote No. 13—to the African Relief and Farm Credit Assistance bill), which requires the FmHA to use the resources of the Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund to provide \$100 million to cooperatively buy down the interest rate for one or more years on farm loans made by commercial or cooperative lenders; authorizes \$1.85 billion in loan guarantee authority in addition to the \$650 million already available for FY 1985; retains the existing requirement that lenders write off part of the principal or interest on a farm loan as a prerequisite to securing an FmHA loan guarantee; modifies existing FmHA regulations to allow borrowers the option of basing their application for assistance on 100 percent or 110 percent of the cash flow needed to meet debt obligations; requires the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations implementing this legislation within 15 days of enactment and to hire additional temporary personnel to process and service loans; requires Federal and State financial regulatory agencies to refrain from adversely classifying loans that have been restructured under the FmHA loan guarantee program; encourages the Small Business Administration to consider implementing a debt adjustment program for current farm loan borrowers comparable to the FmHA program; and requires the Farm Credit Administration to conduct a feasibility study of insuring the financial integrity of farm system institutions. (Vote No. 14—99th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

85% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 54-45.

February 27, 1985.

The Zorinsky-Andrews amendment, as modified by the Melcher-Andrews substitute amendment, was designed to provide effective and timely assistance to financially stricken farmers and to equitably share the responsibility for the program's success among the Federal government, farmers, and private lenders. Farm bankruptcies increased 200 percent in the previous five years and unless Congress acted quickly and effectively, it was feared an additional ten to fifteen percent of farmers could be forced to sell out in 1985. The Administration's much heralded farm credit initiatives were not working. To the date of the amendment, only twenty-one loan guarantees had been made nationwide and only \$44 million of the \$650 million provided by Congress had been dispensed. By providing for a cooperative buy down of interest rates, the amendment would make more farmers eligible for loan guarantees. Interest payments at that time accounted for between twenty and thirty percent of production costs and any initiative that reduces those costs would help improve farmers' cash flow. The amendment also provided additional administrative and regulatory flexibility to help farmers weather the current financial crisis.

- 3) Gramm-Mattingly-Nickles amendment (to the African Relief and Farm Credit Assistance bill) to prohibit any officer of the executive branch of the Federal government from taking any action to implement the farm credit provisions of this bill which would result in an increase in the Federal deficit. (Vote No. 15—99th Congress, 1st Session)

96% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

80% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 43-55.

February 27, 1985.

Adoption of the Gramm amendment would have effectively prevented any aid to farmers as previously agreed to in the Zorinsky-Andrews amendment. The amendment would mean that the deficit could be increased to aid the people of Africa suffering from severe drought, but any similar aid to American farmers would be denied. Clearly, providing financial and other assistance to American farm families in distress is as important as aiding those suffering from the African drought.

- 4) Dixon, et al, amendment (to the African Relief and Farm Credit Assistance bill) which provides fifty percent advance recourse loan payments from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) for 1985 to producers of wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, rice, tobacco, peanuts, soybeans, sugar beets, and cane sugar; limits the advance payment to \$50,000 per farmer; and requires the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations within fifteen days and allow farmers to sign up for participation within thirty days of enactment. (Vote No. 16—99th Congress, 1st Session)

96% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

90% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 50-48.

February 27, 1985.

The Dixon amendment was another attempt to assist financially strapped farmers to survive. It provided the farmer with money for spring planting by advancing up to one-half of the loan that otherwise would be available in the fall after harvest. The advance loan would provide farmers who may have difficulty obtaining credit from other sources with the cash flow necessary to begin spring planting without delay. It was estimated that between five percent and thirty percent of farmers would have difficulty planting their spring crops unless they received some form of assistance. This amendment was not a panacea. But combined with the \$50,000 payment limit per producer and other safeguards, it provided emergency aid to hard pressed farmers to get them through a critical period.

- 5) Passage of the bill which authorizes \$175 million for nonfood assistance to Africa, of which \$137.5 million is for disaster and health assistance and \$37.5 million is for migration and refugee assistance; requires FmHA to use the resources of the Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund to provide \$100 million to buy down the interest rate on farm loans and \$1.85 billion in loan guarantees in addition to the \$650 million already available for FY 1985; and allows farmers to get fifty percent of their price-support loans, up to \$50,000 per farmer, in the spring instead of the fall. (Vote No. 17—99th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of the Democrats voting supported the bill.

68% of the Republicans voting opposed the bill.

The bill was passed 62-35.

February 27, 1985.

The African Relief and Farm Credit Assistance bill, as amended, was the first legislative effort of the 99th Congress to assist the American farmer. It provided emergency aid in the form of cooperative interest rate buy downs, advance loan payments, additional loan guarantee authority, and administrative and regulatory flexibility. In these ways, the bill overcame the shortcomings of the Administration's September 1984 emergency credit plan and the expansion announced shortly before the Senate began debate on the bill. Even Republican Senators from farm states rejected the Administration's program as offering "too little assistance and too little hope."

Despite the overwhelming evidence of distress in the farm economy, President Reagan vetoed the bill on March 7, 1985, citing his objections to the farm credit provisions, which he declared

"...completely unacceptable and unnecessary in view of the measures already instituted" by this Administration. Thus, while Democratic efforts to focus attention on the issue, largely by threatening to hold up the nomination of Edwin Meese as Attorney General, did get the Administration to offer more aid than it was otherwise planning, Republican opposition to farm credit assistance eventually prevailed, preventing needed aid from reaching farmers in distress.

Farm policy also became an issue during the debate on the FY 1986 budget resolution in the spring. Two amendments, one relating to taxes and the other to spending for the Farmers Home Administration, served to illustrate the differences between Democrats and Republicans.

- 6) Harkin motion to table the Abdnor-Grassley-Nickles amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) expressing the sense of the Senate that revenues should be increased by limiting to the national median family income (of approximately \$24,800) the amount of nonfarm income which can be offset by tax losses from farming and that revenue derived should be used to reduce individual tax rates and to assure that fulltime, family-size farm operators will not be disadvantaged by unfair competition from high-income taxpayers with substantial nonfarm income. (Vote No. 43—99th Congress, 1st Session)

68% of Democrats voting supported the motion.

84% of Republicans voting opposed the motion.

The motion to table failed, 38-57, and the amendment was subsequently adopted, 64-32 (Vote No. 44).

May 7, 1985.

Even though the Abdnor-Grassley-Nickles amendment expressed the sense of the Senate and, thus, was not binding, it could have had adverse effects on the very people it was intended to help. By limiting nonfarm tax losses, investors are deterred from buying farmland. This could further depress farm land values, which have plummeted between thirty and fifty percent in just the past four years in some midwestern farm states. Declining land values have created much of the credit crisis that now afflicts both the farmer and local banker. The Abdnor-Grassley-Nickles amendment could simply exacerbate an already bad situation. Despite the potential consequences, the motion to table was rejected and the amendment ultimately was agreed to.

- 7) Cohen, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to restore funding for the FmHA rural housing programs, which would be eliminated by the Dole amendment, to eighty percent of the FY 1985 level and assume the phase-in of a loan guarantee program in place of direct loans (costing an estimated \$4.5 billion, which is \$3.7 billion less than current level over three years). (Vote No. 59—99th Congress, 1st Session)

80% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

80% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 47-50.

May 9, 1985.

The Dole amendment would abruptly halt funding for the Farmers Home Administration's rural housing program, at a time when the rural economy is already reeling from the effects of the severe downturn in farming. This amendment would continue the rural housing programs, at a reduced level, to ensure that the thousands of lower income families living in substandard rural housing have some hope of improving their standard of living. It would also phase-in a pilot program of loan guarantees, which, if successful, could ultimately become the financing mechanism for rural housing. However, the amendment was rejected.

The farm bill presented the greatest number of opportunities to describe the Democratic position on agricultural issues. In many cases, Democrats were defending the bill reported from the Agriculture Committee, which contained many provisions included by them during Committee markup, the most important of which was the four-year freeze on target prices.

- 8) Lugar amendment (to the farm bill) to freeze the target prices for the 1986 crops of wheat, corn, upland cotton, and rice for one year at the present 1985 level of \$4.38 per bushel for wheat, \$3.03 per bushel for corn, eighty-one cents per pound for cotton, and \$11.90 per hundredweight for rice; and allow their target prices for 1987-89 to be reduced by no more than five percent per year. (Vote No. 266—99th Congress, 1st Session)

83% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

77% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 48-51.

October 30, 1985.

Throughout the debate on the 1985 farm bill, Democrats supported a four-year freeze on target prices. This amendment provided for only a one-year freeze followed by up to five percent reductions in each subsequent year through FY 1989. During the first five years of this Administration, farm income fell to \$16 billion, less than half the average farm income under the Carter Administration. This amendment would tell farmers that Congress is not interested in improving that situation. Freezing target prices for one year and then lowering them could result in additional farm bankruptcies, failures which might be avoided if the "safety net" of target prices is maintained at FY 1985 levels for four years.

- 9) Harkin perfecting amendment (to the Pressler-Helms amendment—Vote No. 268—to the farm bill) striking the three-tier target price for wheat (\$4.48 per bushel for the first 7,500 bushels, \$4.33 per bushel for production between 7,500 and 15,000 bushels, and \$4.18 per bushel for production over 15,000 on the first 20,000 bushels and \$4 per bushel thereafter). (Vote No. 267—99th Congress, 1st Session)

96% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

75% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 57-41.

October 30, 1985.

This amendment would restore the committee-reported language pertaining to wheat. The underlying Pressler-Helms amendment would provide greater assistance to those who farm as a hobby by establishing the highest target price for relatively small production and then reducing the target prices for larger production. The net result would be a 4.5 percent reduction in income for a 20,000 bushel production. Those families that farm for a living, as opposed to those that farm for a hobby, would be penalized by the Pressler-Helms amendment. The Harkin amendment would provide greater income for those family wheat farmers that need it the most.

- 10) Dole motion to table the Dole motion to recommit the farm bill to the Committee, with instructions to report back forthwith, with the Dole amendment freezing price supports on feed grains, cotton, and rice for one year and reducing their target prices by five percent per year thereafter, while instituting a "flexible target price parity" system for wheat. (Vote No. 276—99th Congress, 1st Session)

95% of Democrats voting supported the motion.

92% of Republicans voting opposed the motion.

The motion was rejected, 45-49.

November 1, 1985.

This maneuver was a way to determine support for the Dole amendment, which contained a one-year freeze on most target prices with five percent reductions in subsequent years. Democrats continued to reject any retreat from the four-year target price freeze contained in the committee-reported bill. They were not asking for an increase in target prices, merely for a freeze for the next four years to provide some stability to farmers as they struggled to overcome their financial burdens—on grounds that farmers already had suffered through four years of disastrous Republican farm policies and should be given some respite in the form of stable target prices.

- 11) Boschwitz-Leahy-Kasten motion to table the Hawkins-Moynihan, et al, amendment (to the farm bill) authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to reduce the milk price support rate by fifty cents per hundredweight (from \$11.60 to \$11.10) as of January 2, 1986, if the Secretary estimates that net price support purchases of milk during calendar year 1986 will exceed ten billion pounds. (The bill reduces the milk price support by fifty cents in 1987 if purchases are between five and ten billion pounds and by \$1 in subsequent years if surplus purchases exceed ten billion pounds.) (Vote No. 317—99th Congress, 1st Session)

74% of Democrats voting supported the motion.

69% of Republicans voting opposed the motion.

The amendment was tabied, 50-47.

November 19, 1985.

The Hawkins-Moynihan amendment would cut the dairy price support level by fifty cents per hundredweight barely five months after a similar cut was instituted. A cut in the support price before January 1987, as recommended by the committee, would work a hardship on many dairy farmers. Other methods should be found to reduce the Nation's dairy surpluses that do not unfairly burden family dairy farmers.

- 12) Dole perfecting amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit the farm bill with instructions) which contains both a four-year freeze for wheat, feed grains, cotton, and rice and a one-year freeze at the 1985 level and a subsequent five percent reduction for feed grains, cotton and rice and a four-year tiered program for wheat; ties the 1986-88 target prices for wheat to a specific acreage reduction percentage under which producers choose their own target price and corresponding acreage reduction; retains the Committee-approved maximum acreage limitations or set-asides of fifteen percent for feed-grains, twenty percent for cotton, and thirty-five percent for rice for the 1986-88 crop years; authorizes the Secretary to increase the maximum acreage limitations for wheat, feed grains, cotton, and rice by five percent if the estimated carryover would exceed annual usage of the particular commodity by thirty-three percent or more; calculates target price deficiency payments on a twelve-month average price instead of the current five-month average market price; alters the conservation reserve program requirement to require the Secretary to enter no more than five million acres in 1986, ten million acres each in 1987-89, and five million acres in 1990; requires fifty percent cost sharing in establishing the appropriate cover crops for the conservation reserve; reduces the intermediate term export credit program from \$1 billion in direct credits annually to \$500 million annually in loan guarantees; reduces from twenty-five percent to twenty percent the Secretary's authority to transfer FmHA guaranteed loan funds into direct loan funds, and gives the Secretary authority to make disaster payments on the 1985-89 crops of soybeans, sugar cane, and sugar beets; and makes certain changes regarding the soybean and sunflower programs. (Vote No. 319—99th Congress, 1st Session)

76% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

88% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 56-41.

November 20, 1985.

The Dole amendment was a two-headed monster that promised both a one-year and a four-year target price freeze at the same time. The sponsor of the amendment said that its adoption would move the farm bill to conference quickly where a good farm bill would be developed. However, the conference would be dominated by opponents of a four-year freeze. Thus, this maneuver was a ploy to scuttle the four-year target price freeze reported from committee and backed by Democrats. The one-year freeze would lead to lower farm income, adding to the distress in the farm economy and causing more family farmers to sink into bankruptcy. The amendment also abdicated the responsibility of the Senate to determine farm policy over the next four years, instead leaving the task to a conference committee composed of selected House and Senate members. However, despite the inconsistencies in the amendment, it was agreed to, following the earlier addition of several changes in order to gather additional Republican support.

- 13) Dole motion to table the Harkin-Boren, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit the farm bill with instructions) freezing target prices for wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, and rice for four years, notwithstanding any other provision in the bill for a one-year freeze. (Vote No. 320—99th Congress, 1st Session)

78% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

88% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 55-42.

November 20, 1985.

The Harkin-Boren amendment embodied a four-year freeze on target prices. It made no sense to have the Senate adopt a farm bill that contains contradictory one-year and four-year price freezes. This vote was to replace the two-track Republican program with a clear, unambiguous policy of a freeze on target prices for the life of the bill, thus providing a safety net to farm producers during a period of severe financial trouble. However, with strong Republican support, the amendment was tabled.

- 14) Melcher-Chiles amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit the farm bill with instructions) increasing outlay savings by \$3.1 billion over three years, in addition to savings contained in the Dole amendment, by reinstating the farmer-owned grain reserve, saving \$200 million; increasing the required acreage reduction program for wheat to 23.5 percent and for feed grains to 17.5 percent and providing a 7.5 percent paid diversion, saving \$2.3 billion; increasing export sales, saving \$200 million; and providing for mandatory dairy sales assuming specified product levels, saving \$200 million—with a net savings in interest of an additional \$200 million. (Vote No. 323—99th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

98% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 46-50.

November 20, 1985.

Much had been made of the excessive cost of the farm bill. The Melcher-Chiles amendment was an attempt to lower the cost of the bill (by \$3.1 billion) to bring it into compliance with the budget in a fair, responsible way without penalizing family farmers. The combination of mandatory acreage reduction and restoration of the farmer-owned grain reserve would help boost prices, thereby increasing the solvency of farmers, while saving nearly \$2.8 billion. Also, by expanding targeted exports, the amendment sought to increase the sales of agricultural products abroad, further helping the American farmer.

- 15) Garn motion to table the Dixon-Johnston, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit the farm bill with instructions) permitting banks to renegotiate agricultural loans from book value to fair market value and write off the difference between the book value and the fair market value over a period of up to thirty years, instead of one year as in current law. (Vote No. 333—99th Congress, 1st Session)

84% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

83% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 47-44.

November 21, 1985.

Agricultural banks, a major source of credit for farmers, have suffered along with the farmers as a result of the economic distress in the agricultural sector. Current law requires that banks must deduct the amount of loans written off from their capital all at once. This can create an enormous strain on banks, in many cases forcing them to foreclose on loans rather than write down the loan. This creates often unnecessary hardships for the farmer as well as the local economy. The amendment would allow banks to write off the difference between the book value of the loan and its fair market value over thirty years. While it will not solve all of the problems in the farm economy, the amendment provided important relief from one of the more disruptive effects of the farm crisis. It was defeated when over eighty percent of Republicans voted to table it.

- 16) Wilson motion to table the Bumpers-Stennis, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit the farm bill with instructions) prohibiting the Secretary of Agriculture from reducing the soybean price support level more than five percent per year, or below \$4.50 per bushel, whichever is higher. (Vote No. 336—99th Congress, 1st Session)

83% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

88% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 50-44.

November 22, 1985.

This amendment sought to provide some protection to soybean farmers who not only have been caught in the general distress of the farm economy, but also have been buffeted by wide fluctuations in the price of their product. It would provide stability in the market and strengthen the farm bill by bringing the soybean program into line with other commodity programs. With substantial Republican opposition, the amendment was tabled.

- 17) Harkin-Exon, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit the farm bill with instructions) providing for a referendum which, if approved by sixty percent of the wheat and feed grain producers (including separate approval by at least fifty percent of each type of producer), would: eliminate the target price program for wheat and feed grains; raise the loan rate to \$4.86 per bushel for wheat and \$3.55 per bushel for corn, or seventy percent of parity for each commodity; and implement a voluntary marketing certificate program. (Vote No. 337—99th Congress, 1st Session)

73% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

92% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 36-56.

November 22, 1985.

The Harkin-Exon amendment would allow wheat and feed grain farmers to participate in determining their fate, rather than having policy dictated exclusively from the Federal government. Those farmers would vote in a referendum if they wished to approve a voluntary marketing certification program in lieu of the target price programs for wheat and feed grains and raise the loan rate for wheat and corn. Even if the referendum is approved, which takes a sixty percent majority vote, participation in the marketing certificate program will be voluntary. Farmers not choosing to participate would not be forced to do so. This amendment held the promise of higher incomes for farmers, but was rejected with overwhelming Republican opposition.

- 18) Boschwitz-Boren amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit the farm bill with instructions) adding an alternative six-year farm bill for wheat, feed grains, rice, and cotton; reducing price support payments for these commodities by ten percent per year after 1986; eliminating all acreage reduction programs; giving the Secretary of Agriculture the discretionary authority to establish support levels; and providing for payment yields based on the average planted during the years 1981-85 which would be made even if the market price rises above the support level. (Vote No. 338—99th Congress, 1st Session)

93% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

81% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 42-48.

November 22, 1985.

This amendment added to the "multiple choice" farm policies already contained in the bill, as amended. It struck none of the conflicting provisions in the Dole amendment that had been adopted earlier, thus creating the possibility for substantial confusion in the conference. If this amendment were adopted, it would dilute the bargaining position of the Senate conferees, making it more likely that a one-year freeze on target prices would emerge. The amendment was defeated.

- 19) Dole motion to table the Harkin-Exon-Hefflin amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit the farm bill with instructions) requiring the labeling of all fresh, chilled, or frozen meat products of foreign origin, effective one year after enactment of this bill. (Vote No. 340—99th Congress, 1st Session)

80% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

92% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 53-39.

November 22, 1985.

The amendment sought to give consumers additional information about the food they buy. With such knowledge, consumers could avoid purchasing meat from countries that still use dangerous pesticides or chemicals. Furthermore, consumers could also choose to buy American meat, thus helping American farmers and ranchers. The cost of this labeling would be minimal compared to the cost of the 1.9 billion pounds of fresh, chilled, and frozen imported meat sold annually in the U.S. The amendment was an attempt to strike a blow for the American consumer's right to know and for the embattled American meat producers. However, the Republican motion to table the Harkin-Exon-Hefflin amendment was agreed to.

- 20) Dole motion to table the Dole motion to proceed to the consideration of H.R. 2100, the House-passed farm bill. (Vote No. 341—99th Congress, 1st Session)

86% of Democrats voting supported the motion.

100% of Republicans voting opposed the motion.

The motion failed, 38-54.

November 23, 1985 (session of November 22).

During the debate on the farm bill, Democrats had been prevented from offering many of their major amendments. The Republican leadership, in its continuing attempt to impose a one-year freeze on target prices, sought to bring up the House-passed farm bill and insert the provisions of the Senate bill as amended to date, including the one-year/four-year freeze. After making the motion to proceed to consideration of the House-passed bill, the Majority Leader, aware that Democrats wanted to debate the issue, moved to table his own motion, thereby shutting off debate. Despite the fact that Democrats had been prevented time and again from seeking recognition and offering amendments in the normal legislative fashion during debate on the farm bill, they nonetheless supported the motion to table in order to stop further advancement of the Senate bill, as amended. With solid Republican opposition, the motion to table was rejected.

The final forum for major agricultural issues was consideration of the Farm Credit System Restructuring and Regulatory Reform Act of 1985 in December. The bill made several changes to the structure of the Farm Credit System to strengthen its ability to survive the financial distress afflicting the farm sector. On this legislation, Democrats attempted to ensure a high degree of local control over the activities of the system and to protect family-size farms.

- 21) Zorinsky motion to table the Baucus substitute amendment (for the Helms substitute amendment No. 1170 to the farm credit bill) allowing each of the Production Credit Associations, the Banks for Cooperatives, and the Federal Farm Land Banks in the twelve farm credit regions to elect its own five-person board and making the district board (a seven-member board composed of two members each elected by the three regional banks' shareholders and one member appointed by the Farm Credit Administration Governor) of each region an advisory entity only. (Vote No. 345—99th Congress, 1st Session)

73% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

77% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 48-44.

December 3, 1985.

The Baucus amendment provided for greater local control of the farm credit system. The present system of management, in which the stockholders of a district bank have only two of the seven seats on the board of directors, may allow activities, such as overly aggressive—and risky—loan policies, that are not in the best interests of the bank or its shareholders. By establishing separate boards for each bank, the stockholders could more easily hold the board accountable for its actions and minimize the chances for a recurrence of the circumstances that helped lead to the present crisis

in the farm credit system. Despite the often professed support for more local control of governmental functions, the Republican majority succeeded in tabling the amendment.

- 22) Zorinsky motion to table the Baucus substitute amendment (for the Helms substitute amendment No. 1170 to the farm credit bill) limiting the amount of funds to be transferred at any one time to the Capital Corporation; limiting assessments to the amounts necessary to assist Farm Credit System institutions; limiting the powers of the Capital Corporation to those necessary (rather than necessary or expedient); and requiring repayment of any surpluses accumulated by the corporation. (Vote No. 348—99th Congress, 1st Session)

80% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

79% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 47-45.

December 3, 1985.

This Baucus amendment was another attempt to protect the viability of local banks. If the Capital Corporation required excessive contributions from local banks, interest rates on local loans could rise, resulting in an exodus of creditworthy borrowers to commercial lenders and a further weakening of the capital base of the farm credit system. The limits would also ensure that the corporation would remain responsive to local farm credit institutions and would not become a bank holding company. Again, however, the Republican majority succeeded in tabling the amendment.

- 23) Zorinsky motion to table the Harkin amendment (to the Helms substitute amendment No. 1170 to the farm credit bill) requiring that the Capital Corporation sell or lease farmland under its control to operators of not larger than family-size farms, and limiting the rate of interest on any loan owned or made by the Capital Corporation to a rate which does not exceed the average rate of interest charged by the Farm Credit System Bank from which the loan originated. (Vote No. 349—99th Congress, 1st Session)

82% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

83% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 48-44.

December 3, 1985.

As with previous amendments, the Harkin amendment sought to impose some restrictions on the operation of the Capital Corporation, which could easily become the nation's largest owner of farmland. It would prevent the corporation from disposing of farmland in large tracts to corporations or limited partnerships, thereby encouraging the sale of family size farms. It would also prevent the corporation from imposing greater financial burdens on borrowers by limiting the interest rate charged by the

corporation to the average rate charged by the originating bank. Once more, Democratic efforts to protect the family farm and local institutions were rebuffed by the Republican majority, which tabled the amendment.

- 24) Helms motion to table the Melcher-Exon-Zorinsky amendment (to the Helms substitute amendment No. 1170 to the farm credit bill) redeeming at par value "B" stock in liquidated production credit associations from the Farm Credit Association revolving fund. (Vote No. 350—99th Congress, 1st Session)

72% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

94% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 57-34.

December 3, 1985.

In the twelve months preceding Senate consideration of this bill, seven production credit associations were placed in liquidation. This resulted in freezing all their assets, including the stock purchased by the member-borrowers as required by law. The Melcher-Exon-Zorinsky amendment sought to protect the member-borrower's required investment, thereby encouraging farmers and ranchers to continue to obtain financing through the Farm Credit System and prevent further erosion of the financial stability of the system. However, the amendment was tabled.

- 25) Bumpers, et al, amendment (to the Small Business Administration Authorization bill, FY 1986-88) to extend the \$500 million cap on SBA disaster lending from FY 1986 through FY 1988 and to strike the section of the bill which excludes farmers from SBA disaster loan eligibility. (Vote No. 153—99th Congress, 1st Session)

85% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

90% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 45-52.

July 16, 1985.

The amendment was proposed in order to ensure that farmers who had a demonstrated ability to repay a loan but had no credit otherwise available would remain eligible for Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loans. It also proposed extending the \$500 million cap on SBA loans.

The Bumpers amendment sought to retain a farmer's eligibility for SBA disaster loans where there was a demonstrated ability to repay the loan and when credit was not available elsewhere. Democrats maintained that SBA disaster loans were often processed more quickly and charged a lower rate of interest than comparable loans from the Farmers Home Administration, when the latter were

available. Given the current crisis in agricultural credit and the virtual elimination of farm disaster lending contemplated in the budget resolution, Democrats believed that it was essential to maintain a farmer's access to SBA disaster loans. The amendment also retained the existing \$500 million cap on such loans to prevent any increase in the deficit as a result of this program.

A near party line vote defeated the amendment, 45-52.

THE BUDGET

Introduction

Since 1981, the Federal government's budget has been characterized by misordered priorities and shortsighted policies. Under the control of the Reagan Administration and a Republican majority in the Senate, the nation has been burdened with an unbroken string of triple digit deficits which have created the largest increase in debt that the country has ever seen. Democrats have sought to reverse those trends, not just for the benefit of today's economy, but for the prosperity of future generations.

During the first session of the 99th Congress, the public debt, fueled by Republican red ink, rose \$229 billion, reaching \$1.9 trillion by the end of 1985. The cost of that debt is enormous. The interest charge alone amounted to \$129 billion in FY 1985, equivalent to thirty-eight cents out of every dollar paid in individual income taxes! And the cost to our children, as this debt mortgages their economic future, is incalculable.

Facing a budget proposed by President Reagan that continued the misdirected priorities of the past four years, and a Republican leadership budget package that shortchanged the future needs of the nation, Democrats persisted in offering alternatives when the Senate considered the budget for FY 1986, despite maneuvers by the Republican leadership to block Democratic amendments from being considered (eight amendments were offered in sequence by the Republican leadership to block all avenues and prevent any Democratic amendments from being offered).

The Republican leadership budget package provided for a three percent real increase in the Pentagon's budget, while at the same time it cut cost of living adjustments for social security and other retirement programs, reduced spending for farm price supports and medicare, eliminated general revenue sharing payments to cities, and made other cuts in programs ranging from education and transportation to scientific research and job training.

The Democratic alternatives sought to correct many of these specific shortcomings. The major Democratic budget package, the Byrd-Cranston-Inouye amendment, provided for a balanced approach to deficit reduction. It limited the increase in defense spending to one percent above the rate of inflation, preserved full cost of living adjustments for social security and other retirement programs, and added funds for agriculture, education, transportation and economic development while reducing

foreign aid spending. The amendment raised additional revenues (specifying they should not be obtained from increasing personal income tax rates) so that the package reduced the deficit by more than the Republican leadership budget while maintaining funding for programs critical to the future growth and security of the Nation.

Republicans also sought to reduce the deficit through cosmetic, procedural devices. They supported efforts to adopt a version of the line item veto proposal, which would give the President power to determine spending priorities almost without restraint. Democrats opposed that effort, not only because it would have taken the pressure off the Congress to actually reduce the deficit, but because it would have been an abdication of the congressional responsibility to determine fiscal priorities.

Finally, when the repeated frustrations caused by the rising deficits led to the introduction of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings "automatic" deficit reduction process, Democrats attempted to amend the proposal to maintain the pressure for deficit reduction and not let it become another excuse for inaction.

The Record

The differing budget priorities became apparent during consideration of the FY 1986 budget resolution as Democrats offered numerous amendments to the Republican leadership budget. These amendments not only focused on individual issues, such as medicare, education, and farm assistance, but also on a more complete budget alternative.

- 1) Dole-Domenici, et al, perfecting amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43 to the motion to recommit the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986, with instructions) setting budget levels which will reduce the deficit, as estimated by OMB (the OMB budget reductions for defense are measured against growth rates that the Administration agreed to in the Senate GOP-White House FY 1985 budget compromise, whereas current law spending is used to calculate non-defense program savings), to \$175 billion in FY 1986, \$147 billion in 1987, and \$99 billion in 1988; makes three-year spending reductions of \$97.6 billion in defense and \$199.3 billion in domestic programs; provides for three percent real growth each year for defense; cuts COLA's for Social Security, veterans, military and civil service beneficiaries to the greater of two percent or two percent below the Consumer Price Index; cuts farm support and credit programs by \$17.3 billion; freezes medicare provider charges; provides for inflation-adjusted increases in the \$75 annual deductible, and increases the Part B supplemental premium to cover thirty-five percent of costs;

limits increases for medicaid to the amount of inflation in the medical consumer price index; funnels savings from the social security COLA reduction into the medicare trust fund; increases the VA housing loan fee from one to 3.8 percent by FY 1988; requires a means-test for treatment of non-service-connected ailments; terminates revenue sharing in 1987; freezes elementary and secondary education programs; limits student aid loans to families with adjusted annual incomes of \$60,000 or less; reduces Federal aid highway obligations by approximately \$2.7 billion; replaces Ex-Im Bank direct loans with interest rate subsidies for private lenders; imposes a moratorium on filling the strategic petroleum reserve; freezes FY 1986 Federal civilian pay; increases the individual civil service retirement contribution from seven to nine percent; phases out the Federal crop insurance program and mass transit subsidies; provides for the sale of Conrail; terminates community service and UDAG grants after 1986; and totally eliminates part B educational impact aid, the Small Business Administration, Amtrak, the Economic Development Administration, rural housing, postal subsidies, the work incentive program (WIN), and Job Corps. (NOTE: In an effort to force a vote on an unaltered version of the Republican leadership-White House compromise package, Majority Leader Dole utilized his right to first recognition on the Senate floor to offer all possible technical amendments to the original proposal and block any substantive changes in the package.) (Vote No. 34—99th Congress, 1st Session)

100% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

96% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 50-49.

April 30, 1985.

- 2) Byrd-Cranston-Inouye, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) which reduces the projected deficit in the Dole amendment by an additional \$9.1 billion between FY 1986-88; provides full COLAs for social security, veterans, railroad retirement, civil service, and military retirement beneficiaries; removes all increases in medicare beneficiary costs; restores all reductions in medicaid; adds \$11 billion over three years for agriculture; provides for a full inflation adjustment for education, child nutrition, mass transit, UDAG, Amtrak, EDA, and Appalachian Regional Commission; raises \$61 billion in revenues, assuming no individual tax rate increases; reduces foreign aid expenditures by \$1.9 billion over three years, with no reduction for Israel, Egypt, Greece, or Turkey; and funds defense at one percent real growth in FY 1986 and three percent in 1987 and 1988. (Vote No. 52—99th Congress, 1st Session)

91% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

98% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 54-43.

May 8, 1985.

- 3) Second GOP-Dole substitute amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) which sets budget levels to reduce spending by approximately \$56 billion in FY 1986 (\$295 billion over three years) with OMB estimated deficits of \$171.4 billion in FY 1986, \$144.8 billion in 1987, and \$104.3 billion in 1988; provides a real growth rate in defense spending of 0%-3%-3% for FY 1986-88, respectively; freezes social security, veterans, and military and civilian retirement COLAs for one year;

reduces medicare/medicaid funding by \$17.5 billion over FY 1986-88 and increases part B medicare premiums beginning in FY 1987; contains no new tax increases; contains funding for the following programs at reduced levels: Amtrak, postal subsidies, SBA, soil and water conservation, mass transit, agricultural programs, impact aid, energy research and conservation, Job Corps, rural housing, student aid, veterans health and housing programs, and NIH grants; assumes termination of the following programs: Trade Adjustment Assistance, Conrail (sale), Appalachian Development Program, Economic Development Administration, Urban Development Action Grants (after 1986), General Revenue Sharing (after 1986), Export-Import Bank Direct Loans, Community Services Block Grant (after 1986), Work Incentive Program, HODAG, Section 312 Rehabilitation Loans, U.S. Travel and Tourism Program, and Local Rail Service Assistance and Northeast Corridor Improvement Project. (Vote No. 72—99th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

92% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 49-49, with Vice President voting yea to break tie.

May 10, 1985 (session of May 9).

The Byrd-Cranston-Inouye amendment was a major Democratic alternative to the White House-Republican leadership budget. It reordered the Republican budget priorities to encourage economic growth and competitiveness, ensure fairness and equity, and provide funds for investment in the future. The amendment would pay for these priorities by raising revenues—not by increasing the individual income tax rates but by instituting a tough corporate minimum tax, closing corporate tax loopholes, increasing tax compliance and enforcement, and extending the cigarette tax. Further, the amendment would limit the increase in defense spending to one percent above the rate of inflation, and reduce foreign aid expenditures while preserving levels of existing funding for key allies.

In addition to reflecting more sensible budget priorities than the Republican budget, the Democratic alternative also resulted in lower budget deficits over each of the next three years.

The budget put forth by the Democrats is designed to realize the full potential of the nation and its people. It assures that at least the minimum necessary resources are available for investment in our people through education, nutrition and job training; in our cities and towns through economic development, transportation, and infrastructure programs; and in our economic future through science and research, and export promotion. It also equitably spreads the burden for reducing the largest deficits in this country's history while maintaining essential funding of our national defenses.

However, overwhelming Republican opposition to this amendment ensured its defeat.

Shortly after the debate on the budget resolution, the Republican leadership attempted to consider a bill providing a form of line item veto authority for the President. Democrats successfully prevented its consideration, arguing that it was an unwise, and possibly unconstitutional, grant of additional authority to the President and would do little to reduce the budget deficit.

- 4) Quayle, et al, motion to close further debate on the Dole motion to proceed to consideration of the bill which gives the President a form of line item veto authority over appropriations bills for a two-year period and maintains the current requirement of a two-thirds vote of each House to override a veto. (Under the bill, each numbered section or unnumbered paragraph of an appropriation bill or a joint resolution making supplemental, deficiency, or continuing appropriations which passes both Houses of Congress in the same form would be enrolled as a separate bill or joint resolution by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House (depending on the originating body) and signed by the presiding officers of both Houses for presentation to the President, who would be able to sign or veto the separate pieces of legislation. (Vote No. 156—99th Congress, 1st Session)

74% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

87% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was rejected, 57-42, 3/5ths not having voted in the affirmative.

July 18, 1985.

- 5) Dole, et al, second motion to close further debate on the Dole motion to proceed to the consideration of the bill. (Vote No. 157—99th Congress, 1st Session)

74% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

87% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was rejected, 57-41, 3/5ths not having voted in the affirmative.

July 23, 1985.

- 6) Dole, et al, third motion to close further debate on the Dole motion to proceed to the consideration of the bill. (Vote No. 158—99th Congress, 1st Session)

73% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

87% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was rejected, 58-40, 3/5ths not having voted in the affirmative.

July 24, 1985.

The bill proposed to fundamentally alter the balance of power between the President and Congress by establishing a process that effectively gives the President the authority to veto individual line items of appropriations bills for a period of two years. The bill would have allowed unelected clerks to divide an appropriations bill passed by both Houses into as many as several hundred individual bills (each composed of a single line item), thereby allowing the President to veto any number of them.

A majority of Democrats opposed restricting the time for debate on an issue that would fundamentally change the nature of the United States government. They strongly opposed the line item veto because it would concentrate too much power in the hands of the executive branch and would violate the Constitution. The line item veto was seen as an abdication of the congressional responsibility over fiscal matters. And this particular proposal was believed to contain the potential for mass confusion as a single bill was subdivided into hundreds of small pieces, pieces which might have been integrally related in the original bill but which could become totally separate. If the President signed one of those pieces yet vetoed another, would the result make any sense, let alone reflect the intent of Congress?

In the fall, the Senate began debate on a bill to raise the debt ceiling to over \$2 trillion. To secure the votes needed to pass that bill, the Emergency Deficit Control Act, better known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill, was added as an amendment. This amendment sparked considerable debate as Democrats attempted to improve the original proposal. The issue was joined with a series of procedural votes.

- 7) Dole, et al, motion to close further debate on the Dole, et al., modified perfecting amendment embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment (to the Dole, et al, amendment No. 729 to the debt limit bill) establishing a maximum allowable Federal deficit ceiling of \$180 billion for FY 1986, and providing a mechanism to reduce the allowable deficit by \$36 billion for each of the next five fiscal years until a balanced budget is achieved in FY 1991. (Vote No. 203—99th Congress, 1st Session)

77% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

90% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was rejected, 57-38, 3/5ths not having voted in the affirmative.

October 6, 1985.

- 8) Dole motion to table the Byrd motion to recommit the bill to the Finance Committee with instructions to report back with a Committee amendment in the nature of a substitute making the statutory limit on the public debt inapplicable during the period October 1-18, 1985. (Vote No. 204—99th Congress, 1st Session)

77% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

94% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was agreed to, 59-36.

October 6, 1985.

- 9) Dole motion to proceed to the motion to reconsider Vote No. 203 by which the Senate failed to invoke cloture on the Dole, et al, modified perfecting amendment embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment No. 213 (to the Dole, et al, amendment No. 729 to the debt limit bill) to establish a maximum allowable Federal deficit ceiling of \$180 billion for FY 1986, and to provide a mechanism to reduce the allowable deficit by \$36 billion for each of the next five years until a balanced budget is achieved in FY 1991. (Vote No. 207—99th Congress, 1st Session)

73% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

98% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was agreed to, 56-33.

October 8, 1985.

- 10) Dole, et al, motion to reconsider Vote No. 203, by which the Senate failed to invoke cloture on the Dole, et al, modified perfecting amendment embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment (to the Dole, et al, amendment No. 729 to the debt limit bill) to establish a maximum allowable Federal deficit ceiling of \$180 billion for FY 1986, and to provide a mechanism to reduce the allowable deficit by \$36 billion for each of the next five fiscal years until a balanced budget is achieved in 1991. (Vote No. 208—99th Congress, 1st Session)

74% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

98% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was agreed to, 56-35.

October 8, 1985.

- 11) Reconsideration of Vote No. 203 on the Dole, et al, motion to close further debate on the Dole, et al, modified perfecting amendment embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment (to the Dole, et al, amendment No. 729 to the debt limit bill) to establish a maximum allowable Federal deficit ceiling of \$180 billion for FY 1986, and to provide a mechanism to reduce the allowable deficit by \$36 billion for each of the next five fiscal years until a balanced budget is achieved in 1991. (Vote No. 209—99th Congress, 1st Session)

80% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

96% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was rejected, 53-39, 3/5ths not having voted in the affirmative.

October 9, 1985.

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment was introduced in the Senate for the first time on October 3, 1985, as an amendment to the debt limit extension. The legislation had not previously been introduced or referred to a committee, hearings had not been held on it, and no committee had considered the proposal. The proponents attempted to shut off debate on this far-reaching measure without providing adequate time for an examination of the proposal, the issues involved, and any

potential problems. Further, the proponents effectively prevented other amendments from being offered and debated until their proposal was voted upon, contrary to normal legislative procedure.

Because Democrats were blocked from attempting to amend the underlying proposal and were being forced to vote on it before it had received adequate discussion, they opposed the motion to bring the debate to a close. Democrats also opposed a Republican motion to table a Democratic effort to send the proposal to the Finance Committee for hearings and consideration in the usual legislative procedure (Vote No. 204). Two days later, Democrats again opposed bringing debate to a close on the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment (Vote Nos. 207-209).

- 12) Exon-Kerry amendment (to the Dole modified amendment No. 730 embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment—Vote No. 213—to the debt limit bill) requiring OMB/CBO reports on October 1 (except for the first report for FY 1986 which shall remain due on November 1), February 15, and May 1 and lowering the excess deficit trigger for FY 1986 from seven percent to five percent. (Vote No. 210—99th Congress, 1st Session)

94% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

96% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 46-52.

October 9, 1985.

The Exon-Kerry amendment sought to give a greater assurance that the deficit reduction process would start in FY 1986 and not be delayed into later years. As drafted, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment contained a maximum deficit limit of \$180 billion in FY 1986. That limit, coupled with the seven percent margin, would make the automatic spending reduction process unlikely to occur in FY 1986, since the CBO was estimating that the FY 1986 deficit would be \$175 billion. The proponents of the amendment believed that it was better to start the deficit reduction process immediately, and accomplish it with smaller cuts, than to wait for a year or two when drastic cuts might be needed to meet the deficit targets.

However, with near solid Republican opposition, the amendment was defeated.

- 13) Chiles-Byrd-Johnston, et al, amendment (to the Dole modified amendment No. 730 embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment—Vote No. 213—to the debt limit bill) which establishes deficit ceilings beginning with \$170 billion in FY 1986 and declining in four equal steps to a balanced budget in FY 1990; requires the President's budget and the congressional budget resolution to conform to the deficit ceilings; requires the President to send a deficit control message to Congress specifying the spending and revenue changes he would recommend

to eliminate any excess deficit; requires Congress to act on a reconciliation bill to achieve that goal within forty-five days; triggers automatic deficit reductions if Congress fails to act; requires defense and non-means-tested domestic programs (except social security) to be cut proportionate to their share of current outlays; requires spending to be reduced by uniform percentages as determined by CBO rather than OMB; and suspends the deficit reduction procedures in the event of war, recession, or national emergency. (Vote No. 211—99th Congress, 1st Session)

85% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

100% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 40-59.

October 9, 1985.

The amendment not only would ensure the deficit reduction process would commence earlier (FY 1986 instead of waiting perhaps until after the 1986 elections) and the goal of a balanced budget would be achieved one year earlier, FY 1990, than the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal, it does so more fairly and with greater regard to the constitutional separation of powers. It requires the President and the Congress to participate equally in the deficit reduction process, something the President has often shown is not a high priority.

Under the amendment, if Congress fails to pass the reconciliation bill to reduce the deficit—or if the President vetoes that bill—then the automatic spending cuts take place.

Unlike the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings process, however, this amendment would protect from the across-the-board cuts those programs, such as veterans pensions, or women, infant, and children (WIC) feeding programs, that serve the poorest in society, those least able to help themselves. It also would allow the President and Congress to respond to recessions or national emergencies with actions that otherwise could be prevented under the original Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal.

Despite the amendment's merits, overwhelming Republican opposition led to its defeat.

- 14) Packwood motion to table the Eagleton-Exon-Kerry amendment to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal which was an amendment to H.J. Res. 372, the Debt Limit bill, adding additional reporting dates on February 15 and May 1 of each fiscal year for the reporting of expected deficit levels and possible sequestering of government spending; and allowing a maximum deficit of \$175 billion in FY 1986, with automatic across-the-board reductions being triggered if the maximum allowable deficit is exceeded by five percent or more (instead of allowing a maximum deficit of \$180 billion, not to be exceeded by seven percent, as in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment). (Vote No. 221—99th Congress, 1st Session)

93% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.
 93% of Republicans voting supported the motion.
 The amendment was tabled, 46-43.
 October 10, 1985.

The Eagleton-Exon-Kerry amendment was another attempt by Democrats to limit the maximum allowable deficit for FY 1986, this time to \$175 billion—\$5 billion lower than the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment. The congressional budget resolution contained a deficit target of \$172 billion. This amendment would require automatic spending cuts if the FY 1986 deficit exceeded \$183 billion, plus five percent, or \$183 billion. However, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment would have allowed the deficit to reach \$192 billion (\$180 billion plus seven percent) before any reductions were required. Democrats believed that the need for fiscal restraint in a time of record budget deficits necessitated clamping down on spending now, in a meaningful way. The \$20 billion deficit "cushion" in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment was a way to avoid painful budget cuts until after the 1986 elections.

The amendment also provided additional reporting dates so that additional action could be taken throughout the year whenever the deficit threatened to exceed the maximum. However, with substantial Republican opposition, the amendment was tabled.

- 15) Passage of H.J. Res. 372, the public debt limit bill, which increases the public debt limit by \$155 billion to \$2.0787 trillion; establishes a maximum allowable Federal budget deficit ceiling of \$180 billion for FY 1986, and provides a mechanism to reduce the allowable deficit in five equal steps until a balanced budget is achieved in 1991. (Vote No. 222—99th Congress, 1st Session)

69% of Democrats voting opposed the bill.
 83% of Republicans voting supported the bill.
 The bill was passed, 51-37.
 October 10, 1985.

This bill increased the limit on the public debt by \$155 billion. The resulting debt of nearly \$2.1 trillion is more than double the debt at the end of FY 1981, the start of real control over the budget by the Reagan Administration. Under this Administration, the per capita public debt will reach an all time high of \$8,629 for every man, woman, and child in this nation by the end of FY 1986. By comparison, at the end of FY 1981, the per capita debt, representing the accumulation of all debt since 1789, stood at \$4,346.

While the Administration has preached the evils of deficits, they have allowed the deficit to skyrocket, reaching record levels almost every year. The lack of presidential leadership in reducing these budget deficits led to the creation of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings scheme, which was made part of this debt limit bill. Most Democrats opposed this bill, but it passed with the votes of a majority of Republicans.

- 16) Packwood motion to table the Riegle, et al, amendment (to the Packwood substitute amendment to the House amendment—Vote No. 285—to the debt limit bill) establishing a Federal budget deficit ceiling of \$171.9 billion for FY 1986 (the same amount contained in the FY 1986 budget resolution) and requiring automatic across-the-board reductions if the maximum allowable deficit is exceeded by any amount. (The Packwood amendment would pro-rate any reductions needed to reduce the deficit to \$175.2 billion). (Vote No. 281—99th Congress, 1st Session)

89% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

96% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 55-43.

November 5, 1985.

The amendment was another attempt by Democrats to begin the deficit reduction process immediately, and not wait until some later date, perhaps after the 1986 elections. It would establish the deficit in the budget resolution—\$171.9 billion—as the maximum deficit for that year. And it would require that any deficit in excess of that amount be eliminated through the automatic spending cuts.

Opponents of the amendment, while professing a desire to reduce the deficit, had sought to avoid facing the full effect of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal by creating "cushions" and "pro rata" adjustments in calculating the size and timing of the cuts. Despite the seeming merits of an amendment that would reduce the deficit sooner, rather than later, the amendment was defeated on a largely party line vote.

The major legislation considered in 1985 that actually reduced the deficit was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985. This bill was a fulfillment of the congressional budget resolution which called on committees of Congress to report legislation that would reduce deficits by at least \$75.5 billion between FY 1986 and FY 1988. By December, both Houses had passed versions of that bill and the conference agreement awaited final approval by the House and Senate.

- 17) Johnston motion to table the Senate amendment (containing language adding back the Superfund value added tax) to the House amendment to the Senate amendment (to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act). (Vote No. 380—99th Congress, 1st Session) (See also Vote No. 381.)

100% of Democrats voting supported the motion.

92% of Republicans voting opposed the motion.

The motion to table failed, 29-35.

December 20, 1985.

The reconciliation bill would reduce the deficit by \$83 billion over the three-year period, FY 1986-88, by reducing spending by \$69 billion and increasing revenues by \$14 billion over that period. By tabling the Senate amendment, the Senate would send the underlying budget reconciliation bill to the President, giving him a chance to approve reductions in the deficit without delay. However, despite the significant deficit reduction in the bill, the White House objected to several provisions in the bill and threatened to veto the measure.

This is another example of the Republican majority voting to delay actual deficit reduction, while continuing to talk about the need for it. Despite the rhetoric, Senate Republicans voted overwhelmingly to send the bill back for yet another conference with the House. Ultimately, bowing to White House pressure, a slimmed down version of the bill, saving \$25 billion over three years, was approved and signed into law, but not until April 7, 1986.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION

Introduction

In the 99th Congress, Senate Democrats continued the effort to maintain the current levels of assistance in community development programs which are essential to the economic survival of many areas. Many of these programs, including Urban Development Action Grants, the Economic Development Administration, Community Development Block Grants, Amtrak, mass transit, the Farmers Home Administration, and the Appalachian Regional Commission, are critical to providing the basic infrastructure that supports economic growth. Many of them also represent precisely the kind of government/private sector cooperation which the Reagan Administration professes to support. However, time and again, Republicans led efforts to reduce or eliminate these programs in budget and appropriations legislation.

Seven votes in the first session exemplified Democratic efforts to retain, at minimum levels, those programs which have been instrumental not only in assuring the survival of many American communities in economic distress, but also in providing the foundation for future economic growth.

The Record

- 1) Specter, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to continue the Amtrak program by setting the funding level at \$616.4 million in budget authority, and outlays of \$536 million, \$573 million, and \$616 million for each of FY 1986-88 respectively—ten percent less than the FY 1985 appropriation—instead of eliminating all funding by September 30, 1985. (Vote No. 53—99th Congress, 1st Session)

85% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

71% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to. 53-41.

May 9, 1985.

The Reagan Administration proposed the total elimination of all Federal funding for Amtrak, the Nation's passenger rail system. This proposal would have resulted in the shutdown of most, if not all, of Amtrak.

The purpose of the amendment to the First Budget Resolution was to provide funds, at a reduced level, for the continued operation of Amtrak within the constraints of the massive Federal budget deficits accumulated by the Reagan Administration.

Over the years, the Federal government has invested about \$10 billion in the development of a national passenger rail transportation system. The result of these investments is Amtrak, a 24,000 mile passenger rail system that provides intercity rail service to twenty million passengers each year, including many rural communities throughout the Nation which otherwise would be without commercial intercity passenger service.

The Reagan Administration's proposal to totally eliminate all Federal funding for the Amtrak system would have been penny-wise and pound-foolish. It would have been an enormous waste of capital investment and resulted in the loss of about 21,000 Amtrak jobs, not to mention the lost transportation service of such importance and benefit to so many Americans.

Democrats have long recognized the importance of Federal investments in the Nation's infrastructure in order to promote economic growth and development. They recognize that an efficient intermodal transportation system is especially important for a dynamic economy which requires the increased mobility of people and commodities.

Democrats were able to maintain this limited funding for Amtrak when fourteen Republicans joined thirty-nine Democrats in adopting the amendment.

- 2) Domenici motion to table the Sasser, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to maintain the one-year freeze on funding for community and regional development programs including UDAG, Community Development Block Grants, SBA disaster loans, TVA, the Appalachian Regional Commission, and EDA; and restore funding for the FmHA rural housing programs, which would be eliminated by the Dole amendment, to seventy-five percent of the FY 1985 level (costing an estimated \$2.2 billion). (Vote No. 56—99th Congress, 1st Session)

83% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

88% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 52-44.

May 9, 1985.

Democrats sought in another way, in action on the First Budget Resolution, to prevent the elimination of several programs which are essential to the economic survival of rural America: the

Appalachian Regional Commission (ARD), the Urban Development Action Grant Program (UDAG), the Economic Development Administration, the Community Development Block Grant Program, and the TVA developmental programs. A second component of the amendment sought to preserve the FmHA Rural Housing Programs which have served the needs of almost two million families and the elderly since 1949. FmHA has often been the only source of mortgage credit in many of the Nation's rural areas, since there are over 500 rural counties without a Federally-chartered savings and loan.

While opponents of these programs claimed that they cost too much for the number of persons they serve, Democrats maintained that few Federal programs have worked as efficiently as these. The ARC alone has increased literacy rates by some twenty-five percent, cut infant mortality rates by fifty percent, and reduced Appalachian poverty rates by fifty percent. UDAG has stimulated \$7 in private investment for each Federal dollar spent. Prosperity in rural areas lags far behind improvements in the overall economy. These programs are crucial to bringing rural areas into the general economic upswing.

Nonetheless, strong Republican opposition resulted in the tabling of this amendment by a vote of 52-44.

- 3) Kasten, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to restore funding for revenue sharing in FY 1987 and 1988 at fifty percent of the FY 1986 level (costing an estimated \$4.6 billion over two years). (Vote No. 63—99th Congress, 1st Session)

74% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

82% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 43-54.

May 9, 1985.

Proponents claimed that revenue sharing is one of the most efficient and cost-effective programs in the Federal government, and that it gives communities and other local governments the ability to provide essential services such as fire and police protection, mass transit, and economic development. A study by the U.S. Conference of Mayors indicated that tax rates would have to climb by as much as 50.7 percent to make up for the total loss of General Revenue Sharing payments.

The amendment would have restored sufficient amounts to the budget to enable funding the program in FY 1986 at its FY 1985 level and in FY 1987 and 1988 at a level reduced by fifty percent. Democrats acknowledged the need to reduce the deficit but saw no gain in forcing local governments

to adapt to the disappearance of revenue sharing all at once. Rather, they preferred at least a gradual phaseout of the program so that local governments would have sufficient time to plan and adjust as well as they could to preserve essential local services.

Unfortunately, with eighty-two percent of voting Republicans opposing it, the amendment was defeated.

- 4) Dole motion to table the Lautenberg, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to freeze funding at the FY 1985 level for Amtrak, mass transit, and UDAG. (Vote No. 68—99th Congress, 1st Session)

72% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

86% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 57-40.

May 9, 1985.

Democrats noted that the three programs included in this amendment made up only one-half of one percent of Federal spending and that, under the provisions of the Republican leadership's budget, they would bear three times their proportional share of deficit reduction—striking proof of the misplaced priorities of the Republican budget. Amtrak, for which funding had been frozen in FY 1985, provides vital transportation links to many areas of the country, both urban and rural. The mass transit program is extremely important to both urban areas and small, rural States—to the latter, especially, since it pays for gaps in bus service in communities that lost major companies' bus routes due to bus deregulation. UDAG has proven that the Federal and local governments can work in concert with the private sector to revitalize the economies of distressed cities and provide jobs for the unemployed.

Unfortunately, eighty-six percent of Republicans voting supported the motion to table, and the amendment, therefore, was defeated.

- 5) Proxmire-Armstrong amendment (to the HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations bill) to implement the Administration's proposed moratorium on public housing by eliminating \$7.2 billion in FY 1986 budget authority, thereby reducing outlays by \$135 million in FY 1986, \$394 million in 1987, \$483 million in 1988, \$514 million in 1989, and \$555 million in 1990, for a total savings in outlays of over \$2 billion over the next five years. (Vote No. 229—99th Congress, 1st Session)

78% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

68% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 44-52.

October 17, 1985.

The Proxmire-Armstrong amendment proposed to eliminate the addition of approximately 100,000 units of public housing in FY 1986. The elimination of these units would be a serious setback to a program that helps provide decent housing for an estimated fifteen million of the Nation's disadvantaged citizens, living in nearly four million households. Although sixty-eight percent of Republicans voting supported the amendment, when the remaining Republicans joined Democrats who opposed the amendment, the opposition was able to defeat the amendment.

- 6) Garn motion to table the Armstrong-Proxmire amendment (to the HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations bill) to implement the proposed termination of the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program by eliminating \$352 million in FY 1986 funding. (Vote No. 231—99th Congress, 1st Session)

87% of Democrats voting supported the motion.

72% of Republicans voting opposed the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 53-42.

October 17, 1985.

Democrats see the UDAG program as a good program with a proven track record. It stimulates the private sector to solve public problems by combining local businesses, elected leaders, and other interested parties with minimal Federal involvement to promote the revitalization of cities and towns, where investments otherwise would not be made because the area is marginal or in economic distress. This public-private partnership generates both jobs and economic growth. UDAG is a small program with a great number of participants competing for available funding.

Democrats voted by a large margin to table the amendment to cut out the UDAG program and, with some Republican support, the effort to table the amendment succeeded.

- 7) Chafee-Proxmire, et al, amendment (to the Commerce-Justice-State-Judiciary Appropriations bill) to eliminate the Economic Development Administration (EDA) by striking \$160 million in program funding and \$9.45 million in salaries and expenses for FY 1986. (Vote No. 272—99th Congress, 1st Session)

87% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

65% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 39-57.

November 1, 1985.

The purpose of the amendment was to eliminate funding for EDA, the Federal agency designed to address economic development needs in areas of chronically high unemployment and low per capita

income. It promotes development of public facilities and private enterprise in order to create new jobs, and preserve existing jobs which might otherwise be lost. EDA represents an effort to correct disparities between widely differing rates of growth and employment in different areas of the Nation. It has been successful in its efforts to both create jobs at a reasonable cost, and increase revenues for local governments in areas of the Nation which are economically depressed.

Since 1981, the Reagan Administration has sought—unsuccessfully—to eliminate EDA. Democrats believe that such efforts ignore the importance of a program that creates jobs, generates revenues, and increases the level of economic activity. That view prevailed when thirty-five percent of the Republicans voting joined eighty-seven percent of Democrats voting to reject this amendment by a substantial margin.

DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Introduction

Senate Democrats began 1985 by establishing early that their paramount priorities in national security would be reforming the Pentagon's wasteful procurement process, strengthening our conventional forces, and maintaining our nuclear deterrent in a manner contributing to nuclear stability and arms control. In addition, continuing discoveries of espionage activities within our borders emphasized the need to take firm action to protect ourselves.

Several votes during 1985 provided Democrats with the opportunity to demonstrate these priorities. These votes underscore Democratic opposition to inefficient defense budgets; expensive, unnecessary strategic weapons which rob funds from needed conventional force improvements; and overfunded research programs whose military benefits may be outweighed by damage they may do to prospects for mutual, meaningful arms control.

Responsible, Not Profligate, Growth in Annual Defense Spending

Beginning in fiscal 1980 and even before President Reagan's election, U.S. defense spending grew in a way unprecedented in recent history. By FY 1985, there had been six consecutive years in which defense spending showed "real" growth (growth beyond increases to fully compensate for inflation)—the longest sustained growth period since the Korean War.

For example, between FY 1981 and FY 1985, annual real growth in American defense spending averaged 8.8 percent yearly, and cumulative real growth was fifty percent. In contrast, evidence from our intelligence community indicated that Soviet defense budgets grew at a rate of about two percent annually from 1976 to 1982 and only three or four percent in 1982-83. Thus, by early 1985, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was able to testify that "remarkable progress has been made...to strengthen America's defenses."

As they considered this foundation of military security, which they helped create, Senate Democrats in 1985 registered a growing concern that the Pentagon was becoming increasingly incapable of managing its spending in a way which protected the taxpayer. Evidence mounted that the

taxpayers were receiving far less, in terms of improvements to our armed forces, than should have been realized from their huge investment of hard-earned dollars.

An outrageous pattern of profligate waste, cost scandals, and questionable budgeting procedures hastened the erosion of the national consensus underlying a program of vigorous defense expansion. Finally, the important economic component of our national security posture was being eroded by the third successive year of a record Federal budget deficit created by the Administration's failed fiscal policies.

Against this backdrop, and in order to try to protect from further erosion the remnants of the public consensus for a reasonably funded, strong defense posture, Democrats recognized that annual military spending needed to be restructured to force the Pentagon to improve management and eliminate waste. In contrast, and despite the sustained, high real growth of the past six years, the President proposed a five-year defense program contemplating average annual real growth of 6.5 percent.

Alarmed, as were many Americans, that a Pentagon already awash in funds and incapable of managing those funds efficiently likely would waste such large, militarily unjustified increases, Democrats supported a plan offered as an amendment to the First FY 1986 budget resolution to provide more modest real growth at least for the first three years of the five-year plan. This more reasonable and fiscally responsible defense spending program still would have permitted real growth in combat readiness, sustained progress in research, and an adequate pay raise for military personnel, but would have forced the Pentagon to "clean up its management act," cut waste, and increase efficiency. Senate Democrats provided the margin of victory to pass this proposal for prudent, sufficient defense spending.

The Record

- 1) Goldwater motion to table the Dole (for Grassley-Hatfield, et al) amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to limit defense spending to no increase in FY 1986 except for inflation, and to provide for growth at three percent above inflation in FY 1987 and 1988. (Vote No. 36—99th Congress, 1st Session)

83% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

77% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment mandating this plan was agreed to by a division vote after the motion to table was defeated, 51-48.

May 2, 1985.

Maintaining a Sufficient Nuclear Deterrent in a Manner Promoting Nuclear Stability and Arms Control

Too often, efforts to promote careful, mutual, and verifiable arms control agreements have been viewed as contradictory to efforts to maintain sufficient nuclear deterrent forces. Democrats in the Senate reject this view and believe that prudent defense programs and careful arms control arrangements both are important components of our national security posture.

Democrats also support reasonable strategic nuclear modernization which contributes to nuclear stability both in peacetime and in crises.

However, Democrats believe that a military and budgetary over-emphasis on strategic nuclear procurement and research programs can weaken our defenses and undercut our foreign policy by diverting scarce funding resources away from needed improvements to our conventional forces.

In 1985, Democrats underscored these principles in their votes on the MX Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program and the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

MX Missile

The plan to spend billions of dollars to base many of the highly-effective MX missiles in vulnerable silos flies directly in the face of these basic principles and makes little military, fiscal, or arms control sense.

The MX could, if the U.S. were to attack the Soviet Union first, destroy a large proportion of the Soviet strategic forces. However, placed in silos, it is vulnerable to a similar preemptive attack by Soviet ICBM's. Thus, the MX contributes only marginally to our deterrent and puts both nations in an unstable, "hair trigger" posture during crises. In fact, the missile in this basing mode increases the chances of accidental nuclear war and is of extremely dubious value as bargaining leverage in any arms control negotiations.

Compared with the several other more survivable and more effective strategic systems, such as the Trident missile submarine, Stealth bomber, and Midgetman ICBM, the MX is a militarily-unnecessary program, and the money it will absorb can be better used for either those other nuclear programs or to improve our conventional forces.

Democrats voted several times to defer further MX procurement, but they were willing to leave some funds in the program to maintain a missile production base as a "hedge" against future strategic uncertainties, and to continue some research and development work on the missile. Some continued research would permit the U.S. to determine whether a more survivable basing mode is possible and to test the missile's performance while monitoring the progress of arms control talks with the Soviets.

- 2) Passage of S.J. Res. 71 approving the obligation, subject to the enactment of a joint resolution of appropriation, of \$1.5 billion authorized under the FY 1985 DOD Authorization bill (P.L. 98-525) for the procurement of twenty-one MX missiles, in addition to the 21 missiles funded in FY 1984. (Vote No. 19—99th Congress, 1st Session)

79% of Democrats voting opposed the joint resolution.

85% of Republicans voting supported the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was passed, 55-45.

March 19, 1985.

- 3) Passage of H.J. Res. 181 approving the obligation and availability of prior year unobligated balances (\$1.5 billion) made available for FY 1985 for the procurement of twenty-one MX missiles, in addition to the twenty-one missiles funded in FY 1984. (Vote No. 20—99th Congress, 1st Session)

79% of Democrats voting opposed the joint resolution.

85% of Republicans voting supported the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was passed, 55-45.

March 20, 1985.

- 4) Hart, et al, amendment (to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1986) to prohibit the authorization of any funds in FY 1986 to procure or deploy any MX missile or to construct, convert, or renovate any facility for the deployment of the MX missile, thereby reducing Air Force missile procurement funding by \$2.08 billion while retaining \$784 million for MX research, testing, development and evaluation. (Vote No. 85—99th Congress, 1st Session)

77% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

88% of Republicanis voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 42-56.

May 21, 1985.

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

The Strategic Defense Initiative, which has become known widely as the "Star Wars" missile defense program, was one of the most controversial defense issues which confronted Congress in 1985. From military, fiscal, and arms control perspectives, SDI may have almost revolutionary implications for U.S. national security.

Aware of a large Soviet program of research into similar missile defense technologies, Senate Democrats supported a well-funded and vigorous SDI program to investigate the feasibility and potential of such technologies and to protect us against Soviet efforts.

However, SDI could have many negative effects on U.S. conventional forces, the effectiveness of our own deterrent Triad, our relations with our NATO allies, and arms control (especially the ABM Treaty). In addition, it may be very difficult—and unwise—to meet SDI's huge funding needs as the defense budget and the total Federal budget are squeezed by the growing deficit.

In light of these concerns, Democrats believed it was imprudent to support the recommendation that \$2.97 billion be spent for SDI in FY 1986, a total representing about 113 percent growth, after inflation, above the program's FY 1985 budget. In supporting amendments to reduce this budget to more reasonable levels, yet still provide substantial real growth, Democrats were aware of the finding by the House Armed Services Committee that questioned the Pentagon's ability to manage the SDI program efficiently at such high growth rates. The House Armed Services Committee found that major efficiency reductions could be made in various parts of the SDI program without seriously jeopardizing overall SDI goals.

Democrats also were told by a respected former Republican Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, that historical experience showed that growth rates in defense research programs at the level initially recommended for SDI could not be managed without wasting money and overspending.

There were other sound reasons for reasonable reductions in SDI in 1985. Our NATO allies continued to express concerns that the program ultimately could reduce, not increase, the deterrent to war by "de-linking" the deterrent strength of America's strategic nuclear forces from the protection of our allies and U.S. troops in Europe.

Both our NATO allies and members of Congress are concerned that an imprudent pace to the SDI program will undermine further the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and make it even more difficult for the Administration to meet its self-imposed goal of reversing "erosion" of the Treaty through Soviet noncompliance.

SDI's survivability and military effectiveness came under further challenge by the nonpartisan and expert congressional Office of Technology Assessment. Concern also persists that, instead of promoting reduced reliance on nuclear offensive forces, thus permitting major arms reductions, both the USSR and the U.S. will expand their warhead totals in an effort to overwhelm the other's SDI. In this way, SDI might be an obstacle to, not an incentive for, meaningful, mutual, and verifiable arms control.

In view of all these questions, Senate Democrats not only considered it wise to support a more measured pace and budget for the SDI program, but to endorse establishment of a special Strategic Defense Advisory Panel of knowledgeable and respected experts to advise the Senate on these many complex issues.

Finally, recognizing that the President repeatedly states that SDI is to be a nonnuclear missile defense system, and that this aspect is part of its attractiveness, Senate Democrats voted to eliminate from the program any development and testing of missile-kill mechanisms powered by nuclear explosions. In this way, Senate Democrats were trying to bring the program into conformity with the President's own description of it.

- 5) Proxmire-Bumpers-Chafee-Mathias, et al, modified amendment (to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1986) which reduces funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from \$2.97 billion to \$1.86 billion in FY 1986—an increase of thirty-three percent over FY 1985—and transfers the savings to increase funding in readiness accounts for the purchase of items such as ammunition and trucks and for military housing construction; establishes a Threat Analysis Program to conduct research into Soviet countermeasures, analyze Soviet offensive responses, and evaluate the cost effectiveness of developing and deploying offensive nuclear systems to defeat defensive systems; establishes an eight-member strategic defense evaluation panel appointed by congressional leaders to evaluate work on SDI and its effect on U.S. arms control policy; requires a CBO study on the effect of projected SDI expenditures on other DOD and Federal research and a Joint Economic Committee report on its impact on civilian R&D efforts; and reaffirms congressional commitment to the 1972 ABM Treaty. (Vote No. 100—99th Congress, 1st Session)

73% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

88% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 38-57.

June 4, 1985.

- 6) Gore, et al, amendment (to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1986) which reduces funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from \$2.97 billion to \$2.5 billion in FY 1986; establishes an independent interagency legal advisory board to advise the President and the National Security Council on matters relating to SDI and compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty; and limits funding for three projects (the airborne optical sensor at \$29 million, the hypervelocity railgun at \$3.5 million, and the kinetic kill vehicle at \$30 million) that may pose compliance problems with the ABM Treaty until: (1) the President submits a report to Congress on the necessity of an early execution of these projects to the success of the SDI program, the specific purpose these projects would serve in the design concept, and how a defensive system incorporating these project elements would be protected against Soviet countermeasures, and (2) Congress passes a joint resolution to remove the funding fence. (Vote No. 101—99th Congress, 1st Session)
 78% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.
 98% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.
 The amendment was defeated, 36-59.
 June 4, 1985.

- 7) Glenn amendment (to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1986) to reduce funding for the SDI from \$2.97 billion to \$2.8 billion in FY 1986. (Vote No. 102—99th Congress, 1st Session)
 69% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.
 90% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.
 The amendment was rejected, 36-59.
 June 4, 1985.

- 8) Bumpers-Levin amendment (to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1986) expressing the sense of the Senate that a ten-member Strategic Defense Advisory Panel (with two members each to be appointed by the Chairman and ranking minority members of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees and one member each to be appointed by the Majority and Minority Leaders) should be established to evaluate strategic defense R&D activities of DOD, the technical and programmatic status of work within the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, and the effect of SDI on U.S. arms control goals and policies and to submit reports as deemed necessary by the appointing Senators. (Vote No. 104—99th Congress, 1st Session)
 88% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.
 94% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.
 The amendment was defeated, 38-49.
 June 5, 1985.

- 9) Stevens motion to table the Kerly amendment (to the Continuing Appropriations bill) prohibiting the use of funds to conduct, in connection with the SDI program, development, testing, or evaluation of a warhead, bomb, or other explosive device which uses fissionable material. (Vote No. 365—99th Congress, 1st Session)

67% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

96% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 64-32.

December 10, 1985.

Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons and Protecting the U.S.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have made extensive use of space for military purposes, primarily by using satellites for missile attack early warning, reconnaissance, intelligence, meteorological, navigational, and communications missions. Indeed, high altitude satellites are part of America's most important defenses against a successful Soviet nuclear first strike, and against accidental nuclear war in a crisis.

Recognizing this, Democrats in 1985 sought to increase the survivability of our military satellites—on which we now rely more than the Soviets for important military functions according to the OTA—by supporting negotiations for mutual, verifiable arms control limits on ASAT threats and a carefully-paced ASAT weapons research program. This program, which would continue the moratorium then in effect on testing a U.S. ASAT system against a target in space, would not jeopardize such negotiations.

The Democratic approach emphasizing both arms control and careful weapons research was, in part, based on the conclusions, later expressed by OTA, that arms control might prevent an expensive and potentially destabilizing arms race in space and would reduce the likelihood that the USSR could successfully develop and deploy advanced, highly capable ASAT weapons able to threaten America's most important military satellites.

This Democratic approach was in direct contrast to the Administration's policy on ASATs, which was a policy based on refusing even to negotiate limits and on precipitously testing a U.S. ASAT weapon against a target in space regardless of the documented technical flaws in the system and its impact on arms control.

Under the Democratic policy, the U.S. would be free to continue ASAT research and to test against an object in space if warranted by national security. However, the Administration failed to demonstrate such a test was militarily-warranted, and Democrats were concerned that, if the U.S. rushed headlong into tests against space targets, the Soviets could see that as an actual deployment, which could jeopardize chances for a treaty.

The long-term damage to our strategic security from further development of ASAT technology by both nations far outweighs the short-term theoretical advantage, if any, gained from tests of the current U.S. ASAT against space targets.

Democrats further believed that the U.S. should apply pressure on the Soviets to negotiate effective ASAT limits, so they linked extension of the moratorium on space target tests with Soviet willingness to resume or continue such talks. If the USSR refused to participate in such talks, the moratorium would be ended, and ASAT tests against space targets could begin.

Finally, Democrats supported the more conservative position regarding ASAT tests for two additional reasons:

1. Other methods of making U.S. satellites more survivable—such as use of decoys to fool an attacker, maneuverability to escape attack, and protective shielding of critical components—may be more viable, less risky technologically and less obstructive for arms control than testing the current U.S. ASAT.

2. The current U.S. ASAT program experienced serious technical and cost-growth problems, which indicated that less rapidly phased tests were needed to permit the Air Force more time to solve these problems and minimize waste of scarce defense dollars.

- 10) Kerry-Chafee, et al, amendment (to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1986) which prohibits the obligation or expenditure of any funds in FY 1986 to test against an object in space the miniature homing vehicle (MHV) anti-satellite warhead launched from an F-15 unless the President determines and certifies to Congress that: (1) the Soviet Union refuses to resume or continue negotiations aimed at achieving an agreement on anti-satellite weapons, or (2) the Soviet Union has conducted a test of any ASAT weapon against an object in space. (Vote No. 95—99th Congress, 1st Session)

72% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

85% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 35-51.

May 24, 1985.

Improving U.S. Conventional Forces Not Accomplished With New Nerve Gas Weapons

Democrats believe that improving America's nonnuclear forces is important to the nation's ability to carry out a successful foreign policy, to deter conventional attacks, and to reduce chances that such attacks will escalate rapidly into nuclear war, should conventional deterrence fail for some reason.

Staggering Republican budget deficits have imposed extreme pressures on Federal spending, however, and only the most militarily justified defense programs should be pursued. There is ample evidence that no such military justification exists for the Administration's proposal to produce an entire new generation of binary nerve gas munitions. Furthermore, production of such weapons now could severely hurt international chemical arms control efforts. It also would complicate our defense partnership with our NATO allies—who are reluctant to accept forward deployment of the weapons on their soil, where European populations vehemently oppose chemical weapons.

Because of this opposition in Western Europe, even binary munitions thus may jeopardize far more important NATO military improvement programs which also are politically sensitive. Such production also would hand the Soviet propaganda machine a public relations victory, possibly further undermining European support for our chemical arms control positions.

The military justification for new binary munitions was undercut in testimony to Congress by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who, in 1983, stated that, "For procurement of new (binary) artillery shells, the need is not one of redressing a clear lack of military utility. The U.S. possesses a stockpile of chemical nerve agent artillery shells, similar to the proposed M-687 binary round. . . ."

Finally, Congress's investigative agency, the General Accounting Office, still questioned whether the technical problems experienced in the binary munitions program had been addressed with sufficient adequacy to justify initiation of production.

Democrats believed that the most effective way, in 1985, to strengthen U.S. protections against chemical threats was to concentrate scarce military dollars on procurement of improved chemical defensive equipment instead of on production of binary offensive weapons. A significant defensive chemical capability increases our deterrent against chemical warfare by reducing the casualty-causing effectiveness of such warfare, and U.S. chemical defenses still need major improvement.

Thus, Democrats supported a proposal to: continue the sixteen-year-long U.S. policy against producing new offensive chemical weapons; intensify American efforts to reach agreement with the USSR on a mutual, verifiable ban on production and stockpiling of such weapons; and rapidly improve the chemical defenses of U.S. armed forces.

- 11) Pryor-Hart, et al, amendment (to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1986) which prohibits the use of any funds for procurement by any government department or agency of lethal binary chemical munitions or retaliatory equipment relating to such munitions; deletes \$163 million therefor; and states the sense of the Senate that the President should intensify efforts to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Union establishing a mutual and verifiable ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and that the Secretary of Defense should rapidly improve the capabilities of the Armed Forces to detect the use of chemical weapons and to protect members of the Armed Forces against the use of such weapons. (Vote No. 90—99th Congress, 1st Session)

69% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

71% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 46-50.

May 22, 1985.

Counterespionage

Over the last few years we have witnessed an unprecedented rash of major cases of Soviet espionage. It seemed to Democrats that those persons in our government who were charged with responsibility for maintaining and preserving major national defense secrets somehow may have lost the capability to accomplish their mission or the knowledge of how best to accomplish it. Congress had been responding favorably to the President's call to beef up our defenses by authorizing the expenditure of billions of dollars for new technology—disturbing quantities of which apparently were being promptly stolen by the Soviets as a result of their successful espionage activities.

- 12) Byrd, et al, perfecting amendment (to the Supplemental Appropriations bill) to establish an eight-member National Commission on Espionage and Security to conduct an investigation and assess the adequacy of counterespionage, counterintelligence, and security activities in the U.S. in the protection of vital secret defense, foreign policy, and intelligence information against the efforts of hostile foreign powers and report to the President and Congress no later than March 1, 1987. (Vote No. 130—99th Congress, 1st Session)

96% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

91% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was defeated, 48-50.

June 20, 1985.

In mid-1985, Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd concluded that the time had come for an exhaustive and independent investigation and a realistic assessment of the adequacy of our counterespionage, counterintelligence, and security activities. He proposed the creation of a blue ribbon, high-level National Commission on Espionage and Security to address this problem and to

recommend how we could better protect vital secret defense, foreign policy, and intelligence information against the efforts of hostile foreign powers to obtain that information.

Democrats enthusiastically and virtually unanimously supported the proposal, but only 5 Republicans voted to establish the special Commission, and the proposal was therefore defeated.

ENERGY

Introduction

A continuing theme in defining the differences between the Republican and Democratic views of our energy policy has been one of preparedness. In their preoccupation with an elusive "free market," Republicans have been willing to expose Americans to a repeat of the hardships caused by the extreme shortages of petroleum products experienced during the oil embargoes of the 1970's. During the course of Republican leadership in the White House and the Senate, Democrats have repeatedly urged development of contingency plans to prevent complete reliance on foreign oil products for our energy needs.

These efforts have included proposals to complete filling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve while oil prices are low, and to develop alternative energy resources such as clean coal technologies to take advantage of our own natural resources base. During the first session of the 99th Congress, this issue was manifest at one point in a debate concerning development of a standby program of emergency grants to help manage the hardships associated with an energy shortage. Continued and strong Republican opposition prevailed, however, and the nation's exposure to these hardships remains.

The Record

- 1) Bradley amendment (to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act) which requires the President to prepare, and authorizes him to implement, a standby program of emergency block grants to States to enable them to deal with the effects of oil price shocks during an oil shortage. (Vote No. 127—99th Congress, 1st Session)

74% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

83% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 44-55.

June 18, 1985.

The purpose of the amendment was to provide a framework for a minimal program to help cushion society from the adverse economic and financial effects of a sudden increase in the price of oil caused by an oil shortage. Democrats have objected to the Administration's lack of concern for

emergency preparedness in the event of a major disruption in oil supplies. Such a disruption, as we have seen from past experience, could result in sudden, drastic increases in the price of essential commodities such as gasoline and heating oil.

Democrats also have objected to the Administration's willingness, if such an emergency were to occur, to allow price to allocate limited supplies, thereby allowing those who can afford to pay higher prices to have easier access to oil supplies. Democrats advocate a more equitable approach which would ensure that, during the extreme conditions that would likely prevail during an oil shortage, financial assistance is available to those who are least able to afford suddenly higher energy and related costs.

The Republican opposition to this effort to protect those least able to protect themselves insured the defeat of the amendment, 44-55.

FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

The Administration's foreign policy during 1985 continued to be generally dominated by drift, excessive focus on militarism, highly visible factionalism, and lack of coordination within the executive branch, and a notable absence of vision and action befitting America's place in the world. The only bright spot in the foreign policy arena was the resumption of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and the beginnings of a more constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union on the wide range of issues separating our two nations, at the first summit meeting in six years. Little leadership was exhibited by the Administration toward progress with respect to a number of regional crises, particularly in South Africa and Central America, or with respect to breathing new life into the Camp David process in the Middle East.

Democrats have been concerned that, over the last few years, the Soviet-American relationship has been characterized by harsh rhetoric and unproductive finger pointing. Democrats have made every effort to be helpful in putting that relationship back onto a more productive track. At the outset of the 99th Congress, at the initiation of Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd, a new Senate body, the Senate Arms Control Observer Group, was created to monitor the Geneva arms control negotiations on a regular basis. It was the Democratic Leader's hope that the group would help avoid a repetition of the problems of the 1970's, when three successive arms control treaties were signed by three Presidents, but never ratified by the Senate.

Through the Observer Group's monitoring activities, the full Senate will become more knowledgeable about the many complex issues surrounding nuclear arms control, and American negotiators will have the benefit of its advice and counsel, when appropriate. It is expected that this will contribute substantially to the fulfillment of the Senate's constitutional role of providing advice and consent with respect to any treaty that emerges from the negotiations. The group traveled three times to Geneva in 1985 to confer with U.S. negotiators, and to meet with the negotiators from the Soviet side, and met weekly with representatives of the executive branch while the Geneva negotiations were underway.

During 1985, Senate Democrats were in the forefront of initiatives to address the security and foreign policy challenges America faces in the Philippines, the Middle East, Central America, and South Africa.

Senators Sasser and Kerry were early, thoughtful critics of the policies of the Philippine government with the objective of preventing that critical American ally from being further challenged by a growing Communist insurgency. The insurgency threatens not only the Philippine government and the freedom of the Filipino people, but also the long-term existence of two of the U.S.'s most important overseas military bases. These pressures brought to bear on the Philippine government resulted in the decision of President Marcos to conduct new elections in February 1986. The focus of Democratic Senators' efforts were toward free and fair elections, so that frustrations which had been feeding the insurgency would be greatly lessened, and the reinstatement of a fully democratic system would occur in the Philippines.

Regarding the Middle East, Senators Kennedy, Dixon, and Cranston led a successful effort to delay an ill-considered Administration initiative to sell additional sophisticated weapons to Jordan and Saudi Arabia without an accompanying improvement in the prospects for a lasting peace in that region. American policy in the Middle East must be guided by the need to build on the success of the Camp David process, and the hope it offers for comprehensive solutions in the region. The arms sales that this Administration has been promoting for several years do not represent a policy which can contribute to this process.

During 1985, Senate Democrats became increasingly concerned over the activities of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, and determined that every effort must be made on both the political and diplomatic fronts to find a peaceful solution to the differences between that government and its own people. Therefore, Senate Democrats consistently supported the Contadora process (in which many of the democratic governments of the region, led by Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Brazil, seek to bring about a negotiated settlement in the best interests of the entire Central/South American region), and encouraged the reopening of negotiations between the U.S. and Nicaragua, keeping military options in reserve to be used only as a last resort. In the event that the Sandinista regime does not improve its internal record, and fulfill the democratic goals of its own revolution, it must be on unequivocal notice that Democrats will not countenance military expansionism directed

against its neighbors. Based on these considerations, Democrats tried to reach agreement with the White House on a reasonable program of overt humanitarian aid to those forces in Nicaragua who oppose the repressive Sandinista regime. Unfortunately, the Administration rejected efforts to reach a reasonable compromise.

In 1985, South Africa was caught up in a growing cycle of despair and violence. Recognizing that South Africa was drifting into chaos, and that the Administration's policy was translating into destructive disinterest rather than constructive progress, Senate Democrats called for meaningful steps that would focus the attention of South Africa's leadership on the urgent need to carry out basic reforms. Democratic-sponsored legislation calling for specific responses keyed to progress in South Africa was frustrated when Senate Republicans removed the conference report from the Senate chamber in an unprecedented disruption of orderly Senate procedure. Senate Democrats successfully pressed for a return of those papers. In the meantime, however, the Administration accepted substantially all of the points raised in the Democratic legislation and issued much of the Democratic bill in the form of an Executive Order, thereby notably altering the United States' public posture and putting appropriate pressure on the government of South Africa to achieve meaningful reforms of the apartheid system.

The Record

Central America

- 1) Passage of S.J. Res. 106 approving the obligation and expenditure of \$14 million available in FY 1985 for supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. (Vote No. 31—99th Congress, 1st Session)

79% of Democrats voting opposed the resolution.

83% of Republicans voting supported the resolution.

The resolution was agreed to, 53-46.

April 23, 1985.

Public Law 98-473 (Continuing Appropriations, enacted in October 1984) required a presidential report certifying the need for funds to support covert activities in Nicaragua and congressional approval

of such activities before funds could be expended for that purpose. President Reagan sent a letter requesting the funds and providing assurances that the money would be used for nonlethal aid, so long as a cease-fire was observed; that bilateral negotiations with the Sandinistas would be resumed; and that human rights abuses by the Contras would be investigated.

Democrats argued that the resolution to release the funds for Contra aid was too open-ended and could lead to direct military involvement of U.S. troops in Nicaragua. The definition used by the Administration of "humanitarian aid," as well as the direction of the operation by the Central Intelligence Agency, indicated strong movement toward violence before an adequate exploration of nonviolent avenues of reconciliation. While many agreed that the U.S. should maintain pressure for change in Nicaragua, more constructive policies could be pursued. Economic and diplomatic sanctions should be inaugurated, and full support lent to the Contadora process. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, it was argued, should be given an opportunity to demonstrate his willingness or unwillingness to enter into a cease-fire, terminate press censorship, and send Cuban military advisers home.

Although, the House had rejected a companion resolution on the same day, by a vote of 180-248, the resolution was approved in the Senate when Republicans supported it overwhelmingly.

- 2) Division I of the Kennedy-Hatfield amendment (to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1986-87) stating the sense of the Congress that the U.S. should resume bilateral negotiations with the government of Nicaragua. (Vote No. 108—99th Congress, 1st Session)

89% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

88% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

Division I of the amendment was rejected by a tie vote, 48-48.

June 6, 1985.

Democrats argued that President Reagan should direct the Secretary of State to return to the negotiating table with Nicaragua, an event which would be welcomed throughout Latin America, and that all possible efforts should be made to find a peaceful resolution of our differences with the Sandinistas. Bilateral talks would be in keeping with the aspirations of the Contadora process, and any military option should be viewed as a last resort when all reasonable efforts at accommodation have failed, and U.S. national security interests are at stake. Unfortunately, the amendment was defeated on a tie vote when 88 percent of Republicans voting opposed it.

- 3) Nunn-Lugar-Bentsen-Boren, et al, amendment (to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1986-87) which unfences the \$14 million authorized in FY 1985 and authorizes \$24 million in FY 1986 for humanitarian aid to the Contras, to be distributed by the President and monitored by the National Security Council, limited to food, medicine, clothing, etc., and transportation associated with the delivery of this assistance and not weapons, ammunition, or any other equipment or material designed to inflict serious bodily harm or death; permits sharing of intelligence information with the Contras; repeals the "Boland amendment" prohibiting military or paramilitary aid to the Contras but prohibits any military assistance to the Contras unless the President requests and Congress authorizes such aid; and encourages the President to pursue the Contadora objectives and bilateral negotiations with the Nicaraguan government. (Vote No. 112—99th Congress, 1st Session)

70% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

80% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was adopted, 55-42.

June 6, 1985.

Democrats argued that the assistance in the bill, although labeled "humanitarian," is essentially a form of logistical support to the Contras in their effort to overthrow the Sandinista government. This is a continuation of a policy which over the last five years simply has not worked, but instead has led to an increase in Soviet-Cuban influence in Nicaragua. The continuation of this bankrupt policy has only given Sandinista hardliners a pretext for continuing to delay needed democratic reforms internally. Nonetheless, the Senate approved the amendment.

- 4) Division I of the Harkin amendment (to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1986-87) to prohibit the funds provided in this or any other Act from being obligated or expended by the CIA or DOD to provide humanitarian assistance to forces opposed to the government of Nicaragua. (Vote No. 113—99th Congress, 1st Session)

70% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

90% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

Division I of the amendment was rejected, 35-57.

June 7, 1985.

Supporters of this amendment argued that it would keep the CIA from managing the secret war in Nicaragua, and that it did not make sense for the CIA to be managing a "humanitarian" program such as that which the Senate had approved by an earlier vote. Amendment supporters contended that the State Department would be the appropriate agency to manage this kind of aid, but the amendment was defeated.

- 5) Kerry-Moynihan modified amendment (to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1986-87) to provide that no funds authorized under this or any other Act can be used to fund, directly or indirectly, activities against the government of Nicaragua which would place the U.S. in violation of our obligations under the Charter of the Organization of American States, to which the U.S. is a signatory, or under international law as defined by treaty commitments agreed to and ratified by the U.S. (Vote No. 115—99th Congress, 1st Session)

95% of Democrats voting supported the amendment.

82% of Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 47-42.

June 7, 1985.

Democrats argued that the U.S. has been a leader in the effort to develop basic rules of behavior among nations, and that the rule of laws should prevail in international relations. Questions have been raised about the basic legality, under accepted traditions and rules of international law, of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua over the last few years—for example, the secret mining of Nicaragua's harbor by the CIA. Democrats, believing it is important that the U.S. adhere to the standards it expects from other nations, strongly supported the amendment. The amendment was supported by only 14 percent of Republicans voting, but that was sufficient for the amendment to prevail.

Population Planning Assistance

- 6) Kassebaum motion to table the Helms amendment (to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1986-87) to repeal a provision of the Foreign Assistance Authorization bill, passed by the Senate on May 15, which would prohibit tighter restrictions from being imposed on nongovernmental or multilateral organizations than are imposed on foreign governments in their use of funding for population planning assistance. (Repeal of this provision would have permitted the President, or any government official to whom he delegates the authority, to implement whatever policies he deemed necessary to curb human rights violations, including but not limited to infanticide, abortion, involuntary sterilization, and racial and ethnic discrimination.) (Vote No. 121—99th Congress, 1st Session)

78% of Democrats voting supported the motion.

66% of Republicans voting opposed the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 53-45.

June 11, 1985.

Democrats argued that this amendment, which was cloaked in language defending human rights, would actually weaken the U.S. commitment to population assistance and change a policy formulated only three weeks prior to this debate. That policy, contained in the Kassebaum amendment to the Foreign Aid bill, would assure equal treatment of both foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations that provide family planning services in developing nations.

Not only would it set a bad precedent to make governmental and nongovernmental recipients of the same aid subject to different conditions, but the premise on which the amendment was based is erroneous. There have been no flagrant violations of family planning policies by anyone receiving U.S. aid. In fact, since 1973, no population aid has been used for abortions or other coercive practices.

Democrats argued that if it is made more difficult for the poor of developing nations to obtain the family planning assistance they need, unnecessary suffering will result for the millions of mothers and children and their families who now enjoy a more secure future because of the present aid efforts.

South Africa

- 7) Weicker, et al, motion to close further debate on the conference report on the bill expressing opposition to the apartheid policies of the South African government through the imposition of immediate bans on the import of Krugerrands, extension of bank loans to the South African government, exports of computers to specified South African government agencies, and exports of nuclear technology and goods. (Vote No. 171—99th Congress, 1st Session)

100% of Democrats voting supported the motion.

74% of Republicans voting opposed the motion.

The motion was defeated, 53-34, 3/5ths not having voted in the affirmative.

September 9, 1985.

- 8) Kennedy, et al, second motion to close further debate on the conference report on the bill expressing opposition to the apartheid policies of the South African government through the imposition of immediate bans on the import of Krugerrands, extension of bank loans to the South African government, exports of computers to specified South African government agencies, and exports of nuclear technology and goods. (Vote No. 173—99th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of Democrats voting supported the motion.

78% of Republicans voting opposed the motion.

The motion was defeated, 57-41, 3/5ths not having voted in the affirmative.

September 11, 1985.

- 9) Dole motion to table the motion to reconsider Vote No. 173 by which the Senate rejected the second cloture motion on the conference report on the bill. (Vote No. 174—99th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

96% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was agreed to, 50-48, thereby preventing a new vote to invoke cloture on the resolution.

September 11, 1985.

In 1985, South Africa became caught up in a cycle of increasing despair and violence as a result of its apartheid policies. The Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" added to the uncertainty by failing to provide a clear statement of U.S. expectations and intentions. Recognizing the human and strategic costs of South Africa's drift into chaos, Senate Democrats called for meaningful steps that would demonstrate America's commitment to encouraging peaceful solutions to that country's problems.

All three votes on this issue occurred in the attempt to bring to the floor of the Senate a conference report on Democratic legislation setting out specific economic responses keyed to reducing violence and encouraging progress toward removal of the apartheid system in South Africa. All three failed when Republicans frustrated the attempt to break a filibuster. (NOTE: Senator Byrd, in order to be permitted by the Senate Rules to seek reconsideration of the previous vote, was prohibited from voting for the cloture motion on Vote No. 173.)

In an effort to head off the Democratic initiative, the President issued an Executive Order which embodied many elements of the Democratic legislation, though the Order lacked some provisions to encourage ongoing progress. To frustrate further action on the Democratic conference report, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee removed the report from the Senate chamber in what amounted to an unprecedented one-Senator veto. This breach of Senate practice effectively denied the Senate further opportunity to consider the legislation until after implementation of the Executive Order had begun.

While Senate Republicans and the Administration resorted to unprecedented measures to frustrate a change in American policy with respect to South Africa, American public opinion and the need for decisive action caused the Administration to adopt substantially the Democratic position.

Aid to UNITA

- 10) Wallop question of germaneness of the Wallop, et al, amendment (to the Continuing Appropriations bill) to earmark \$50 million from the foreign operations section (foreign aid) of the bill to assist the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The question was: "Is it the judgment of the Senate that the amendment is germane to the bill?" (Vote No. 367—99th Congress, 1st Session)


91% of Democrats voting said the amendment was nongermane.

69% of Republicans voting said the amendment was germane.

The amendment was declared nongermane and it therefore fell, 39-58.
December 10, 1985.

Democrats argued that giving \$50 million to UNITA would undermine our role as mediator in the Angola-South Africa negotiations on Namibia, would increase the threat of more Cuban troops being introduced in Angola, and damage our interests and prestige in the rest of the world. Such aid might also be perceived as a decision to collaborate consciously with the policies of the South African government.

Democrats declared their opposition to any U.S. intervention in the Angolan war and said that the American-sponsored negotiations were the only hope for reducing the Cuban presence and promoting national reconciliation in Angola.



HUMAN SERVICES AND EDUCATION

Introduction

Despite its professed support for a human services "safety net," this Administration has consistently worked to reduce or eliminate services for those least able to assist themselves. In fact, the Administration has successfully reduced funding for many education, nutrition, and other human services programs well below the 1982 levels, despite increased need. Democrats view these programs as vital to our future national security and economic well-being. Those who are poorly educated will not be able to lead this country in economic development and growth in the future. Inadequate nourishment and housing among poor children leads to higher levels of dependence among poor adults because of ill-health and structural joblessness.

There were a number of votes in the first session of the 99th Congress which clearly illustrated the differences between the Republican and Democratic parties in this field.

The Record

- 1) Domenici motion to table the Hawkins, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to maintain funding for school lunch programs at the current level for FY 1986-88 by restoring the subsidy for children from families with annual incomes over \$19,700—costing \$1.6 billion over three years. (Vote No. 55—99th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion.

70% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was agreed to by voice vote after the motion to table failed, 36-60.

May 9, 1985.

Democrats broadly supported this amendment to restore funding for child nutrition programs—a provision which was included in both Democratic budget alternatives offered earlier in the budget resolution debate.

Supporters of the amendment believed that it was critical to restore the school lunch program funding. Child nutrition programs had suffered significant cuts in 1981 when funding was cut by thirty

percent. These cuts resulted in 2,700 schools dropping out of the school lunch program, affecting an estimated 2.5 million children. Eliminating the middle-income subsidy would further exacerbate the situation because the twelve-cents-per-meal subsidy allows many schools to afford participation in the program. Dropping the subsidy would result in an estimated 5,000-6,000 schools dropping their participation in the program, affecting an estimated three to five million additional children—many of whom would be from low-income families.

In a time of increasing poverty and hunger throughout the Nation, especially among children, this program cut was unacceptable to Democrats, and, joined by fifteen Republicans, they defeated the motion to table the Hawkins amendment. The amendment subsequently was agreed to by voice vote.

- 2) Chiles, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to maintain funding for education, training, employment, and social service programs (Function 500) to insure that no discretionary program is cut below current levels and provide protection against inflation for those programs targeted to low-income children, youths, handicapped, and the elderly, such as Pell grants, Headstart, elderly nutrition, some job training programs, etc. (costing an estimated \$8.3 billion). (Vote No. 58—99th Congress, 1st Session)

93% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

92% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 47-50.

May 9, 1985.

After the two major Democratic budget alternatives were defeated by the Republican majority earlier during consideration of the Budget Resolution, Senator Chiles offered this amendment consisting of the human services component of those alternatives. It restored funding for Federal education programs to at least FY 1985 levels, rather than reducing it as in the Republican budget. It also maintained funding at current service levels funding for many important means-tested discretionary social programs, including Pell grants, Head Start, elderly nutrition, and job training.

Democratic sponsors of the amendment believed that it was time to halt the erosion in funding for these programs which has occurred throughout the previous five years. In addition to the role of State and local governments, the Federal government has a vital part to play in assuring the people of the entire Nation receive adequate education, training, and nourishment.

The amendment was defeated, 47-50, on a near party line vote.

- 3) Dole motion to table the Evans, et al, amendment (to the Budget Reconciliation Act) striking the provision increasing fiscal sanctions on States for error rates in their food stamp program, imposing a two-year moratorium on the collection of error rate penalties from the States, and requiring a study on the quality control system used for the food stamp program. (Vote No. 306—99th Congress, 1st Session)

80% of the Democrats voting opposed the motion.

83% of the Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 52-45.

November 13, 1985.

In 1982, in an effort to cut spending in the food stamp program, Congress substantially increased penalties on States with error rates over five percent in their programs. This proposal was phased in over a three-year period, 1983-85. Thus, in 1985, sanctions on States with high error rates were thirteen times larger in magnitude than they were in 1982, even though error rates were fifteen percent lower than they were in 1982.

Nevertheless, the reconciliation bill for FY 1986 contained a provision further raising the penalties, ignoring the concerns voiced by many States that the methodology used in determining the error rates and penalties was flawed. The Evans amendment struck the increased error penalties, and called for a two-year moratorium on the collection of penalties from States while a study on the quality control system used in the food stamp program was conducted. According to a Congressional Budget Office study, stiffer penalties will not spur substantial additional error reduction. The principal effect of large penalties would be to shift costs to the States.

Nevertheless, the Evans amendment was tabled on a vote of 52-45 when eighty-three percent of voting Republicans voted to table. However, when the farm bill was considered in the Senate, Senator Evans again offered an amendment calling for a penalty moratorium and study. At that time, his amendment was adopted by voice vote.

- 4) Dole (for Abdnor, et al) amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to restore impact educational aid part B funding to its FY 1985 level of \$391 million for each of FY 1986-88. (Vote No. 61—99th Congress, 1st Session)

76% of the Democrats voting supported the amendment.

75% of the Republicans voting opposed the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 47-49.

May 9, 1985.

Impact aid is a basic education program for the benefit of children who attend schools in areas where local and State tax revenue—the primary source of funding for school systems—is limited due to a Federal activity largely because Federal property in such locations is not subject to State or local taxation. The Abdnor amendment, offered on his behalf by Majority Leader Robert Dole, was an effort to restore to 1985 levels funding for a major part of the impact aid program, which was proposed to be drastically cut in the Republican leadership budget. (Part B payments go to schools which serve students whose parents live or work in Federal facilities. These include Native American students, military dependents, and children living in Federally-subsidized housing.)

This program was singled out for drastic cuts in the Republican leadership budget. Proponents of the amendment argued that, because the quality of education in the schools serving these students would be seriously impaired were it not for the Federal part B payments compensating for lost tax revenue, its funding should be restored to 1985 levels.

Even though it was offered by a Republican Senator, over three-fourths of voting Republicans voted against the amendment, and it was defeated on a close vote.

- 5) Hatfield motion to table the Dixon amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to restore \$160 million per year for summer youth jobs for FY 1986-88 in order to maintain the program at the FY 1984 level. (Vote No. 69—99th Congress, 1st Session)

67% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

92% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 62-35.

May 9, 1985.

Throughout the course of the Reagan Administration, one of the programs consistently targeted for cuts has been the summer youth jobs program. Congress has repeatedly acted to keep the most severe cuts from being enacted and has often provided increased funding through supplemental appropriations because youth unemployment levels have skyrocketed throughout the period. Nevertheless, the program was held to FY 1984 funding levels for two years, despite the record level of teenage unemployment. The Republican leadership budget for FY 1986 cut the program \$160 million dollars per year below that level through FY 1988.

The Dixon amendment was an effort to freeze funding for the program at the FY 1984 level. Unfortunately, virtually every voting Republican supported the motion to table. It prevailed, and the amendment therefore was defeated.

LABOR

Introduction

The Republican majority in the Senate often has sought to diminish or cripple protections for labor enacted over the years. A frequent target is the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires that contractors for Federally-funded construction projects pay the prevailing wage in the locality where the project is situated. This is to assure that such construction is not done by unskilled workers hired in order to enable a contractor to win a contract with the lowest bid principally or solely because the contractor pays lower-than-average wages to its workers. It also is to prevent a large Federal construction project from undermining an area's customary wage structure.

Two votes during the first session of the 99th Congress contrasted the support of Senate Democrats for and the opposition of Republicans to such labor protections.

The Record

- 1) Kennedy-Specter-Packwood amendment (to the Department of Defense Authorization bill) to strike the committee provision (in the Gramm amendment) which would narrow the application of the prevailing wage requirements under the Davis-Bacon Act to military construction contracts of \$1 million or less rather than to contracts of \$2,000 or less, as under present law. (Vote No. 97—99th Congress, 1st Session)

79% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

76% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was rejected by a tie vote, 49-49.

June 4, 1985.

- 2) Gramm motion to table the Dole motion to reconsider Vote No. 97 by which the Kennedy-Specter-Packwood amendment (striking the committee changes in the Gramm amendment that narrow the application of the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements) was defeated. (Vote No. 98—99th Congress, 1st Session)

79% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

78% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was tabled, 49-48.

June 4, 1985.

The Department of Defense Authorization bill included an amendment, successfully proposed in the Armed Services Committee by Senator Gramm of Texas, that narrowed the application of the prevailing wage requirements in the Davis Bacon Act to military construction projects. It raised the threshold amount at which a project comes under the Act's requirements from contracts of \$2,000 (and up) to contracts of \$1 million (and up). This would have meant that workers on 95 percent of Federal military construction contracts and subcontracts would not be covered by the protections of the Davis-Bacon Act.

The amendment to strike the committee provision was offered because removing wage floor protections for most defense-related construction probably would lead ultimately to substandard construction by unskilled laborers working for contractors who won bids principally or solely because they undercut the wage standards of the local community in which the construction project is located.

The Kennedy, et al, amendment was not successful, losing on a tie vote of 49-49, when over three-fourths of Republicans voting opposed the amendment. Following that vote, a motion was made to table the motion to reconsider the vote on the Kennedy amendment. The motion to table was agreed to 49-48. However, this amendment was stricken in the House-Senate conference on the bill.

- 3) Mattingly question of germaneness of the Committee amendment (section 128) (to the Military Construction Appropriations bill) to exempt military construction contracts of \$1 million or more (rather than \$2,000 or more) from compliance with the prevailing wage requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act, thereby reducing the prevailing wage rate base. The question is: "Is the Committee amendment germane?" (Vote No. 286—99th Congress, 1st Session)

88% of Democrats voting voted that the amendment was nongermane.


78% of Republicans voting voted that the amendment was germane.

The vote on the question of germaneness was 45-49; thus, the amendment was declared nongermane.

November 7, 1985.

Proponents of the amendment, who were seeking to weaken the reach of the Davis-Bacon Act, were successful in adding it to the Military Construction Appropriations Act for FY 1986 when the bill was considered in the Appropriations Committee. Democrats believed that this issue had already been resolved during the House-Senate conference on the DOD Authorization bill, when the conferees rejected the similar Senate amendment to increase this exemption. (See items No. 1 and 2 on page 63.) A point of order was made that the Committee's Davis-Bacon amendment was substantive legislation

on an appropriation bill (not allowed by Senate Rules). Senator Mattingly invoked the defense that the provision was germane to the bill which automatically is decided by a vote of the Senate. Democrats were joined by several Republicans in voting to declare the amendment nongermane, and it therefore was removed from the bill.



NOMINATIONS

Introduction

During this session of Congress, Democrats continued to express their concern about the quality of some of the Reagan Administration's nominees to executive branch and judicial positions, and about the Administration's attitude toward the constitutional role of the Senate with respect to high-level appointments. The problem began during the Administration's first term when the Senate was required to vote on the confirmation of Raymond Donovan for the position of Secretary of the Department of Labor without the benefit of all the background information necessary to perform the advice and consent role in a responsibly informed way. Thereafter, when Edwin Meese III was nominated to be the Attorney General, the Republican majority tried to push the nomination through despite several serious allegations which began to surface concerning Meese's financial and other activities. Only in the face of the appointment of an independent counsel were the Republicans, confronting the potential defeat of the Meese nomination, willing to put off final disposition of the nomination.

The Meese nomination finally came to a vote during the first session of the 99th Congress. Most Democrats examined the entire record and concluded that a nominee for Attorney General should be held to a much higher standard than merely not having been indicted, and voted not to confirm the nomination. Meese was nevertheless confirmed, with 100 percent Republican support.

Meese's confirmation increased the already existing problem with respect to Administration nominees. Judiciary Committee Republicans attempted to put judicial nominees on a "fast-track," virtually precluding any possibility of responsible confirmation review. In addition, further flouting the confirmation process, the Administration, in the summer of 1985, made a rash of recess appointments to positions which are subject to advice and consent provisions, thus completely bypassing Senate consideration of those nominees. Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd, fully supported by his colleagues, suspended further Senate action on virtually the entire Executive Calendar, first, and thereafter on pending judicial nominations in order to force the Administration to acknowledge and comport with the constitutional confirmation process. From this strategy, two major concessions were obtained. First, White House officials agreed that, prior to any Senate adjournment in the future, they would notify the Senate leadership about any contemplated recess appointments. Second, the Senate Republican

leadership agreed to a responsible timetable which would enable Senate Democrats to conduct a fully adequate review of the qualifications of each judicial nominee before action on the nomination would be scheduled in the Judiciary Committee.

The qualifications of judicial nominees have prompted continued expressions of alarm by Democrats. Recognizing the extreme difficulty of blocking the appointment of even an unqualified judicial nominee, Senate Democrats mounted a major effort with respect to one of the circuit court nominees during the first session of the 99th Congress. That effort failed by only eleven votes, with ninety-four percent of the Republicans voting to support the President's choice.

Another area in which Democratic Senators expressed concerns about the qualifications of Reagan Administration nominees was the Legal Services Corporation.

The Legal Services Corporation is a private, nonprofit organization established by Congress to insure the availability of adequate legal representation of the poor. By statute, the Board of Directors must include members of the organized bar, attorneys providing legal assistance, the general public, and eligible clients. In addition, the Corporation's legislative history sets forth special standards to be applied by the Senate in confirming Board nominations. These include:

1. The nominee must be committed to the Corporation's freedom from political control.
2. The nominee must demonstrate an understanding of and commitment to the role of legal assistance attorneys and support of the underlying principle of the Legal Services Corporation Act—that it is in the national interest that the poor have full access to comprehensive and effective legal services.

3. No more than six of the eleven directors may be members of the same political party.

The Reagan Administration has sought to dismantle the Legal Services Corporation. Every budget submitted by this Administration has proposed eliminating all funding for the program. Congress, with strong bipartisan support, has consistently rejected the Administration's proposal and supported the program. Nevertheless, the Administration has also sought to undermine the program by nominating persons for membership on the Legal Services Board who are either unqualified for such service or insensitive to the goals of the Legal Services program. Over the last five years, the

Administration had proposed twenty-five nominees—none of whom was approved by the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. In addition, nineteen appointments have been made through recess appointments, circumventing the requirement for Senate confirmation. In November 1984, eleven recess appointments were made to the Board. Subsequently, nine were reported out of the Labor Committee by a unanimous vote. However, their consideration was delayed for some six months, because a number of Senators had serious reservations about the qualifications of two of the nominees, Michael Wallace and LeAnne Bernstein—the two which the Committee had reported with a negative recommendation. Finally, in June, 1985, the Senate brought those two nominations to a vote. Both were confirmed despite the Committee's recommendation because of overwhelming Republican support.

The Record

- 1) Confirmation of the nomination of Edwin Meese III, of California, to be Attorney General of the United States. (Vote No. 9—99th Congress, 1st Session)
 67% of Democrats voting opposed the nomination.
 100% of Republicans voting supported the nomination.
 The nomination was confirmed, 63-31.
 February 23, 1985.

In 1984, an Independent Counsel was appointed by a special court in the District of Columbia to investigate eleven specific charges of criminal conduct concerning Edwin Meese III, formerly Counselor to President Reagan, who had been nominated to be Attorney General of the United States. The charges included the allegation that Meese had accepted financial favors in exchange for helping individuals to obtain Federal jobs, the allegation he had filed false financial disclosure statements, and the allegation he had used undue influence to obtain a military promotion. After an extensive investigation, the Independent Counsel concluded that there was "no basis" for Meese to be indicted on any criminal charges.

The original charges against Meese and the evidence adduced during Judiciary Committee hearings and the Independent Counsel's investigation were the focus of the Meese confirmation debate on the Senate floor in February 1985. Democrats expressed the view that an Attorney General should be held to a much higher standard than merely just not having been indicted. They spent considerable

time addressing the ethics and propriety of Meese's conduct, which they found to be considerably lacking. The Independent Counsel had been charged only with determining whether or not Meese should be prosecuted for a Federal crime and had specifically refused to assure the Senate that the evidence did not substantiate "charges of moral turpitude."

Democrats were also troubled by the prospect of confirming for the position of Attorney General an individual who had called the American Civil Liberties Union a criminals' lobby and who had supported tax exemptions for segregated schools.

When faced with this record, two-thirds of the Democrats opposed Meese's confirmation. No Republicans voted in opposition, and he was therefore confirmed.

- 2) Confirmation of the nomination of Alex Kozinski, of California, to U.S. Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit. (Vote No. 288—99th Congress, 1st Session)
 89% of Democrats voting opposed the nomination.
 94% of Republicans voting supported the nomination.
 The nomination was confirmed, 54-43.
 November 7, 1985.

Alex Kozinski was nominated to be a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He had previously served as special counsel to the Merit Systems Protection Board and, at the time he was nominated, he was the chief judge of the U.S. Claims Court.

Substantial questions were raised concerning Kozinski's compassion, sensitivity, and commitment to fairness—qualities essential for a Federal judge. He was described by former employees as "cruel and harsh and sadistic." Doubts were also raised about whether Kozinski had been fully candid with the Judiciary Committee at the time of his nomination hearings, in that he always seemed to provide the Committee with only partial information in response to questions. He denied sending letters "impugning persons questioning my qualifications and urging recipients to lobby on my behalf," even though the Committee had evidence that he had sent to at least two supporters an inflammatory radio editorial which falsely linked one of his critics to a "revolutionary group hostile to the United States with ties to terrorist groups."

Based upon the foregoing, eighty-nine percent of the Democrats concluded that Kozinski did not have the necessary judicial temperament and other qualifications necessary for a Federal judge.

Only six percent of the Republicans joined the Democrats in opposing Kozinski, and he was confirmed, 54-43.

- 3) Confirmation of the nomination of Michael B. Wallace, of Mississippi, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation (LSC). (Vote No. 123—99th Congress, 1st Session)

74% of Democrats voting opposed the nomination.

100% of Republicans voting supported the nomination.

The nomination was confirmed, 62-34.

June 12, 1985.

Democrats felt that, while Wallace had impressive credentials, they did not qualify him to be a member of the LSC Board of Directors. This nomination had been reported with a negative recommendation by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

During floor debate on the nomination, it was noted that Wallace's "contributions to the poor have included efforts to win tax breaks for racist private schools, a role in blocking Federal inspection of a Mississippi jail in which 27 inmates were killed in a fire a year later, and being a key strategist in maneuvers to block the extension of the Voting Rights Act." These actions occurred when Wallace served as counsel to the House Republican Whip. Wallace had also gone on record as supporting the elimination of the LSC's minority recruitment effort.

Serious doubt was expressed about his willingness to fight hard for the rights of the LSC clients. This concern was reiterated in letters of opposition to Wallace's nomination by a member of the Central Mississippi Legal Services Board of Directors, the Mississippi State Conference of the NAACP, and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law.

Based on these considerations, three-fourths of voting Democrats opposed confirmation of Wallace, but he was confirmed when every voting Republican voted for confirmation.

- 4) Confirmation of the nomination of LeAnne Bernstein, of Maryland, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the the Legal Services Corporation. (Vote No. 124—99th Congress, 1st Session)

81% of Democrats voting opposed the nomination.

100% of Republicans voting supported the nomination.

The nomination was confirmed, 58-38.

June 12, 1986.

LeAnne Bernstein worked at the LSC for two years, serving as the Corporation Secretary, prior to her nomination to the Board. Her actions during that time were often in direct conflict with the statutory requirements for actions by Board members and officers.

As Corporation Secretary, Bernstein had primary responsibility for making sure that Board meetings were held in conformity with the Legal Services Corporation Act, its bylaws, and the Sunshine Act. Yet, she failed to provide proper public notice of the Board's meetings—resulting in the D.C. District Court enjoining the Board from meeting. Also during Bernstein's tenure as Corporation Secretary, the Board was successfully sued several times for policies that violated its own bylaws and statutory requirements.

As an unconfirmed Board member, Bernstein sought a twenty to twenty-five percent cut in the Corporation's funding. She also voted to enforce and then attempted to block reconsideration and further public comment on regulations, promulgated by the prior Board, that two congressional committees had demanded be withdrawn because they far exceeded congressional intent.

Most Democratic Senators argued that Bernstein engaged in activities directly in conflict with statutory requirements and congressional intent, and contended that the Senate should not confirm appointees who did not share the goals of the organization which they have been nominated to represent. She nonetheless was confirmed when every voting Republican Senator voted to confirm her nomination.

SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE

Introduction

During the first session of the 99th Congress, Republicans repeatedly tried to use the Social Security and Medicare programs to reduce the budget deficit. Again and again Democrats attempted to thwart, or at least ameliorate, the most egregious of those efforts. These episodes occurred during consideration of major budget legislation: the First Budget Resolution for FY 1986, the bill to increase the debt limit, the Gramm-Rudman-Holling legislation, and the Continuing Resolution.

Social Security

Ultimately, the FY 1986 budget passed by Congress did not reduce Social Security benefits by freezing the cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). However, it was the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives which secured this outcome despite the Republican-controlled Senate.

In the Senate, several budgets were proposed by the Republican leadership during the course of the debate on the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986—and all of them cut COLAs for Social Security. The budget alternative sponsored by Democratic Leader Robert C. Byrd would have provided a full COLA, but it was defeated on a near party line vote.

After Republican votes obtained Senate passage of the final Republican leadership budget proposal, which included a one-year freeze in Social Security COLAs, Democrats tried one last time to restore full COLAs for FY 1986, arguing that in Social Security's fiftieth anniversary year, the Senate was proposing for the first time to cut Social Security benefits for the purpose of retaining larger amounts in the Social Security trust funds and thereby artificially reducing the deficit in the remainder of the budget—even though the Social Security trust funds can be used solely to pay Social Security benefits. Democrats estimated that freezing the COLAs would drive as many as half a million elderly individuals below the poverty level, and would directly contradict the President's re-election campaign promise to protect Social Security and Social Security COLAs.

The amendment was tabled, nonetheless, and the COLA cut remained in the budget passed by the Senate. Later, during the House-Senate conference on the budget, President Reagan, surprising a

number of Republican Senators, agreed to the House leadership's demand that Social Security COLAs not be cut or frozen. Thus, the budget ultimately did not contain the provision for a freeze.

Later in the session, when the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal was developed, the strength of Democratic support for protecting Social Security resulted in that proposal's sponsors excluding Social Security from automatic cuts.

Finally, on several occasions during the fall, when the government came close to exhausting the debt limit, the Administration disinvested Social Security trust funds in order to provide operating cash for the government. In reaction, Senate Democrats led the way in taking action to instruct the Treasury to restore to the trust funds any monies and interest amounts which were lost during the time the funds were disinvested. They also succeeded in passing amendments which will make it more difficult for Congress to try to use Social Security in future budget debates as a budget balancing tool.

Medicare

The Medicare program was a favorite Republican target for massive cuts throughout the first session of the 99th Congress. While Democrats successfully deleted from the Republican leadership budget one of the most onerous proposals that would have increased out-of-pocket health care costs for the elderly and disabled, they were unable keep the Republican majority from seriously cutting funding for the program.

The first Republican leadership budget proposal (referred to in the Senate Record Votes as the Dole amendment No. 43) devastated funding for the Medicare program and made massive cuts in the Medicaid program: the total cuts over the three-year period (FY 1986-88) would have been \$20.1 billion, with \$18.1 billion in cuts from Medicare and \$2 billion in cuts from Medicaid. While this proposal was agreed to by the Administration and the Senate Republican leadership, these cuts were unacceptable to Senate Democrats and even failed to gain the support of a number of Republicans. Thus, with the ink barely dry on the proposal, a group of Senate Republicans—knowing that Democrats were preparing to offer similar amendments—developed an amendment which would eliminate the most egregious of the cuts. That amendment, offered by Senator Packwood and others, restored \$1.8 billion to Medicare over the three-year period and \$800 million to the Medicaid program over the period, leaving approximately \$16.3 billion in Medicare cuts and \$1.2 billion in Medicaid cuts. These Packwood restorations were designed to allow the proposed copayment on Medicare home health visits to be eliminated; to slow the

increase in the Part B deductible to only thirty percent of program costs over five years, rather than the proposed 35 percent of costs; and to eliminate the proposed cap on spending for the Medicaid program.

In analyzing the effects of the Packwood add-back, the ranking Democrat on the Budget Committee, Senator Chiles, estimated that the severity of cuts would still do great harm to the program, and after all the changes in the program were made that were necessary to achieve the required savings, "there will not be anything left but the beneficiaries." Knowing that, at least, the amendment was preferable to the original Republican proposal it would amend, ninety-eight percent of Democrats voting joined ninety percent of Republicans voting in support of the amendment, and it was approved. But Democrats later tried three separate amendments (in addition to the two broad budget proposals offered by Democrats—see chapter on the Budget) in an effort to restore more funding to these two critical programs. All three amendments were tabled.

The first amendment, offered by Senators Chiles, Kennedy, and Byrd, was aimed at restoring funds sufficient to eliminate the increase in beneficiaries' out-of-pocket expenses under the Medicare program. The amendment was tabled, on a motion offered by Senator Packwood, 51-46. The second amendment was offered by Senator Bradley. It would have restored Medicare funds in order to eliminate the proposed increase in beneficiary premium costs under Medicare's Part B (which pays doctors' bills) and would have offset the costs of the restoration by extending the current cigarette excise tax through 1988 (the tax of sixteen cents per pack then in effect was scheduled to fall back to eight cents per pack on October 1, 1985). The Bradley amendment was tabled, on a motion by Majority Leader Robert Dole, 49-47. The final attempt was an amendment by Senator Kennedy to restore sufficient funds to eliminate the increases in out-of-pocket expenses to Medicare beneficiaries and to fully restore funding for Medicaid over the period. The amendment was tabled, on a motion by Senator Packwood, 54-44.

After debate on the budget resolution was concluded, the next arena for the Medicare debate was consideration of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings initiative. The Senate, in first passing the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment to the debt limit bill, agreed to the Democratic demand that the Medicare program, in the event of across-the-board sequestration cuts, be protected so that only automatic increases to offset inflation and not the basic services provided under the program would be subject to such sequestration. The second Republican modification to the House-passed version of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings did not provide this protection for the program, and so Senator Chiles offered an

amendment to rectify this. It was tabled, on a motion offered by Senator Packwood, 54-44. Democrats were successful, however, in securing a limit (two percent) to any Medicare cuts ordered under Gramm-Rudman.

The Medicare program again was addressed when the Senate began consideration of the FY 1986 Budget Reconciliation bill. The Medicare amendment offered by Democrats (Senators Bumpers, Gore, and Sasser) was an effort to permit persons over eighteen years old to receive liver transplants under the program. (Current law limits coverage for liver transplants to persons under eighteen years of age.) The amendment was tabled.

The final legislation on which Democrats and Republicans differed substantially in 1985 with respect to the Medicare program was the Continuing Appropriations bill for FY 1986 (to fund programs for which regular appropriations bills had not been enacted.) Senators Kennedy and Burdick offered an amendment to defer the exorbitant January 1986 scheduled increase in the Medicare Part A (hospital costs insurance) for 4-1/2 months so that the Finance Committee could have time to report legislation to correct the inequities contained in the Part A deductible formula. (The amendment also raised the cigarette tax by one cent per pack.) The amendment was ruled out of order. Then Senator Heinz offered an amendment which would have lowered the scheduled increase by \$16 per deductible. The Chair ruled that amendment out of order, and Senator Heinz appealed the ruling. Seventy percent of Republicans voting voted to table the appeal, overcoming Democratic votes in support of the amendment.

The Record

Social Security

- 1) Metzenbaum appeal of the Chair's ruling that the Metzenbaum motion [to recess for fifteen minutes and immediately upon reconvening proceed to vote on the Moynihan-Byrd-Riegle, et al, amendment (to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to delete the budget cut to the social security cost-of-living adjustment in current law] is out of order. The question is: "Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the ruling of the Senate?" (Vote No. 33—99th Congress, 1st Session)

96% of Democrats voting voted not to sustain.

94% of Republicans voting voted to sustain.

The ruling was sustained, 54-45.

April 30, 1985.

For almost the first full week of debate on the First Budget Resolution, the Democrats were prevented from offering any amendments to the bill. The Majority Leader, using his power of recognition, assiduously controlled the floor, offering all amendments on behalf of his Republican colleagues, thus making sure to maintain his fragile coalition in support of the budget compromise agreed to by the White House and Senate Republicans.

Democratic frustration with this shutout almost boiled over several times. One example was the Metzenbaum motion to recess in order to reconvene to consider a Democratic amendment to restore full COLAs for Social Security recipients. The motion to recess was a necessary parliamentary strategy to make the Democratic amendment in order before the Senate. The motion was extraordinary, however, because it is an almost-never breached Senate tradition that the Majority Leader controls motions to recess and adjourn.

The Metzenbaum motion was a desperate measure to obtain Senate consideration of a Democratic amendment to assure full Social Security COLAs—and it showed the level of Democratic discontent over not being able to offer amendments to the budget resolution. The motion was ruled out of order by the Chair. Senator Metzenbaum then appealed the ruling, and the vote was whether or not to sustain the Chair's ruling. The vote adhered almost completely to party lines, and the Chair's ruling was sustained, thereby precluding consideration of the Democrats' COLA amendment. (Democrats later succeeded in offering the amendment—see item No. 2 on page 77.)

- 2) Dole motion to table the Moynihan-Byrd-Riegle, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended by the second GOP-Dole substitute amendment No. 93—Vote No. 72—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to restore full COLAs for Social Security in FY 1986 instead of freezing all 1986 COLAs. (Vote No. 73—99th Congress, 1st Session)

96% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

94% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 51-47.

May 10, 1985 (session of May 9).

The Moynihan-Byrd-Riegle amendment was offered to the final Republican leadership budget proposal (for the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986), which had been approved by the Senate earlier in

the evening. The Democratic amendment sought to reverse the Social Security COLA freeze for FY 1986 which the Republican budget contained.

The amendment was tabled on a motion by Majority Leader Dole, 51-47, with the votes of ninety-four percent of the Republicans who voted. Later, during the House-Senate conference on the budget, President Reagan agreed to the House leadership's demand that Social Security COLAs not be cut or frozen. Thus, the budget ultimately did not contain the provision.

- 3) Packwood motion to table the Chiles-Kennedy-Byrd, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to restore cuts which would increase Medicare beneficiaries' out-of-pocket expenses by: striking increases in the Medicare part B premium and deductible; restoring \$3 billion over three years in Medicare funding for hospital reimbursements (including restoring the fifty percent reduction in "indirect teaching adjustments" to certain hospitals); eliminating a home care copayment to be charged after the twentieth visit; and eliminating the provision which would have delayed Medicare eligibility for one month (costing an estimated \$4.6 billion over three years, but still achieving \$11.7 billion in savings through a full provider freeze). (Vote No. 64—99th Congress, 1st Session)

91% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

92% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 51-46.

May 9, 1985.

The Republican leadership budget proposal, even as amended earlier by Senator Packwood, contained significant increases in Medicare premiums and deductibles and levied a new copayment for home health services. Specifically, the premium for Medicare's Part B (paying doctors' bills) was to increase two percent per year until 1990. This would mean an increase from the current annual premium of \$186 to a premium of \$299 by 1988 and one of \$416 by 1990. The Republican budget proposal also increased the annual part B deductible from \$75 per year to \$92 per year by 1990.

The Chiles-Kennedy-Byrd amendment would have retained the premium increase schedule under current law (in 1990, premiums would still be less than \$250), and would have retained the present deductible level of \$75.

The Republican proposal added a daily copayment for home health care visits after the first 20 visits (currently there is no copayment). The Chiles-Kennedy-Byrd amendment would have retained current policy. The Democratic amendment also eliminated from the Republican amendment a one-month delay of initial Medicare eligibility.

Finally, the Republican proposal froze Medicare payments to hospitals for one year and called for cuts in payments to hospitals of over \$3 billion over FY 1986-88. Most of these cuts resulted from a 50 percent reduction in the "indirect teaching adjustment" to hospitals. The Chiles-Kennedy-Byrd amendment would have reduced these cuts to \$1.8 billion over the three-year period.

Proponents of the Democratic amendment pointed out that major cuts in the Medicare program have been adopted every year of the Reagan Administration and, with the addition of the proposed cuts, Medicare beneficiaries will be required to pay an additional \$21.1 billion for health care by the year 1990. Currently, Medicare participants are paying the same percentage of their incomes for health care—even with the aid provided by Medicare—as elderly citizens were paying in the year prior to enactment of the Medicare program. More cuts in the program, increasing the price the elderly will have to pay out of their own pockets, will further increase the burden and force many senior citizens to choose between food and shelter, and health care.

Despite the unfairness of the Republican budget proposal, Republicans prevailed in tabling the amendment on a motion offered by Senator Packwood.

- 4) Dole motion to table the Bradley amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended, to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to eliminate the increase in Medicare part B premium costs to beneficiaries and extend the current cigarette excise tax. (Vote No. 66—99th Congress, 1st Session)

83% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

82% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 49-47.

May 9, 1985.

The Bradley Medicare amendment would eliminate the scheduled increase for part B premiums included in the Republican leadership budget (see the commentary about the prior Vote No. 64). That increase is estimated to cost beneficiaries \$2 billion in the FY 1986-88 period. Senator Bradley proposed tying his Medicare amendment to an extension of the current tax on cigarettes, which was scheduled to revert to eight cents per pack from sixteen cents per pack. This extension would gain the Treasury approximately \$5 billion over the three-year period, thus providing more revenue to the budget than would be lost through eliminating the part B increase.

Despite the deficit-reducing effect of the Bradley amendment and its beneficial effect on Medicare participants, it was tabled by a heavy Republican vote.

- 5) Packwood motion to table the Kennedy amendment (to the final Republican leadership budget proposal for the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to eliminate the increases in out-of-pocket expenses to Medicare beneficiaries and to fully restore the funding for the Medicaid program. (Vote No. 74—99th Congress, 1st Session)

93% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

98% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 54-44.

May 10, 1985.

This amendment would restore funds to the Medicare program in the same way as proposed in the Chiles-Kennedy-Byrd amendment, unsuccessfully offered earlier in the budget debate (see item No. 3 on page 78). In addition, the Kennedy amendment fully restored funding for the Medicaid program which was to be cut in the Republican budget proposal.

The Kennedy amendment was the final Democratic effort to change the effect of the Republican budget on the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Like earlier Democratic efforts, however, it was tabled, with only one Republican voting against the motion to table.

- 6) Packwood motion to table the Chiles, et al, amendment (to the Senate Republican modification of the House-passed version of the Gramm/Rudman proposal which itself was an amendment to legislation to H.J. Res. 372, to increase the debt limit) to prohibit reductions in the Medicare program, except in cost-of-living increases, in the event across-the-board cuts are required under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. (Vote No. 280—99th Congress, 1st Session)

80% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

87% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 54-44.

November 5, 1985.

When the Senate first passed its Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment, Medicare was included among those programs to be protected—so that only cost-of-living adjustments could be cut, not the benefits themselves. However, when the Senate Republican leadership offered a modification to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment that had passed the House, the proposal did not include such protection for the program. Instead, Medicare was categorized as a so-called "controllable" program, and therefore was open to unlimited cuts under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law.

The Chiles amendment was an effort to protect the Medicare program from automatic across-the-board cuts in benefits (cuts in cost-of-living adjustments which might occur in various provider payments made by the program would be allowed) should sequestration occur as provided in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law.

Supporters of the Chiles amendment argued that the Senate had already determined that Medicare should be protected from unlimited Gramm-Rudman-Hollings cuts, and should reconfirm its earlier action by supporting the amendment. They also pointed out the widespread speculation that the Republican proposal moved Medicare into the controllable category in order to reduce the amount it would be necessary to cut from other programs, such as defense. However, despite these arguments and statements concerning how much Medicare had been cut in previous years, and how its ability to meet the needs it was established to meet is in risk of serious impairment, the amendment was tabled, with 87 percent of Republicans who voted voting to table.

Ultimately, in the version of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings that emerged from a House-Senate conference and was signed into law, the Medicare program was offered more protection: though not fully protected from sequestration, it was placed in a new category of programs for which a special formula is to be followed in the event of sequestration. For Medicare, that formula will result in a one percent cut in FY 1986 and two percent in FY 1987, should sequestration occur.

- 7) Durenberger motion to table the Bumpers-Gore-Sasser amendment (to the Budget Reconciliation bill) to limit the power of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to exercise the new authority granted under this Act until the Secretary rules that liver transplants are not classified as an experimental procedure, thereby allowing payment under Medicare when reasonable and medically necessary, as determined on a case-by-case basis. (Vote No. 312—99th Congress, 1st Session)

87% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

87% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 51-47.

November 14, 1985.

This amendment attempted to reverse the policy of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) concerning payment for liver transplants by the Medicare program. Currently, Medicare pays for liver transplants only for persons under eighteen years of age (very few persons in this age group are eligible for Medicare), because HHS has classified this procedure as experimental for persons

over eighteen, and experimental procedures are not covered by Medicare. However, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) does not conclude that there is a scientifically justifiable basis for setting a "benchmark" of eighteen. Thus, CHAMPUS (health insurance for dependents of armed forces personnel), in conformity with NIH opinion, does pay for liver transplants for eligible persons over eighteen.

The amendment offered by Senators Bumpers, Gore, and Sasser would permit Medicare to pay for transplants for those approximately one dozen persons per year who are over eighteen, able to get a donor organ, and qualified to participate in Medicare. Since a liver transplant currently costs between \$135,000 to \$238,000, the estimated cost of this amendment would be \$1 million to \$3 million a year.

Despite the fact that the amendment had a small fiscal impact, it was opposed as a potential budget buster and was tabled, with eighty-seven percent of Republican Senators who voted voting to table.

- 8) Packwood motion to table the Kennedy appeal from the ruling of the Chair on the Helms point of order that the Kennedy-Burdick amendment (to the Continuing Appropriations bill), deferring the \$92 increase in the Medicare Part A hospital deductible for 4-1/2 months and raising the cigarette tax by one cent per pack for three years, is out of order as legislation on an appropriations bill. (Vote No. 357—99th Congress, 1st Session)

67% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

81% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was agreed to, 53-37.

December 9, 1985.

- 9) Hatfield motion to table the Heinz appeal of the ruling of the Chair that the Heinz amendment (to the Continuing Appropriations bill) to limit the Medicare part A hospital deductible increase to \$76 rather than \$92, is out of order as legislation on an appropriations bill. (Vote No. 358—99th Congress, 1st Session)

67% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

70% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion was agreed to, 45-41, thereby killing the amendment.

December 9, 1985.

In January 1986, the Medicare Part A deductible (hospital insurance) was scheduled to increase by twenty-three percent, from \$400 to \$492—an increase felt by many, particularly Democrats, to be unwarranted. Democrats argued that this large increase was principally an unintended result of the

establishment of the Medicare prospective payment system in 1983. Under this system, Medicare pays hospitals a fixed amount for each Medicare patient based on the patient's diagnosis, rather than reimbursing hospitals on the basis of the number of days of care and the fees charged for each service provided to the patients. This prospective system is designed to remove any incentive to keep Medicare patients in the hospital longer than necessary, or to provide them with more services than they need. In this way, the system is intended to produce cost savings in the Medicare program—and so far it is having that effect.

But, because the prospective system is decreasing the average length of stay, the average daily cost of each hospital stay is increasing faster than before. Since Medicare Part A is based on the average daily cost of care, the deductible is increasing far more rapidly than if it were based solely on the overall increase in hospital costs in aggregate or the increase in costs per hospitalization episode.

Democrats, with some Republican support, tried several times in the fall of 1985 to limit the anticipated January increase in the deductible. The first attempt was a Baucus amendment to the budget reconciliation bill which instructed the conferees on the bill to examine what a reasonable increase in the deductible should be in FY 1986. The second attempt, also an amendment to the reconciliation bill, was offered by Senator Kennedy; it expressed the sense of the Senate that the Finance Committee should report legislation to reform the way in which the deductible is calculated. Both amendments were agreed to by voice vote.

When the Continuing Resolution for FY 1986 (making appropriations for all programs not already funded) was before the Senate in December, another attempt was made to rectify the Medicare Part A deductible problem. Senators Kennedy and Burdick offered an amendment to delay the scheduled increase so that the Finance Committee would have time to report legislation making changes in the formula. The amendment paid for the cost of the delay with a one-cent increase in the cigarette tax. Senator Helms made a point of order that the amendment was out of order as legislation on an appropriation bill. The Chair ruled the amendment out of order, and Senator Kennedy appealed the ruling. Senator Packwood then offered a motion to table the Kennedy appeal, and the Packwood motion succeeded, thereby killing the Kennedy-Burdick amendment.

The Heinz amendment, the final attempt to address this problem, took a somewhat different tack by directly changing the amount of the increase. By limiting the increase to nineteen percent (instead of twenty-three percent), the FY 1986 deductible would be \$476 rather than \$492. Senator Hatfield

made a point of order that the amendment was legislation on an appropriations bill (not allowed by Senate Rules). The Chair sustained the point of order, Senator Heinz appealed the ruling of the Chair, and Senator Hatfield moved to table the appeal. The motion to table was approved—with the support of seventy percent of voting Republicans (while 67 percent of voting Democrats voted to overturn the ruling and allow the amendment to be considered).

Despite the Senate's approval of the Baucus and Kennedy amendments to the Reconciliation bill, no further congressional action occurred on this subject—with one major reason being that the Reconciliation bill had not passed the Senate by January, 1986. Consequently, the increase in the Medicare Part A deductible to \$492 did take effect that month.

TAX EQUITY

Introduction

In votes on tax issues addressed when the Senate considered the First Budget Resolution for FY 1986, Democrats raised important themes of insuring that all people paid their fair share of taxes. The increase in tax revenues promised by Republicans, despite the sharp cut in tax rates under the 1981 tax laws, had failed to materialize. Important social programs were being trimmed to bring the budget closer to balance. Moreover, higher income taxpayers received a greater relative reduction in their tax burden under the 1981 tax bill.

Three Democratic efforts to increase the fairness of our revenue system were lost on nearly party line votes, and are illustrative of the overall differences in viewpoint between the Republican Majority and the Democratic Minority in the Senate.

The Record

Automobile Recordkeeping

- 1) Metzenbaum amendment (to the Packwood substitute amendment to the Automobile Recordkeeping bill) stating the sense of the Congress that the existing regulations that impute income to corporate executives (so-called "key employees") for the personal use of noncommercial aircraft shall not be amended or altered by this bill in any manner that would reduce the amount of income imputed to such employees. (Vote No. 24—99th Congress, 1st Session)

83% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

83% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was rejected, 46-47.

April 3, 1985.

At the time the amendment was offered, Internal Revenue Service regulations imputed income to corporate executives for personal use of corporate aircraft. The amendment stated the sense of the Congress that the regulations should be retained. Democrats maintained that the amendment was necessary to halt a massive giveaway to corporate executives by retaining the requirement that a

businessperson who takes along a family member or an extra employee on a business trip on his corporate aircraft must impute the cost of that seat as income.

Democrats believed that such "key employees" of corporations should not be able to avoid paying their fair share of taxes on the benefit they receive by not having to pay air fare for employees or family members given rides for nonbusiness reasons on corporate aircraft. By a slim 46-47 vote, the Republican majority prevailed, however, defeating the amendment and approving this tax giveaway.

Cigarette Excise Tax

- 2) Dole motion to table the Levin-Dixon, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to continue through FY 1988 the cigarette excise tax of sixteen cents per pack, scheduled to return to eight cents on October 1, 1985, and apply the \$4.9 billion in revenue raised toward reducing the deficit. (Vote No. 70—99th Congress, 1st Session)

74% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

76% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 50-46.

May 9, 1985.

Democrats noted that the expiration of the additional eight cents cigarette tax was a part of legislation enacted in 1982, and had been accepted when estimates indicated that the budget would be near balance by 1986, thereby lessening the need for this revenue. However, with the deficit soaring to over \$200 million, the Senate should not lower the cigarette tax when draconian cuts are being made in domestic programs which protect those who are least able to protect themselves. Nonetheless, seventy-six percent of voting Republicans voted to allow the tax on cigarettes to be reduced by eight cents a pack, thus failing to reduce the deficit by \$4.9 billion.

Corporate Tax

- 3) Dole motion to table the Metzenbaum amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended by the second GOP-Dole substitute amendment No. 93—Vote No. 72—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to raise \$10.5 billion over FY 1986-88 for deficit reduction with a corporate minimum tax of fifteen percent on profits in excess of \$50,000. (Vote No. 75—99th Congress, 1st Session)

74% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

94% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 61-37.

May 10, 1985.

This amendment was actually a proposal by President Ronald Reagan as he outlined it on August 11, 1982. Democrats agreed that it was time to address the issue of a corporate minimum tax—both because fairness demands that all profitable corporations pay at least some income taxes, and because the resulting revenues could be used to help reduce the deficit. Democrats also felt that the sense of the Senate amendment calling for a minimum corporate and individual tax (Vote No. 38), which was passed earlier by the Senate, was an inadequate gesture, and that the Senate should legislate such a corporate minimum tax then rather than just make a statement that such a tax was desirable. Even though most Republicans had supported the sense of the Senate provision, 94 percent of them voted to table the Metzenbaum amendment, and it therefore was defeated.



TRADE

Introduction

For the first time since 1914, America became a debtor nation in 1985. The massive Federal deficit was financed by record levels of foreign capital. As Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker told the Washington Post (February 21, 1985), "[T]he stability of our capital markets is now dependent as never before on the willingness of foreigners to continue to place growing amounts of money in our markets....We are in a real sense living on borrowed money and time."

This influx of foreign capital into the U.S. increases demand for the dollar, thereby raising its value. The abnormally high dollar acts as a tax on our exports and a subsidy of foreign products coming into the American market. The Administration's own estimates describe the dollar as being overvalued by twenty-five percent or more. But the President insisted that the overvaluation of the American dollar was good news. "A strong dollar is one of our greatest weapons against inflation," he said in remarks to a conservative fundraiser. Even his own advisors were concerned about the dangerous impact of the high dollar policy. Secretary of State Shultz said the overvalued dollar was "altering the character of the American economy in a basic, and, in my view, undesirable way." Trade Representative William Brock said, "The explosion in the price of the dollar has made life more difficult than all the trade barriers in all the countries of the world."

But the Administration remained committed to the high dollar policy that threatened to continue the record trade deficit growth. In 1984, that deficit reached \$123 billion. The 1985 trade shortfall was a record \$148.5 billion. These are the largest trade deficits of any country in history, and they translate into American job loss and a dangerous decline in the Nation's industrial base.

The Record

- (1) Lugar motion to table Bradley, et al, amendment (to S. 960, the Foreign Aid Authorization bill) stating the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve should work with our allies to achieve a coordinated exchange rate policy. (Vote No. 79—99th Congress, 1st Session)

100% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

78% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was agreed to by voice vote after the motion to table failed, 39-56.

May 15, 1985.

In response to the Administration's unwillingness to correct the situation of the overvalued dollar, and thereby seek to undo the damage to our trade balance that was being caused by that overvaluation, Senator Bradley offered a successful amendment to the foreign assistance bill which called for concerted action with our allies to control the value of the dollar and a coordinated policy effort by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve to ensure greater cooperation on domestic and international economic policies. Despite a Republican effort to table the Bradley initiative, it passed. Within weeks, the Administration began an effort to work with our major trading partners to control the dollar and achieve greater cooperation.

VETERANS BENEFITS

Introduction

Democrats in 1985 continued their commitment to honor America's promises to those who have fought to defend the country, despite Republican efforts to cut veterans programs. As ranking Democrat on the Veterans' Affairs Committee, Senator Cranston offered important amendments to protect veterans against reductions sought by the White House in veterans' programs.

Senator Cranston and Senate Democrats opposed budget cuts that would reduce veterans' health care programs by more than \$2 billion over three years (1986-88) by eliminating in-patient care for some 284,000 veterans and cutting out-patient visits; that would reduce cost-of-living adjustments for veterans compensation and pension benefits; and that would double the fee charged veterans using their home loan guaranty entitlement—an increase which the Congressional Budget Office estimated would result in 16,000 Vietnam-era veterans not using the VA loan guaranty program in 1986 alone. Senate Democrats also sought to exempt VA service-connected compensation from automatic cuts under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation and to protect the VA's medical care account from Gramm-Rudman-Hollings reductions below the previous year's level.

The Record

- 1) Domenici motion to table Cranston, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43 as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1986) to maintain veterans health care system at FY 1985 staff and program levels; provide full COLAs for veterans compensation and pensions; and eliminate increases in the VA home loan guaranty fee. (Vote No. 54—99th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

96% of Republicans voting supported motion.

The amendment was tabled, 49-47.

May 9, 1985.

The Republican Leadership-White House agreement on the FY 1986 budget resolution called for cuts of \$800 million in FY 1987 and \$900 million in FY 1988 in funding for veterans health programs,

which could have meant reducing VA health-care staffing at existing facilities by some 25,000 employees (in addition to an 8,000 employee cut in FY1986), closing some facilities, and making it impossible for the VA to continue services at the existing level, despite the need for increased services in the coming years due to the aging of World War II and Korean Conflict veterans. Additionally, the plan assumed implementation of a very burdensome means test for non-service-connected disabled veterans seeking treatment. That test would have forced many veterans to obtain health care through the Medicare system. The substantial savings claimed for these changes were never backed up by hard facts, and, clearly, simply shifting costs from one Federal health care program to another makes no budgetary sense. Democrats stood together to protect the interests of those who had served their country, but the amendment was tabled when only two Republicans joined them.

- 2) Packwood motion to table Riegle-Cranston modified amendment to the Gramm-Rudman legislation (itself an amendment to a bill to increase the public debt limit) which would exempt Veterans' Administration service-connected compensation benefits from reductions and protect the VA health-care system from being subjected to cuts below the current funding levels. (Vote No. 282—99th Congress, 1st Session)

87% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

90% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 52-44.

November 5, 1985.

Democrats agreed that it would be grossly inequitable to permit veterans' COLAs to be reduced while COLAs in a similar "social contract" program, Social Security disability, are protected. Also, a failure to protect the VA health-care system could result in denying many non-service-connected disabled veterans health care services at VA facilities, thus sending them back into the Medicare and Medicaid systems, which are also being cut back. The end result could be the denial of all health care to many of these veterans. An amendment offered by Democrats to prevent the Gramm-Rudman process from making such cuts was tabled, however, despite the fact that 87 percent of voting Democrats were joined by five Republicans in supporting veterans' health care.

MISCELLANEOUS

Postal Subsidies

- 1) Stevens motion to table the Metzenbaum-Burdick, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34—to the First Budget Resolution, FY 1987) to restore funding for postal subsidies for the blind, charitable nonprofit organizations, religious organizations, rural newspapers, and libraries, with the exception of national publications using the second class, in-country rate (costing \$2.5 billion over three years). (Vote No. 62—99th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

98% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was agreed to, 51-46.

May 9, 1985.

Democrats saw the elimination of the postal subsidy as potentially devastating for nonprofit groups since the increased costs would have to be absorbed by the public through higher subscription rates, decreased services, and the need for the groups to secure additional funding just to maintain their current operations. For example, the mailing costs for the Salvation Army would increase by \$2.6 million, the March of Dimes by \$7.8 million, and the National Catholic Development Conference by \$39 million. Proponents of the Metzenbaum-Burdick amendment argued that postal costs for small newspapers could go up by as much as 300 percent and postal costs for libraries would rise at least 75 percent.

Democrats saw the elimination of the subsidies in the Republican leadership's FY 1986 budget proposal as an ill-advised overreaction to abuses of the privilege of third class mail, and the Republicans' proposed partial offset—transferring \$100 million in funding to the Postal Service for subsidies for small rural newspapers and other nonprofit organizations approved for nonprofit rates by the Postal Rate Commission—as inadequate.

Democrats, supporting the Metzenbaum-Burdick amendment, criticized the Administration, which originally fabricated this proposal, for being "penny-wise and pound-foolish" for attempting to balance the budget "on the backs" of the Nation's voluntary organizations at the same time President Reagan is seeking support from such organizations to fill the void created by drastic cuts in social service programs.

On a virtually total party line vote, the motion to table the amendment was approved, and the elimination of the postal subsidy remained in the Republican leadership budget.

Amusement Park Safety

- 2) Danforth substitute amendment (for the Simon amendment to the Consumer Product Safety bill) to establish a commission, chaired by the Director of the National Bureau of Standards, to study the safety of fixed site amusement parks and report its recommendations within eighteen months and to permit the National Bureau of Standards to investigate serious accidents, if requested to do so by State authorities. (Vote No. 160—99th Congress, 1st Session)

85% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

88% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 52-41.

July 24, 1985.

Prior to 1981, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) had the authority to inspect fixed site amusement parks to ensure their safety to the public. However, fixed site amusement parks were exempted from CPSC inspection authority by a provision in the "Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981."

Senator Simon offered an amendment which would have reauthorized CPSC to inspect rides at fixed site amusement parks in those States which did not have legislation relating to the regulation of such facilities. CPSC would have no authority to inspect such facilities in those states which did regulate rides at fixed site amusement parks. The purpose of the amendment was to ensure the safety of the children and adults who frequent the hundreds of amusement parks across the nation providing for inspections and enforcement of safety standards at such facilities.

The Danforth amendment was offered as a weak substitute for the Simon amendment, and authorized the National Bureau of Standards, not the Consumer Product Safety Commission, to inspect fixed site amusement parks only after an accident occurred, and only if asked by a State or local government to provide assistance. The amendment would have provided no enforcement of safety standards for fixed site amusement parks.

Democrats believe that it is legitimate and essential for the Federal government to act to protect the public in those States which have not yet acted to ensure the safety of rides at fixed site

amusement parks. Consequently, Democrats overwhelmingly opposed the Danforth amendment. Nearly unanimous Republican support achieved passage of the weaker substitute by a vote of 52-41.

Immigration Bill—Employment

- 3) Simpson motion to table the Levin, et al, amendment (to the Immigration Reform bill) to provide that illegal aliens who arrived prior to January 1, 1980 (who under the bill's provisions would be eligible for legalization in three years), may be employed during the 2-1/2 year interim period prior to their legalization. (Vote No. 187—99th Congress, 1st Session)

75% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

85% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The amendment was tabled, 54-41.

September 17, 1985.

While the immigration bill (S. 1200) was pending, Democrats sought to correct an obvious inequity in that measure. The legislation, if not corrected, would have permitted a situation to exist where individuals eligible for legalization (amnesty), but who had to wait three years for the official commencement of the legalization process, could not be "legally" employed for most of that time under the employer sanctions provisions of the bill. The result of this anomaly would have been that persons who would undoubtedly be legalized would be forced onto welfare roles or into destitution because they will be unable to hold gainful work during that period. Democrats sought to correct this problem by providing that such individuals would be permitted to be legally employed. Although, three-fourths of voting Democrats resisted a motion to table the fairness amendment, it prevailed when eighty-four percent of voting Republicans supported the tabling motion.

Aid to Victims of Exposure to Toxic Substances

- 4) Roth amendment (to the Superfund bill) to strike the five-year Victim Assistance Demonstration Program which would aid victims of exposure to hazardous substances released into the environment. (Vote No. 193—99th Congress, 1st Session)

79% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

78% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 49-45.

September 24, 1985.

The Superfund Improvement Act of 1985, legislation reported by the Senate Environment Committee reauthorizing the Nation's Superfund program, included a provision establishing a 5-year, \$30 million demonstration program which would provide compensation to individuals whose health had been endangered as a result of exposure to toxic substances. The program would provide compensation for out-of-pocket medical expenses to individuals from areas in close proximity to selected toxic waste sites who have no other form of insurance. The implementation of this program for the five-year demonstration period would provide Congress with the necessary information to determine the need for a permanent national program to compensate individuals who have suffered injury from exposure to toxic substances. The Roth amendment eliminated this provision from the Senate bill.

Democrats recognized that this demonstration program was intended to respond to the immense financial hardships imposed on individuals whose health has been endangered or harmed through exposure to toxic substances. These hardships are compounded and exacerbated by the numerous legal and other difficulties encountered by such individuals in efforts to obtain compensation for personal injury and/or property damage. The victim assistance program contained in the bill reported by the Environment Committee was a limited and carefully-defined means of assisting these people.

Nonetheless, the Senate Republican majority was able to defeat even this modest effort and remove it from the bill by a vote of 49-45.

Abortions in Prisons

- 5) Helms motion to table the Rudman point of order that the Helms-Armstrong amendment (to the Commerce-Justice-State-Judiciary Appropriations bill)—to prohibit the Federal funding of abortions in prisons except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term—violates the Constitution and is out of order. (Vote No. 274—99th Congress, 1st Session)

72% of Democrats voting opposed the motion.

67% of Republicans voting supported the motion.

The motion failed, 47-48.

November 1, 1985.

In the years since the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of abortion, opponents of Federal funding of abortions have offered many amendments in their efforts to close off all avenues of such funding. The amendment offered by Senators Helms and Armstrong took a new approach:

prohibiting use of Federal funds to provide abortions in Federal prisons, except in cases where the life of the mother is endangered. The implications of the amendment were limited because fewer than a score of abortions were provided in Federal prisons in 1984.

The debate and vote on the Helms-Armstrong amendment, concentrated on the question of the constitutionality of the amendment, rather than on its merits. A point of order was raised against the amendment by Republican Senator Rudman, on the grounds that the eighth amendment to the Constitution which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment) requires that Federal prisons not restrict access to adequate medical care, and that the Supreme Court has ruled that denial of access to medical care by prison officials violates the eighth amendment.

Senator Helms offered a motion to table the point of order. The motion to table, although supported by the great majority of Republicans, was not agreed to and the point of order was sustained; thus the amendment failed.

Colorado Wilderness Protection

- 6) Gorton motion to table the Hart amendment (to the Continuing Appropriations bill) expressing the sense of the Senate that no funds appropriated in this bill should be used to provide for commercial activities within certain areas in Colorado proposed for wilderness designation. (Vote No. 364—99th Congress, 1st Session)

98% of Democrats voting opposed the amendment.

100% of Republicans voting supported the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to, 50-45.

December 10, 1985.

Nearly 700,000 acres of land in Colorado have been awaiting official designation as wilderness areas since 1984. The designation of these lands would provide protection from commercial development. However, the process has been delayed, and the lands could still be despoiled by commercial development before final action is taken to save some or all of it in a wilderness condition. Indeed, permits have been issued by the Reagan Administration for timbering and oil and gas exploration on the areas awaiting wilderness protection.

The Hart amendment expressed the sense of the Senate that no Federal agency should grant a permit for any activity which would damage the wilderness characteristics of Colorado lands awaiting permanent designation as wilderness areas.

The Republican Senate tabled the amendment on a vote of 50-45, with 100 percent of the Republicans who voted voting to table, and ninety-eight percent of the Democrats who voted voting in opposition to tabling the amendment.

APPENDIX

ROLLCALL VOTES REFERRED TO IN DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES

PART V



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 9

99th Congress
1st Session

February 23, 1985, 3:53 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-1993

NOMINATION OF EDWIN MEESE, III, TO BE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL

POSITION: Attorney General of the United States

SUBJECT: Confirmation of the nomination of Edwin Meese III, of California, to be Attorney General of the United States.

NOTE: As a consequence of information revealed in the press and during 4 days of Judiciary Committee hearings in March 1984, Attorney General William French Smith initiated a preliminary investigation of possible criminal charges against Mr. Meese. This investigation resulted in the appointment of Independent Counsel Jacob Stein to further examine 11 specific charges against Mr. Meese, including allegations that he had accepted financial favors in exchange for helping individuals to obtain Federal jobs, willfully filed false financial disclosure statements, and improperly obtained a promotion in the U.S. Army Reserve. In September 1984, after interviewing over 100 witnesses and convening a grand jury which questioned 45 witnesses at length, the Independent Counsel's report concluded that there was "no basis" for indicting Mr. Meese on criminal charges. From January 29-31, 1985, the Judiciary Committee again held hearings on the nomination. Relying heavily upon the Independent Counsel's conclusion, the Committee reported the nomination favorably by a vote of 12-6. Mr. Meese's experience in government and law enforcement, proponents maintained, has prepared him well for the job of Attorney General. A scholarship student at Yale and a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley Law School, Mr. Meese has served as deputy district attorney in Alameda County, a volunteer in several delinquency prevention and youth job placement programs, Legal Affairs Secretary to the Governor of California, and counselor to the President of the United States. The President deserves to have the person of his choice to serve in this important position, and confirmation, they contended, should be delayed no further.

(OVER)

Vote Nos. 5-9.

RESULT: NOMINATION CONFIRMED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (63)			NAYS (31)		NOT VOTING (6)	
Democrats (15 or 33%)	Republicans (48 or 100%)		Democrats (31 or 67%)	Republicans (0 or 0%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (5)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Lautenberg	Chiles—2AY	East—2AY
Boren	Andrews	Laxalt	Biden	Leahy		Garn—2AY
Burdick	Armstrong	Lugar	Bingaman	Levin		Goldwater—2AY
DeConcini	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bradley	Melcher		Humphrey—2AY
Exon	Chafee	Mattingly	Bumpers	Metzenbaum		Stevens—2AY
Ford	Cochran	McClure	Byrd	Mitchell		
Heflin	Cohen	McConnell	Cranston	Moynihan		
Hollings	D'Amato	Murkowski	Dixon	Nunn		
Inouye	Danforth	Nickles	Dodd	Proxmire		
Johnston	Denton	Packwood	Eagleton	Pryor		
Long	Dole	Pressler	Glenn	Riegle		
Matsunaga	Domenici	Quayle	Gore	Rockefeller		
Pell	Durenberger	Roth	Harkin	Sarbanes		
Stennis	Evans	Rudman	Hart	Sasser		
Zorinsky	Gorton	Simpson	Kennedy	Simon		
	Gramm	Specter				
	Grassley	Stafford				
	Hatch	Symms				
	Hatfield	Thurmond				
	Hawkins	Trible				
	Hecht	Wallop				
	Heinz	Warner				
	Helms	Weicker				
	Kassebaum	Wilson				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—67%
Republicans—100%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (63)
Democrats—15 or 24%
Republicans—48 or 76%

Against (31)
Democrats—31 or 100%
Republicans—0 or 0%

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Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Opponents argued that the Independent Counsel's report does not constitute a vindication of Mr. Meese from charges of repeated ethical violations nor does it demonstrate his fitness to serve as Attorney General. Despite the request of the nominee's counsel, Mr. Stein explicitly refused to say "...that the evidence does not substantiate the loose charges of moral turpitude against Mr. Meese." It is not enough to say that the nominee for Attorney General cannot be prosecuted for any Federal crime. Questions remain regarding the propriety and ethics of his conduct—matters the Independent Counsel declined to review as being outside its charter. The Attorney General serves as the head of the FBI, Bureau of Prisons, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Immigration and Naturalization Service. These are only a few of the sensitive areas where the Attorney General must make delicate, extremely important decisions. A man who has called the American Civil Liberties Union a criminals' lobby and who supports tax exemptions for segregated schools, they contended, is not fully prepared to fight for equal enforcement of our laws and civil liberties.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 13

99th Congress
1st Session

February 27, 1985, 3:28 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-2224

AFRICAN RELIEF AND FARM CREDIT ASSISTANCE

BILL NO.: S. 457 (H.R. 1096)

AMENDMENT NO.: 11

SUBJECT: Melcher-Andrews, et al, substitute amendment (to the Zorinsky-Andrews, et al, amendment—Vote No. 14) which contains farm credit assistance provisions identical to the Zorinsky-Andrews amendment except that it includes the existing requirement that lenders write off a portion of the principal or interest on farm loans as a prerequisite to securing an FmHA loan guarantee. (See Vote No. 14 for arguments on this amendment. See also Vote Nos. 11 and 15-17.)

S. 457 (H.R. 1096): Vote Nos. 12-17.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (54)			NAYS (45)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (46 or 98%)		Republicans (8 or 15%)	Democrats (1 or 2%)		Republicans (44 or 85%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (1)
Baucus	Inouye	Abdnor	Proxmire	Armstrong	Laxalt		Garn—2AN
Bentsen	Johnston	Andrews		Boschwitz	Lugar		
Biden	Kennedy	Danforth		Chafee	Mathias		
Bingaman	Kerry	Durenberger		Cochran	Mattingly		
Boren	Lautenberg	Grassley		Cohen	McClure		
Bradley	Leahy	Kasten		D'Amato	McConnell		
Bumpers	Levin	Pressler		Denton	Murkowski		
Burdick	Long	Weicker		Dole	Nickles		
Byrd	Matsunaga			Domenici	Packwood		
Chiles	Melcher			East	Quayle		
Cranston	Metzenbaum			Evans	Roth		
DeConcini	Mitchell			Goldwater	Rudman		
Dixon	Moynihan			Gorton	Simpson		
Dodd	Nunn			Gramm	Specter		
Eagleton	Pell			Hatch	Stafford		
Exon	Pryor			Hatfield	Stevens		
Ford	Riegle			Hawkins	Symms		
Glenn	Rockefeller			Hecht	Thurmond		
Gore	Sarbanes			Heinz	Trible		
Harkin	Sasser			Helms	Wallop		
Hart	Simon			Humphrey	Warner		
Heflin	Stennis			Kassebaum	Wilson		
Hollings	Zorinsky						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—98%
Republicans—85%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (54)
Democrats—46 or 85%
Republicans—8 or 15%

Against (45)
Democrats—1 or 2%
Republicans—44 or 98%

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SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 14

99th Congress
1st Session

February 27, 1985, 3:53 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-2224

AFRICAN RELIEF AND FARM CREDIT ASSISTANCE

BILL NO.: S. 457 (H.R. 1096)

AMENDMENT NO.: 10

SUBJECT: Zorinsky-Andrews, et al, amendment, as amended (by the Melcher-Andrews, et al, amendment—Vote No. 13), which requires the FmHA to use the resources of the Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund to provide \$100 million to cooperatively buy down the interest rate for one or more years on farm loans made by commercial or cooperative lenders; authorizes \$1.85 billion in loan guarantee authority in addition to the \$650 million already available for FY 1985; retains the existing requirement that lenders write off part of the principal or interest on a farm loan as a prerequisite to securing an FmHA loan guarantee; modifies existing FmHA regulations to allow borrowers the option of basing their application for assistance on 100 percent or 110 percent of the cash flow needed to meet debt obligations; requires the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations implementing this legislation no later than 15 days after enactment and to hire additional temporary personnel to process and service loans; requires Federal and State financial regulatory agencies to refrain from adversely classifying loans that have been restructured under the FmHA loan guarantee program; encourages the Small Business Administration to consider implementing a debt adjustment program for current farm loan borrowers comparable to the FmHA program; and requires the Farm Credit Administration to conduct a feasibility study of insuring the financial integrity of farm system institutions. (See also Vote Nos. 11, 13, and 15-17.)

NOTE: Proponents termed this is a fiscally prudent and cost-conscious farm package designed to provide effective and timely assistance to financially-stricken farmers and to equitably divide the responsibility for the program's success among the Federal government, farmers, and lenders. Farm bankruptcies have increased 200 percent in the last five years and, unless Congress acts quickly, an additional 10-15 percent of farmers will be forced to sell out this year. The President's much heralded farm credit initiatives are not working. There have been only 21 Federal guarantees of farm loans nationwide and only \$44 million of the \$650 million provided by Congress has been dispensed. This amendment provides for a more workable program by encouraging lenders to participate by cooperatively buying down the interest rates, making more farmers eligible for loan guarantees and providing

(OVER)

S. 457 (H.R. 1096): Vote Nos. 12-17.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (54)			NAYS (45)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (46 or 98%)	Republicans (8 or 15%)		Democrats (1 or 2%)	Republicans (44 or 85%)		Democrats (0)	Republicans (1)
Baucus	Inouye	Abdnor	Proxmire	Armstrong	Laxalt		Garn—2AN
Bentsen	Johnston	Andrews		Boschwitz	Lugar		
Biden	Kennedy	Danforth		Chafee	Mathias		
Bingaman	Kerry	Durenberger		Cochran	Mattingly		
Boren	Lautenberg	Grassley		Cohen	McClure		
Bradley	Leahy	Kasten		D'Amato	McConnell		
Bumpers	Levin	Pressler		Denton	Murkowski		
Burdick	Long	Weicker		Dole	Nickles		
Byrd	Matsunaga			Domenici	Packwood		
Chiles	Melcher			East	Quayle		
Cranston	Metzenbaum			Evans	Roth		
DeConcini	Mitchell			Goldwater	Rudman		
Dixon	Moynihan			Gorton	Simpson		
Dodd	Nunn			Gramm	Specter		
Eagleton	Pell			Hatch	Stafford		
Exon	Pryor			Hatfield	Stevens		
Ford	Riegle			Hawkins	Symms		
Glenn	Rockefeller			Hecht	Thurmond		
Gore	Sarbanes			Heinz	Trible		
Harkin	Sasser			Helms	Wallop		
Hart	Simon			Humphrey	Warner		
Heflin	Stennis			Kassebaum	Wilson		
Hollings	Zorinsky						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion		Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on	
Democrats—98%	Republicans—85%	For (54) Democrats—46 or 85% Republicans—8 or 15%	Against (45) Democrats—1 or 2% Republicans—44 or 98%

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adequate personnel to process FmHA loan applications quickly and efficiently. U.S. farmers are spending from 20 to 30 percent of their production costs on interest payments alone and must be relieved of some of this burden if they are going to survive the current unfavorable economic conditions caused by government-initiated embargoes and the burgeoning deficit. Retaining the provision requiring lenders to write off an equal percentage of the interest or a portion of the principal will further lower costs for farmers, thereby increasing their cash flow. It also could make the entire package more acceptable to the Administration. Allowing farmers the option of utilizing either the 100 percent or 110 percent cash flow requirement will enable them to choose the best loan restructuring method for their particular circumstances and also make more farmers eligible. Farmers should be encouraged to borrow from their own banks in order to help to relieve the enormous workload on the FmHA and help cut taxpayer costs since commercial lenders must finance half of the drawdown in interest or principal. Encouraging financial regulatory agencies to refrain from adversely classifying restructured loans is only reasonable since sending more farmers into bankruptcy will only cause further devaluation of farmland and equipment. Examiners should be allowed to use their discretion and give due consideration to a farmer's loan collateral and ultimate ability to repay rather than just to his/her current cash flow. It is unreasonable for the Senate to be willing to appropriate \$175 million for African relief, they concluded, and to balk at spending \$100 million to save the vital agricultural economy of the Nation.

Opponents asserted that the Administration has already taken major, immediate, and productive steps to insure that farmers are able to obtain timely operating credit from private and government lenders. This amendment is totally unnecessary and risks a Presidential veto of this bill for African famine relief. It would not help farmers and is nothing more than a "bank grab" of \$100 million of the taxpayers' money to help cut the costs of writing off part of the interest or principal in order to be eligible for Federal loan guarantees. The only reason the Administration upped the cash-flow requirement to 110 percent was that banks were unwilling to write down the principal or interest to allow farmers a higher cash flow. Furthermore, the Federal government cannot, and perhaps should not, save a farmer who does not have 110 percent cash flow. Opponents also objected to the provision encouraging financial regulatory agencies to refrain from adversely classifying loans. This requirement only would undermine the integrity and security of the Nation's banking system, they claimed, and result in the withdrawal of deposits from agricultural banks and further depletion of the monies available for farm loans. The Senate should not be appropriating \$100 million in new money which it does not have to spend, thereby increasing the Federal deficit and further compounding farmers' problems.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 15

99th Congress
1st Session

February 27, 1985, 4:52 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-2228

AFRICAN RELIEF AND FARM CREDIT ASSISTANCE

BILL NO.: S. 457 (H.R. 1096)

AMENDMENT NO.: 12

SUBJECT: Gramm-Mattingly-Nickles amendment to prohibit any officer of the executive branch of the Federal government from taking any action to implement the farm credit provisions of this bill which would result in an increase in the Federal deficit. (See also Vote Nos. 13 and 14.)

NOTE: Proponents pointed out that no segment of the American economy is hurt more by deficits than agriculture. The Senate must insure that its actions do not adversely impact on the Federal deficit and, therefore, compound the problems of farmers. Larger deficits only place greater demands on the already depleted money supply and push up interest rates at a time when farmers desperately need additional credit to plant crops, buy land and equipment, and conduct the production of agricultural products. High interest rates also help to drive up the value of the dollar, thereby denying markets to the American farmer. "Squandering" money on farm credit assistance now will only decrease available funding for the farm bill to be drafted later in the session. Proponents claimed that this amendment gives Senators an opportunity to show where they stand on deficit spending, independent of their stance on African relief funds.

Opponents questioned how the Senate could increase the deficit to aid the people of Africa, yet cannot do the same to aid the American farmer. Allowing farmers access to additional credit sources, and possibly a lower interest rate, will give some farmers the ability to become taxpayers again and contribute to the Nation's economy. More importantly though, passage of this amendment would effectively negate the Administration's recent proposals to help alleviate the plight of farmers which are included in the Melcher-Zorinsky amendment.

S. 457 (H.R. 1096): Vote Nos. 12-17.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (43)			NAYS (55)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (2 or 4%)	Republicans (41 or 80%)		Democrats (45 or 96%)	Republicans (10 or 20%)		Democrats (0)	Republicans (2)
Bradley	Armstrong	Laxalt	Baucus	Johnston	Abdnor		Garn—2AY
Proxmire	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bentsen	Kennedy	Andrews		Wallop—2
	Chafee	Mattingly	Biden	Kerry	Danforth		
	Cochran	McClure	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Durenberger		
	Cohen	McConnell	Boren	Leahy	Grassley		
	D'Amato	Murkowski	Bumpers	Levin	Kassebaum		
	Denton	Nickles	Burdick	Long	Kasten		
	Dole	Packwood	Byrd	Matsunaga	Mathias		
	Domenici	Quayle	Chiles	Melcher	Pressler		
	East	Roth	Cranston	Metzenbaum	Weicker		
	Evans	Rudman	DeConcini	Mitchell			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Dixon	Moynihan			
	Gorton	Specter	Dodd	Nunn			
	Gramm	Stafford	Eagleton	Pell			
	Hatch	Stevens	Exon	Pryor			
	Hatfield	Symms	Ford	Riegle			
	Hawkins	Thurmond	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Hecht	Trible	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Heinz	Warner	Harkin	Sasser			
	Helms	Wilson	Hart	Simon			
	Humphrey		Heflin	Stennis			
			Hollings	Zorinsky			
			Inouye				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—96%
Republicans—80%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (43)
Democrats—2 or 5%
Republicans—41 or 95%

Against (55)
Democrats—45 or 82%
Republicans—10 or 18%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 16

99th Congress
1st Session

February 27, 1985, 5:59 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-2240

AFRICAN RELIEF AND FARM CREDIT ASSISTANCE

BILL NO.: S. 457 (H.R. 1096)

AMENDMENT NO.: 14

SUBJECT: Dixon, et al, amendment which provides for 50 percent advance recourse loan payments from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) for 1985 to producers of wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, rice, tobacco, peanuts, soybeans, sugar beets, and cane sugar; limits the advance payment to \$50,000 per farmer; and requires the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations within 15 days and allow farmers to sign up for participation within 30 days of enactment.

NOTE: Proponents contended that almost 9 percent of farmers are not considered creditworthy and will not be able to borrow in the spring to plant their crops, as they normally do. Even with the President's recently announced remedy in place, 7 out of 100 will go bankrupt by the end of the planting season. They are not failing in the normal operation of a pure, free economy. Bad weather, falling land values, Federal policy, and reduced commodity prices threaten the existence of good solid operating farmers. This emergency amendment would provide effective assistance for the 1985 crop year. It is revenue neutral because the only farmers eligible for advance payment in the spring are those who could obtain the whole amount after the fall harvest. The interest rate would be the CCC commodity loan rate in effect on the date the loan is made, or just over 9 percent. Although it is less than the market rate for loans, it is higher than the rate the government normally receives. All the so-called basic cash crops are included in the CCC program and would be covered under the amendment. However, the recourse nature of the loans, the \$50,000 ceiling, and the requirement to post adequate security will limit outlays. The amendment is drastic but necessary since a thriving agricultural sector is the key to a growing, dynamic economy. Moreover, if farm failures are allowed to continue, conglomerates will dominate agriculture, to the detriment of consumers. Long-term solutions must be found to assure farmers of a decent price for their goods; but on an immediate basis, steps must be taken to make spring planting possible.

(OVER)

S. 457 (H.R. 1096): Vote Nos. 12-17.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (50)			NAYS (48)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (45 or 96%)		Republicans (5 or 10%)	Democrats (2 or 4%)		Republicans (46 or 90%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Johnston	Abdnor	Bradley	Armstrong	Kasten		Garn—2AN
Bentsen	Kennedy	Andrews	Proxmire	Boschwitz	Laxalt		Wallop—2
Biden	Kerry	Danforth		Chafee	Lugar		
Bingaman	Lautenberg	Grassley		Cochran	Mathias		
Boren	Leahy	Pressler		Cohen	Mattingly		
Bumpers	Levin			D'Amato	McClure		
Burdick	Long			Denton	McConnell		
Byrd	Matsunaga			Dole	Murkowski		
Chiles	Melcher			Domenici	Nickles		
Cranston	Metzenbaum			Durenberger	Packwood		
DeConcini	Mitchell			East	Quayle		
Dixon	Moynihan			Evans	Roth		
Dodd	Nunn			Goldwater	Rudman		
Eagleton	Pell			Gorton	Simpson		
Exon	Pryor			Gramm	Specter		
Ford	Riegle			Hatch	Stafford		
Glenn	Rockefeller			Hatfield	Stevens		
Gore	Sarbanes			Hawkins	Symms		
Harkin	Sasser			Hecht	Thurmond		
Hart	Simon			Heinz	Trible		
Heftin	Stennis			Helms	Warner		
Hollings	Zorinsky			Humphrey	Weicker		
Inouye				Kassebaum	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—96%
Republicans—90%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (50)
Democrats—45 or 90%
Republicans—5 or 10%

Against (48)
Democrats—2 or 4%
Republicans—46 or 96%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Opponents maintained that by driving up the deficit, the amendment would hurt farmers. It lacks basic safeguards to ensure that the advance loans can or will be repaid. Federal crop insurance is not required, and the advance loans could be attached by other creditors. Not only is there no security to protect the taxpayers' interests, the loans are nonrecourse—meaning the government has no choice but to accept the collateral as full payment upon default. Under this proposal there are no commodities securing the loans, and, therefore, no reason to doubt that many of them would have to be written off as losses to the taxpayers. Cost estimates range between \$4.5 and \$9 billion. In addition, there is no means test so loans could go to farmers who are in a position to reinvest and make money while the government makes up the difference between its borrowing rate and the CCC interest rate charged. Producers of some of the commodities covered, like peanuts and tobacco, are not in trouble. In addition, the amendment would destroy the CCC, a historically important program for price stabilization. It was never intended to be a farm credit bailout mechanism, so this plan cannot possibly be in place in time for spring planting. Opponents contended that even if it worked, the result this year would be increased enrollment and production, hence, destabilized prices. Hard decisions merely would be postponed until fall when farmers would have only half their usual operating capital on hand, forcing them to borrow to pay expenses or sell crops on the depressed, postharvest market. The Administration's Debt Adjustment Program will meet the credit requirements of nearly every viable farmer this spring if bankers and farmers are left alone to restructure debts. If a farmer cannot meet even these lenient conditions, it does no favor to extend more credit, especially since commodity prices are not going to improve dramatically this year. Farm organizations are opposed to this program, and more importantly, it will be vetoed. Congress will have ample opportunity to grapple with agriculture's fundamental problems when it considers the 1985 farm bill.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 17

99th Congress
1st Session

February 27, 1985, 6:49 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-2249

AFRICAN RELIEF AND FARM CREDIT ASSISTANCE

BILL NO.: H.R. 1096 (S. 457)

SUBJECT: Passage of the bill which authorizes \$175 million for non-food assistance to Africa of which \$137.5 million is for disaster and health assistance and \$37.5 million is for migration and refugee assistance; provides farm credit assistance; requires FmHA to use the resources of the Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund to provide \$100 million to buy down the interest rate on farm loans and \$1.85 billion in loan guarantees in addition to the \$650 million already available for FY 1985; and allows farmers to get 50 percent of their price-support loans, up to \$50,000 per farmer, in the spring instead of the fall.

NOTE: President Reagan vetoed the bill on March 7, 1985, citing his objections to the farm credit provisions (contained in Titles II and III of the bill) which he declared were "... completely unacceptable and unnecessary in view of measures already instituted" by his Administration. Title II provisions, he contended, would alter regulations governing the Special Debt Adjustment Program announced in September of 1984 and benefit banks at the expense of farmers and taxpayers. The new program to subsidize farm loans would grow into an uncontrollable, multi-billion dollar annual spending spree. Regulatory agencies would be required to refrain from adversely classifying delinquent farm loans that would "inject uncertainty into the authority of regulatory agencies ... provoke litigation, and jeopardize interests of depositors in banks that made agriculture loans." The President also claimed that Title III, which allows the Commodity Credit Corporation to provide advance loans, would distort the "purpose of the basic Federal mechanism for stabilizing farm prices," and would add \$7 billion to FY 1985 outlays. The President concluded that near term funding for African relief is available through other Federal authorities and that the answer to the farm crisis lies not in "... hasty legislation requiring massive changes in rules just as the planting season begins" but in cooperation and long-term consideration by all concerned.

H.R. 1096 (S. 457): Vote Nos. 12-17.

RESULT: BILL PASSED

YEAS (62)			NAYS (35)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (46 or 98%)		Republicans (16 or 32%)	Democrats (1 or 2%)		Republicans (34 or 68%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (3)
Baucus	Inouye	Abdnor	Proxmire	Armstrong	Laxalt		Garn—2AN
Bentsen	Johnston	Andrews		Boschwitz	Lugar		Goldwater—1
Biden	Kennedy	D'Amato		Chafee	Mattingly		Wallop—2
Bingaman	Kerry	Danforth		Cochran	McClure		
Boren	Lautenberg	Denton		Cohen	McConnell		
Bradley	Leahy	Durenberger		Dole	Nickles		
Bumpers	Levin	Grassley		Domenici	Packwood		
Burdick	Long	Hatfield		East	Quayle		
Byrd	Matsunaga	Hawkins		Evans	Roth		
Chiles	Melcher	Kasten		Gorton	Rudman		
Cranston	Metzenbaum	Mathias		Gramm	Simpson		
DeConcini	Mitchell	Murkowski		Hatch	Stafford		
Dixon	Moynihan	Pressler		Hecht	Symms		
Dodd	Nunn	Specter		Heinz	Thurmond		
Eagleton	Pell	Stevens		Helms	Trible		
Exon	Pryor	Weicker		Humphrey	Warner		
Ford	Riegle			Kassebaum	Wilson		
Glenn	Rockefeller						
Gore	Sarbanes						
Harkin	Sasser						
Hart	Simon						
Heflin	Stennis						
Hollings	Zorinsky						

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:		
Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on		
Party Cohesion	For (62)	Against (35)
Democrats—98%	Democrats—46 or 74%	Democrats—1 or 3%
Republicans—68%	Republicans—16 or 26%	Republicans—34 or 97%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

MAJOR PROVISIONS

African Famine Relief: Authorizes a supplemental appropriation of \$175 million for non-food assistance to Africa of which \$137.5 million is for disaster and health assistance and \$37.5 million is for migration and refugee assistance; calls upon the President to provide the disaster and health assistance, to the maximum extent practicable, through private and voluntary organizations and international organizations, and earmarks 18 percent of the funds for emergency health projects including vaccinations.

Specifies that 54 percent of the migration and refugee assistance funds may be made available to the U.N. Development Program Trust Fund proposed at the second International Conference on Assistance for Refugees in Africa; permits use of military personnel and transportation to furnish the U.S. assistance, on an incremental cost reimbursement basis, as requested by the Department of State; limits assistance to those African countries most severely affected by the drought and other disasters in 1984 and 1985; waives section 620(e)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act (Hickenlooper amendment) prohibiting assistance to any country that has expropriated American-owned property; and requires the President to report to Congress on the uses of these funds, including DOD furnished assistance, by the end of FY 1985.

Farm Crisis Assistance: Provides emergency assistance to farmers who are in severe financial distress by requiring the FmHA to use the resources of the Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund to provide \$100 million to buy down the interest rate—for one or more years—on farm loans made by commercial or cooperative lenders; states that the Federal share of the interest payment will be provided to lenders that reduce the borrowers' interest rate by an additional amount equal to the interest payment provided by the FmHA.

Authorizes \$1.85 billion in loan guarantees authority in addition to the \$650 million already available for FY 1985; clarifies that loan guarantees will result in Federal expenditures only when a borrower—whose loan has been guaranteed up to 90 percent of the principal amount—is unable to meet his obligations; and preserves the administrative requirements that lenders write off part of the principal or interest on a farm loan as a prerequisite to securing an FmHA loan guarantee.

Modifies existing FmHA regulations that require borrowers—as a condition of eligibility for assistance under the Administration's debt adjustment program—to show that they have 100 percent instead of 110 percent of the cash flow needed to meet their obligations; provides that borrowers will be given the option of basing their application for assistance on 100 percent or 110 percent of the cash flow needed to meet obligations; and allows advance recourse loans to producers of wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, rice, tobacco, peanuts, soybeans, sugar cane, and sugar beets.

Requires the Farm Credit Administration to study, and report within 180 days, on the feasibility of obtaining insurance that will effectively protect the Farm Credit System borrower stock.

Directs the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations implementing the appropriate provisions of this legislation as soon as practicable, but not later than 15 days after enactment, and to make available additional personnel and other resources, including assignment of personnel to work overtime and on weekends, to enable the timely processing of applications for assistance; stipulates that additional personnel would be assigned in proportion to the total number of unprocessed applications; and requires Federal and State financial regulatory agencies to refrain from adversely classifying agricultural loans that have been restructured under the FmHA loan guarantee program.

Encourages the SBA to consider implementing a debt adjustment program for current farm loan borrowers that is comparable to the debt adjustment program available for FmHA borrowers.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 19

99th Congress
1st Session

March 19, 1985, 4:57 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-3165

MX MISSILE AUTHORIZATION

BILL NO.: S.J. Res. 71

SUBJECT: Passage of the joint resolution approving the obligation, subject to the enactment of a joint resolution of appropriation, of \$1.5 billion authorized under the FY 1985 DOD Authorization bill (P.L. 98-525) for the procurement of 21 MX missiles, in addition to the 21 missiles funded in FY 1984. (See also Vote Nos. 131 and 132, 98th-2d, and No. 20, 99th-1st.)

NOTE: Proponents asserted that the U.S. must continue its deployment of the MX without delay in order to maintain the effectiveness of its defense triad, ensure deterrence of nuclear war, and promote meaningful arms reduction negotiations. The Soviets will have no incentive to negotiate seriously if the U.S. voluntarily reduces its defensive strength by "killing" the MX without demanding equitable concessions from the Soviet Union. Approximately 95 percent of available MX funding will have been obligated by March 31. Unless the FY 1985 monies are released, production will cease, and the Soviet Union will maintain its dangerous monopoly of land-based ICBM's. The U.S. defense triad will provide a strong and stable deterrent to Soviet aggression, and the MX is a vital element of the system even if its survivability depends substantially on the existence of other triad components. A launch-on-warning policy will not be necessary because of the strength, speed, and effectiveness of the triad which will allow the President considerable time to study his options in any crisis. Our European allies have recognized the need for nuclear weapons in their homelands because of the continued Soviet buildup and have boldly allowed their deployment in spite of their unpopularity. Failure of the U.S. to deploy the MX would detrimentally affect our relations with these allies and weaken their faith in our commitment to a strong defense. Noting their doubt about the necessity and wisdom of deploying the MX, some voted for releasing the FY 1985 appropriations because they felt it would strengthen our bargaining position in the arms talks. Others voiced their support for only limited MX deployment so that the missiles would not be viewed as a first-strike threat to the Soviet Union.

(OVER)

NOTE: S.J. Res. 71 became Public Law 99-17, approved April 4, 1985.

S.J. Res. 71: Vote No. 19.

RESULT: JOINT RESOLUTION PASSED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (55)			NAYS (45)		NOT VOTING (0)
Democrats (19 or 21%)	Republicans (45 or 85%)		Democrats (37 or 79%)	Republicans (8 or 15%)	
Bentsen	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews
Boren	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Kerry	Durenberger
Byrd	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Grassley
DeConcini	Chafee	Mathias	Bradley	Leahy	Hatfield
Gore	Cochran	Mattingly	Bumpers	Levin	Kassebaum
Heflin	Cohen	McClure	Burdick	Matsunaga	Pressler
Long	D'Amato	McConnell	Chiles	Melcher	Stafford
Nunn	Danforth	Murkowski	Cranston	Metzenbaum	Weicker
Stennis	Denton	Nickles	Dixon	Mitchell	
Zorinsky	Dole	Packwood	Dodd	Moynihan	
	Domenici	Quayle	Eagleton	Pell	
	East	Roth	Exon	Proxmire	
	Evans	Rudman	Ford	Pryor	
	Garn	Simpson	Glenn	Riegle	
	Goldwater	Specter	Harkin	Rockefeller	
	Gorton	Stevens	Hart	Sarbanes	
	Gramm	Symms	Hollings	Sasser	
	Hatch	Thurmond	Inouye	Simon	
	Hawkins	Trible	Johnston		
	Hecht	Wallop			
	Heinz	Warner			
	Helms	Wilson			
	Humphrey				

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—79%
Republicans—85%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (55)
Democrats—10 or 18%
Republicans—45 or 82%

Against (45)
Democrats—37 or 82%
Republicans—8 or 18%

Opponents called the MX a vulnerable, destabilizing, and costly weapons system and contended that its deployment only would waste U.S. tax dollars and further escalate the arms race. The President's plan to base the ICBM's in existing Minutemen silos is unacceptable since it would make them extremely vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Secretary Weinberger himself testified in 1981 that the existing silos "are well known [to the Soviets] and are not hardened sufficiently, nor could they be, to be of sufficient strategic value...." Consequently, the MX only would serve as a dangerous, first-strike threat against the Soviets and mandate that the U.S. adopt a launch-on-warning policy, thereby greatly increasing the chances of accidental nuclear war and lessening the chances for successful arms reduction negotiations. Even the Administration has admitted that the MX cannot serve as a bargaining chip in arms talks as evidenced by the Soviets coming back to the negotiating table only months after Congress refused to appropriate further MX funding. Congress does not have to release these funds to prove the Nation's commitment to a strong defense. Since 1980, the U.S. has spent over \$1 trillion to rebuild its defenses and will spend an additional \$50 billion through FY 1986 to further modernize our strategic forces. Congress should utilize these funds on more cost-efficient, survivable, and powerful weapons systems, such as the Midgetman and Trident II missile (D-5), or to significantly improve the under-equipped and underfunded conventional forces. Some asserted that voting not to "unfence" the \$1.5 billion in MX funding would not kill the program since only 6 percent in available FY 1985 funding has been expended. The production line can be kept "warm" with the remaining funds while the U.S. continues to seek a more survivable basing mode, performs operational tests of the MX to ensure its effectiveness, monitors the arms controls talks with the USSR, and continues the development and production of more effective alternative weapon systems.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 20

99th Congress
1st Session

March 20, 1985, 4:04 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-3280

MX MISSILE APPROPRIATIONS

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 181

SUBJECT: Passage of the joint resolution approving the obligation and availability of prior year unobligated balances (\$1.5 billion) made available for FY 1985 for the procurement of 21 MX missiles, in addition to the 21 missiles funded in FY 1984. (See also Vote No. 19.)

NOTE: Proponents argued that this vote is crucial to the continuity of the MX program, preserving the triad deterrent, and the U.S. posture at the renewed Geneva arms control talks. Additional funding is required to keep key subcontractors in production since nearly all available FY 1985 appropriations will be obligated by month's end. Although the main MX production line can operate for many more months, the network of small vendors could begin to break down as early as May, causing an expensive break in the entire production effort, as GAO recently acknowledged in Congressional testimony. The Senate's affirmative vote is needed to demonstrate U.S. dedication to strategic force modernization, to begin to rectify the force imbalances between the U.S. and USSR, and to avoid undercutting our negotiators, just as they begin the quest for real reductions, not just future growth limits, in nuclear arms. Only if the Soviets' advantage can be reduced substantially, will they have any reason to negotiate reductions. MX is crucial militarily and that is precisely why it is a useful tool in negotiations. If arms control or reduction proves impossible, the U.S. will be forced to rely on MX because we cannot make up the time with it or any other system if it is set aside now. Moreover, terminating the MX program will not create a windfall for other programs since Air Force estimates of termination costs indicate that if the program is ended June 30, the net recoverable sum is only \$9.4 million; April 30 termination would recover \$195.6 million.

(OVER)

NOTE: H.J. Res. 181 became Public Law 99-18, approved April 4, 1985.

H.J. Res. 181: Vote No. 20.

RESULT: JOINT RESOLUTION PASSED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (55)			NAYS (45)			NOT VOTING (0)	
Democrats (10 or 21%)	Republicans (45 or 85%)		Democrats (37 or 79%)	Republicans (8 or 15%)			
Bentsen	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews		
Boren	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Kerry	Durenberger		
Byrd	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Grassley		
DeConcini	Chafee	Mathias	Bradley	Leahy	Hatfield		
Gore	Cochran	Mattingly	Bumpers	Levin	Kassebaum		
Heflin	Cohen	McClure	Burdick	Matsunaga	Pressler		
Long	D'Amato	McConnell	Chiles	Melcher	Stafford		
Nunn	Danforth	Murkowski	Cranston	Metzenbaum	Weicker		
Stennis	Denton	Nickles	Dixon	Mitchell			
Zorinsky	Dole	Packwood	Dodd	Moynihan			
	Domenici	Quayle	Eagleton	Pell			
	East	Roth	Exon	Proxmire			
	Evans	Rudman	Ford	Pryor			
	Garn	Simpson	Glenn	Riegle			
	Goldwater	Specter	Harkin	Rockefeller			
	Gorton	Stevens	Hart	Sarbanes			
	Gramm	Symms	Hollings	Sasser			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Inouye	Simon			
	Hawkins	Trible	Johnston				
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—79%
Republicans—85%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (55)
Democrats—10 or 18%
Republicans—45 or 82%

Against (45)
Democrats—37 or 82%
Republicans—8 or 18%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Opponents noted that the MX's primary advantage over existing land-based missiles stemmed from its mobility. Once mobile basing was discarded in favor of placing the missiles in reinforced existing silos, MX lost much of its rationale. Credible analysts, including Caspar Weinberger, have concluded that stationary basing is not survivable, and some claimed that the revised plan for MX basing is probably in violation of SALT I and II. Current analysis suggests that by the early 1990's, 90-95 percent of U.S. missile sites, which the Russians have had targeted for at least a decade, can be knocked out in a short period of time due to improvements in their weaponry. If the missiles are based in the old silos, the President would have few options: allow MX to be destroyed, launch on warning, or launch under attack. Thus, because of its vulnerability and its potential use for a first strike, MX is not a convincing deterrent to the Soviets, yet in times of crisis, it is the kind of weapon that invites each side to move toward a first strike. Because of this fact, MX indirectly but fundamentally will move U.S. nuclear policy toward a new doctrine that increases the chance of nuclear holocaust, especially by accidental launch. Current U.S. policy is not to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the USSR nor to launch upon warning of an attack. Rather, we have sought to build a strong, stable deterrent that not only will survive a nuclear strike, but will unleash a retaliatory attack that assures our aggressors massive destruction. No one likes the current doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction and the equilibrium of terror on which it is based, but it is more sane than what follows from the MX's "use it or lose it" dilemma. With respect to the argument that the MX is a bargaining chip in the arms talks, opponents noted that the Strategic Defense Initiative and Trident submarine concern the Soviets far more than MX. In fact, the last proposal the Soviets made before arms negotiations broke off in December 1983 would have allowed the U.S. 680 MX missiles. However, the U.S. can hardly afford its planned 100 MX missiles which will cost, conservatively, over \$26 billion, severely limiting efforts to reduce the deficit. The U.S. already has a staggering array of strategic nuclear weapons, and will have spent over \$400 billion from 1984-89 on new systems, including B-1 and Stealth bombers, advanced cruise missiles, the Trident II missile (the promising D-5), and the Midgetman mobile missile. More emphasis should be placed on mobile missiles since they are less vulnerable to attack and better utilize certain American technological advantages. The Soviets already have moved forward in this area. Finally, GAO reported that as of January 1985, the Pentagon had spent less than five percent of the \$3 billion available to the MX program. Therefore, sufficient funds are available to continue the program without this new infusion.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 24

99th Congress
1st Session

April 3, 1985, 3:37 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-3969

AUTOMOBILE RECORDKEEPING

BILL NO.: H.R. 1869

AMENDMENT NO.: 25

SUBJECT: Metzenbaum amendment (to the Packwood substitute amendment) stating the sense of the Congress that the existing regulations that impute income to corporate executives (so-called "key employees") for the personal use of noncommercial aircraft shall not be amended or altered by this bill in any manner that would reduce the amount of income imputed to such employees.

NOTE: Proponents maintained that this amendment is necessary to halt a massive give-away to corporate America and to retain current IRS regulations regarding imputed income to corporate executives for personal use of corporate jets. If controversy surrounds this matter, then it should be debated in committee and on the Senate floor as legislation. It is inappropriate to pass this bill with unofficial Senate Finance Committee language directing the IRS to alter its policies on this topic. This amendment, they added, would affect only key executive employees and would not concern the recordkeeping provisions of the bill.

Opponents contended that it is unfair that IRS regulations permit airline employees to fill an empty seat without tax obligation, while refusing to extend the same privilege to employees of companies that possess their own aircraft. If a small businessperson takes along an extra family member or employee on a business trip on his personal aircraft to ride in an otherwise empty seat, legally the cost of the seat must be considered as imputed income at a very high rate. Many businesspeople probably do not and would not comply with this provision. This amendment, opponents argued, would retain this inequitable policy and continue to encourage noncompliance with IRS policy.

H.R. 1869: Vote Nos. 23-25.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (46)			NAYS (47)			NOT VOTING (7)	
Democrats (38 or 83%)		Republicans (8 or 17%)	Democrats (8 or 17%)		Republicans (39 or 83%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (6)
Baucus	Inouye	Chafee	Bentsen	Abdnor	Lugar	Stennis ²	Armstrong ²
Biden	Johnston	Cohen	Boren	Andrews	Mattingly		Durenberger ²
Bingaman	Kennedy	Danforth	Bumpers	Boschwitz	McClure		Garn ²
Bradley	Kerry	Grassley	Hollings	Cochran	McConnell		Hatfield ^{2AN}
Burdick	Lautenberg	Helms	Leahy	D'Amato	Nickles		Humphrey ²
Byrd	Levin	Mathias	Long	Denton	Packwood		Murkowski ²
Chiles	Matsunaga	Trible	Pryor	Dole	Pressler		
Cranston	Melcher	Warner	Zorinsky	Domenici	Quayle		
DeConcini	Metzenbaum			East	Roth		
Dixon	Mitchell			Evans	Rudman	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
Dodd	Moynihan			Goldwater	Simpson		
Eagleton	Nunn			Gorton	Specter		
Exon	Pell			Gramm	Stafford		
Ford	Proxmire			Hatch	Stevens		
Glenn	Riegle			Hawkins	Symms	SYMBOLS:	
Gore	Rockefeller			Hecht	Thurmond		
Harkin	Sarbanes			Heinz	Wallop		
Hart	Sasser			Kassebaum	Weicker		
Heflin	Simon			Kasten	Wilson		
				Laxalt			

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—83%
Republicans—83%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (46)
Democrats—38 or 83%
Republicans—8 or 17%

Against (47)
Democrats—8 or 17%
Republicans—39 or 83%

17

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 31

99th Congress
1st Session

April 23, 1985, 8:11 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-4624

NICARAGUA CONTRA AID

BILL NO.: S.J. Res. 106

SUBJECT: Passage of the joint resolution approving the obligation and expenditure of \$14 million available in FY 1985 for supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.

BACKGROUND: Public Law 98-473, enacted in October 1984, prohibited the use of funds available under the Act by any U.S. department or agency involved in intelligence activities to support, directly or indirectly, covert activities in Nicaragua without Congressional approval and subject to a Presidential report certifying the necessity for these funds. On April 3, 1985, President Reagan submitted the required report for the release of \$14 million to assist the Contras.

While there is no statutory restriction on these funds, if approved, the President, in a letter dated April 23, pledged to: (1) use the money only for food, medicine, clothing, and other assistance for the Contras—not for arms, ammunition or weapons of war—as long as a cease-fire is observed; (2) resume bilateral negotiations with the Nicaraguan government; (3) favorably consider economic sanctions against Nicaragua; (4) condemn human rights abuses by both factions and urge investigations of human rights violations and appropriate actions against those found guilty; and (5) report to Congress by September 1, 1985, on the progress of efforts to achieve a verifiable peace and reconciliation in Nicaragua and the utilization of funds obligated or expended under this resolution.

The House, on April 23, rejected its companion resolution, H.J. Res. 239, by a vote of 180-248. Two alternative proposals, in the form of amendments to a resolution (H.J. Res. 247) authorizing the expenditure of \$10 million for Nicaraguan refugee assistance and \$4 million for implementation of a regional peace treaty, were also voted on. An amendment restating the provisions of the underlying resolution was offered for parliamentary reasons and tentatively adopted by a vote of 219-206. The House then rejected the second amendment (213-215) to provide \$14 million for humanitarian aid to the Contras through the Agency for International Development. This proposal was supported by the Administration and would have superseded the previously adopted amendment. In final action on April 24, the House rejected the underlying resolution by a vote of 123-303.

(OVER)

S.J. Res. 106: Vote No. 31.

RESULT: BILL PASSED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (53)			NAYS (46)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (10 or 21%)	Republicans (43 or 83%)		Democrats (37 or 79%)	Republicans (9 or 17%)		Democrats (0)	Republicans (1)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Kerry	Chafee		East ²
Boren	Andrews	Kasten	Biden	Lautenberg	Evans		
Chiles	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bingaman	Leahy	Gorton		
Dixon	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bradley	Levin	Hatfield		
Heflin	Cochran	Mattingly	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Mathias		
Hollings	Cohen	McClure	Burdick	Melcher	Packwood		
Johnston	D'Amato	McConnell	Byrd	Metzenbaum	Specter		
Long	Danforth	Murkowski	Cranston	Mitchell	Stafford		
Nunn	Denton	Nickles	DeConcini	Moynihan	Weicker		
Stennis	Dole	Pressler	Dodd	Pell			
	Domenici	Quayle	Eagleton	Proxmire			
	Durenberger	Roth	Exon	Pryor			
	Garn	Rudman	Ford	Riegle			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Gramm	Stevens	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Grassley	Symms	Harkin	Sasser			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Hart	Simon			
	Hawkins	Trible	Inouye	Zorinsky			
	Hecht	Wallop	Kennedy				
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—79%
Republicans—83%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (53)
Democrats—10 or 19%
Republicans—43 or 81%

Against (46)
Democrats—37 or 80%
Republicans—9 or 20%

NOTE: Proponents stated that the U.S. must protect its national security interests in Central America and fulfill its commitment to assist nations struggling for democracy by releasing the funds for the Contras. Those who argue that continued U.S. aid to the Contras will only force the Nicaraguan government into even closer alliance with the USSR and Cuba are ignoring the fact that the U.S. initially provided monetary and diplomatic support to the Sandinistas. In return, the Sandinistas began an enormous military buildup, instituted press censorship, revoked civil liberties, began attempts to destabilize neighboring governments, and sought a Soviet-Cuban alliance. Vital American security interests are at stake because almost half of all foreign trade, including oil, is shipped to the U.S. from the Gulf of Mexico through the Caribbean-Central American zone. The safety of these sea lanes must therefore be ensured. A trade embargo would be ineffective against Nicaragua, they warned, since only 14 percent of their trade is with the U.S. Other supporters of the resolution stated that approving only humanitarian aid to the Contras would give the U.S. the opportunity to try diplomatic and economic pressures on the Sandinistas and to work out a clearer long-term definition of our Central American policy goals.

Opponents contended that the resolution was too open-ended and could lead to direct military involvement by U.S. troops in Nicaragua, just as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution did in Vietnam. U.S. support of the Contras is a shameful violation of international law and several treaties commitments. It weakens our political position in an area that is vital to our national security, further destabilizes the region, and damages our international credibility. The Administration's emphasis on military aid has not accomplished its stated goal of restoring democratic principles in Nicaragua but has heightened tensions, escalated the military buildup, incited further Nicaraguan dependence on Soviet and Cuban aid, and provided an excuse for increased repression by the Sandinista government. The President's stated intent to use this \$14 million only for humanitarian aid is non-binding, and he has already shown his preference for covert military activity through such actions as the mining of Nicaraguan waters. The Administration's definition of humanitarian aid is much too broad since it would include trucks, communications equipment, and other supplies necessary to their military operation. A vote against this resolution is not one for the Sandinista regime but one against the illegal and immoral involvement of the U.S. in the violent overthrow of an official government with which we have diplomatic relations. Indeed, it is an attempted overthrow by rebels whose commitment to human rights and democratic principles is questionable at best. While the U.S. should maintain pressure for change in Nicaragua, many agreed, more constructive policies should be pursued. Economic and diplomatic sanctions should be inaugurated and full support lent to the Contadoran process. Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega, they noted, has promised to enter into a cease-fire with the Contras, terminate press censorship, and send several Cuban military advisers home if Congress denies further aid to the rebel forces.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 33

99th Congress
1st Session

April 30, 1985, 3:36 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-4985

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

SUBJECT: Metzenbaum appeal of the Chair's ruling that the Metzenbaum motion to recess for 15 minutes and immediately upon reconvening proceed to vote on the Moynihan-Byrd-Riegle, et al, amendment (to delete the budget cut to the social security cost-of-living adjustment in current law) is out of order. The question is: "Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the ruling of the Senate?" (See also Vote No. 35.)

NOTE: The motion was an attempt to overcome the inability of Democratic Senators to gain recognition to offer amendments. The Majority Leader had frustrated Democrats in their efforts to participate through effective use of his right to be recognized first, established under the precedents of the Senate. Republican amendments were offered by the Majority Leader regardless of his views on their content. There were reports in the press, later corroborated in floor debate, that in order to secure the support of certain Members on his side of the aisle for the compromise budget package agreed to by the White House and Senate Republicans, Majority Leader Dole committed himself to offering their amendments so that they would have the first opportunity to alter the budget package with amendments that would have been offered, and have been offered in the past, by Democratic Senators. The Chair ruled, however, that the motion was in fact a unanimous consent request which, when presented to the Senate, met with an objection.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: DECISION OF CHAIR SUSTAINED

YEAS (54)			NAYS (45)		NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (2 or 4%)	Republicans (52 or 100%)		Democrats (45 or 96%)	Republicans (0 or 0%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (1)
Byrd	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Johnston		East—3AY
Long	Andrews	Kasten	Bentsen	Kennedy		
	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Kerry		
	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bingaman	Lautenberg		
	Chafee	Mathias	Boren	Leahy		
	Cochran	Mattingly	Bradley	Levin		
	Cohen	McClure	Bumpers	Matsunaga		
	D'Amato	McConnell	Burdick	Melcher		
	Danforth	Murkowski	Chiles	Metzenbaum		
	Denton	Nickles	Cranston	Mitchell		
	Dole	Packwood	DeConcini	Moynihan		
	Domenici	Pressler	Dixon	Nunn		
	Durenberger	Quayle	Dodd	Pell		
	Evans	Roth	Eagleton	Proxmire		
	Garn	Rudman	Exon	Pryor		
	Goldwater	Simpson	Ford	Riegle		
	Gorton	Specter	Glenn	Rockefeller		
	Gramm	Stafford	Gore	Sarbanes		
	Grassley	Stevens	Harkin	Sasser		
	Hatch	Symms	Hart	Simon		
	Hatfield	Thurmond	Heflin	Stennis		
	Hawkins	Trible	Hollings	Zorinsky		
	Hecht	Wallop	Inouye			
	Heinz	Warner				
	Helms	Weicker				
	Humphrey	Wilson				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—96%
Republicans—100%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (54)
Democrats—2 or 4%
Republicans—52 or 96%

Against (45)
Democrats—45 or 100%
Republicans—0 or 0%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 34

99th Congress
1st Session

April 30, 1985, 6:05 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5048

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 44

SUBJECT: Dole-Domenici, et al, perfecting amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43 to the motion to recommit with instructions) setting budget levels which will reduce the deficit, as estimated by OMB*, to \$175 billion in FY 1986, \$147 billion in 1987, and \$99 billion in 1988; makes three-year spending reductions of \$97.6 billion in defense and \$199.3 billion in domestic programs; provides for three percent real growth each year for defense; cuts COLA's for social security, veterans, military and civil service beneficiaries to the greater of two percent or two percent below the Consumer Price Index; cuts farm support and credit programs by \$17.3 billion; freezes medicare provider charges; provides for inflation-adjusted increases in the \$75 annual deductible, and increases the Part B supplemental premium to cover 35 percent of costs; limits increases for medicaid to the amount of inflation in the medical consumer price index; funnels savings from the social security COLA reduction into the medicare trust fund; increases the VA housing loan fee from one to 3.8 percent by FY 1988; requires a means-test for treatment of non-service connected ailments; terminates revenue sharing in 1987; freezes elementary and secondary education programs; limits student aid loans to families with adjusted annual incomes of \$60,000 or less; reduces Federal aid highway obligations by approximately \$2.7 billion; replaces Ex-Im Bank direct loans with interest rate subsidies for private lenders; imposes a moratorium on filling the strategic petroleum reserve; freezes FY 1986 Federal civilian pay; increases the individual civil service retirement contribution from seven to nine percent; phases out the Federal crop insurance program and mass transit subsidies; provides for the sale of Conrail; terminates community service and UDAG grants after 1986; and totally eliminates part B educational impact aid, the Small Business Administration, Amtrak, the Economic Development Administration, rural housing, postal subsidies, the work incentive program (WIN), and Job Corps.

* The OMB budget reductions for defense are measured against growth rates that the Administration agreed to in the Senate GOP-White House FY 1985 budget compromise whereas current law spending is used to calculate non-defense program savings.

(OVER)

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (50)		NAYS (49)		NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (0 or 0%)	Republicans (50 or 96%)	Democrats (47 or 100%)	Republicans (2 or 4%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (1)
Abdnor	Humphrey	Baucus	Johnston	Kasten	East- ³
Andrews	Kassebaum	Bentsen	Kennedy	Mathias	
Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Kerry		
Boschwitz	Lugar	Bingaman	Lautenberg		
Chafee	Mattingly	Boren	Leahy		
Cochran	McClure	Bradley	Levin		
Cohen	McConnell	Bumpers	Long		
D'Amato	Murkowski	Burdick	Matsunaga		
Danforth	Nickles	Byrd	Melcher		
Denton	Packwood	Chiles	Metzenbaum		
Dole	Pressler	Cranston	Mitchell		
Domenici	Quayle	DeConcini	Moynihan		
Durenberger	Roth	Dixon	Nunn		
Evans	Rudman	Dodd	Pell		
Garn	Simpson	Eagleton	Proxmire		
Goldwater	Specter	Exon	Pryor		
Gorton	Stafford	Ford	Riegle		
Gramm	Stevens	Glenn	Rockefeller		
Grassley	Symms	Gore	Sarbanes		
Hatch	Thurmond	Harkin	Sasser		
Hatfield	Trible	Hart	Simon		
Hawkins	Wallop	Heflin	Stennis		
Hecht	Warner	Hollings	Zorinsky		
Heinz	Weicker	Inouye			
Helms	Wilson				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—100%
Republicans—96%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (50)
Democrats—0 or 0%
Republicans—50 or 100%

Against (49)
Democrats—47 or 96%
Republicans—2 or 4%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

NOTE: In an effort to force a vote on an unaltered version of the Republican leadership-White House compromise package, Majority Leader Dole utilized his right to first recognition on the Senate floor to offer all possible technical amendments to the original proposal and block any substantive changes in the package.

Proponents declared that the "Rose Garden II" proposal is a good budget plan which would reduce the deficit approximately \$300 billion by 1988 solely through spending cuts. The Federal government simply cannot pay for all of its current programs at any reasonable tax rate, and many worthy programs cannot be afforded in these difficult economic times. This amendment would eliminate 20 programs, reform 40 others, and freeze nearly all remaining Federal expenditures. Reducing the deficit by spending cuts alone and avoiding tax increases now also will give Congress maximum flexibility in reforming the tax code later this year. Although the budget plan is flawed in its emphasis on discretionary non-defense spending cuts, some admitted, the "most important social program we can support" is to reduce the deficit and thereby create an economic environment "congenial to steady and sustained economic growth." Other supporters voted for adoption of the amendment as a procedural step with the intent of amending the package later for fairness and equity. Majority Leader Dole stated that he was not abusing the parliamentary rules by holding the Senate floor, and that the Minority party would be given the chance to offer its own budget packages and amendments later.

Opponents described the "Rose Garden II" proposal as an outrageous farce which would drastically cut or freeze essential programs such as medicare, social security, child nutrition, housing, veterans, and education programs, while totally protecting the "sacred cow" of Pentagon spending. These unfair budget cuts would only further burden the middle-income and senior citizens who can least afford it. Instead of breaking his promise to the Nation's senior citizens not to freeze or cut their benefits, the President should be attacking waste in the defense budget and seeking revenue increases through minimum corporate taxes. Social security has its own separate trust fund, which is enjoying a surplus, and is not part of the overall Federal budget. Any COLA freeze or benefit cut would only reduce the deficit on paper since any savings would have to remain in the trust fund. Yet the Administration is willing to make that "sacrifice" and push 450,000 senior citizens below the poverty line in order to make it look as though the deficit problem is being addressed. Furthermore, the OMB figures are based on extremely optimistic economic projections which result in exaggerated savings and underestimated deficits. The huge Federal deficit must be reduced, they agreed, but in a fair and equitable way which better reflects our national priorities. Many opponents complained that the Majority Leader was abusing his right to first recognition on the Senate floor in order to block the offering of amendments by the Minority party. The Democrats did not have a single opportunity to offer an amendment to the budget resolution even though one-half of the limited debate time had been charged against their side during several days of consideration.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 36

99th Congress
1st Session

May 2, 1985, 3:16 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5266

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 46

SUBJECT: Goldwater motion to table the Dole (for Grassley-Hatfield, et al) amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to limit defense spending to zero plus inflation in FY 1986 and provide for growth at three percent above inflation in FY 1987 and 1988. (Subsequently, the amendment was agreed to by a division vote.)

NOTE: Proponents asserted that U.S. security would not be endangered by this amendment because it would freeze the defense budget at the very high level attained over the last four years. These dramatic increases for defense—\$211 billion to \$292 billion from FY 1982-85—were unprecedented in the post-WWII era. As a result, \$1 trillion was spent on defense. More was appropriated in the last four years than in the four most costly years of the Korean and Vietnam wars. Unfortunately, defense improvements were not even closely proportional to the sums that were put in; and it is unlikely that the \$2 trillion the White House proposes to spend over the next five years would be used any more wisely. Given the disappointing returns, it is evident that fundamentally improved management will yield far greater returns than budget increases. So much money is available to the defense industry that efficiencies not only are not sought, but significant incentives exist for inefficiency. Labor efficiency data obtained from DOD shows that defense plants are operating at only 33 percent of normal efficiency, and scrap-and-rework in at least six major defense plants averages 41 percent over the last two or three years. Outlandish prices and other abuses, like those detailed almost daily in the press, reveal a Pentagon awash in funds but short on controls even though it is capable of leaner operation. This freeze is intended as an abrupt policy change, a first-step to slowing the momentum of spending growth, to be followed by major structural reform. A January 1985 Harris poll suggests this would be an opportune time for a freeze because the public consensus for large defense increases, especially at the expense of

(OVER)

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MQTION TO TABLE FAILED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (48)			NAYS (51)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (8 or 17%)	Republicans (40 or 77%)		Democrats (39 or 83%)	Republicans (12 or 23%)		Democrats (0)	Republicans (1)
Bradley	Armstrong	Laxalt	Baucus	Inouye	Abdnor		East—3
Glenn	Cochran	Lugar	Bentsen	Kennedy	Andrews		
Heflin	Cohen	Mattingly	Biden	Kerry	Boschwitz		
Johnston	D'Amato	McClure	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Chafee		
Long	Denton	McConnell	Boren	Leahy	Danforth		
Nunn	Dole	Murkowski	Bumpers	Levin	Grassley		
Stennis	Domenici	Packwood	Burdick	Matsunaga	Hatfield		
Zorinsky	Durenberger	Quayle	Byrd	Melcher	Kassebaum		
	Evans	Roth	Chiles	Metzenbaum	Mathias		
	Garn	Rudman	Cranston	Mitchell	Nickles		
	Goldwater	Simpson	DeConcini	Moynihan	Pressler		
	Gorton	Specter	Dixon	Pell	Weicker		
	Gramm	Stafford	Dodd	Proxmire			
	Hatch	Stevens	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Hawkins	Symms	Exon	Riegle			
	Hecht	Thurmond	Ford	Rockefeller			
	Heinz	Trible	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Helms	Wallop	Harkin	Sasser			
	Humphrey	Warner	Hart	Simon			
	Kasten	Wilson	Hollings				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—83%
Republicans—77%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (48)
Democrats—8 or 17%
Republicans—40 or 83%

Against (51)
Democrats—39 or 76%
Republicans—12 or 24%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

certain nondefense spending, has collapsed. The debate on national security is not entirely a question of dollars, proponents argued; a debtor nation, carrying a \$200 billion deficit, is not a secure nation in any sense of the word. Cutting the deficit is essential to our future and security, and equity requires that some of the funding come out of the defense budget. Secretary Weinberger's protests that his request for FY 1986 is already \$45 billion below last year's plan should take into account that these so-called budget cuts are based on inflated threat projections. Finally, real growth in readiness, sustained progress in research, and an adequate pay raise can still be realized within the zero real growth target approved by the Budget Committee. Our NATO partners have no cause for alarm because the U.S. has exceeded the 1978 NATO agreement for three percent defense increases each year; that surplus now stands at nearly \$117 billion. Even if defense budget authority were to be frozen for three years, outlays will grow at three percent—exactly our NATO commitment.

Opponents maintained that the defense figure in the Dole amendment had already undergone paring and that three percent growth over inflation for each of the next three years was the lowest tolerable figure. In fact, the defense portion of the budget bears one-third of the cuts in this entire package (or \$97.7 billion) even though it represents only 26 percent of the budget. As large as the defense increases have been in the last few years, they did not produce a massive military buildup, rather, they started to redress the decade of neglect that began in the early 1970's. Late in his term President Carter recognized the shortsightedness of such reductions, and the defense figure that Carter planned for FY 1985 was larger than President Reagan's 1986 defense figure. Defense expenditures are not responsible for the debt since they can be shown to have escalated far slower than the cost of nondefense programs. Starving defense is the most irresponsible way to set spending priorities because it undermines U.S. credibility both with allies and adversaries. Further, the reasons given for cutting defense are irrational. We cannot afford to view our levels of defense spending solely as a budget function; we must take full account of the threats we face and commitments to allies, including the promise to NATO of three percent annual real growth. In addition, this should not be seen as a vote for procurement reform in the belief that overruns, waste, fraud, and abuse can be squeezed out because squeezing defense ultimately risks war. DOD has taken steps to improve its processes, increase competition, and root out and prosecute wrongdoing. In fact, the horror stories so regularly in the news usually originate from DOD investigations. Cutting defense to this degree will result in higher costs as production is stretched out, and competition will take a step backward because money will not be available for the up-front costs of dual source contracting. Finally, cutting defense at this stage in the budget process will not contribute to lowered deficits because savings are likely to be redistributed to cover spending restored to other parts of the budget. The majority of voters, they claimed, already expressed their impatience with this strategy, and their wishes should be honored.

Democrats noted during debate on this amendment that the Senate had spent five days on the budget resolution. Almost half the overall 50-hour statutory time limit had been exhausted with half the debate charged against them, but no Democrats had been able to call up amendments because the Majority Leader has consistently used his right of prior recognition under the precedents of the Senate.

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 50: Defense						
Dole amendment No. 43	\$312.8	\$276.1	\$334.9	\$298.4	\$359.6	\$321.4
Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amt.	-10.3	-3.0	-11.5	-6.3	-12.8	-8.4
Total	302.5	273.1	323.4	292.1	346.8	313.0
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole amendment No. 43	\$142.3	\$142.3	\$153.0	\$153.0	\$155.2	\$155.2
Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amt.	-0.2	-0.2	-0.6	-0.6	-1.3	-1.3
Total	142.1	142.1	152.4	152.4	153.9	153.9

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 43

99th Congress
1st Session

May 7, 1985, 11:19 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5471

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 56

SUBJECT: Harkin motion to table the Abdnor-Grassley-Nickles amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) expressing the sense of the Senate that revenues should be increased by limiting to the national median family income (of approximately \$24,800) the amount of non-farm income which can be offset by tax losses from farming and that revenue derived should be used to reduce individual tax rates and to assure that full-time, family-size farm operators will not be disadvantaged by unfair competition from high-income taxpayers with substantial non-farm income.

NOTE: See Vote No. 44 for arguments for and against the amendment.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE FAILED

YEAS (38)		NAYS (57)		NOT VOTING (5)		
Democrats (30 or 68%)	Republicans (8 or 16%)	Democrats (14 or 32%)	Republicans (43 or 84%)	Democrats (3)	Republicans (2)	
Baucus	Hatfield	Biden	Abdnor	Humphrey	Exon— ³	Armstrong— ²
Bentsen	Hawkins	Bingaman	Andrews	Kassebaum	Matsunaga— ²	East— ³
Boren	Mathias	Bradley	Boschwitz	Kasten	Stennis— ²	
Bumpers	McConnell	Cranston	Chafee	Laxalt		
Burdick	Nickles	DeConcini	Cochran	Lugar		
Byrd	Symms	Dixon	Cohen	Mattingly		
Chiles	Wallop	Lautenberg	D'Amato	McClure		
Dodd	Warner	Leahy	Danforth	Murkowski		
Eagleton		Metzenbaum	Denton	Packwood		
Ford		Pell	Dole	Pressler		
Glenn		Proxmire	Domenici	Quayle		
Gore		Riegle	Durenberger	Roth		
Harkin		Simon	Evans	Rudman		
Hart		Zorinsky	Garn	Simpson		
Heflin			Goldwater	Specter		
Hollings			Gorton	Stafford		
Inouye			Gramm	Stevens		
Johnston			Grassley	Thurmond		
Kennedy			Hatch	Trible		
Kerry			Hecht	Weicker		
Levin			Heinz	Wilson		
Long			Helms			
Melcher						
Mitchell						
Moynihan						
Nunn						
Pryor						
Rockefeller						
Sarbanes						
Sasser						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

1—Official Business
2—Necessarily Absent
3—Illness
4—Other

SYMBOLS:

AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—68%
Republicans—84%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (38)
Democrats—30 or 79%
Republicans—8 or 21%

Against (57)
Democrats—14 or 25%
Republicans—43 or 75%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 52

99th Congress
1st Session

May 8, 1985, 4:55 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5664

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 64

SUBJECT: Byrd-Cranston-Inouye, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) which reduces the projected deficit in the Dole amendment by an additional \$9.1 billion between FY 1986-88; provides full COLA's for social security, veterans, railroad retirement, civil service, and military retirement beneficiaries; removes all increases in medicare beneficiary costs; restores all reductions in medicaid; adds \$11 billion for agriculture over three years; provides for full inflation adjustment for education and child nutrition, mass transit, UDAG, Amtrak, EDA, and the Appalachian Regional Commission; raises \$61 billion in revenues, assuming no individual tax rate increases; reduces foreign aid expenditures by \$1.9 billion over three years, with no reduction for Israel, Egypt, Greece, or Turkey; and funds defense at one percent real growth in FY 1986 and three percent each in 1987-88.

NOTE: Proponents stated that this amendment would assure that at least a minimum of necessary resources would be available for investment in people, cities, and energy and the transportation infrastructure; for improving the competitive posture of the U.S. in the world economy and enhancing domestic industries; and for spreading more fairly across the nation the burden of reducing the largest budget deficits in our history. It would reduce the FY 1986 deficit figure by \$4.5 billion more than the White House proposal. It would raise about \$60 billion in new revenues over the next three years by imposing a minimum tax on corporations at the rate of 20 percent, by closing loopholes for corporate tax evasion, and by retaining the cigarette excise tax at 16 cents per pack. Too many powerful corporations pay no taxes every year while working people bear the brunt of high taxation. This
(OVER)

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (43)			NAYS (54)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (42 or 91%)	Republicans (1 or 2%)		Democrats (4 or 9%)	Republicans (50 or 98%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Johnston	Mathias	Dixon	Abdnor	Humphrey	Exon— ³	East— ³
Bentsen	Kennedy		Hollings	Andrews	Kassebaum		Wilson— ³
Biden	Kerry		Nunn	Armstrong	Kasten		
Bingaman	Lautenberg		Proxmire	Boschwitz	Laxalt		
Boren	Leahy			Chafee	Lugar		
Bradley	Levin			Cochran	Mattingly		
Bumpers	Long			Cohen	McClure		
Burdick	Matsunaga			D'Amato	McConnell		
Byrd	Melcher			Danforth	Murkowski		
Chiles	Metzenbaum			Denton	Nickles		
Cranston	Mitchell			Dole	Packwood		
DeConcini	Moynihan			Domenici	Pressler		
Dodd	Pell			Durenberger	Quayle		
Eagleton	Pryor			Evans	Roth		
Ford	Riegle			Garn	Rudman		
Glenn	Rockefeller			Goldwater	Simpson		
Gore	Sarbanes			Gorton	Specter		
Harkin	Sasser			Gramm	Stafford		
Hart	Simon			Grassley	Stevens		
Heflin	Stennis			Hatch	Symms		
Inouye	Zorinsky			Hatfield	Thurmond		
				Hawkins	Trible		
				Hecht	Wallop		
				Heinz	Warner		
				Helms	Weicker		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—91%
Republicans—98%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (43)
Democrats—42 or 98%
Republicans—1 or 2%

Against (54)
Democrats—4 or 7%
Republicans—50 or 93%

amendment would restore equity to the rich and poor alike. All but \$7 billion of the cuts the Republican budget made to agriculture would be restored, and sufficient funding would be provided to preserve UDAG, Amtrak, export promotion, and many other programs severely handicapped under the Republican plan. It also would retain COLA's and would provide for a one percent growth in defense.

Opponents pointed out that many economists testified before the Budget Committee that the economy would be stronger, growth would be greater and jobs would be more numerous, if spending were reduced rather than if taxes were increased. This amendment would effectively raise taxes. In fact, it would have to raise \$6.1 billion in new taxes, they claimed, to offset the money restored to unnecessary domestic spending programs. Any change in taxes should be considered in a tax reform package, not during the budget resolution debate. Finally, since this amendment purports to be fair concerning the restoration of COLA's to many civil and social service retirees, it also should include cost of living raises for present Federal workers.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 53

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 11:08 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5767

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 59

SUBJECT: Specter, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to continue the Amtrak program by setting the funding level at \$616.4 million in budget authority and outlays of \$536 million, \$573 million and \$616 million for each of fiscal years 1986-88, respectively—ten percent less than the FY 1985 appropriation instead of eliminating all funding by September 30, 1985. (The final budget package, as adopted in Vote No. 72, provides for cuts of 12 percent, 25 percent, and 40 percent in FY 1986-88, respectively. See also Vote No. 68.)

NOTE: Proponents stated that this equitable amendment would help to reduce the deficit and also sustain the nation's vital rail transportation system which can carry more people, more efficiently than any other travel mode, operate in extreme weather conditions, and plays a key part of our national defense system. A ten percent reduction is the maximum that Amtrak could withstand without sacrificing major components of its passenger service. If funding is totally eliminated, as the Administration has proposed, the rail company would face almost certain bankruptcy. State and local governments would be unable and unlikely to provide substitute funding and Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole has confirmed that the cost, in conjunction with competition from publicly-subsidized air and highway transportation, would prohibit the private sector from taking over. Suspension of Amtrak passenger service would result in: tremendous overcrowding of the nation's highways and airports by the 20 million displaced rail passengers, increased Federal spending on other transportation modes, the unemployment of 25,000 Amtrak employees in 44 States and the potential loss of 150,000 jobs in related industries, and the isolation of many communities left without any type of commercial passenger service. A \$2.1 billion Amtrak liability for labor protection agreements, as mandated by Federal law, would be triggered and neither the Federal deficit nor the public would benefit from these payments. If forced to sell off its \$3.1 billion worth of capital assets, purchased almost entirely with Federal money, the return would be minimal and \$100 million in State capital investments also would be lost. An Amtrak shutdown could force out of business many secondary users of Amtrak rails and services, if they could not afford an additional \$164 million for track maintenance and other items for which the national rail system now pays. Amtrak has significantly improved its service and reduced its dependence on Federal funds (from 52 percent to 40 percent in four years), and deserves continued Federal support.

(OVER)

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

YEAS (53)			NAYS (41)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (39 or 85%)		Republicans (14 or 29%)	Democrats (7 or 15%)		Republicans (34 or 71%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (4)
Baucus	Inouye	Andrews	Bentsen	Abdnor	Humphrey	Exon— ³	East— ³
Biden	Kennedy	Chafee	Cranston	Armstrong	Kassebaum		Mathias— ² PY
Bingaman	Kerry	D'Amato	Johnston	Boschwitz	Kasten		Trible— ²
Boren	Lautenberg	Durenberger	Long	Cochran	Laxalt		Wilson— ³
Bradley	Leahy	Grassley	Nunn	Cohen	Mattingly		
Bumpers	Levin	Hawkins	Proxmire	Denton	McClure		
Burdick	Matsunaga	Heinz	Stennis	Dole	McConnell		
Byrd	Melcher	Lugar		Domenici	Murkowski		
Chiles	Metzenbaum	Quayle		Evans	Nickles		
DeConcini	Mitchell	Roth		Garn	Packwood		
Dixon	Moynihan	Specter		Goldwater	Pressler		
Dodd	Pell	Stafford		Gorton	Rudman		
Eagleton	Pryor	Warner		Gramm	Simpson		
Ford	Riegle	Weicker		Hatch	Stevens		
Glenn	Rockefeller			Hatfield	Symms		
Gore	Sarbanes			Hecht	Thurmond		
Harkin	Sasser			Helms	Wallop		
Hart	Simon						
Heflin	Zorinsky						
Hollings							

LIVE PAIRS (1)
PRESENT AND
GIVING: Danforth (PN) **RECEIVING:** Mathias (PY)

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:
1—Official Business
2—Necessarily Absent
3—Illness
4—Other

SYMBOLS:
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—85%
Republicans—71%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (53)
Democrats—39 or 74%
Republicans—14 or 26%

Against (41)
Democrats—7 or 17%
Republicans—34 or 83%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Opponents declared that a nation with a \$200 billion deficit can no longer afford the luxury of bankrolling a so-called national passenger train that does not come close to serving every State's rail passenger needs. It is unfair to force residents of States not served by Amtrak to subsidize service to other parts of the country. The authorizing legislation for the rail system explicitly states that "the corporation shall be operated and managed as a for-profit" business. Fifteen years of experience, however, have only proven the obsolescence of rail travel and the senselessness of expending tax dollars in an effort to make it profitable. Amtrak has lost money every year since its creation, with the Federal government's costs having grown 20-fold annually for a much higher subsidization than for any other transportation mode; yet increasingly fewer people ride Amtrak. Not one community in this nation, they argued, would be seriously inconvenienced by the lack of Amtrak service. Interstate highways, intercity motorbuses, and commercial airline service are readily available, and the private sector will pick up rail service for areas where demand would support a for-profit operation. Bus service is available, at more frequent intervals, for almost every community served by Amtrak, and the American Bus Association has pledged to fill any gaps should Amtrak service terminate. Buses are three times more energy efficient than trains, and airplanes and buses emit less pollutants. While some argue that train service is more affordable for the poor, statistics show that 51 percent of Amtrak riders have annual incomes in excess of \$30,000 with only ten percent earning below \$10,000. Amtrak's labor protection agreement is not a Federal liability, they asserted, since the Supreme Court has ruled that it is a private corporation and not a Federal entity. Should the government decide to help fulfill Amtrak's employee obligations it would only be a one-time expenditure versus subsidizing Amtrak services forever. It is pure nostalgia to argue that Federally-subsidized passenger rail travel must be maintained because the U.S. cannot be the only nation in the world without it.

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 400: Transportation						
Dole amendment No. 43	\$26.6	\$25.6	\$27.1	\$27.0	\$26.3	\$26.5
Specter, et al, amendment	+0.6	+0.5	+0.6	+0.6	+0.6	+0.6
Total	27.2	26.1	27.7	27.6	26.9	27.1
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole amendment No. 43*	\$142.1	\$142.1	\$152.7	\$152.7	\$154.5	\$154.5
Specter, et al, amendment	----	----	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1
Total	142.1	142.1	152.8	152.8	154.6	154.6

*As amended by the Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amendment—Vote No. 36; Dole-Murkowski, et al, amendment—Vote No. 37; and Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 54

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 12:31 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5790

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 75

SUBJECT: Domenici motion to table the Cranston, et al, modified amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to maintain the veterans' health care system at FY 1985 staff and program levels; provide full COLA's for veterans' compensation and pensions; and eliminate increases in the VA home loan guaranty fee (costing \$2.2 billion in budget authority and \$2.7 billion in outlays over FY 1986-88).

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment expressed concern for the fate of medical care for disabled veterans under the Republican leadership-White House proposal. According to the Veterans' Administration, the agreement calls for cuts of \$4.7 million in 1987, and \$8.7 million in 1988. Cuts of this magnitude would mean that the VA could not continue services at the existing level, much less provide the increased services which will be needed in future years due to the aging of World War II and Korean Conflict veterans. The effects of the proposed cuts include the prevention of the opening of new VA medical facilities already planned and under construction, the closure of several existing facilities, the layoff of approximately 25,000 VA health care personnel, and a drastic reduction in both in-patient beds and outpatient visits. The Republican plan assumes enactment of legislation which would impose a means test on all non-service-connected disabled veterans seeking treatment at VA facilities. Although it was claimed that substantial savings would be realized from this new rule, no hard proof of such savings has been submitted to the Veterans' Affairs Committee. Implementation of a means test would force veterans to seek health care through the Medicare system which is more costly than VA care. Shifting costs from one Federal health care program to another makes no budgetary sense. The proposed increase in home loan guaranty fees charged to veterans (from one percent to 3.8

(OVER)

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (49)		NAYS (47)		NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (1 or 2%)	Republicans (48 or 96%)	Democrats (45 or 98%)	Republicans (2 or 4%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (3)
Proxmire	Abdnor Armstrong Boschwitz Chafee Cochran Cohen D'Amato Danforth Denton Dole Domenici Durenberger Evans Garn Goldwater Gorton Gramm Grassley Hatch Hatfield Hawkins Hecht Heinz Helms	Humphrey Kassebaum Kasten Laxalt Lugar Mattingly McClure McConnell Murkowski Nickles Packwood Pressler Quayle Roth Rudman Simpson Stafford Stevens Symms Thurmond Trible Wallop Warner Weicker	Baucus Bentsen Biden Bingaman Boren Bradley Bumpers Burdick Byrd Chiles Cranston DeConcini Dixon Dodd Eagleton Ford Glenn Gore Harkin Hart Heflin Hollings Inouye	Johnston Kennedy Kerry Lautenberg Leahy Levin Long Matsunaga Melcher Metzenbaum Mitchell Moynihan Nunn Pell Pryor Riegle Rockefeller Sarbanes Sasser Simon Stennis Zorinsky	Andrews Specter
				Exon ³	East ³ Mathias ² Wilson ³
EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE: 1—Official Business 2—Necessarily Absent 3—Illness 4—Other					
SYMBOLS: AY—Announced Yea AN—Announced Nay PY—Paired Yea PN—Paired Nay					

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—98%
Republicans—96%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (49)
Democrats—1 or 2%
Republicans—48 or 98%

Against (47)
Democrats—45 or 96%
Republicans—2 or 4%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

percent over five years) is unnecessary, since CBO has determined that the VA's Loan Guaranty Revolving Fund is solvent for at least the next five years. This amendment does not seek a large increase for VA programs, but merely a freeze at FY 1985 levels—the bare minimum necessary to maintain the VA programs and this Nation's commitment to those who served.

Opponents maintained that this amendment would add more than \$4 billion in outlays between FY 1986-88 for veterans' programs over the amounts originally contained in S. Con. Res. 32, as reported. The Senate has already voted to add back \$1.5 billion in outlays for FY 1986-88 to provide a full COLA for both the VA compensation and pension programs for FY 1986-88. In doing so, the Senate has ensured that the Nation's veterans would receive no less than the same COLA's that beneficiaries of social security and other Federal entitlement programs would receive. The budgetary impact on the veterans' function as a result of the COLA conforming amendment would be an increase in the FY 1986 deficit of \$200 million. This amendment includes an additional \$2.1 billion in outlays and \$2.8 billion in budget authority. The VA's Chief Medical Director has stated that the VA budget for FY 1986 is sufficient to meet the health care needs of veterans using the system.

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 700 Veterans Benefits						
Dole amendment No. 43*	\$26.9	\$26.5	\$27.4	\$26.8	\$27.7	\$27.2
Cranston, et al, amendment	+0.8	-1.1	+1.2	+1.5	+1.3	+1.6
Total	27.7	27.6	28.6	28.3	29.0	28.8
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole amendment No. 43**	\$142.3	\$142.3	\$153.3	\$153.3	\$155.7	\$155.7
Cranston, et al, amendment	----	----	+0.1	+0.1	+0.2	+0.2
Total	142.3	142.3	154.4	154.4	155.9	155.9

* As amended by the Dole-Murkowski amendment—Vote No. 37.

**As amended by the Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amendment—Vote No. 36; Dole-Murkowski, et al, amendment—Vote No. 37; Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39; and the Specter amendment—Vote No. 53.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 55

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 1:17 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5797

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 77

SUBJECT: Domenici motion to table the Hawkins, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to maintain funding for school lunch programs at the current level for FY 1986-88 by restoring the subsidy for children from families with annual incomes over \$19,700—costing \$1.6 billion over three years. (The amendment was subsequently agreed to by voice vote. The final budget package, as passed on Vote No. 72, only restored \$400 million in program funding.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment declared that it was essential to the health and development of American children that funding be restored for child nutrition programs. The Reconciliation Act of 1981 reduced Federal spending for child nutrition programs by almost 30 percent—one of the steepest cuts in the entire package—and resulted in 2,700 schools terminating their participation and an estimated 2.5 million children being dropped from the School Lunch Program. The current proposed cuts would cause an additional 3-5 million children and 5-6,000 schools to drop out. Further evidence of the critical need to restore these funds is the devastating fact that one in four children under age six is now living in poverty. It is not true, as some opponents claim, that these cuts would only affect "upper-income" children. The 12 cents-per-meal subsidy is used to support the basic infrastructure of local school lunch programs and many systems will not be able to afford to participate without this income. A 1982 study on the School Lunch Program by the Agriculture Department found the program to be nutritionally important to children in all income categories and this popular and successful program, which also encourages the consumption of domestic agricultural commodities, should not be jeopardized by further cuts. Enacted in 1946 to ensure the availability of healthy able-bodied citizens for the defense of our nation, the Congressionally-mandated goal of this program is to serve the nutritional needs of all children. Passage of the proposed cuts would change this national nutritional program into another welfare program exclusively for the poor. Raising lunch prices also would detrimentally affect the program. Surveys indicate that for every one cent price increase, there is a corresponding one

(OVER)

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE FAILED

YEAS (36)			NAYS (60)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (1 or 2%)	Republicans (35 or 70%)		Democrats (45 or 98%)	Republicans (15 or 30%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (3)
Proxmire	Abdnor	McClure	Baucus	Johnston	Andrews	Exon—3	East—3
	Armstrong	McConnell	Bentsen	Kennedy	Boschwitz		Mathias—2
	Cochran	Murkowski	Biden	Kerry	Chafee		Wilson—3
	Denton	Nickles	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Cohen		
	Dole	Packwood	Boren	Leahy	D'Amato		
	Domenici	Pressler	Bradley	Levin	Danforth		
	Garn	Quayle	Bumpers	Long	Durenberger		
	Goldwater	Roth	Burdick	Matsunaga	Evans		
	Gorton	Rudman	Byrd	Melcher	Grassley		
	Gramm	Simpson	Chiles	Metzenbaum	Hatfield		
	Hatch	Specter	Cranston	Mitchell	Hawkins		
	Hecht	Stevens	DeConcini	Moynihan	Heinz		
	Helms	Symms	Dixon	Nunn	Kasten		
	Humphrey	Thurmond	Dodd	Pell	Stafford		
	Kassebaum	Trible	Eagleton	Pryor	Weicker		
	Laxalt	Wallop	Ford	Riegle			
	Lugar	Warner	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Mattingly		Gore	Sarbanes			
			Harkin	Sasser			
			Hart	Simon			
			Heflin	Stennis			
			Hollings	Zorinsky			
			Inouye				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—98%
Republicans—70%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (36)
Democrats—1 or 3%
Republicans—35 or 97%

Against (60)
Democrats—45 or 75%
Republicans—15 or 25%

percent decrease in participation by children. The budget proposal to impose a means test on day care centers would virtually eliminate these facilities from the Child Care Food Program because of their inability to afford the resulting 32 percent jump in administrative costs. It also would cause many day care providers to go "underground" since they would no longer have an incentive to maintain their licenses which ensure proper training of personnel and a safe environment for the children.

Opponents of the amendment asserted that the budget proposal would maintain adequate Federal funding for needy children in the School Lunch Program, while eliminating unnecessary subsidies for upper-income children. The proposal would not affect free or reduced price lunch recipients and CBO estimates that no more than two percent of these children would lose access to school lunch as a result of these changes. The average school would lose six percent of its funding, but subsidies for predominantly low-income schools would remain relatively stable. Cafeteria closings since the 1981 funding cuts were not because of program adjustments, they claimed, but were due to decreased enrollment, school consolidations, and the elimination of high-tuition private schools from the program. The children who benefit from the 12 cent per lunch subsidy which would be eliminated are from households with an average annual income of \$33,000 which can certainly afford to make up that subsidy which the taxpayers are now bearing. The proposal also would reinstate the means test for participation in the Child Care Food Program which has suffered enormous new costs because of the influx of non-needy children into the Federally-subsidized program. The objective of these program adjustments, as were the cuts of 1981, are to retarget the Federal benefits to the poor and the selective spending reductions in child nutrition programs being made this year will not significantly affect their operation.

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 600: Income Security						
Dole amendment No. 43*	\$156.3	\$118.8	\$166.5	\$123.6	\$175.2	\$128.3
Hawkins, et al, amendment	+0.4	+0.4	+0.5	+0.5	+0.7	+0.7
Total	156.7	119.2	167.0	124.1	172.9	129.0
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole amendment No. 43**	\$142.1	\$142.1	\$152.8	\$152.8	\$154.6	\$154.6
Hawkins, et al, amendment	----	----	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1
Total	142.1	142.1	152.9	152.9	154.7	154.7

* As amended by Dole-Murkowski, et al, amendment—Vote No. 37.

**As amended by the Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amendment—Vote No. 36; Dole-Murkowski, et al, amendment—Vote No. 37; Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39; and Specter amendment—Vote No. 53.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 56

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 2:11 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5804

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 79

SUBJECT: Domenici motion to table the Sasser, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to maintain a one-year freeze on funding for community and regional development programs including UDAG, community development block grants, SBA disaster loans, TVA and the Appalachian Regional Commission, and EDA; and restore funding for the FmHA rural housing programs, which would be eliminated by the Dole amendment, to 75 percent of the FY 1985 level (costing an estimated \$2.2 billion). (See also Vote No. 71.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment maintained that although it does call for additional funding above the Republican leadership-White House package, it would prevent the elimination of programs which are essential to the economic survival of rural America. The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is slated for elimination in the Republican package, yet few programs have proven themselves as well as ARC. Since its inception in the mid-1960's, the number of Appalachian citizens living in poverty has declined 50 percent; the region's infant mortality rate has declined 50 percent; the number of Appalachian residents who have completed high school has increased from 33 to 57 percent; and nearly 400 health clinics and 2,000 miles of highway have been constructed—all with the financial and planning assistance of the Commission. The Urban Development Action Grant Program (UDAG), also targeted for elimination, has likewise demonstrated solid results. Over 2,400 UDAG projects are projected to create or maintain 484,000 permanent new jobs and 55 percent of those jobs are slated for low and moderate-income persons. UDAG has stimulated approximately \$7 in private investment for every Federal dollar—a total of 21 billion private investment dollars in just a few years. Like these two programs, the Economic Development Administration (EDA), Community Development Block Grant Program, and the TVA developmental programs are all programs which are essential to the growth and development of areas of the country which would not otherwise benefit from the economic recovery. The second component of this amendment addresses the proposed elimination of the FmHA Rural Housing (OVER)

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (52)			NAYS (44)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (8 or 17%)	Republicans (44 or 88%)		Democrats (38 or 83%)	Republicans (6 or 12%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (3)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Humphrey	Baucus	Kerry	Cochran	Exon ⁻³	East ⁻³
Boren	Andrews	Kassebaum	Biden	Lautenberg	Cohen		Mathias ⁻²
Bradley	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bingaman	Leahy	Grassley		Wilson ⁻³
Bumpers	Boschwitz	Lugar	Burdick	Levin	Kasten		
Chiles	Chafee	Mattingly	Byrd	Long	McConnell		
DeConcini	D'Amato	McClure	Cranston	Matsunaga	Specter		
Nunn	Danforth	Murkowski	Dixon	Melcher			
Proxmire	Denton	Nickles	Dodd	Metzenbaum			
	Dole	Packwood	Eagleton	Mitchell			
	Domenici	Pressler	Ford	Moynihan			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Glenn	Pell			
	Evans	Roth	Gore	Pryor			
	Garn	Rudman	Harkin	Riegle			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Hart	Rockefeller			
	Gorton	Stafford	Heflin	Sarbanes			
	Gramm	Stevens	Hollings	Sasser			
	Hatch	Symms	Inouye	Simon			
	Hatfield	Thurmond	Johnston	Stennis			
	Hawkins	Trible	Kennedy	Zorinsky			
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Weicker					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—83%
Republicans—88%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (52)
Democrats—8 or 15%
Republicans—44 or 85%

Against (44)
Democrats—38 or 86%
Republicans—6 or 14%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Programs. These programs have served the needs of almost two million families and the elderly since 1949. FmHA has been the only source of mortgage credit in many of the Nation's rural areas since there are over 500 rural counties without a Federally-chartered savings and loan. While the 25 percent program reduction is deep relative to the problems encountered in rural America, it is a far cry from the abandonment advocated by the Administration. A keen eye must be kept on the budget deficit, but the Senate must not close its eyes to rural America. Furthermore, this amendment will result in significant savings of almost \$8.6 billion from the CBO baseline.

Opponents of the amendment asserted that it would add \$10.4 billion to the deficit by restoring funds for several programs which the Budget Committee has recommended terminating. With respect to EDA, opponents pointed out that today, 85 percent of the Nation's communities qualify compared to 12 percent when the program was first created. These statistics, they claimed, show how this program has grown into a "very large and wide trough" in which communities feed at the expense of other communities which are ineligible. The same type of problem exists with UDAG, as approximately 13 cities received 95 percent of UDAG funding. By cutting UDAG, a deficit reduction of \$9 billion can be realized. In regard to TVA, opponents maintained that elimination of TVA developmental programs proposed by the Republican package would not affect residents who receive low-cost electricity from TVA, because the developmental programs and rural electrification programs are mutually exclusive. ARC has not been reauthorized by Congress for three years, and the Federal government cannot afford to continue to pour billions of dollars into special-interest programs which benefit only a small portion of the public. If prosperity is to come to these distressed areas, interest rates must be brought down and the economy kept healthy, so that new jobs can be created. The solution to rural America's economic problems is not the endless pumping of money into programs designed to give temporary relief.

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 370: Commerce and Housing Credit						
Dole amendment No. 43	\$7.2	\$2.6	\$3.9	\$0.1	\$4.3	\$2.0
Sasser, et al, amendment	+2.5	+1.5	+2.6	+2.2	+3.0	+2.6
Total	9.7	4.1	6.5	2.3	7.3	4.6
Function 450: Community and Regional Development						
Dole amendment No. 43	\$5.4	\$7.4	\$5.8	\$6.8	\$6.2	\$6.2
Sasser, et al, amendment	+2.6	+0.7	+2.5	+1.7	+9.2	+8.7
Total	8.0	8.3	9.3	8.5	9.2	8.7
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole amendment No. 43*	\$142.1	\$142.1	\$152.9	\$152.9	\$154.7	\$154.7
Sasser, et al, amendment	----	----	+0.2	+0.2	+0.3	+0.3
Total	142.1	142.1	153.1	153.1	155.0	155.0

*As amended by the Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amendment—Vote No. 36; Dole-Murkowski, et al, amendment—Vote No. 37; Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39; Specter amendment—Vote No. 53; and Hawkins, et al, amendment—Vote No. 55.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 58

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 3:59 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5820

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 81

SUBJECT: Chiles, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to maintain funding for education, training, employment, and social service programs (Function 500) to insure that no discretionary program is cut below current levels and provide protection against inflation for those programs targeted to low-income children, youths, handicapped, and the elderly, such as Pell grants, Headstart, elderly nutrition, some job training programs, etc. (costing an estimated \$8.3 billion).

NOTE: Proponents stated that this amendment would restore all education programs to FY 1985 funding levels and would allow many means tested discretionary programs to maintain their current services. Under the President's budget, the groups—disadvantaged children, unemployed youths and adults, students, and the elderly—who have already been subjected to large cutbacks in the past four years, would be made to suffer unfair further reductions. In addition to the State and local government's role, the Federal government has a vital part to play in the education, training, and nourishment of the people of this country. It cannot allow mediocrity and lack of access to quality programs to persist. An investment in these social programs is sound economic policy, good defense policy, and sensible.

Opponents argued that this amendment is too expensive in these tough economic times. The government is asking for equal sacrifices across the board from beneficiaries of almost every single Federal program. The social programs affected by this amendment would be better served if the economy itself was on solid ground. This amendment must be defeated in the name of fiscal discipline and because of the effect that the present deficit would have on future generations.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (47)			NAYS (50)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (43 or 93%)		Republicans (4 or 8%)	Democrats (3 or 7%)		Republicans (47 or 92%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Inouye	Andrews	Long	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Exon— ³	East— ³
Bentsen	Johnston	Hawkins	Nunn	Armstrong	Kasten		Wilson— ³
Biden	Kennedy	Mathias	Proxmire	Boschwitz	Laxalt		
Bingaman	Kerry	Specter		Chafee	Lugar		
Boren	Lautenberg			Cochran	Mattingly		
Bradley	Leahy			Cohen	McClure		
Bumpers	Levin			D'Amato	McConnell		
Burdick	Matsunaga			Danforth	Murkowski		
Byrd	Melcher			Denton	Nickles		
Chiles	Metzenbaum			Dole	Packwood		
Cranston	Mitchell			Domenici	Pressler		
DeConcini	Moynihan			Durenberger	Quayle		
Dixon	Pell			Evans	Roth		
Dodd	Pryor			Garn	Rudman		
Eagleton	Riegle			Goldwater	Simpson		
Ford	Rockefeller			Gorton	Stafford		
Glenn	Sarbanes			Gramm	Stevens		
Gore	Sasser			Grassley	Symms		
Harkin	Simon			Hatch	Thurmond		
Hart	Stennis			Hatfield	Trible		
Heflin	Zorinsky			Hecht	Wallop		
Hollings				Heinz	Warner		
				Helms	Weicker		
				Humphrey			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—93%
Republicans—92%


Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (47)
Democrats—43 or 91%
Republicans—4 or 9%

Against (50)
Democrats—3 or 5%
Republicans—47 or 94%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 59

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 5:09 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5829

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 82

SUBJECT: Cohen, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to restore funding for the FmHA rural housing programs, which would be eliminated by the Dole amendment, to 80 percent of the FY 1985 level and assume the phase-in of a loan guarantee program in place of direct loans (costing an estimated \$4.5 billion, which is \$3.7 billion less than current level over three years).

NOTE: Proponents stated that this amendment addresses an inequitable proposal in the President's budget which would assume complete termination of all new program authority for FmHA rural housing and would transfer the remaining program to HUD. This proposal would be fundamentally unfair to thousands of poor families whose income is less than \$8,000 and who live in substandard rural housing. It would be wrong to halt abruptly this financing when there is no guarantee of an alternative for these people. This amendment would not only ensure that the poor still have the option of living in single family dwellings, but it also would provide over 80,000 construction jobs. Further, it takes into consideration the need for FmHA program reform by providing loan guarantees for private lenders for about 7,000 units in the first year. If this pilot program proves to be successful, then it would be feasible gradually to transform the financing structure of rural housing.

Opponents maintained that it was time for the Federal government to halt direct financing for rural housing as it has done for most other similar programs. If the FmHA rural housing program remains as it is, it will cost the Federal government \$9 billion over the next three years. By combining rehabilitation of existing homes, a voucher plan, loan guarantees for private lenders, and limited new construction of single family dwellings, the same objective of providing quality living places for the rural poor could be accomplished for about \$1.78 billion.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (47)			NAYS (50)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (37 or 80%)		Republicans (10 or 20%)	Democrats (9 or 20%)		Republicans (41 or 80%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews	Bentsen	Abdnor	Kasten	Exon ⁻³	East ⁻³
Biden	Kerry	Cohen	Bradley	Armstrong	Laxalt		Wilson ⁻³
Bingaman	Leahy	D'Amato	DeConcini	Boschwitz	Lugar		
Boren	Levin	Gorton	Dixon	Chafee	Mathias		
Bumpers	Long	Grassley	Dodd	Cochran	Mattingly		
Burdick	Matsunaga	Hawkins	Lautenberg	Danforth	McClure		
Byrd	Melcher	Murkowski	Nunn	Denton	McConnell		
Chiles	Metzenbaum	Specter	Pell	Dole	Nickles		
Cranston	Mitchell	Stafford	Proxmire	Domenici	Packwood		
Eagleton	Moynihan	Stevens		Durenberger	Pressler		
Ford	Pryor			Evans	Quayle		
Glenn	Riegle			Garn	Roth		
Gore	Rockefeller			Goldwater	Rudman		
Harkin	Sarbanes			Gramm	Simpson		
Hart	Sasser			Hatch	Symms		
Heflin	Simon			Hatfield	Thurmond		
Hollings	Stennis			Hecht	Trible		
Inouye	Zorinsky			Heinz	Wallop		
Johnston				Helms	Warner		
				Humphrey	Weicker		
				Kassebaum			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—80%
Republicans—80%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (47)
Democrats—37 or 79%
Republicans—10 or 21%

Against (50)
Democrats—9 or 18%
Republicans—41 or 82%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 370: Commerce and Housing Credit						
Dole amendment No. 43	\$7.2	\$2.6	\$3.9	\$0.1	\$4.3	\$2.0
Cohen, et al, amendment	+3.0	+1.4	+3.6	+1.6	+3.4	+1.4
Total	10.2	4.0	7.5	1.7	7.7	3.4
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole amendment No. 43*	\$142.1	\$142.1	\$152.9	\$152.9	\$154.7	\$154.7
Cohen, et al, amendment	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1
Total	142.2	142.2	153.0	153.0	154.8	154.8

*As amended by the Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amendment—Vote No. 36; Dole-Murkowski, et al, amendment—Vote No. 37; Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39; Specter amendment—Vote No. 53; and Hawkins, et al, amendment—Vote No. 55.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 61

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 6:54 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5836

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 83

SUBJECT: Dole (for Abdnor, et al) amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to restore impact educational aid part B funding to its FY 1985 level of \$391 million for each of FY 1986-88.

NOTE: Proponents stated that it is unfair for Federally-impacted school districts to be forced to suffer a 22 percent funding reduction while other elementary and secondary education programs are merely frozen. Last year, Congress and the Administration reaffirmed support for impact aid by reauthorizing it for four years at a higher funding level. The budget proposal now before the Senate, however, seeks devastating cuts which will entirely eliminate part B and construction assistance. Impact aid is a basic education program for the benefit of children who attend schools in areas where tax revenue is limited due to Federal activity. Such aid goes primarily to schools with Native Americans, military dependents, and children living in Federally-subsidized housing. Although the overall Federal role in education may be open to debate, the government has an undeniable responsibility to provide these children with a quality education, and to compensate local school districts that suffer the effect of lost revenue because of Federal activity. These proposed reductions would "pull the rug out from under" many school systems including those which serve the children of military personnel at a much lower cost than DOD schools. Although some government personnel may own their homes and pay real estate taxes, the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act exempts many from other State and local taxes. Since most military families shop at base commissaries, they do not contribute to the local economy either. Even a freeze at the FY 1985 level would create hardships in many Federally-impacted localities, but the drastic cuts proposed in this budget plan could seriously disrupt many of the school systems.

Opponents declared that Congress should continue its efforts to restrain impact aid funding. The budget package proposes to fund this program adequately at the 1984 level of \$246 million which can be targeted to the neediest areas of the country. Many programs are going to suffer funding reductions from this budget proposal, and impact aid is one which can and should be cut. Since "B" families only work on Federal property and live in privately-held homes, they noted, real estate taxes are being paid to the communities in support of education. Some proponents admitted that many school districts will suffer severe hardship as a result of impact aid cutbacks, but expressed the hope that States would be able to provide additional assistance to these localities.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (47)			NAYS (49)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (34 or 76%)		Republicans (13 or 25%)	Democrats (11 or 24%)		Republicans (38 or 75%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Johnston	Abdnor	Bentsen	Armstrong	Helms	Eagleton ⁻²	East ⁻³
Biden	Kerry	Andrews	Byrd	Boschwitz	Humphrey	Exon ⁻³	Wilson ⁻³
Bingaman	Lautenberg	D'Amato	Cranston	Chafee	Kassebaum		
Boren	Levin	Hawkins	Dixon	Cochran	Kasten		
Bradley	Long	Heinz	Harkin	Cohen	Laxalt		
Bumpers	Matsunaga	Mathias	Kennedy	Danforth	Lugar		
Burdick	Melcher	Murkowski	Leahy	Denton	Mattingly		
Chiles	Mitchell	Nickles	Metzenbaum	Dole	McClure		
DeConcini	Moynihan	Pressler	Proxmire	Domenici	McConnell		
Dodd	Nunn	Specter	Rockefeller	Durenberger	Packwood		
Ford	Pell	Stevens	Simon	Evans	Quayle		
Glenn	Pryor	Trible		Garn	Roth		
Gore	Riegle	Warner		Goldwater	Rudman		
Hart	Sarbanes			Gorton	Simpson		
Heflin	Sasser			Gramm	Stafford		
Hollings	Stennis			Grassley	Symms		
Inouye	Zorinsky			Hatch	Thurmond		
				Hatfield	Wallop		
				Hecht	Weicker		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—76%
Republicans—75%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (47)
Democrats—34 or 72%
Republicans—13 or 28%

Against (49)
Democrats—11 or 22%
Republicans—38 or 78%

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 500: Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services						
Dole amendment No. 43	\$28.6	\$29.8	\$29.4	\$28.7	\$29.8	\$29.0
Dole (for Abdnor, et al.) amt.	+0.2	+0.1	+0.2	+0.1	+0.2	+0.2
Total	28.8	29.9	29.6	28.8	30.0	29.2

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 62

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 7:34 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5839

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 84

SUBJECT: Stevens motion to table the Metzenbaum-Burdick, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to restore funding for postal subsidies for the blind, charitable non-profit organizations, religious organizations, rural newspapers, and libraries, with the exception of national publications using the second class, in-country rate (costing \$2.5 billion over three years).

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment declared that elimination of the postal subsidy would send postal rates for non-profit groups skyrocketing and result in cuts in their services. It is "penny-wise and pound-foolish" for the Administration to seek to balance the budget "on the backs" of the nation's voluntary organizations which the Administration is continually asking to fill the void created by drastic cuts in social service programs. Mailing costs for the Salvation Army would increase by \$2.6 million, the March of Dimes by \$7.8 million, and the National Catholic Development Conference by \$39 million. Postal rates for small newspapers could go up by as much as 300 percent, and rates for libraries would rise at least 75 percent. These cost increases only will have to be absorbed by the public through higher subscription rates and decreased service.

Opponents stated that the amendment merely sought to restore funding for postal subsidies without dealing with the problem of abuses. The cost of third class, non-profit mailings has jumped from \$450 million in 1984 to an estimated \$717 million this year, and, if it continues to increase at the current rate of 50-70 percent annually, could be over \$1 billion by 1987. While agreeing that action must be taken to cut costs and curtail such unnecessary mailings, many favored a substitute proposal that would be included in the final budget package. It would transfer \$100 million in funding to the Postal Service budget for subsidies to small rural newspapers, the blind and handicapped, libraries, school classroom publications, and other social, philanthropic, religious, and cultural organizations approved for non-profit rates by the Postal Rate Commission. As Chairman of the Post Office and Civil Service Subcommittee, Senator Stevens made assurances that action would be taken on legislation to curtail abuses of the subsidies by groups such as alumni organizations which utilize reduced postal rates to mail brochures advertising expensive travel packages.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (51)			NAYS (46)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (1 or 2%)	Republicans (50 or 98%)		Democrats (45 or 98%)		Republicans (1 or 2%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Proxmire	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Johnston	Andrews	Exon— ³	East— ³ Wilson— ³
	Armstrong	Kasten	Bentsen	Kennedy			
	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Biden	Kerry			
	Chafee	Lugar	Bingaman	Lautenberg			
	Cochran	Mathias	Boren	Leahy			
	Cohen	Mattingly	Bradley	Levin			
	D'Amato	McClure	Bumpers	Long			
	Danforth	McConnell	Burdick	Matsunaga			
	Denton	Murkowski	Byrd	Melcher			
	Dole	Nickles	Chiles	Metzenbaum			
	Domenici	Packwood	Cranston	Mitchell			
	Durenberger	Pressler	DeConcini	Moynihan			
	Evans	Quayle	Dixon	Nunn			
	Garn	Roth	Dodd	Pell			
	Goldwater	Rudman	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Gorton	Simpson	Ford	Riegle			
	Gramm	Specter	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Grassley	Stafford	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Hatch	Stevens	Harkin	Sasser			
	Hatfield	Symms	Hart	Simon			
	Hawkins	Thurmond	Heflin	Stennis			
	Hecht	Trible	Hollings	Zorinsky			
	Heinz	Wallop	Inouye				
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey	Weicker					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—98%
Republicans—98%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (51)
Democrats—1 or 2%
Republicans—50 or 98%

Against (46)
Democrats—45 or 98%
Republicans—1 or 2%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 370: Commerce and Housing Credit						
Dole amendment No. 43	\$7.2	\$2.6	\$3.9	\$0.1	\$4.3	\$2.0
Metzenbaum-Burdick, et al, amt.	+0.3	+0.3	+1.9	+1.9	+0.4	+0.4
Total	7.5	2.9	5.8	2.0	4.7	2.4
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole amendment No. 43*	\$142.10	\$142.10	\$152.90	\$152.90	\$154.70	\$154.70
Metzenbaum-Burdick, et al, amt.	+.15	+.15	+.12	+.12	+.24	+.24
Total	142.25	142.25	123.0	123.0	154.94	154.94

*As amended by the Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amendment—Vote No. 36; Dole-Murkowski, et al, amendment—Vote No. 37; Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39; and Specter, et al, amendment—Vote No. 53.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 63

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 8:06 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5845

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 85

SUBJECT: Kasten, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to restore funding for revenue sharing in FY 1987 and 1988 at 50 percent of the FY 1986 level (costing an estimated \$4.6 billion over two years).

NOTE: Proponents claimed that revenue sharing is one of the most efficient and cost-effective programs in the Federal government. It targets Federal assistance to the neediest local governments, provides the flexibility to address specific community needs, and is used to support essential services such as police and fire protection, water and sewer projects, mass transit, economic development, and huge increases in property taxes. A recent study by the U.S. Conference of Mayors indicates that elimination of the program would force 60 percent of the cities that responded to cut capital improvements, 48 percent to reduce public safety spending, 47 percent to cut health and human services, and 14 percent to cut sanitation. Tax rates would have to be raised by as much as 50.7 percent to make up for the lost General Revenue Sharing payments. The much-touted revenue surplus of State and local governments—which, combined nationally, only amounts to 1.9 percent of their expenditures—does not warrant termination of this successful and popular program. A 50 percent reduction in funding for FY 1987 and 1988 is a fair and equitable compromise which would allow sufficient budgetary savings and still give communities time to adjust their budgets and find replacement funds.

Opponents contended that there was no revenue for the Federal government to share with anyone and that the program should be renamed "deficit sharing." The revenue sharing program was enacted in 1972 on the basis of projections that the Federal government would be enjoying revenue surpluses for many years. Revenue sharing payments have totaled \$78 billion since that time, and yet the Federal government has not experienced a surplus in any year since the program's enactment. We simply can no longer afford this program which gives away much needed tax dollars to some of the wealthiest communities in the nation. Furthermore, during Finance Committee hearings on the issue, cities and counties indicated their preference for full funding through FY 1986 over having the program cut by 50 percent and extended for another one or two years.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (43)			NAYS (54)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (34 or 74%)		Republicans (9 or 18%)	Democrats (12 or 26%)		Republicans (42 or 82%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Biden	Lautenberg	Andrews	Baucus	Abdnor	Laxalt	Exon— ³	East— ³
Bradley	Leahy	Cohen	Bentzen	Armstrong	Lugar		Wilson— ³
Bumpers	Levin	Garn	Bingaman	Boschwitz	Mattingly		
Burdick	Long	Grassley	Boren	Chafee	McClure		
Byrd	Matsunaga	Hatch	Chiles	Cochran	McConnell		
Dixon	Melcher	Heinz	Cranston	D'Amato	Murkowski		
Eagleton	Metzenbaum	Kasten	DeConcini	Danforth	Nickles		
Ford	Mitchell	Mathias	Dodd	Denton	Packwood		
Glenn	Moynihan	Specter	Kennedy	Dole	Pressler		
Gore	Pryor		Nunn	Domenici	Quayle		
Harkin	Riegle		Pell	Durenberger	Roth		
Hart	Rockefeller		Proxmire	Evans	Rudman		
Heflin	Sarbanes			Goldwater	Simpson		
Hollings	Sasser			Gorton	Stafford		
Inouye	Simon			Gramm	Stevens		
Johnston	Stennis			Hatfield	Symms		
Kerry	Zorinsky			Hawkins	Thurmond		
				Hecht	Trible		
				Helms	Wallop		
				Humphrey	Warner		
				Kassebaum	Weicker		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—74%
Republicans—82%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (43)
Democrats—34 or 79%
Republicans—9 or 21%

Against (54)
Democrats—12 or 22%
Republicans—42 or 78%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 850: General Purpose Fiscal Assistance						
Dole amendment No. 43	\$6.5	\$6.5	\$2.0	\$3.2	\$2.1	\$2.1
Kasten, et al, amendment	----	----	+2.3	+1.7	+2.3	+2.3
Total	6.5	6.5	4.3	4.9	4.4	4.4
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole amendment No. 43*	\$142.1	\$142.1	\$152.9	\$152.9	\$154.7	\$154.7
Kasten, et al, amendment	----	----	+0.1	+0.1	+0.3	+0.3
Total	142.1	142.1	153.0	153.0	155.0	155.0

*As amended by the Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amendment—Vote No. 36; Dole-Murkowski, et al, amendment—Vote No. 37; Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39; and Specter, et al, amendment—Vote No. 53.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 64

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 8:41 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S.5855

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 86

SUBJECT: Packwood motion to table the Chiles-Kennedy-Byrd, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to restore cuts which would increase medicare beneficiaries out-of-pocket expenses by: striking increases in the medicare part B premium and deductible; restoring \$3 billion over three years in medicare funding for hospital reimbursements (including restoring the 50 percent reduction in "indirect teaching adjustments" to certain hospitals); eliminating a home care copayment to be charged after the 20th visit; and eliminating the provision which would have delayed medicare eligibility for one month (costing an estimated \$4.6 billion over three years, but still achieving \$11.7 billion in savings through a full provider freeze). (See also Vote No. 63.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that it would protect 30 million elderly and disabled medicare beneficiaries against the unfair cuts in the Republican budget package. Major cuts in the medicare program have been adopted every year of this Administration's tenure which, in conjunction with the currently proposed reductions, would require recipients to pay an additional \$21.1 billion for health care by 1990. Medicare presently covers only about 40 percent of the health costs of America's senior citizens who annually expend 15 percent of their income (an average of \$1,800) for health care—the same percentage as was being paid before medicare was created. The additional cuts proposed by the Administration would further increase the burden and force many senior citizens to choose between food, shelter, or health care. Quality health care for medicare recipients also would be jeopardized by the proposed 50 percent reduction in the "indirect teaching adjustment" used to compensate hospitals which carry the greatest load of medicare and indigent patients. Opponents claimed that this adjustment payment was unjustifiably doubled when the new medicare reimbursement system was enacted two years ago. This modification was made specifically to compensate for large indigent caseloads, however, and only until the Administration could devise a better formula which it has

(OVER)

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (51)			NAYS (46)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (4 or 9%)	Republicans (47 or 92%)		Democrats (42 or 91%)	Republicans (4 or 8%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Long	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Hollings	Cohen	Exon— ³	East— ³
Nunn	Andrews	Lavalt	Bentsen	Inouye	D'Amato		Wilson— ³
Proxmire	Armstrong	Lugar	Biden	Johnston	Hawkins		
Stennis	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bingaman	Kennedy	Specter		
	Chafee	Mattingly	Boren	Kerry			
	Cochran	McClure	Bradley	Lautenberg			
	Danforth	McConnell	Bumpers	Leahy			
	Denton	Murkowski	Burdick	Levin			
	Dole	Nickles	Byrd	Matsunaga			
	Domenici	Packwood	Chiles	Melcher			
	Durenberger	Pressler	Cranston	Metzenbaum			
	Evans	Quayle	DeConcini	Mitchell			
	Garn	Roth	Dixon	Moynihan			
	Goldwater	Rudman	Dodd	Pell			
	Gorton	Simpson	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Gramm	Stafford	Ford	Riegle			
	Grassley	Stevens	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Hatch	Symms	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Hatfield	Thurmond	Harkin	Sasser			
	Hecht	Trible	Hart	Simon			
	Heinz	Wallop	Heflin	Zorinsky			
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey	Weicker					
	Kassebaum						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—91%
Republicans—92%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (51)
Democrats—4 or 8%
Republicans—47 or 92%

Against (46)
Democrats—42 or 91%
Republicans—4 or 9%

failed to do. Even though a Congressional commission has recommended a 2.5 percent compensation increase in hospital reimbursements for 1986, this amendment would institute a one-year freeze in an effort to curtail program costs. More than \$9 billion in savings over three years would be yielded, and the medicare hospital insurance fund's solvency would be guaranteed well into the 1990's. While Federal expenditures must be controlled, they admitted, the elderly should not be unfairly penalized for Congress' inability to deter the rapid escalation of medical costs.

Opponents contended that this amendment was an unnecessary expenditure which the nation cannot afford. Most hospitals are faring quite well under the medicare system, however, and can afford to bear these modest cuts. An American Hospital Association study indicated that in 1984 the hospital industry showed its healthiest profit margin in 20 years. Medicare is one of the most generous benefit programs ever created, and this budget package merely attempts to make reasonable changes and keep the program solvent. It does not deny benefits to anyone, but merely aims to institute cost controls through a balanced approach of provider cuts and beneficiary cost-sharing. Part B is an optional supplementary insurance program which, when created, required participants to bear one-half of the program costs. The government's share has grown continually, however, until beneficiaries now pay less than 25 percent. Greater beneficiary cost-sharing is needed to help deter unnecessary utilization and thereby dampen spiraling health costs. Others claimed that the Packwood, et al, amendment adopted by the Senate on May 3, already restored sufficient medicare funds to prevent the elderly from having to forego essential health care and no further funding should be authorized.

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	BA	1986 O	BA	1987 O	BA	1988 O
Function 570: Medical Insurance						
Dole amendment No. 43*	\$81.8	\$68.2	\$91.1	\$74.7	\$94.8	\$82.7
Chiles-Kennedy-Byrd, et al, amt.	+0.2	+0.9	+0.4	+1.2	+0.6	+1.9
Total	82.0	69.1	91.5	75.9	95.4	84.6
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole amendment No. 43**	\$142.1	\$142.1	\$152.9	\$152.9	\$154.7	\$154.7
Chiles-Kennedy-Byrd, et al, amt.	----	----	+0.1	+0.1	+0.3	+0.3
Total	142.1	142.1	153.0	153.0	155.0	155.0

* As amended by the Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39.

**As amended by the Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amendment—Vote No. 36; Dole-Murkowski, et al, amendment—Vote No. 37; Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39; and Specter, et al, amendment—Vote No. 53.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 66

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 10:03 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S.5864

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 88

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Bradley amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to eliminate the increase in medicare part B premium costs to beneficiaries (costing an estimated \$2 billion) and extend the current cigarette excise tax (raising an estimated \$5 billion, with the \$3 billion excess applied to reduce the deficit). (See also Vote Nos. 39, 64, 70, and 74.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that it would redress two serious problems found in the First Budget Resolution. Under current law, the 16 cent Federal cigarette tax would fall back to eight cents in September, 1985. Since the Federal cigarette tax was eight cents in 1951, it would represent less than 10 percent of the cost per pack today, nearly a 75 percent reduction in taxes over the last 34 years. It would be absurd to lower taxes on a product that has known health hazards, while at the same time, increase significantly health insurance premiums for medicare. By holding the Federal cigarette tax at 16 cents, the Federal treasury would gain approximately \$5 billion in revenues over the 1986-88 period. Furthermore, medicare premiums today have risen so dramatically that health care costs borne by the elderly are as expensive as they were before inception of the program. Although holding medicare premiums at the present rate would cost the government \$2 billion in projected revenues, adoption of this fiscally sensible amendment still would reduce the deficit more than the Republican leadership budget by about \$3 billion over the next three years.

Opponents of the amendment contended that it represents a tax increase because one-half of the 16 cents already levied on cigarettes is part of a temporary surtax enacted in 1982 and scheduled to expire this year. Since this is a tax proposal, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee budget debate, making this an inappropriate time to settle the matter. Many States have imposed their own cigarette tax in anticipation of the lower Federal rate, and stand to lose much needed revenue if the Federal cigarette tax remains at 16 cents per pack. Finally, consumers of tobacco products, opponents claimed, already bear an inordinate share of taxes.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (49)			NAYS (47)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (8 or 17%)	Republicans (41 or 82%)		Democrats (38 or 83%)	Republicans (9 or 18%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
DeConcini	Abdnor	Laxalt	Baucus	Kennedy	Boschwitz	Exon—3	East—3PY Wilson—3
Ford	Andrews	Lugar	Bentsen	Kerry	Chafee		
Gore	Armstrong	Mattingly	Biden	Lautenberg	Cohen		
Heflin	Cochran	McClure	Bingaman	Leahy	Garn		
Hollings	D'Amato	McConnell	Boren	Levin	Hatch		
Nunn	Danforth	Murkowski	Bradley	Long	Hatfield		
Stennis	Denton	Packwood	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Heinz		
Zorinsky	Dole	Pressler	Burdick	Melcher	Mathias		
	Domenici	Quayle	Byrd	Metzenbaum	Nickles		
	Durenberger	Roth	Chiles	Mitchell			
	Evans	Rudman	Cranston	Moynihan			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Dixon	Pell			
	Gorton	Specter	Dodd	Proxmire			
	Gramm	Stafford	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Grassley	Symms	Glenn	Riegle			
	Hawkins	Thurmond	Harkin	Rockefeller			
	Hecht	Trible	Hart	Sarbanes			
	Helms	Wallop	Inouye	Sasser			
	Humphrey	Warner	Johnston	Simon			
	Kassebaum	Weicker					
	Kasten						

LIVE PAIRS (1)

PRESENT AND
GIVING:

RECEIVING:

Stevens (PN) East (PY)

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—83%
Republicans—82%

Measure of Party-Support on Issue as Voted on

For (49)
Democrats—8 or 16%
Republicans—41 or 84%

Against (47)
Democrats—38 or 81%
Republicans—9 or 19%

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 570: Medical Insurance						
Dole amendment No. 43*	\$81.80	\$68.20	\$91.10	\$74.70	\$94.80	\$82.70
Bradley amendment	+0.18	+0.18	+0.48	+0.48	+1.27	+1.27
Total	81.98	68.38	91.58	75.18	96.07	83.97
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole amendment No. 43**	\$142.1	\$142.1	\$152.9	\$152.9	\$154.7	\$154.7
Bradley amendment	----	----	+0.2	+0.2	+0.2	+0.2
Total	142.1	142.1	153.1	153.1	154.9	154.9

* As amended by the Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39.

**As amended by the Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amendment—Vote No. 36; Dole-Murkowski, et al, amendment—Vote No. 37; Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39; and Specter, et al, amendment—Vote No. 53.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 68

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 10:52 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S.5869

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 90

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Lautenberg, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to freeze funding at the FY 1985 level for Amtrak, mass transit, and UDAG. (See also Vote No. 65.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that without it these three programs would bear three times their share of the burden of the deficit reduction plan. The Senate already has debated and voted to restore 90 percent of the funding for Amtrak which is moving in an orderly fashion toward self sufficiency by increasing its ridership and instituting reforms. The Senate agreed to freeze its funding this year and to re-examine the issue next year. The mass transit program, they noted, is extremely important to small, rural States, especially since it pays for bus service gaps left in communities that lost major companies' routes due to bus deregulation. Finally, they maintained that UDAG has proven that the Federal and local governments can act in cooperation with the private sector to strengthen the economies of the nation's most distressed cities. It has spurred over 2,400 developments in close to 1,100 cities involving \$26 billion in private investment which generated \$990 million a year in tax revenues and in reduced transfer payments. Clearly, these three programs have worked and should not be eliminated.

Opponents of the amendment declared that priorities must be set during this budget debate. The nation must ask itself if a program such as Amtrak is so important that it should be exempt from playing a role in reducing the size of the budget deficit. The fact remains that Amtrak is not even the focal point of the U.S. transportation system, and it carries only one-fourth of one percent of intercity transportation. No arguments were made against the other two programs.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (57)			NAYS (40)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (13 or 28%)	Republicans (44 or 86%)		Democrats (33 or 72%)	Republicans (7 or 14%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Humphrey	Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews	Exon— ³	East— ³
Bingaman	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Biden	Kerry	D'Amato		Wilson— ³
Boren	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Bradley	Lautenberg	Heinz		
Bumpers	Chafee	Lugar	Burdick	Leahy	Kasten		
Chiles	Cochran	Mattingly	Byrd	Levin	Mathias		
Glenn	Cohen	McCiure	Cranston	Matsunaga	Specter	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
Gore	Danforth	McConnell	DeConcini	Melcher	Weicker		
Long	Denton	Murkowski	Dixon	Metzenbaum			
Mitchell	Dole	Nickles	Dodd	Moynihan			
Nunn	Domenici	Packwood	Eagleton	Pell		SYMBOLS:	
Proxmire	Durenberger	Pressler	Ford	Riegle			
Pryor	Evans	Quayle	Harkin	Rockefeller			
Sasser	Garn	Roth	Hart	Sarbanes			
	Goldwater	Rudman	Heflin	Simon		AY—Announced Yea	
	Gorton	Simpson	Hollings	Stennis		AN—Announced Nay	
	Gramm	Stafford	Inouye	Zorinsky		PY—Paired Yea	
	Grassley	Stevens	Johnston			PN—Paired Nay	
	Hatch	Symms					
	Hatfield	Thurmond					
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Helms	Warner					

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—72%
Republicans—86%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (57)
Democrats—13 or 23%
Republicans—44 or 77%

Against (40)
Democrats—33 or 83%
Republicans—7 or 18%

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 400: Transportation						
Dole amendment No. 43*	\$27.2	\$26.1	\$27.7	\$27.6	\$26.9	\$27.1
Lautenberg, et al, amendment	+1.6	+0.8	+2.1	+2.1	+2.5	+1.6
Total	28.8	26.9	29.8	29.7	29.4	28.7
Function 450: Community and Regional Development						
Dole amendment No. 43	\$5.4	\$7.6	\$5.8	\$6.8	\$6.2	\$6.2
Lautenberg, et al, amendment	+0.4	----	+0.4	+0.1	+0.4	+0.2
Total	5.8	7.6	6.2	6.9	6.6	6.4
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole amendment No. 43**	\$142.1	\$142.1	\$152.9	\$152.9	\$154.7	\$154.7
Lautenberg, et al, amendment	----	----	+0.1	+0.1	+0.3	+0.3
Total	142.1	142.1	153.0	153.0	155.0	155.0

* As amended by the Specter, et al, amendment—Vote No. 53.

**As amended by the Grassley-Hatfield, et al, amendment—Vote No. 36; Dole-Murkowski, et al, amendment—Vote No. 37; Packwood, et al, amendment—Vote No. 39; and Specter, et al, amendment—Vote No. 53.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 69

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 11:15 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5872

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 73

SUBJECT: Hatfield motion to table the Dixon amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to restore \$160 million per year for summer youth jobs for FY 1986-88 in order to maintain the program at the FY 1984 level.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment noted that this program had been at \$825 million since FY 1984. Considering that unemployment for youths has not decreased from 19 percent, this is a small amount to pay to help keep teenagers in our major cities off the streets during summer. The Administration's answer to the severe teenage unemployment levels has been deeper cuts or elimination of programs that are working. The summer jobs program has worked, and it should be strengthened and improved—not cut. Eighty-six percent of its funds were spent last year, with an additional ten percent carried over to this year, leaving only four percent unexpended due to the late start-up caused by the Administration's drastic cut which Congress acted to ameliorate.

Opponents of the amendment made no statements.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (62)			NAYS (35)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (15 or 33%)	Republicans (47 or 92%)		Democrats (31 or 67%)	Republicans (4 or 8%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Abdnor	Kasten	Biden	Kennedy	Cohen	Exon— ³	East— ³
Bentsen	Andrews	Laxalt	Bingaman	Kerry	D'Amato		Wilson— ³
Boren	Armstrong	Lugar	Bradley	Lautenberg	Heinz		
Byrd	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bumpers	Levin	Specter		
Chiles	Chafee	Mattingly	Burdick	Matsunaga			
DeConcini	Cochran	McClure	Cranston	Melcher			
Glenn	Danforth	McConnell	Dixon	Metzenbaum			
Heflin	Denton	Murkowski	Dodd	Moynihan			
Leahy	Dole	Nickles	Eagleton	Nunn			
Long	Domenici	Packwood	Ford	Pell			
Mitchell	Durenberger	Pressler	Gore	Pryor			
Proxmire	Evans	Quayle	Harkin	Riegle			
Rockefeller	Garn	Roth	Hart	Sarbanes			
Stennis	Goldwater	Rudman	Hollings	Sasser			
Zorinsky	Gorton	Simpson	Inouye	Simon			
	Gramm	Stafford	Johnston				
	Grassley	Stevens					
	Hatch	Symms					
	Hatfield	Thurmond					
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey	Weicker					
	Kassebaum						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—67%
Republicans—92%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (62)
Democrats—15 or 24%
Republicans—47 or 76%

Against (35)
Democrats—31 or 89%
Republicans—4 or 11%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 500: Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services						
Dole amendment No. 43	\$28.60	\$29.80	\$29.40	\$28.70	\$29.80	\$29.03
Dixon amendment	+0.16	----	+0.16	+0.14	+0.16	+0.16
Total	28.76	29.80	29.56	28.84	29.96	29.16

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 70

99th Congress
1st Session

May 9, 1985, 11:32 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5874

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 91

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Levin-Dixon, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) to continue through FY 1988 the 16 cent cigarette excise tax, which returns to eight cents on October 1, 1984, and apply the \$4.9 billion in revenue raised toward reducing the deficit. (See also Vote No. 66.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment noted that the cigarette tax had been set in 1982 because of estimates that the deficit would be coming down by 1986 and that the cigarette tax could return to its eight cent level. However, with the deficit soaring over \$200 million, this is no time to cut the tax. Certainly, the Senate does not want to go on record that lower cigarette taxes are more important than educating our children, helping our farmers, or providing mass transit or a host of other programs for Americans living in cities. Because of the health risk involved in smoking, cigarettes should not be made cheaper to buy. It is ironic that a new and tougher cigarette labeling requirement will go into effect in October, on the same day the cost of cigarettes will drop, if this tax is not extended. Opponents of the amendment made no statements.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (50)			NAYS (46)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (12 or 26%)	Republicans (38 or 76%)		Democrats (34 or 74%)	Republicans (12 or 24%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Byrd	Abdnor	Laxalt	Baucus	Johnston	Boschwitz	Exon— ³	East— ³ PY Wilson— ³
Ford	Andrews	Lugar	Bentsen	Kennedy	Chafee	LIVE PAIRS (1)	
Gore	Armstrong	Mattingly	Biden	Kerry	Cohen		
Hart	Cochran	McClure	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Garn	PRESENT AND GIVING: RECEIVING:	
Heflin	D'Amato	McConnell	Boren	Leahy	Gorton		
Hollings	Danforth	Murkowski	Bradley	Levin	Hatch	Stevens (PN)	East (PY)
Long	Denton	Packwood	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Hatfield	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
Metzenbaum	Dole	Quayle	Burdick	Melcher	Heinz		
Rockefeller	Domenici	Roth	Chiles	Mitchell	Kassebaum	SYMBOLS:	
Sasser	Durenberger	Rudman	Cranston	Moynihan	Mathias		
Stennis	Evans	Simpson	DeConcini	Nunn	Nickles	AY—Announced Yea	
Zorinsky	Goldwater	Specter	Dixon	Pell	Pressler	AN—Announced Nay	
	Gramm	Stafford	Dodd	Proxmire		PY—Paired Yea	
	Grassley	Symms	Eagleton	Pryor		PN—Paired Nay	
	Hawkins	Thurmond	Glenn	Riegle			
	Hecht	Trible	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Helms	Wallop	Inouye	Simon			
	Humphrey	Warner					
	Kasten	Weicker					

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—74%
Republicans—76%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (50)
Democrats—12 or 24%
Republicans—38 or 76%

Against (46)
Democrats—34 or 74%
Republicans—12 or 26%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 72

99th Congress
1st Session

May 10, 1985, 1:27 a.m.
Session of May 9, 1985
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5899

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 93

SUBJECT: Second GOP-Dole substitute amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended—Vote No. 34) which sets budget levels to reduce spending by approximately \$56 billion in FY 1986 (\$295 billion (OVER))

NOTE: Proponents declared that this amendment would dramatically reduce domestic expenditures, remove several non-essential programs, reform five or six programs that have needed to be changed for decades, freeze COLA's for one year, and reduce defense spending a little more than the President desires. It would lower the FY 1986 deficit by about \$300 billion and restore \$17 billion to domestic programs over the next three years without raising taxes. It would not adversely affect recipients of medicare or medicaid, they claimed, because the changes affect the providers only. While acknowledging that the second GOP-Dole substitute amendment may not be perfect, the proponents asserted that it represents the best package for deficit reduction this year.

Opponents stated that this amendment would be unfair to America's future since it would cut drastically funds in such critical areas as education, child nutrition, and economic development, and shortchange the U.S. competitive ability by slashing job training, export promotion, and research capabilities. This amendment would break the President's promise to the elderly not to make cuts in social security while at the same time would not ask rich corporations to make sacrifices. The opponents pointed out that earlier in this budget debate, three more equitable alternatives—that would have lowered the deficit more and balanced the budget earlier than the second GOP-Dole substitute package—were offered, but were rejected by the Senate. If this amendment is adopted, the U.S. will become a place where the standard of living grows and grows for the wealthy but drops lower and lower for the middle class and the poor.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO, WITH VICE PRESIDENT VOTING YEA TO BREAK TIE

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (49)			NAYS (49)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (1 or 2%)	Republicans (48 or 92%)		Democrats (45 or 98%)	Republicans (4 or 8%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (1)
Zorinsky	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Johnston	D'Amato	Exon—3	East—3
	Andrews	Kasten	Bentsen	Kennedy	Hawkins		
	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Kerry	Mathias		
	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Specter		
	Chafee	Mattingly	Boren	Leahy			
	Cochran	McClure	Bradley	Levin			
	Cohen	McConnell	Bumpers	Long			
	Danforth	Murkowski	Burdick	Matsunaga			
	Denton	Nickles	Byrd	Melcher			
	Dole	Packwood	Chiles	Metzenbaum			
	Domenici	Pressler	Cranston	Mitchell			
	Durenberger	Quayle	DeConcini	Moynihan			
	Evans	Roth	Dixon	Nunn			
	Garn	Rudman	Dodd	Pell			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Eagleton	Proxmire			
	Gorton	Stafford	Ford	Pryor			
	Gramm	Stevens	Glenn	Riegle			
	Grassley	Symms	Gore	Rockefeller			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Hatfield	Trible	Hart	Sasser			
	Hecht	Wallop	Heflin	Simon			
	Heinz	Warner	Hollings	Stennis			
	Helms	Weicker	Inouye				
	Humphrey	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—98%
Republicans—92%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (49)
Democrats—1 or 2%
Republicans—48 or 98%

Against (49)
Democrats—45 or 92%
Republicans—4 or 8%

over three years) with OMB estimated deficits of \$171.4 billion in FY 1986, \$144.8 billion in 1987, and \$104.3 billion in 1988; provides a real growth rate in defense spending of 0%-3%-3% for FY 1986-88, respectively; freezes social security, veterans, and military and civilian retirement COLA's for one year; reduces medicare/medicaid funding by \$17.5 billion over FY 1986-88 and increases part B medicare premiums beginning in FY 1987; contains no new tax increases; contains funding for the following programs at reduced levels: Amtrak, postal subsidies, SBA, soil and water conservation, mass transit, agricultural programs, impact aid, energy research and conservation, Job Corps, rural housing, student aid, veterans health and housing programs, and NIH grants; assumes termination of the following programs: Trade Adjustment Assistance, Conrail (sale), Appalachian Development Program, Economic Development Administration, Urban Development Action Grants (after 1986), General Revenue Sharing (after 1986), Export-Import Bank Direct Loans, Community Services Block Grant (after 1986), Work Incentive Program, HODAG, Section 312 Rehabilitation Loans, U.S. Travel and Tourism Program, and Local Rail Service Assistance and Northeast Corridor Improvement Project.

**DOLE AMENDMENT NO. 43 (ORIGINAL REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP-WHITE HOUSE COMPROMISE)
COMPARED WITH DOLE AMENDMENT NO. 93 (SECOND GOP SUBSTITUTE BUDGET)**

		FY 1986			FY 1987			FY 1988		
		Dole 1	Dole 2	Dole 1 comp. w/ Dole 2	Dole 1	Dole 2	Dole 1 comp. w/ Dole 2	Dole 1	Dole 2	Dole 1 comp. w/ Dole 2
[In billions of dollars]										
050: National defense	BA	\$312.8	\$302.5	\$-10.3	\$334.9	\$323.4	\$-11.5	\$359.6	\$346.8	\$-12.8
	O	276.1	273.1	-3.0	298.4	292.1	-6.3	321.4	313.0	-8.4
150: International Affairs	BA	21.0	21.2	+0.2	20.2	20.4	+0.2	20.5	20.7	+0.2
	O	17.8	17.8	----	17.1	17.1	----	16.6	16.7	+0.1
250: General science, space technology	BA	8.8	9.1	+0.3	9.0	9.0	----	9.3	9.3	----
	O	8.7	9.0	+0.3	8.8	8.8	----	9.0	9.0	----
270: Energy	BA	5.2	5.2	----	5.2	5.2	----	4.9	4.9	----
	O	5.1	5.1	----	4.6	4.6	----	4.2	4.2	----
300: Natural resources and environment	BA	12.1	12.2	+0.1	12.5	12.6	+0.1	12.7	12.8	+0.1
	O	12.4	12.5	+0.1	12.2	12.4	+0.2	12.3	12.5	+0.2
350: Agriculture	BA	16.5	17.2	+0.7	16.4	17.7	+1.3	13.6	17.0	+3.4
	O	13.8	14.5	+0.7	14.5	15.8	+1.3	11.5	12.9	+1.4
370: Commerce and housing credit	BA	7.2	6.8	-0.4	3.9	5.6	+1.7	4.3	6.1	+1.8
	O	2.6	3.4	+0.8	0.1	2.3	+2.2	2.0	5.1	+3.1
400: Transportation	BA	26.6	27.2	+0.6	27.1	27.9	+0.8	26.3	27.3	+1.0
	O	25.6	26.1	+0.5	27.0	27.7	+0.7	26.5	27.4	+0.9
450: Community and regional development	BA	5.4	6.6	+1.2	5.8	6.7	+0.9	6.2	7.1	+0.9
	O	7.6	7.9	+0.3	6.8	7.1	+0.3	6.2	6.7	+0.5
500: Edu., training, employment and social serv.	BA	28.6	30.1	+1.5	29.4	30.7	+1.3	29.8	31.3	+1.5
	O	29.8	30.3	+0.5	28.7	29.9	+1.2	29.0	30.4	+1.4
550: Health	BA	34.9	35.7	+0.8	37.1	38.2	+1.1	39.2	40.8	+1.6
	O	35.0	35.3	+0.3	36.7	37.8	+1.1	38.7	40.3	+1.6
570: Medical Insurance	BA	81.6	81.9	+0.3	90.5	91.2	+0.7	93.3	94.8	+1.5
	O	68.0	68.3	+0.3	74.1	74.8	+0.7	81.6	82.7	+1.1
600: Income Security	BA	156.3	155.4	-0.9	166.5	164.9	-1.6	174.7	173.9	-0.8
	O	118.1	116.6	-1.5	121.9	120.6	-1.3	125.6	125.7	+0.1
650: Social Security	BA	207.6	207.4	-0.2	225.3	225.5	+0.2	266.2	266.1	-0.1
	O	197.7	194.9	-7.2	206.5	205.9	-0.6	216.1	220.0	+3.9
700: Veterans' benefits and services	BA	26.9	26.7	-0.2	26.9	26.8	-0.1	26.9	27.2	+0.3
	O	26.3	26.1	-0.2	26.3	26.2	-0.1	26.4	26.7	+0.3
750: Administration of justice	BA	6.8	6.8	----	6.9	6.9	----	7.0	7.0	----
	O	6.7	6.7	----	6.9	6.9	----	7.0	7.0	----
800: General government	BA	5.3	5.3	----	5.4	5.4	----	5.6	5.5	-0.1
	O	5.3	5.2	-0.1	5.3	5.2	-0.1	5.5	5.5	----
850: General purpose fiscal assistance	BA	6.5	6.5	----	2.0	2.0	----	2.1	2.1	----
	O	6.5	6.5	----	3.2	3.2	----	2.1	2.1	----
900: Net interest	BA	142.3	142.3	----	153.0	152.1	-0.9	155.2	153.9	-1.3
	O	142.3	142.3	----	153.0	152.1	-0.9	155.2	153.9	-1.3
920: Allowances	BA	-1.4	-1.6	+0.2	-1.2	-1.6	+0.5	-0.2	-0.6	+0.4
	O	-1.4	-1.6	+0.2	-1.2	-1.6	+0.5	-0.1	-0.5	+0.4
950: Undistributed offsetting receipts	BA	-35.0	-35.0	----	-37.8	-37.8	----	-41.1	-41.1	----
	O	-35.0	-35.0	----	-37.8	-37.8	----	-41.1	-41.1	----
TOTAL	BA	1,076.0	1,069.5	-6.5	1,139.0	1,132.8	-6.2	1,216.1	1,212.9	-3.2
	O	969.0	965.0	-4.0	1,013.1	1,011.1	-2.0	1,055.7	1,060.2	+4.5

over three years) with OMB estimated deficits of \$171.4 billion in FY 1986, \$144.8 billion in 1987, and \$104.3 billion in 1988; provides a real growth rate in defense spending of 0%-3%-3% for FY 1986-88, respectively; freezes social security, veterans, and military and civilian retirement COLA's for one year; reduces medicare/medicaid funding by \$17.5 billion over FY 1986-88 and increases part B medicare premiums beginning in FY 1987; contains no new tax increases; contains funding for the following programs at reduced levels: Amtrak, postal subsidies, SBA, soil and water conservation, mass transit, agricultural programs, impact aid, energy research and conservation, Job Corps, rural housing, student aid, veterans health and housing programs, and NIH grants; assumes termination of the following programs: Trade Adjustment Assistance, Conrail (sale), Appalachian Development Program, Economic Development Administration, Urban Development Action Grants (after 1986), General Revenue Sharing (after 1986), Export-Import Bank Direct Loans, Community Services Block Grant (after 1986), Work Incentive Program, HODAG, Section 312 Rehabilitation Loans, U.S. Travel and Tourism Program, and Local Rail Service Assistance and Northeast Corridor Improvement Project.

DOLE AMENDMENT NO. 43 (ORIGINAL REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP-WHITE HOUSE COMPROMISE)
COMPARED WITH DOLE AMENDMENT NO. 93 (SECOND GOP SUBSTITUTE BUDGET)

		FY 1986			FY 1987			FY 1988		
		Dole 1	Dole 2	Dole 1 comp. w/ Dole 2	Dole 1	Dole 2	Dole 1 comp. w/ Dole 2	Dole 1	Dole 2	Dole 1 comp. w/ Dole 2
[In billions of dollars]										
050: National defense	BA	\$312.8	\$302.5	\$-10.3	\$334.9	\$323.4	\$-11.5	\$359.6	\$346.8	\$-12.8
	O	276.1	273.1	-3.0	298.4	292.1	-6.3	321.4	313.0	-8.4
150: International Affairs	BA	21.0	21.2	+0.2	20.2	20.4	+0.2	20.5	20.7	+0.2
	O	17.8	17.8	----	17.1	17.1	----	16.6	16.7	+0.1
250: General science, space technology	BA	8.8	9.1	+0.3	9.0	9.0	----	9.3	9.3	----
	O	8.7	9.0	+0.3	8.8	8.8	----	9.0	9.0	----
270: Energy	BA	5.2	5.2	----	5.2	5.2	----	4.9	4.9	----
	O	5.1	5.1	----	4.6	4.6	----	4.2	4.2	----
300: Natural resources and environment	BA	12.1	12.2	+0.1	12.5	12.6	+0.1	12.7	12.8	+0.1
	O	12.4	12.5	+0.1	12.2	12.4	+0.2	12.3	12.5	+0.2
350: Agriculture	BA	16.5	17.2	+0.7	16.4	17.7	+1.3	13.6	17.0	+3.4
	O	13.8	14.5	+0.7	14.5	15.8	+1.3	11.5	12.9	+1.4
370: Commerce and housing credit	BA	7.2	6.8	-0.4	3.9	5.6	+1.7	4.3	6.1	+1.8
	O	2.6	3.4	+0.8	0.1	2.3	+2.2	2.0	5.1	+3.1
400: Transportation	BA	26.6	27.2	+0.6	27.1	27.9	+0.8	26.3	27.3	+1.0
	O	25.6	26.1	+0.5	27.0	27.7	+0.7	26.5	27.4	+0.9
450: Community and regional development	BA	5.4	6.6	+1.2	5.8	6.7	+0.9	6.2	7.1	+0.9
	O	7.6	7.9	+0.3	6.8	7.1	+0.3	6.2	6.7	+0.5
500: Edu., training, employment and social serv.	BA	28.6	30.1	+1.5	29.4	30.7	+1.3	29.8	31.3	+1.5
	O	29.8	30.3	+0.5	28.7	29.9	+1.2	29.0	30.4	+1.4
550: Health	BA	34.9	35.7	+0.8	37.1	38.2	+1.1	39.2	40.8	+1.6
	O	35.0	35.3	+0.3	36.7	37.8	+1.1	38.7	40.3	+1.6
570: Medical Insurance	BA	81.6	81.9	+0.3	90.5	91.2	+0.7	93.3	94.8	+1.5
	O	68.0	68.3	+0.3	74.1	74.8	+0.7	81.6	82.7	+1.1
600: Income Security	BA	156.3	155.4	-0.9	166.5	164.9	-1.6	174.7	173.9	-0.8
	O	118.1	116.6	-1.5	121.9	120.6	-1.3	125.6	125.7	+0.1
650: Social Security	BA	207.6	207.4	-0.2	225.3	225.5	+0.2	266.2	266.1	-0.1
	O	197.7	194.9	-7.2	206.5	205.9	-0.6	216.1	220.0	+3.9
700: Veterans' benefits and services	BA	26.9	26.7	-0.2	26.9	26.8	-0.1	26.9	27.2	+0.3
	O	26.3	26.1	-0.2	26.3	26.2	-0.1	26.4	26.7	+0.3
750: Administration of justice	BA	6.8	6.8	----	6.9	6.9	----	7.0	7.0	----
	O	6.7	6.7	----	6.9	6.9	----	7.0	7.0	----
800: General government	BA	5.3	5.3	----	5.4	5.4	----	5.6	5.5	-0.1
	O	5.3	5.2	-0.1	5.3	5.2	-0.1	5.5	5.5	----
850: General purpose fiscal assistance	BA	6.5	6.5	----	2.0	2.0	----	2.1	2.1	----
	O	6.5	6.5	----	3.2	3.2	----	2.1	2.1	----
900: Net interest	BA	142.3	142.3	----	153.0	152.1	-0.9	155.2	153.9	-1.3
	O	142.3	142.3	----	153.0	152.1	-0.9	155.2	153.9	-1.3
920: Allowances	BA	-1.4	-1.6	+0.2	-1.2	-1.6	+0.5	-0.2	-0.6	+0.4
	O	-1.4	-1.6	+0.2	-1.2	-1.6	+0.5	-0.1	-0.5	+0.4
950: Undistributed offsetting receipts	BA	-35.0	-35.0	----	-37.8	-37.8	----	-41.1	-41.1	----
	O	-35.0	-35.0	----	-37.8	-37.8	----	-41.1	-41.1	----
TOTAL	BA	1,076.0	1,069.5	-6.5	1,139.0	1,132.8	-6.2	1,216.1	1,212.9	-3.2
	O	969.0	965.0	-4.0	1,013.1	1,011.1	-2.0	1,055.7	1,060.2	+4.5

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 73

99th Congress
1st Session

May 10, 1985, 2:11 a.m.
Session of May 9, 1985
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5901

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 94

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Moynihan-Byrd-Riegle, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended by the second GOP-Dole substitute amendment No. 93—Vote No. 72) to restore full COLA's for social security in FY 1986 instead of freezing all 1986 COLA's. (See also Vote No. 35.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stressed that it only restores COLA's for FY 1986 as provided under the Social Security Act. During the 50th anniversary of social security, the Senate is proposing for the first time to cut social security benefits for the purpose of acquiring revenue for the general budget. Such action, will drive a half million elderly below the poverty level. This Republican budget proposal is clearly in serious conflict with President Reagan's pledge that social security recipients would get their COLA.

Noting that at least 78 Senators had voted for COLA freezes in some form, opponents of the amendment claimed it was a back door effort to take apart the \$300 billion deficit reduction package just passed by a 50 to 49 vote.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (51)		NAYS (47)		NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (2 or 4%)	Republicans (49 or 94%)	Democrats (44 or 96%)	Republicans (3 or 6%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (1)
Stennis Zorinsky	Abdnor Andrews Armstrong Boschwitz Chafee Cochran Cohen Danforth Denton Dole Domenici Durenberger Evans Garn Goldwater Gorton Gramm Grassley Hatch Hatfield Hawkins Hecht Heinz Helms Humphrey	Kassebaum Kasten Laxalt Lugar Mattingly McClure McConnell Murkowski Nickles Packwood Pressler Quayle Roth Rudman Simpson Stafford Stevens Symms Thurmond Trible Wallop Warner Weicker Wilson	Baucus Bentsen Biden Bingaman Boren Bradley Bumpers Burdick Byrd Chiles Cranston DeConcini Dixon Dodd Eagleton Ford Glenn Gore Harkin Hart Heflin Hollings	Inouye Johnston Kennedy Kerry Lautenberg Leahy Levin Long Matsunaga Melcher Metzenbaum Mitchell Moynihan Nunn Pell Proxmire Pryor Riegle Rockefeller Sarbanes Sasser Simon	D'Amato Mathias Specter
				Exon— ³	East— ³
				EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE: 1—Official Business 2—Necessarily Absent 3—Illness 4—Other	
				SYMBOLS: AY—Announced Yea AN—Announced Nay PY—Paired Yea PN—Paired Nay	

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—96%
Republicans—94%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (51)
Democrats—2 or 4%
Republicans—49 or 96%

Against (47)
Democrats—44 or 94%
Republicans—3 or 6%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 600: Income Security						
Dole II	\$155.400	\$116.600	\$164.900	\$120.600	\$173.900	\$125.700
Moynihan-Byrd-Riegle, et al, amt.	-0.167	-0.055	-0.228	-0.660	-0.257	-0.760
Total	155.233	116.545	164.672	119.940	173.643	124.940
Function 650: Social Security						
Dole II	\$207.400	\$194.900	\$225.500	\$205.900	\$266.100	\$220.000
Moynihan-Byrd-Riegle, et al, amt.	-0.190	+5.834	-0.740	+0.800	-1.459	+3.059
Total	207.210	200.734	224.760	206.700	264.641	223.059
Function 900: Net Interest						
Dole II	\$142.300	\$142.300	\$152.100	\$152.100	\$153.900	\$153.900
Moynihan-Byrd-Riegle, et al, amt.	+0.289	+0.289	+0.997	+0.997	+1.725	+1.725
Total	142.589	142.589	153.097	153.097	155.625	155.625

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 74

99th Congress
1st Session

May 10, 1985, 2:31 a.m.
Session of May 9, 1985
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5904

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 95

SUBJECT: Packwood motion to table the Kennedy amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended by the second GOP-Dole substitute amendment No. 93—Vote No. 72) to eliminate the increases in out-of-pocket expenses to medicare beneficiaries and fully restore funding for medicaid to prevent States from having to cut benefits and eligibility. (See also Vote No. 39, 99th-1st; No. 70, 98th-1st; and Nos. 90, 91, and 97, 98th-2d.)

NOTE: Proponents argued that medicare has done more to bring dignity and security to America's senior citizens than any social innovation since social security, and it is ironic that it should be the object of more cuts in its 20th year. The cuts are proposed in the name of fairness, to further deficit reduction. But it conveys a cynical definition of fairness to break the promise of medicare to pay for this Administration's failed fiscal policies. The Republican compromise would levy new co-payments on home health services after the 20th day of care and would sharply increase the medicare Part B premium to 30 percent of program costs by 1990. Together, the two proposals will cost 30 million elderly and disabled medicare beneficiaries \$9.6 billion over the next five years. These severe cuts will be in addition to proposals already enacted into law in the past four years which will cost beneficiaries another \$11 billion over the same period. Delaying initial medicare eligibility by one month, from the first day of the month in which the beneficiary turns 65 to the first day of the month after the 65th birthday, will cost the elderly \$1.5 billion over the next five years and expose 160,000 elderly beneficiaries to the costs of uninsured illness during that month. Moreover, senior citizens will have to

(OVER)

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (54)			NAYS (44)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (3 or 7%)	Republicans (51 or 98%)		Democrats (43 or 93%)	Republicans (1 or 2%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (1)
Nunn	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Inouye	Specter	Exon— ³	East— ³
Proxmire	Andrews	Kasten	Bentsen	Johnston		EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE: 1—Official Business 2—Necessarily Absent 3—Illness 4—Other	
Zorinsky	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Kennedy			
	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bingaman	Kerry			
	Chafee	Mathias	Boren	Lautenberg			
	Cochran	Mattingly	Bradley	Leahy			
	Cohen	McClure	Bumpers	Levin		SYMBOLS: AY—Announced Yea AN—Announced Nay PY—Paired Yea PN—Paired Nay	
	D'Amato	McConnell	Burdick	Long			
	Danforth	Murkowski	Byrd	Matsunaga			
	Denton	Nickles	Chiles	Melcher			
	Dole	Packwood	Cranston	Metzenbaum			
	Domenici	Pressler	DeConcini	Mitchell			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Dixon	Moynihan			
	Evans	Roth	Dodd	Pell			
	Garn	Rudman	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Ford	Riegle			
	Gorton	Stafford	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Gramm	Stevens	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Grassley	Symms	Harkin	Sasser			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Hart	Simon			
	Hatfield	Trible	Heflin	Stennis			
	Hawkins	Wallop	Hollings				
	Hecht	Warner					
	Heinz	Weicker					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—93%
Republicans—98%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (54)
Democrats—3 or 6%
Republicans—51 or 94%

Against (44)
Democrats—43 or 98%
Republicans—1 or 2%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

pay an average of \$1,800 this year out of their own pockets to purchase the health care they need. Despite the presence of medicare, which currently covers about 40 percent of their health costs, the elderly pay approximately 15 percent of their annual income for medical care and supplementary health insurance—roughly the same as in the dark days before the enactment of medicare. Even under current law, without the measures in this resolution, health care could consume 19 percent of their income by the year 2000, rising from about \$698 in 1977 to \$4,600 in 2000. This package would permanently reverse stated policy and permanently victimize beneficiaries for excessive health care cost inflation that Congress has failed to control. In 1984, for example, program costs went up three times as fast as the social security COLA, so it is obvious that the COLA cannot keep pace with medical costs, much less cover the increased cost of all the elderly's other essential needs. These cuts could not come at a worse time because the number of people without health insurance has increased from 25 to 35 million since 1977; the proportion of the poor and new poor covered by medicaid has declined from 63 to 50 percent since 1975; and public hospitals are reporting 300-400 percent increases in so-called "economic transfers"—critically ill patients with no health insurance—from other hospitals. The Republican budget also would cut medicaid \$1.2 billion over three years even though, as a recent study indicates, about one million Americans annually are denied care because they cannot pay, and another five million do not even seek care because they know they cannot afford it. In addition to the proposals that shift costs to beneficiaries, this proposal halves payments to teaching hospitals that compensate them for indirect costs of medical education. Finally, proponents argued that although this amendment adds back \$4.6 billion in spending over the next three years, it leaves more than 70 percent of the medicare savings in this package intact, but more fairly distributed.

Opponents noted that certain hospital, lab, and doctor payments are frozen in the medicare portion of this package, so despite the characterization of the amendment's sponsors, beneficiaries alone do not bear the burden of deficit reduction. In fact, out of \$16.3 billion cut, about \$1.2 billion falls on medicare beneficiaries; the rest falls on providers. They further argued that if savings of \$1.2 billion cannot legitimately be found in medicaid, which will cost \$72 billion over the next three years, then it is unlikely the Senate will find any place to save.

Effect of Amendment (in billions)

	1986		1987		1988	
	BA	O	BA	O	BA	O
Function 550: Health						
Dole II	\$35.7	\$35.3	\$38.2	\$37.8	\$40.8	\$40.3
Kennedy amendment	+0.3	+0.3	+0.4	+0.3	+0.6	+0.5
Total	36.0	35.6	38.6	38.1	41.4	40.8
Function 570: Medical Insurance						
Dole II	\$81.9	\$68.3	\$91.2	\$74.8	\$94.8	\$82.7
Kennedy amendment	+0.2	+0.9	+0.4	+1.2	+0.6	+0.2
Total	82.1	69.2	91.6	76.0	95.4	82.9

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 75

99th Congress
1st Session

May 10, 1985, 2:53 a.m.
Session of May 9, 1985
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-5905

FIRST BUDGET RESOLUTION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. Con. Res. 32

AMENDMENT NO.: 96

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Metzenbaum amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 43, as amended by the second GOP-Dole substitute amendment No. 93—Vote No. 72) to raise \$10.5 billion over FY 1986-88 for deficit reduction with a corporate minimum tax of 15 percent on profits in excess of \$50,000. (See also Vote No. 38.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment pointed out that it was actually the President's proposal as he outlined on August 11, 1982.

Opponents of the amendment noted that the Senate had already passed a sense of the Senate amendment calling for a minimum corporate and individual tax (Vote No. 38) and the Chairman of the Finance Committee stated his intent to pursue the matter in committee.

S. Con. Res. 32: Vote Nos. 32-46, 49-75, 169.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (61)			NAYS (37)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (12 or 26%)	Republicans (49 or 94%)		Democrats (34 or 74%)	Republicans (3 or 6%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (1)
Biden	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Kerry	Cohen	Exon— ³	East— ³
Bingaman	Andrews	Laxalt	Bentsen	Leahy	Heinz		
Bradley	Armstrong	Lugar	Boren	Levin	Weicker		
DeConcini	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bumpers	Matsunaga			
Dixon	Chafee	Mattingly	Burdick	Melcher			
Ford	Cochran	McClure	Byrd	Metzenbaum			
Glenn	D'Amato	McConnell	Chiles	Mitchell			
Heflin	Danforth	Murkowski	Cranston	Moynihan			
Lautenberg	Denton	Nickles	Dodd	Nunn			
Long	Dole	Packwood	Eagleton	Pell			
Stennis	Domenici	Pressler	Gore	Proxmire			
Zorinsky	Durenberger	Quayle	Harkin	Fryor			
	Evans	Roth	Hart	Riegle			
	Garn	Rudman	Hollings	Rockefeller			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Inouye	Sarbanes			
	Gorton	Specter	Johnston	Sasser			
	Gramm	Stafford	Kennedy	Simon			
	Grassley	Stevens					
	Hatch	Symms					
	Hatfield	Thurmond					
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey	Wilson					
	Kassebaum						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:


Party Cohesion

Democrats— 74%
Republicans— 94%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (61)
Democrats— 12 or 20%
Republicans— 49 or 80%

Against (37)
Democrats— 34 or 92%
Republicans— 3 or 8%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 79

99th Congress
1st Session

May 15, 1985, 12:04 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-6157

FOREIGN AID AUTHORIZATION

BILL NO.: S. 960

AMENDMENT NO.: 117

TITLE: "International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Lugar motion to table the Bradley, et al, amendment stating the sense of the Congress that: "(1) the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, in concert with our allies, should take steps to gradually lower the value of the dollar; (2) such steps should not exclude intervention in the foreign exchange markets; and (3) the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve should work to ensure that the domestic macroeconomic policies of the U.S. and its allies are forged to reinforce rather than oppose one another." (Subsequently, the Senate agreed to the amendment by voice vote.)

NOTE: Proponents maintained that the amendment's adoption would express clearly the Senate's concern about the competitive disadvantage under which U.S. industry is now operating due to the dollar's inflated value. The dollar rose 30 percent against foreign currencies between 1981 and 1983 and again in 1984. The high dollar is killing jobs, business plans, and future economic opportunity, particularly in U.S. export- and import-sensitive sectors. This amendment recommends that the Federal Reserve and Treasury consider an active policy of intervention in the foreign exchange markets which, proponents argued, would have immediate results because of the speculative nature of the currency markets that developed after the 1973 breakup of the Bretton Woods system of regulated exchange rates. Continuing a passive policy will lock the U.S. into excessively high exchange rates, which threatens to make the trading system almost untenable, and unleash strong protectionist pressures that are not in the nation's long-term interest. Sustained, moderate intervention, coordinated with the actions of the central banks of our major trading partners, is most likely to produce the gradual decline in the dollar that is needed.

Opponents sought to discourage nongermane arguments in the interest of time, since there were many amendments remaining that dealt directly with foreign aid. They also questioned whether the Senate would agree, without considerable debate and study, to the economic assumptions in the amendment.

S. 960: Vote Nos. 76-82.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE FAILED

YEAS (39)		NAYS (56)		NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (0 or 0%)	Republicans (39 or 78%)	Democrats (45 or 100%)	Republicans (11 or 22%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)
Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Johnston	Exon ⁻³	East ⁻³
Andrews	Lugar	Bentsen	Kennedy	Stennis ⁻²	Cohen
Armstrong	Mattingly	Biden	Kerry		D'Amato
Chafee	McClure	Bingaman	Lautenberg		Danforth
Cochran	McConnell	Boren	Leahy		Hatfield
Denton	Murkowski	Bradley	Levin		Heinz
Dole	Pressler	Bumpers	Long		Kasten
Domenici	Quayle	Burdick	Matsunaga		Mathias
Durenberger	Roth	Byrd	Melcher		Nickles
Evans	Rudman	Chiles	Metzenbaum		Packwood
Garn	Simpson	Cranston	Mitchell		Specter
Goldwater	Stafford	DeConcini	Moynihan		
Gorton	Stevens	Dixon	Nunn		
Gramm	Symms	Dodd	Pell		
Grassley	Thurmond	Eagleton	Proxmire		
Hatch	Trible	Ford	Pryor		
Hawkins	Wallop	Glenn	Riegle		
Hecht	Warner	Gore	Rockefeller		
Helms	Weicker	Harkin	Sarbanes		
Humphrey		Hart	Sasser		
		Heflin	Simon		
		Hollings	Zorinsky		
		Inouye			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—100%
Republicans—78%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (39)
Democrats—0 or 0%
Republicans—39 or 100%

Against (56)
Democrats—45 or 80%
Republicans—11 or 20%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 85

99th Congress
1st Session

May 21, 1985, 2:11 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-6647

DOD AUTHORIZATION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. 1160

AMENDMENT NO.: 158

TITLE: "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986."

SUBJECT: Hart, et al, amendment to prohibit the authorization of any funds in FY 1986 to procure or deploy any MX missile or to construct, convert, or renovate any facility for the deployment of the MX missile, thereby, reducing the Air Force missile procurement funding by \$2.08 billion while retaining \$784 million for MX research, testing, development, and evaluation. (See also Vote Nos. 19 and 20.)

NOTE: Proponents cited intelligence studies in the late 1970's which indicated that at some point in the 1980's, U.S. land-based systems would become vulnerable to a first strike due to improvements in Soviet weaponry. After lengthy consideration that encompassed about 34 basing modes, all of which either did not work or had political liabilities, it was decided to place the MX in existing Minuteman silos—silos targeted by the Soviets for more than a decade. It has been estimated that by the time the MX is deployed, between 90 and 95 percent of the missiles could be destroyed in a Soviet first strike. The last thing we need in a crisis with the Soviet Union is a "use it or lose it" mentality with our most destructive missiles. MX should have been abandoned when it became clear that no practical solution to the vulnerability problem could be found for a missile the size of the MX. MX supporters repeatedly have blinded themselves to the grave strategic failings of the MX, and justified their support for it on the basis of vague political rationales having to do with its value as a symbol of resolve, or as a necessary component in the arms control process. But it is precisely because the missile represents such poor defense policy that their arguments ring hollow and its bargaining leverage is minimal at best. In

(OVER)

S. 1160: Vote Nos. 83-106, 167.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (42)			NAYS (56)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (36 or 77%)		Republicans (6 or 12%)	Democrats (11 or 23%)		Republicans (45 or 88%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews	Bentsen	Abdnor	Kasten		East— ³
Biden	Kerry	Durenberger	Boren	Armstrong	Laxalt		Packwood— ²
Bingaman	Lautenberg	Hatfield	Byrd	Boschwitz	Lugar		
Bradley	Leahy	Kassebaum	Chiles	Chafee	Mathias		
Bumpers	Levin	Stafford	DeConcini	Cochran	Mattingly		
Burdick	Matsunaga	Weicker	Gore	Cohen	McClure		
Cranston	Melcher		Heflin	D'Amato	McConnell		
Dixon	Metzenbaum		Long	Danforth	Murkowski		
Dodd	Mitchell		Nunn	Denton	Nickles		
Eagleton	Moynihan		Stennis	Dole	Pressler		
Exon	Pell		Zorinsky	Domenici	Quayle		
Ford	Proxmire			Evans	Roth		
Glenn	Pryor			Garn	Rudman		
Harkin	Riegle			Goldwater	Simpson		
Hart	Rockefeller			Gorton	Specter		
Hollings	Sarbanes			Gramm	Stevens		
Inouye	Sasser			Grassley	Symms		
Johnston	Simon			Hatch	Thurmond		
				Hawkins	Trible		
				Hecht	Wallop		
				Heinz	Warner		
				Helms	Wilson		
				Humphrey			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats— 77%
Republicans— 88%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (42)
Democrats— 36 or 86%
Republicans— 6 or 14%

Against (56)
Democrats— 11 or 20%
Republicans— 45 or 80%

fact, before negotiations broke off, the Soviets were willing to allow the U.S. 680 MX's, and they clearly indicated that it was concern over the militarization of space that brought them back to the negotiating table, not the MX. The U.S. has spent nearly a trillion dollars on a robust strategic modernization program in the last 4 years. This has shown strength and determination unlike the dogged pursuit of a weapon that cannot meet its basic operational requirements. Already Congress has spent over \$10.5 billion for the procurement of 42 missiles; now the Armed Services Committee asks approval for procurement of an additional 21 missiles at a cost of over \$2 billion. A couple of months ago, DOD experts testified that silo hardening will run \$180 million per silo, and the cost of each MX missile, slated to be \$74 million, has jumped to \$119 million. This comes just as the public consensus for increased national security spending is waning. It would be far better to apply funding to a small mobile missile that really is a deterrent to aggression, especially since the Soviets have chosen this route. Compromises to continue this program destine Congress to repeat this polarizing debate, and simply delay the inevitable step of stopping it.

Opponents argued that there has been no breakthrough in the the arms control talks to warrant a unilateral concession since the Senate voted to release funds for 21 additional MX missiles two months ago. Although arms control is the most visible and most important reason for Congress to approve the MX missile now, it is not the only reason. The deployment of 100 MX missiles in existing silos satisfies essential military requirements that can only be met in this decade by the MX. It brings unique characteristics to our strategic deterrent posture, including a combination of speed of delivery, hard target capability, and speed and reliability of communications. A strong, modern triad of strategic forces provides a hedge against unexpected breakthroughs in Soviet defensive measures, or unforeseen reliability problems with one element of the force. Those who would cancel the MX and rely on the small, mobile ICBM seem to forget that it will not be available until the 1990's, that it inherently will be more expensive, and that it will be subjected to the same public scrutiny that delayed MX mobile basing schemes. Nor is its invulnerability assured. What is at issue is whether this nation possesses the resolve and continuity of purpose required to modernize an essential element of our strategic triad forces, or whether the nation will continue into the next decade in the shadow of a significant imbalance in strategic force capabilities that threatens important elements of our retaliatory capability while affording the Soviets a virtual sanctuary for their own. Research on superhard silos may offer a future option to enhance MX survivability. In the meantime, MX survivability should be viewed, as the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission pointed out, not in isolation, but in the context of the total strategic force. The Armed Services Committee already has cut the administration's request for 48 missiles by more than half and reduced funding by almost \$1 billion. Others opposed this amendment because it would strike all MX funds even though there are insufficient funds to base missiles previously authorized, arguing that there should be enough spare and test missiles to make the program viable.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 90

99th Congress
1st Session

May 22, 1985, 9:04 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-6823

DOD AUTHORIZATION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. 1160

AMENDMENT NO.: 193

TITLE: "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986."

SUBJECT: Pryor-Hart, et al, amendment which prohibits the use of any funds for procurement by any government department or agency of lethal binary chemical munitions or retaliatory equipment relating to such munitions; deletes \$163 million therefor; and states the sense of the Senate that the President should intensify efforts to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Union establishing a mutual and verifiable ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and that the Secretary of Defense should rapidly improve the capabilities of the Armed Forces to detect the use of chemical weapons and to protect members of the Armed Forces against the use of such weapons.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment declared that production of new binary chemical weapons would not enhance the security of the U.S. or its allies, would be a waste of scarce defense resources, and would break a 16-year moratorium on this practice. The U.S. has undertaken a major initiative to stop the spread of chemical weapons internationally and should continue to do so. If the U.S. resumes production, it may undercut negotiations and stimulate a chemical weapons arms race around the world. It is unnecessary to produce new chemical weapons since our current stockpile is sufficient to deter an attack. If new binary chemical weapons are produced, they will have to be stored in this country far from theatres of critical military operations, requiring them to be airlifted in times of crisis. Not only are these weapons expensive to produce, but they also have not been tested in the field. It would be unfair to ask our military men and women to subject themselves to the unknown dangers of usage. Furthermore, it is often innocent civilians who suffer from chemical attacks, not soldiers. The U.S. should give top priority to improving the defensive rather than the offensive capabilities of nerve gas. The problem lies not in the lack of sufficient chemical weapons, but in the inability to meet an attack and carry on operations in a contaminated environment. Until a fair and credible analysis of all the issues surrounding chemical weapons and negotiations toward a total ban are resumed with the Soviet Union, no request for new production of these weapons should be considered.

(OVER)

S. 1160: Vote Nos. 83-106, 167.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (46)			NAYS (50)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (31 or 69%)	Republicans (15 or 29%)		Democrats (14 or 31%)	Republicans (36 or 71%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Lautenberg	Andrews	Bentsen	Abdnor	Kasten	Johnston ⁻²	East ⁻³
Biden	Leahy	Chafee	Bingaman	Armstrong	Laxalt	Stennis ⁻²	Stafford ⁻²
Boren	Levin	Danforth	Bumpers	Boschwitz	Lugar		
Bradley	Matsunaga	Durenberger	Byrd	Cochran	Mattingly		
Burdick	Melcher	Evans	Chiles	Cohen	McClure		
Cranston	Metzenbaum	Grassley	Dixon	D'Amato	Murkowski		
DeConcini	Mitchell	Hatfield	Exon	Denton	Nickles		
Dodd	Moynihan	Heinz	Glenn	Dole	Pressler		
Eagleton	Pell	Kassebaum	Heflin	Domenici	Quayle		
Ford	Proxmire	Mathias	Hollings	Garn	Rudman		
Gore	Pryor	McConnell	Long	Goldwater	Simpson		
Harkin	Riegle	Packwood	Nunn	Gorton	Stevens		
Hart	Sarbanes	Roth	Rockefeller	Gramm	Symms		
Inouye	Sasser	Specter	Zorinsky	Hatch	Thurmond		
Kennedy	Simon	Weicker		Hawkins	Trible		
Kerry				Hecht	Wallop		
				Helms	Warner		
				Humphrey	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—69%
Republicans—71%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (46)
Democrats—31 or 67%
Republicans—15 or 33%

Against (50)
Democrats—14 or 28%
Republicans—36 or 72%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Opponents asserted that one of the most serious deficiencies in the U.S. conventional defense posture is the lack of a credible deterrent to chemical attacks. According to several military experts, in case of a chemical attack, the U.S. would be forced to use nuclear deterrents prematurely. The majority of U.S. chemical weapons, they insisted, are obsolete or are in the form of munitions for which we have no means of delivery. The entire system must be modernized. Seventy-six percent of the funds provided for chemical deterrent are for protective equipment, such as defensive clothing, but there is no substitute for an effective retaliatory capability. History is filled with examples showing that when there is some balance of forces with respect to all weapons, the availability to one side has been a deterrent against the use by the other. The Soviets have had no incentive to negotiate with the U.S. in this area, because they enjoy an overwhelming advantage. New and more modern chemical weapons would force the Soviet Union to bargain.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 95

99th Congress
1st Session

May 24, 1985, 1:13 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7171

DOD AUTHORIZATION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. 1160

AMENDMENT NO.: 239

TITLE: "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986."

SUBJECT: Kerry-Chafee, et al, amendment which prohibits the obligation or expenditure of any funds in FY 1986 to test against an object in space the miniature homing vehicle (MHV) anti-satellite warhead launched from an F-15 unless the President determines and certifies to Congress that: (1) the Soviet Union refuses to resume or continue negotiations aimed at achieving an agreement on anti-satellite weapons, or (2) the Soviet Union has conducted a test of any ASAT weapon against an object in space. (See also Vote No. 96.)

NOTE: Proponents pointed out that the amendment would continue the moratorium on ASAT testing which is vital to the negotiation of an ASAT arms control agreement. Under the moratorium, the Soviets and the U.S. would be free to continue ASAT research and the U.S. would still be able to test ASAT's if national security warrants or if the President certifies the necessity. According to Kenneth Adelman, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director, the U.S. currently has not been observing this moratorium and tests are following a schedule determined by technical factors. Proponents claimed further that because the Soviet system is effective only against ocean reconnaissance and weather satellites, it would present no threat to the U.S. unless the F-15 is tested and found workable. If the U.S. tests F-15's, the Soviets could view it as an actual deployment of a viable and immediately usable American system and thus jeopardize chances for a treaty. The long-term damage to our strategic security from further development of ASAT technology by both sides far outweighs the short-term theoretical advantage gained from going ahead with the testing of the current ASAT.

(OVER)

S. 1160: Vote Nos. 83-106, 167.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (35)		NAYS (51)		NOT VOTING (14)		
Democrats (28 or 72%)	Republicans (7 or 15%)	Democrats (11 or 28%)	Republicans (40 or 85%)	Democrats (8)	Republicans (6)	
Baucus	Chafee	Bradley	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Bentsen ⁻²	Cohen ⁻²
Biden	Hatfield	Byrd	Andrews	Kasten	Boren ⁻²	Danforth ⁻²
Bingaman	Heinz	Chiles	Armstrong	Laxalt	DeConcini ⁻²	Domenici ⁻²
Bumpers	Mathias	Exon	Boschwitz	Lugar	Dixon ⁻²	East ⁻³
Burdick	Specter	Ford	Cochran	Mattingly	Harkin ^{-2AY}	Packwood ⁻²
Cranston	Stafford	Glenn	D'Amato	McClure	Johnston ⁻¹	Rudman ⁻²
Dodd	Weicker	Heflin	Denton	McConnell	Long ⁻²	
Eagleton		Hollings	Dole	Murkowski	Melcher ^{-2AY}	
Gore		Nunn	Durenberger	Nickles		
Hart		Stennis	Evans	Pressler		
Inouye		Zorinsky	Garn	Quayle		
Kennedy			Goldwater	Roth		
Kerry			Gorton	Simpson		
Lautenberg			Gramm	Stevens		
Leahy			Grassley	Symms		
Levin			Hatch	Thurmond		
Matsunaga			Hawkins	Trible		
Metzenbaum			Hecht	Wallop		
Mitchell			Helms	Warner		
Moynihan			Humphrey	Wilson		
Pell						
Proxmire						
Pryor						
Riegle						
Rockefeller						
Sarbanes						
Sasser						
Simon						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

1—Official Business
2—Necessarily Absent
3—Illness
4—Other

SYMBOLS:

AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—72%
Republicans—85%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (35)
Democrats—28 or 80%
Republicans—7 or 20%

Against (51)
Democrats—11 or 22%
Republicans—40 or 78%

Opponents claimed that the premise of this amendment is false—there is no moratorium in place—and it ignores the fact that the Soviets have the world's only operational ASAT system which poses a direct threat to the U.S. Space tests of ASAT's must follow a schedule determined by technical factors because the U.S. has not tested what the Soviets have done and this gives the Soviets a superior edge and a disincentive to negotiate. Congress should not try to manage diplomacy and defense by binding every defense development to some diplomatic contingency. A compromise between no moratorium and a moratorium would be the best policy, but this amendment, they argued, provides no middle ground.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 97

99th Congress
1st Session

June 4, 1985, 3:09 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7324

DOD AUTHORIZATION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. 1160

AMENDMENT NO.: 254

TITLE: "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986."

SUBJECT: Kennedy-Specter-Packwood amendment to strike the committee provision (in the Gramm amendment) which would narrow the application of the prevailing wage requirements under the Davis-Bacon Act to military construction contracts of \$1 million or less rather than to contracts of \$2,000 or less, as under present law. (See also Vote No. 98.)

NOTE: Proponents contended that the real purpose of the Gramm amendment is to repeal the concept of prevailing wage on all military construction projects. In fact, its raised threshold will eliminate Davis-Bacon coverage for 95 percent of all military construction contracts. Nor is there substantial evidence that it will save money. The CBO study, which projects small savings of \$47 million by 1987, relies on previous studies that have been discredited. The regulatory changes which became effective in January address the problem of transferring urban wage rates into rural areas. In the name of cost saving, this bill would guarantee nothing but shoddy construction performed by unskilled workers for military contractors who won bids by undercutting the standards of the local community. One should not assume that savings will be realized by having work performed by less skilled, less productive workers who will take longer to complete a job. No hearings were held on this wide reaching change. If this important labor law is to be amended radically, it should be done so after extensive testimony from labor and business before the Labor Committee and after careful committee markup and a detailed report to the Senate.

Opponents maintained that the committee language would have very beneficial results by encouraging competition among contractors, opening up Federal contracting to small businesses, and reducing to some extent the costs of defense. The present act allows contractors to charge many times more than reasonable for the area. This amendment provides an opportunity to show taxpayers that the Senate is serious about cutting defense waste.

S. 1160: Vote Nos. 83-106, 167.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (49)			NAYS (49)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (37 or 79%)		Republicans (12 or 24%)	Democrats (10 or 21%)		Republicans (39 or 76%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Kerry	Andrews	Bentsen	Abdnor	Humphrey		East—3AN
Biden	Lautenberg	D'Amato	Boren	Armstrong	Kassebaum		Pressler—2
Bingaman	Leahy	Danforth	Bumpers	Boschwitz	Kasten		
Bradley	Levin	Durenberger	DeConcini	Chafee	Laxalt		
Burdick	Long	Heinz	Exon	Cochran	Lugar		
Byrd	Matsunaga	Mathias	Hollings	Cohen	Mattingly		
Chiles	Melcher	Murkowski	Johnston	Denton	McClure		
Cranston	Metzenbaum	Packwood	Nunn	Dole	McConnell		
Dixon	Mitcheli	Specter	Pryor	Domenici	Nickles		
Dodd	Moynihan	Stafford	Zorinsky	Evans	Quayle		
Eagleton	Pell	Stevens		Garn	Roth		
Ford	Proxmire	Weicker		Goldwater	Rudman		
Glenn	Riegle			Gorton	Simpson		
Gore	Rockefeller			Gramm	Symms		
Harkin	Sarbanes			Grassley	Thurmond		
Hart	Sasser			Hatch	Trible		
Heflin	Simon			Hatfield	Wallop		
Inouye	Stennis			Hawkins	Warner		
Kennedy				Hecht	Wilson		
				Helms			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—79%
Republicans—76%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (49)
Democrats—37 or 76%
Republicans—12 or 24%

Against (49)
Democrats—10 or 20%
Republicans—39 or 80%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 98

99th Congress
1st Session

June 4, 1985, 3:33 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7325

DOD AUTHORIZATION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. 1160

AMENDMENT NO.: 254

TITLE: "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986."

SUBJECT: Gramm motion to table the Dole motion to reconsider Vote No. 97 by which the Kennedy-Specter-Packwood amendment (striking the committee changes in the Gramm amendment that narrow the application of the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements) was defeated.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment contended that the real purpose of the Gramm amendment is to repeal the concept of prevailing wage on all military construction projects. In fact, its raised threshold will eliminate Davis-Bacon coverage for 95 percent of all military construction contracts. Nor is there substantial evidence that it will save money. The CBO study, which projects small savings of \$47 million by 1987, relies on previous studies that have been discredited. The regulatory changes which became effective in January address the problem of transferring urban wage rates into rural areas. In the name of cost saving, this bill would guarantee nothing but shoddy construction performed by unskilled workers for military contractors who won bids by undercutting the standards of the local community. One should not assume that savings will be realized by having work performed by less skilled, less productive workers who will take longer to complete a job. No hearings were held on this wide reaching change. If this important labor law is to be amended radically, it should be done so after extensive testimony from labor and business before the Labor Committee and after careful committee markup and a detailed report to the Senate.

Opponents of the amendment maintained that the committee language would have very beneficial results by encouraging competition among contractors, opening up Federal contracting to small businesses, and reducing to some extent the costs of defense. The present act allows contractors to charge many times more than reasonable for the area. This amendment provides an opportunity to show taxpayers that the Senate is serious about cutting defense waste.

S. 1160: Vote Nos. 83-106, 167.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (49)			NAYS (48)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (10 or 21%)	Republicans (39 or 78%)		Democrats (37 or 79%)	Republicans (11 or 22%)		Democrats (0)	Republicans (2)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Humphrey	Baucus	Kerry	Andrews		East—3PY
Boren	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Biden	Lautenberg	D'Amato		Pressler—2
Bumpers	Boschwitz	Kasten	Bingaman	Leahy	Danforth		
DeConcini	Chafee	Laxalt	Bradley	Levin	Durenberger		
Exon	Cochran	Lugar	Burdick	Long	Mathias	PRESENT AND	
Hollings	Cohen	Mattingly	Byrd	Matsunaga	Murkowski	GIVING:	RECEIVING:
Johnston	Denton	McClure	Chiles	Melcher	Packwood	Heinz (PN)	East (PY)
Nunn	Dole	McConnell	Cranston	Metzenbaum	Specter		
Pryor	Domenici	Nickles	Dixon	Mitchell	Stafford		
Zorinsky	Evans	Quayle	Dodd	Moynihan	Stevens	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
	Garn	Roth	Eagleton	Pell	Weicker	1—Official Business	
	Goldwater	Rudman	Ford	Proxmire		2—Necessarily Absent	
	Gorton	Simpson	Glenn	Riegle		3—Illness	
	Gramm	Symms	Gore	Rockefeller		4—Other	
	Grassley	Thurmond	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Hatch	Trible	Hart	Sasser		SYMBOLS:	
	Hatfield	Wallop	Heflin	Simon		AY—Announced Yea	
	Hawkins	Warner	Inouye	Stennis		AN—Announced Nay	
	Hecht	Wilson	Kennedy			PY—Paired Yea	
	Helms					PN—Paired Nay	

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion		Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on	
Democrats—79%	Republicans—78%	For (49) Democrats—10 or 20% Republicans—39 or 80%	Against (48) Democrats—37 or 77% Republicans—11 or 23%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 100

99th Congress
1st Session

June 4, 1985, 8:30 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7360

DOD AUTHORIZATION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. 1160

AMENDMENT NO.: 198

TITLE: "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986."

SUBJECT: Proxmire-Bumpers-Chafee-Mathias, et al, modified amendment which reduces funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from \$2.97 billion to \$1.86 billion in FY 1986—an increase of 33 percent over FY 1985—and transfers the savings to increase funding in readiness accounts for the purchase of items such as ammunition and trucks and for military housing construction; establishes a Threat Analysis Program to conduct research into Soviet countermeasures, analyze Soviet offensive responses, and evaluate the cost effectiveness of developing and deploying offensive nuclear systems to defeat defensive systems; establishes an eight-member strategic defense evaluation panel appointed by Congressional leaders to evaluate work on SDI and its effect on U.S. arms control policy; requires a CBO study on the effect of projected SDI expenditures on other DOD and Federal research and a Joint Economic Committee report on its impact on civilian R&D efforts; and reaffirms Congressional commitment to the 1972 ABM Treaty. (See also Vote Nos. 99 and 101-103.)

NOTE: Proponents stated that the amendment would provide adequate funding for research and development of ballistic missile technologies and divert the savings into chronically underfunded conventional military readiness accounts. Every program within SDI would receive an increase but the emphasis would be redirected away from premature tests of hardware and toward high-quality research into defense technologies which would provide a hedge against the possibility of a Soviet breakout while remaining within the limits of the ABM Treaty. Research and development for the SDI would proceed, but at a slower, more realistic rate. In addition, an independent panel of experts would be established to aid Congress in making future decisions. The present SDI program should not be accelerated to the level requested by the Administration until numerous determinations can be made regarding: the

(OVER)

S. 1160: Vote Nos. 83-106, 167.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (38)			NAYS (57)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (32 or 73%)		Republicans (6 or 12%)	Democrats (12 or 27%)		Republicans (45 or 88%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Lautenberg	Chafee	Bentsen	Abdnor	Kasten	Biden—2PY	East—3
Bumpers	Leahy	Grassley	Bingaman	Andrews	Lexalt	Stennis—2	Specter—2
Burdick	Levin	Hatfield	Bradley	Armstrong	Lugar		
Chiles	Matsunaga	Kassebaum	Byrd	Boschwitz	Mattingly		
Cranston	Melcher	Mathias	Dixon	Cochran	McClure		
DeConcini	Metzenbaum	Weicker	Exon	Cohen	McConnell		
Dodd	Mitchell		Glenn	D'Amato	Murkowski		
Eagleton	Moynihan		Heflin	Danforth	Nickles		
Ford	Pell		Hollings	Denton	Packwood		
Gore	Proxmire		Long	Dole	Pressler		
Harkin	Pryor		Nunn	Domenici	Quayle		
Hart	Riegle		Zorinsky	Durenberger	Roth		
Inouye	Rockefeller			Evans	Rudman		
Johnston	Sarbanes			Garn	Simpson		
Kennedy	Sasser			Goldwater	Stafford		
Kerry	Simon			Gorton	Stevens		
				Gramm	Symms		
				Hatch	Thurmond		
				Hawkins	Trible		
				Hecnt	Wallop		
				Heinz	Warner		
				Helms	Wilson		
				Humphrey			

LIVE PAIRS (1)

PRESENT AND

GIVING:

RECEIVING:

Boren (PN) Biden (PY)

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats— 73%
Republicans— 88%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (38)
Democrats— 32 or 84%
Republicans— 6 or 16%

Against (57)
Democrats— 12 or 21%
Republicans— 45 or 79%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

technical feasibility of building a strategic defense system; possible Soviet countermeasures; the reactions of our allies to its proposed deployment; and the potential effects of SDI on nuclear stability and the arms race, U.S. arms control goals and policies, and compliance with existing arms control treaties. Furthermore, a 166 percent funding increase would be wasteful and unnecessary, considering that the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization has spent only four percent of its FY 1986 appropriations.

Opponents contended that this amendment is "ill-advised" at a time when the U.S. is embarking on a vigorous and comprehensive research program to analyze and design defenses that will: improve the security of the U.S. and its allies; provide a hedge against a Soviet breakout of the ABM Treaty; and ultimately, if feasible, provide options on whether to develop and deploy an advanced strategic defensive system. SDI represents a welcome policy shift from our reliance for deterrence on mutual assured destruction to a commitment to strategic self-defense. The Soviets have been brought back to the negotiating table by the prospect of SDI and the U.S. should continue to fully support this important research program. The Armed Services Committee reported that \$2.97 billion is the minimum amount needed to maintain the program's current level of research into many defense technologies. It is a comprehensive research program, they maintained, and does not include development or testing inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. It is vital that this research continue, in order to provide a deterrent to any Soviet decision to expand its ballistic missile defense capability beyond that permitted by the ABM Treaty. Successful development of such a defense system, even on a limited basis, would accelerate a nuclear disarmament and enhance deterrence by neutralizing each nation's offensive ICBM capabilities. The Soviet Union would have to make incredible concessions in nuclear weapons reductions in order to offset our forbearing deployment of feasible defensive technologies. Even if a comprehensive "Star Wars" defense system proves unfeasible, the program will yield many important technological spinoffs in defense and other areas. The amendment's attempts to micromanage SDI by setting up an advisory panel and emphasizing certain types of research while limiting others would cause more harm than good. Even though SDI has a somewhat low expenditure rate, 62 percent of its funding has been obligated. Several defense programs have enjoyed spending growth rates equal to or substantially greater than those proposed for SDI, including the ICBM program which is set to grow by 191 percent from FY 1986 to 1987 and the Trident II program which expanded by 303 percent between FY 1983 and 1984. Others opposed the amendment because it would provide funding increases for all SDI areas, including demonstration projects, which could be deemed in violation of the ABM Treaty and would cause a new escalation of the arms race and undermine the already precarious state of mutual deterrence.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 101

99th Congress
1st Session

June 4, 1985, 10:01 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7369

DOD AUTHORIZATION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. 1160

AMENDMENT NO.: 257

TITLE: "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986."

SUBJECT: Gore, et al, amendment which reduces funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from \$2.97 billion to \$2.5 billion in FY 1986; establishes an independent interagency legal advisory board to advise the President and the National Security Council on matters relating to SDI and compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty; and limits funding for three projects (the airborne optical sensor at \$29 million, the hypervelocity railgun at \$3.5 million, and the kinetic kill vehicle at \$30 million) that may pose compliance problems with the ABM Treaty until: (1) the President submits a report to Congress on the necessity of an early execution of these projects to the success of the SDI program, the specific purpose these projects would serve in the design concept, and how a defensive system incorporating these project elements would be protected against Soviet countermeasures, and (2) Congress passes a joint resolution to remove the funding fence. (See also Vote Nos. 99, 100, 102, and 103.)

NOTE: Proponents stated that the amendment would vigorously fund needed research of high technology weaponry in order to protect the nation against potential Soviet breakouts in the area of anti-ballistic missile defense, while also addressing concerns about the consistency of various parts of the SDI program with our responsibility to comply with the ABM Treaty. It would constrain funding to a prudent level of \$2.5 billion and subject the SDI projects which pose the greatest threat to the ABM Treaty to further Congressional scrutiny before their full implementation. The Senate has a Constitutional responsibility to ratify treaties and a concomitant obligation not to authorize activities which would violate them. This amendment partially fences funds for three proposed demonstration projects which are of the most direct concern to U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty, pending

(OVER)

S. 1160: Vote Nos. 83-106, 167.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (36)			NAYS (59)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (35 or 78%)		Republicans (1 or 2%)	Democrats (10 or 22%)	Republicans (49 or 98%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)
Baucus	Kennedy	Hatfield	Bingaman	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Pryor ²	East ³
Bentsen	Kerry		Boren	Andrews	Kasten	Stennis ²	Mathias ²
Biden	Lautenberg		Dixon	Armstrong	Laxalt		Specter ²
Bradley	Leahy		Exon	Boschwitz	Lugar		
Bumpers	Levin		Glenn	Chafee	Mattingly		
Burdick	Matsunaga		Heflin	Cochran	McClure		
Byrd	Meicher		Hollings	Cohen	McConnell		
Chiles	Metzenbaum		Long	D'Amato	Murkowski		
Cranston	Mitchell		Nunn	Danforth	Nickles		
DeConcini	Moynihan		Zorinsky	Denton	Packwood		
Dodd	Pell			Dole	Pressler		
Eagleton	Proxmire			Domenici	Quayle		
Ford	Riegle			Durenberger	Roth		
Gore	Rockefeller			Evans	Rudman		
Harkin	Sarbanes			Garn	Simpson		
Hart	Sasser			Goldwater	Stafford		
Inouye	Simon			Gorton	Stevens		
Johnston				Gramm	Synms		
				Grassley	Thurmond		
				Hatch	Trible		
				Hawkins	Waliop		
				Hecht	Warner		
				Heinz	Weicker		
				Helms	Wilson		
				Humphrey			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—78%
Republicans—98%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (36)
Democrats—35 or 97%
Republicans—1 or 3%

Against (59)
Democrats—10 or 17%
Republicans—49 or 83%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

receipt of a technical justification for their execution, a report on the consistency of these projects with elements of the ABM Treaty, and enactment of a joint resolution to release the funds. It does not attempt to micromanage or redirect the focus of the SDI program, but seeks to ensure that the program's goals and implications are fully understood and comply with arms controls goals. The amendment would not detrimentally affect the Geneva negotiations, they claimed, because its 80 percent funding increase would clearly indicate our support for research into high technology weaponry while its fencing provisions would show our continued commitment to compliance with the ABM Treaty. The advisory panel, which would be composed of the chief counsels of the Departments of Defense and State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, could not provide scientific insight into the program, they admitted, but would provide vital information relating to the legal aspects of the research in regard to our treaty obligations.

Opponents claimed that the amendment was unnecessary because the bill already contains language to prohibit the expenditure of money for projects which would violate the ABM Treaty. The fencing provisions of the amendment, which would effectively reduce funds from \$2.5 billion to \$2.1 billion, also were opposed as attempts to micromanage three key SDI research areas. The chief counsels of Federal agencies are not scientific experts, they argued, and, therefore, are unqualified to advise the Senate on the highly technical issues associated with this program.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 102

99th Congress
1st Session

June 4, 1985, 10:40 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7371

DOD AUTHORIZATION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. 1160

AMENDMENT NO.: 258

TITLE: "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986."

SUBJECT: Glenn amendment to reduce funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from \$2.97 billion to \$2.8 billion in FY 1986. (See also Vote Nos. 99-101 and 103.)

NOTE: Proponents stated that \$2.8 billion—a 100 percent increase over the FY 1985 funding level—would be ample funding to keep the SDI program "alive and functioning." Between \$2.2 billion and \$2.5 billion has already been committed in FY 1986 to existing projects. A total of \$2.8 billion would fully fund current research as well as provide extra "flex" money to ensure that the program is carried out effectively. The decision on whether to deploy a strategic defense system will not have to be made until the results of SDI research become available in a decade or more. Until then we must continue to adequately fund the fundamental research and development of a strategic defense system as a hedge against a Soviet breakout in this weapons area. None of the \$2.8 billion in funding is fenced, they noted, because Congress cannot micromanage a research program from the Capitol floor. The program director must be given the flexibility to conduct the research, make program modifications, and redirect the money as is deemed necessary for a successful and cost-effective program.

Opponents pointed out that the Senate had voted four times to fund the SDI program at the Armed Services Committee's recommended level and maintained that it should continue to support that mark. The House has appropriated \$2.47 billion and the higher \$2.97 billion amount is needed for negotiating leverage in conference.

S. 1160: Vote Nos. 83-106, 167.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION NAY

YEAS (36)			NAYS (59)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (31 or 69%)		Republicans (5 or 10%)	Democrats (14 or 31%)	Republicans (45 or 90%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)
Baucus	Inouye	Hatfield	Biden	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Pryor ²	Cochran ²
Bentsen	Johnston	Heinz	Boren	Andrews	Laxalt	Stennis ²	East ³
Bingaman	Lautenberg	Kasten	Dixon	Armstrong	Lugar		Stafford ²
Bradley	Levin	Specter	Harkin	Boschwitz	Mathias		
Bumpers	Matsunaga	Weicker	Hart	Chafee	Mattingly		
Burdick	Melcher		Heflin	Cohen	McClure		
Byrd	Mitchell		Hollings	D'Amato	McConnell		
Chiles	Moynihan		Kennedy	Danforth	Murkowski		
Cranston	Pell		Kerry	Denton	Nickles		
DeConcini	Proxmire		Leahy	Dole	Packwood		
Dodd	Riegle		Long	Domenici	Pressler		
Eagleton	Rockefeller		Metzenbaum	Durenberger	Quayle		
Exon	Sarbanes		Nunn	Evans	Roth		
Ford	Sasser		Zorinsky	Garn	Rudman		
Glenn	Simon			Goldwater	Simpson		
Gore				Gorton	Stevens		
				Gramm	Symms		
				Grassley	Thurmond		
				Hatch	Trible		
				Hawkins	Wallop		
				Hecht	Warner		
				Helms	Wilson		
				Humphrey			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—69%
Republicans—90%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (36)
Democrats—31 or 86%
Republicans—5 or 14%

Against (59)
Democrats—14 or 24%
Republicans—45 or 76%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 104

99th Congress
1st Session

June 5, 1985, 12:34 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7381
Session of June 4, 1985

DOD AUTHORIZATION, FY 1986

BILL NO.: S. 1160

AMENDMENT NO.: 261

TITLE: "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986."

SUBJECT: Bumpers-Levin amendment expressing the sense of the Senate that a ten-member Strategic Defense Advisory Panel (with two members each to be appointed by the Chairman and ranking minority members of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees and one member each to be appointed by the Majority and Minority Leaders) should be established to evaluate strategic defense R&D activities of DOD, the technical and programmatic status of work within the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, and the effect of SDI on U.S. arms control goals and policies and submit reports as deemed necessary by the appointing Senators.

NOTE: Proponents noted that this amendment merely recommends the appointment of a knowledgeable panel of experts to monitor the SDI program and report to the Senate on the program's progress and its potential effects on U.S. arms control policies and goals. The "Star Wars" project is an immensely complex undertaking and the Senate should seek to be as well informed as possible in order to be able to make wise decisions on the program's future. The appointment of an arms control panel will not detract from Congress' responsibility and authority in the matter. Full decisionmaking power will still reside in the Senate, they commented, and the statements and advice of the panel can be given only as much credence as Congress allows, as in the case of the Scowcroft and Kissinger Commissions. Although the advisory panel may cost \$500,000 to \$600,000 to fund, its expert advice might well enable Congress to save billions of taxpayer dollars.

Opponents contended that the panel recommended by the amendment would unnecessarily duplicate the efforts of Congressional committees and other Federal organizations with oversight responsibilities. The Armed Services Committee has held six hearings on SDI, with over 15 hours of testimony; the

(OVER)

S. 1160: Vote Nos. 83-106, 167.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (38)			NAYS (49)			NOT VOTING (13)	
Democrats (35 or 88%)		Republicans (3 or 6%)	Democrats (5 or 13%)	Republicans (44 or 94%)		Democrats (7)	Republicans (6)
Baucus	Kerry	Heinz	Exon	Abdnor	Humphrey	Bentsen ⁻²	Cochran ⁻²
Biden	Lautenberg	Mathias	Glenn	Andrews	Kassebaum	Boren ⁻²	East ⁻³
Bingaman	Leahy	Warner	Hollings	Armstrong	Kasten	Chiles ⁻²	Hawkins ⁻²
Bradley	Levin		Long	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Eagleton ⁻²	Packwood ⁻²
Bumpers	Matsunaga		Zorinsky	Chafee	Lugar	Inouye ⁻²	Rudman ⁻²
Burdick	Melcher			Cohen	Mattingly	Pryor ⁻²	Stafford ⁻²
Byrd	Meizenbaum			D'Amato	McClure	Stennis ⁻²	
Cranston	Mitchell			Danforth	McConnell		
DeConcini	Moynihan			Denton	Murkowski		
Dixon	Nunn			Dole	Nickles		
Dodd	Pell			Domenici	Pressler	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
Ford	Proxmire			Durenberger	Quayle		
Gore	Riegle			Evans	Roth		
Harkin	Rockefeller			Garn	Simpson		
Hart	Sarbanes			Goldwater	Specter	SYMBOLS:	
Heflin	Sasser			Gorton	Stevens		
Johnston	Simon			Gramm	Symms		
Kennedy				Grassley	Thurmond		
				Hatch	Trible	AY—Announced Yea	
				Hatfield	Wallop	AN—Announced Nay	
				Hecht	Weicker	PY—Paired Yea	
				Helms	Wilson	PN—Paired Nay	

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—88%
Republicans—94%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (38)
Democrats—35 or 92%
Republicans—3 or 8%

Against (49)
Democrats—5 or 10%
Republicans—44 or 90%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Department of Defense has testified 23 times during the 99th Congress and has chartered a distinguished independent panel of scientists to review the program; and the Office of Technology Assessment is conducting an extensive review of SDI. The members of the Senate, they commented, apparently felt adequately informed to reject several SDI amendments on this bill. Creating another advisory panel only would waste the taxpayers' money and create another "overlay" of oversight that will impede the work of Congress rather than support it. The Scowcroft Commission and the bipartisan National Commission on Central America were presidentially-appointed panels with single purpose missions which "self-destructed" upon achieving their goals, leaving Congress to evaluate their work and utilize it as deemed necessary. This amendment would establish a dangerous and undesirable precedent, however, by credentializing a panel of scientists and engineers as authorities whose advice and efforts could supplant the work of the elected representatives of Congress. Others criticized the amendment's failure to limit the life of the panel, establish membership terms and reporting requirements for the panel, and clarify who is to pay the panel's expenses.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 108

99th Congress
1st Session

June 6, 1985, 2:13 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7610

STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, FY 1986-87

BILL NO.: S. 1003 (H.R. 2068)

AMENDMENT NO.: 272

TITLE: "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987."

SUBJECT: Division I of the Kennedy-Hatfield amendment stating the sense of the Congress that the U.S. should resume bilateral negotiations with the government of Nicaragua.

NOTE: Proponents emphasized that President Reagan should direct the Secretary of State to return to the negotiating table with Nicaragua. Every effort must be made on both the political and diplomatic fronts to find a peaceful solution to the dispute with Nicaragua's Sandinista regime. Bilateral talks between the U.S. and Nicaragua would be in keeping with the aspirations of the Contadora process. Any military option should be taken only as a last resort when U.S. national security interests are at stake.

Opponents felt that the amendment would lead to a futile exercise because it suggests a unilateral move by the U.S. to negotiate with Nicaragua. The key issue is whether or not the Sandinistas are prepared to have talks that will move in the direction of peace. Negotiations between the Sandinistas and Contras are more crucial than those between the Sandinistas and the U.S. Any attempt by the U.S. to negotiate out of the context of internal talks in Nicaragua would be counterproductive.

S. 1003 (H.R. 2068): Vote Nos. 107-122.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (48)			NAYS (48)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (42 or 89%)		Republicans (6 or 12%)	Democrats (5 or 11%)		Republicans (43 or 88%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (4)
Baucus	Inouye	Hatfield	Heflin	Abdnor	Kassebaum		Armstrong-2
Bentsen	Johnston	Heinz	Hollings	Andrews	Kasten		Denton-2AN
Biden	Kennedy	Mathias	Long	Boschwitz	Laxalt		East-3
Bingaman	Kerry	Packwood	Moynihan	Chafee	Lugar		Wallop-2AN
Boren	Lautenberg	Specter	Stennis	Cochran	Mattingly		
Bradley	Leahy	Weicker		Cohen	McClure		
Bumpers	Levin			D'Amato	McConnell		
Burdick	Matsunaga			Danforth	Murkowski		
Byrd	Melcher			Dole	Nickles		
Chiles	Metzenbaum			Domenici	Pressler		
Cranston	Mitchell			Durenberger	Quayle		
DeConcini	Nunn			Evans	Roth		
Dixon	Pell			Garn	Rudman		
Dodd	Proxmire			Goldwater	Simpson		
Eagleton	Pryor			Gorton	Stafford		
Exon	Riegle			Gramm	Stevens		
Ford	Rockefeller			Grassley	Symms		
Glenn	Sarbanes			Hatch	Thurmond		
Gore	Sasser			Hawkins	Trible		
Harkin	Simon			Hecht	Warner		
Hart	Zorinsky			Helms	Wilson		
				Humphrey			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—89%
Republicans—88%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (48)
Democrats—42 or 88%
Republicans—6 or 13%

Against (48)
Democrats—5 or 10%
Republicans—43 or 90%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 112

99th Congress
1st Session

June 6, 1985, 7:32 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7648

STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, FY 1986-87

BILL NO.: S. 1003 (H.R. 2068)

AMENDMENT NO.: 275

TITLE: "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987."

SUBJECT: Nunn-Lugar-Bentsen-Boren, et al, amendment which unfences the \$14 million authorized in FY 1985 and authorizes \$24 million in FY 1986 for humanitarian aid to the Contras, to be distributed by the President and monitored by the National Security Council, limited to food, medicine, clothing, etc., and transportation associated with the delivery of this assistance and not weapons, ammunition, or any other equipment or material designed to inflict serious bodily harm or death; permits sharing of intelligence information with the Contras; repeals the "Boland amendment" prohibiting military or paramilitary aid to the Contras but prohibits any military assistance to the Contras unless the President requests and Congress authorizes such aid; and encourages the President to pursue the Contadora objectives and bilateral negotiations with the Nicaraguan government.

NOTE: Proponents maintained that the amendment would provide the President with a basis to conduct a coherent, sustainable foreign policy. By changing the nature of renewed U.S. assistance to the Contras, it serves to emphasize a determined U.S. in a negotiated settlement. Yet it does not prevent the U.S. from sending a strong signal of support for the democratic opposition. Military aid is relegated to the background, but the military option is left open. Thus, the amendment provides a mixture of pressures and incentives for Nicaragua to change course at home and in its dealings with neighboring countries.

Opponents asserted that a change in the label of U.S. assistance to the Contras would make no difference to the Nicaraguan issue. The humanitarian assistance extended to the Contras is in essence a form of logistical support to overthrow the Sandinista government. Instead of achieving success, the U.S. policy toward Nicaragua over the past five years has resulted in an increase of Soviet-Cuban influence in that country. The Reagan administration has only given the Sandinista hardliners a pretext to crack down on dissidents inside Nicaragua.

S. 1003 (H.R. 2068): Vote Nos. 107-122.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

YEAS (55)			NAYS (42)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (14 or 30%)	Republicans (41 or 80%)		Democrats (32 or 70%)	Republicans (10 or 20%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Lautenberg	Chafee	Rockefeller—2AY	Goldwater—2
Boren	Andrews	Kasten	Biden	Leahy	Cohen		Wallop—2AY
Byrd	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bingaman	Levin	Evans		
Chiles	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bradley	Matsunaga	Gorton		
DeConcini	Cochran	Mattingly	Bumpers	Melcher	Hatfield		
Dixon	D'Amato	McClure	Burdick	Metzenbaum	Mathias		
Exon	Danforth	McConnell	Cranston	Mitchell	Packwood		
Ford	Denton	Murkowski	Dodd	Moynihan	Specter		
Heflin	Dole	Nickles	Eagleton	Pell	Stafford		
Hollings	Domenici	Pressler	Glenn	Proxmire	Weicker		
Johnston	Durenberger	Quayle	Gore	Pryor			
Long	East	Roth	Harkin	Riegle			
Nunn	Garn	Rudman	Hart	Sarbanes			
Stennis	Gramm	Simpson	Inouye	Sasser			
	Grassley	Stevens	Kennedy	Simon			
	Hatch	Symms	Kerry	Zorinsky			
	Hawkins	Thurmond					
	Hecht	Trible					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
1—Official Business	
2—Necessarily Absent	
3—Illness	
4—Other	

SYMBOLS:	
AY—Announced Yea	
AN—Announced Nay	
PY—Paired Yea	
PN—Paired Nay	

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—70%
Republicans—80%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (55)
Democrats—14 or 25%
Republicans—41 or 75%

Against (42)
Democrats—32 or 76%
Republicans—10 or 24%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 113

99th Congress
1st Session

June 7, 1985, 10:01 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7735

STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, FY 1986-87

BILL NO.: S. 1003 (H.R. 2068)

AMENDMENT NO.: 278

TITLE: "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987."

SUBJECT: Division I of the Harkin amendment to prohibit the funds provided in this or any other Act from being obligated or expended by the CIA or DOD to provide humanitarian assistance to forces opposed to the government of Nicaragua.

NOTE: Proponents argued that the amendment would have the effect of keeping the CIA out of the business of managing the secret war in Nicaragua. The CIA should not be engaged in distributing humanitarian assistance because its role is to gather intelligence and provide interpretations for U.S. policymakers.

Opponents took the view that U.S. humanitarian aid is designed to help the Contras. As the situation is fraught with many dangers, the mission is one that the CIA is best able to perform. Until other agencies are willing to administer the funds, the CIA has to be given the task.

S. 1003 (H.R. 2068); Vote Nos. 107-122.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (35)		NAYS (57)		NOT VOTING (8)		
Democrats (30 or 70%)	Republicans (5 or 10%)	Democrats (13 or 30%)	Republicans (44 or 90%)	Democrats (4)	Republicans (4)	
Baucus	Chafee	Bentsen	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Bumpers— ²	Cohen— ²
Biden	Grassley	Boren	Andrews	Kasten	Rockefeller— ²	Gorton— ² PN
Bingaman	Mathias	Chiles	Armstrong	Laxalt	Sarbanes— ²	Hatfield— ² PY
Bradley	Stafford	DeConcini	Boschwitz	Lugar	Simon— ²	Wallop— ² AN
Burdick	Weicker	Dixon	Cochran	Mattingly		
Byrd		Exon	D'Amato	McClure		
Cranston		Glenn	Danforth	McConnell		
Dodd		Heflin	Denton	Murkowski		
Eagleton		Hollings	Dole	Nickles		
Ford		Johnston	Domenici	Packwood		
Gore		Long	Durenberger	Pressler		
Harkin		Nunn	East	Quayle		
Hart		Stennis	Evans	Roth		
Inouye			Garn	Rudman		
Kennedy			Goldwater	Simpson		
Kerry			Gramm	Specter		
Lautenberg			Hatch	Stevens		
Leahy			Hawkins	Symms		
Levin			Hecht	Thurmond		
Matsunaga			Heinz	Trible		
Melcher			Helms	Warner		
Metzenbaum			Humphrey	Wilson		
Mitchell						
Moynihan						
Pell						
Proxmire						
Pryor						
Riegle						
Sasser						
Zakrinsky						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

1—Official Business
2—Necessarily Absent
3—Illness
4—Other

SYMBOLS:

AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—70%
Republicans—90%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (35)
Democrats—30 or 86%
Republicans—5 or 14%

Against (57)
Democrats—13 or 23%
Republicans—44 or 77%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 115

99th Congress
1st Session

June 7, 1985, 11:15 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7752

STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, FY 1986-87

BILL NO.: S. 1003 (H.R. 2068)

AMENDMENT NO.: 280

TITLE: "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987."

SUBJECT: Kerry-Moynihan modified amendment to provide that no funds authorized under this or any other Act can be used to fund, directly or indirectly, activities against the government of Nicaragua (*which have not been authorized by, or pursuant to, law and*) which would place the U.S. in violation of our obligations under the Charter of the Organization of American States, to which the U.S. is a signatory, or under international law as defined by treaty commitments agreed to and ratified by the U.S. (See also Vote No. 116, after which the above italicized phrase was added and the amendment adopted by voice vote.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment emphasized that the U.S. has been a leader in the effort to develop basic rules of behavior among nations of the world. But when it comes to U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, serious questions have been raised about whether U.S. actions have violated international law. It is important that the U.S. reiterate its adherence to international law if it wants to avoid being classified with such international outlaws as Libya, South Africa, and Iran.

Opponents objected to the amendment because it could cause two major problems. First, it could open a Pandora's box of controversy and litigation in U.S. courts about whether specific aspects of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua violate international obligations. Second, and potentially even more dangerous, the amendment could raise complex legal questions about the effects of international tribunals on U.S. foreign policies.

S. 1003 (H.R. 2068): Vote Nos. 107-122.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

YEAS (47)			NAYS (42)			NOT VOTING (11)	
Democrats (38 or 95%)	Republicans (9 or 18%)		Democrats (2 or 5%)	Republicans (40 or 82%)		Democrats (7)	Republicans (4)
Baucus	Inouye	Armstrong	Hollings	Abdnor	Humphrey	Bradley ⁻²	Cohen ⁻²
Bentsen	Johnston	Grassley	Long	Andrews	Kassebaum	Bumpers ⁻²	Gorton ^{-2PN}
Biden	Kennedy	Heinz		Boschwitz	Kasten	Chiles ^{-2AY}	Hatfield ^{-2PY}
Bingaman	Kerry	Lugar		Chafee	Laxalt	Rockefeller ⁻²	Wallop ⁻²
Boren	Lautenberg	Nickles		Cochran	Mathias	Sarbanes ⁻²	
Burdick	Leahy	Packwood		D'Amato	Mattingly	Simon ⁻²	
Byrd	Levin	Specter		Danforth	McClure	Stennis ⁻²	
Cranston	Matsunaga	Stafford		Denton	McConnell		
DeConcini	Melcher	Weicker		Dole	Murkowski		
Dixon	Metzenbaum			Domenici	Pressler		
Dodd	Mitchell			Durenberger	Quayle		
Eagleton	Moynihan			East	Roth		
Exon	Nunn			Evans	Rudman		
Ford	Pell			Garn	Simpson		
Glenn	Proxmire			Goldwater	Stevens		
Gore	Pryor			Gramm	Symms		
Harkin	Riegle			Hatch	Thurmond		
Hart	Sasser			Hawkins	Trible		
Heflin	Zorinsky			Hecht	Warner		
				Helms	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—95%
Republicans—82%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (47)
Democrats—38 or 81%
Republicans—9 or 19%

Against (42)
Democrats—2 or 5%
Republicans—40 or 95%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 121

99th Congress
1st Session

June 11, 1985, 6:12 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7899

STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, FY 1986-87

BILL NO.: S. 1003 (H.R. 2068)

AMENDMENT NO.: 290

TITLE: "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987."

SUBJECT: Kassebaum motion to table the Helms amendment repealing a provision of the Foreign Assistance Authorization bill, passed by the Senate on May 15, which would prohibit imposition of tighter restrictions on non-governmental or multilateral organizations than those imposed on foreign governments in their use of funding for population planning assistance. (Repeal of this provision would permit the President, or any government official to whom he delegates the authority, to implement whatever policies he deemed necessary to curb human rights violations, including but not limited to infanticide, abortion, involuntary sterilization, and racial and ethnic discrimination.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that it would merely give the President sufficient latitude and flexibility to formulate foreign policy and preserve the President's authority and responsibility clearly found in the U.S. Constitution. It would not affect current or future foreign aid funding for family planning nor would it set requirements or restrictions on any specific recipient of U.S. population assistance. The human rights abuses concerned here include coercive and discriminatory practices which are definitely distinct from constructive family planning methods. This amendment has not been drafted as a tool to address South African policy, although the President would receive authority to curb racial and ethnic problems in South Africa. This amendment, they claimed, would return to the President his proper foreign policy role and register the confidence of Congress in the result.

Opponents declared that this amendment which is cloaked in language defending human rights would actually weaken the U.S. commitment to population assistance and change a policy formulated only three weeks prior to this debate. That policy contained in the Kassebaum amendment to the Foreign Aid bill, would assure equal treatment of both foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations that provide family planning services in developing nations. Not only would it be a bad precedent to

(OVER)

S. 1003 (H.R. 2068): Vote Nos. 107-122.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (53)			NAYS (45)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (35 or 78%)		Republicans (18 or 34%)	Democrats (10 or 22%)		Republicans (35 or 66%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (0)
Baucus	Kerry	Chafee	DeConcini	Abdnor	Helms	Harkin ⁻²	
Rentsen	Lautenberg	Cohen	Eagleton	Andrews	Humphrey	Inouye ⁻²	
Biden	Leahy	Evans	Exon	Armstrong	Kasten		
Bingaman	Levin	Goldwater	Ford	Boschwitz	Layalt		
Boren	Long	Gorton	Heflin	Cochran	Lugar		
Bradley	Matsunaga	Hatfield	Johnston	D'Amato	Mattingly	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
Bumpers	Metzenbaum	Heinz	Melcher	Danforth	McClure		
Burdick	Mitchell	Kassebaum	Proxmire	Denton	McConnell		
Byrd	Moynihan	Mathias	Stennis	Dole	Murkowski		
Chiles	Nunn	Packwood	Zorinsky	Domenici	Nickles	1—Official Business	
Cranston	Pell	Rudman		Durenberger	Pressler	2—Necessarily Absent	
Dixon	Pryor	Simpson		East	Quayle	3—Illness	
Dodd	Riegle	Specter		Garn	Roth	4—Other	
Glenn	Rockefeller	Stafford		Gramm	Symms	SYMBOLS:	
Gore	Sarbanes	Stevens		Grassley	Thurmond		
Hart	Sasser	Warner		Hatch	Trible		
Hollings	Simon	Weicker		Hawkins	Wallip		
Kennedy		Wilson		Hecht		AY—Announced Yea	
						AN—Announced Nay	
						PY—Paired Yea	
						PN—Paired Nay	

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—78%
Republicans—66%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (53)
Democrats—35 or 66%
Republicans—18 or 34%

Against (45)
Democrats—10 or 22%
Republicans—35 or 78%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

create policy that would make governmental and nongovernmental recipients of the same aid subject to different conditions, but the premise on which it is based is erroneous. There have been no flagrant violations of family planning policies by anyone receiving U.S. aid. In fact, since 1973, no population aid has been used for abortions or other coercive practices. If it is made more difficult for the poor of developing nations to obtain the family planning assistance they need, unnecessary suffering will result for the millions of mothers and children who now enjoy a more secure future because of the present aid efforts. Hearings must be held on this issue, and if any amendment were to be passed on this topic, it must be written in a more concise manner so that constitutional scholars would not be needed to interpret its provisions.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 123

99th Congress
1st Session

June 12, 1985, 11:56 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7991

NOMINATION OF MICHAEL B. WALLACE TO THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION

POSITION: Member of Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation

SUBJECT: Confirmation of the nomination of Michael B. Wallace, of Mississippi, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation.

NOTE: Proponents noted that Mr. Wallace graduated at the top of his class at the University of Virginia Law School, clerked for Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist, and served as a top aide to House Minority Whip Trent Lott. Mr. Wallace is presently practicing law on behalf of the poor in Mississippi which would make him well acquainted with the problems of legal assistance to the poor. While serving as a recess appointee to the Legal Services Board, Mr. Wallace was commended for his fairness by the Project Advisory Group, an association of legal services staff members. Finally, proponents pointed out that many of the objections to Wallace's actions do not necessarily represent his views because they were executed at the direction of his former employers.

Opponents stated that many of Mr. Wallace's past activities cause several Senators to doubt his willingness to carry out the proper duties of a Legal Services Board member. As a staff aid in 1982 to House Minority Whip Trent Lott, Mr. Wallace urged President Reagan to side with segregated private schools in the Bob Jones Supreme Court case, an accusation Mr. Wallace would not confirm or deny. He also was a key strategist in maneuvers to block the extension of the Voting Rights Act, and he played a primary role in stopping the Federal inspection of a Mississippi jail in which 27 inmates were killed in a fire less than a year later. Proponents pointed out that the nominee has gone on record as supporting the elimination of the Legal Service Corporation's minority recruitment effort. These activities would call into question Mr. Wallace's commitment to carrying out the mandate of a Legal Services Board member.

Vote No. 123.

RESULT: NOMINATION CONFIRMED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (62)			NAYS (34)		NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (12 or 26%)	Republicans (50 or 100%)		Democrats (34 or 74%)	Republicans (0 or 0%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (3)
Boren	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Hollings	Melcher ⁻²	Cohen ⁻²
Chiles	Andrews	Laxalt	Bentsen	Inouye		East ⁻²
Dixon	Armstrong	Lugar	Biden	Kennedy		Heinz ⁻²
Exon	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bingaman	Kerry	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
Heflin	Chafee	Mattingly	Bradley	Lautenberg		
Johnston	Cochran	McClure	Bumpers	Leahy		
Long	D'Amato	McConnell	Burdick	Levin		
Nunn	Danforth	Murkowski	Byrd	Matsunaga	1—Official Business	
Pryor	Denton	Nickles	Cranston	Metzenbaum	2—Necessarily Absent	
Simon	Dole	Packwood	DeConcini	Mitchell	3—Illness	
Stennis	Domenici	Pressler	Dodd	Moynihan	4—Other	
Zorinsky	Durenberger	Quayle	Eagleton	Pell	SYMBOLS:	
	Evans	Roth	Ford	Proxmire		
	Garn	Rudman	Glenn	Riegle		
	Goldwater	Simpson	Gore	Rockefeller		
	Gorton	Specter	Harkin	Sarbanes	AY—Announced Yea	
	Gramm	Stafford	Hart	Sasser	AN—Announced Nay	
	Grassley	Stevens			PY—Paired Yea	
	Hatch	Symms			PN—Paired Nay	
	Hatfield	Thurmond				
	Hawkins	Trible				
	Hecht	Wallop				
	Helms	Warner				
	Humphrey	Weicker				
	Kassebaum	Wilson				

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—74%
Republicans—100%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (62)
Democrats—12 or 19%
Republicans—50 or 81%

Against (34)
Democrats—34 or 100%
Republicans—0 or 0%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 124

99th Congress
1st Session

June 12, 1985, 12:29 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-7992

NOMINATION OF LEANNE BERNSTEIN TO THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION

POSITION: Member of the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation

SUBJECT: Confirmation of the nomination of LeAnne Bernstein, of Maryland, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Legal Services Corporation.

NOTE: Proponents stated that LeAnne Bernstein is highly qualified for a position on the Legal Services Board. Not only was she a magna cum laude graduate of Indiana Law School, but she has already served for two years as a Legal Services Corporation secretary. From this experience, she gained an informed understanding of the Board's strengths and weaknesses. In addition, during her Senate testimony, she expressed a commitment to provide direct legal assistance to the poor, and to oversee Legal Services Corporation activities to ensure that past abuses do not recur.

Opponents claimed that Ms. Bernstein supports policies which directly conflict with the statutory enactments and congressional intent of the Legal Services Corporation. During her Senate testimony, Ms. Bernstein misrepresented her role as a legal services staff member as being purely clerical, when in fact she was one of the principal policy actors. She did so in order to avoid responsibility for policies she knew the Senate would disapprove. For example, she blocked public participation to Legal Services Corporation Board meetings, and she proposed a 20 percent reduction for the Corporation which was not supported by any other member. During her recess appointment to the Board, Ms. Bernstein consistently voted to reduce programs she could not eliminate and to restrict those she could not reduce. While admitting that Ms. Bernstein may be a highly trained lawyer and experienced in the procedures of the Legal Services Corporation, opponents contended that the Senate should not confirm appointees whose main goal is to destroy the organization for which they have been nominated to represent.

Vote No. 124.

RESULT: NOMINATION CONFIRMED

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (58)			NAYS (38)		NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (9 or 19%)	Republicans (49 or 100%)		Democrats (38 or 81%)	Republicans (0 or 0%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (4)
Dixon	Abdnor	Laxalt	Baucus	Hollings		Cohen ⁻²
Exon	Andrews	Lugar	Bentsen	Inouye		East ⁻²
Heflin	Armstrong	Mathias	Biden	Kennedy		Goldwater ⁻²
Johnston	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Bingaman	Kerry		Heinz ⁻²
Long	Chafee	McClure	Boren	Lautenberg		
Pell	Cochran	McConnell	Bradley	Leahy		
Pryor	D'Amato	Murkowski	Bumpers	Levin		
Stennis	Danforth	Nickles	Burdick	Matsunaga		
Zorinsky	Denton	Packwood	Byrd	Melcher		
	Dole	Pressler	Chiles	Metzenbaum		
	Domenici	Quayle	Cranston	Mitchell		
	Durenberger	Roth	DeConcini	Moynihan		
	Evans	Rudman	Dodd	Nunn		
	Garn	Simpson	Eagleton	Proxmire		
	Gorton	Specter	Ford	Riegle		
	Gramm	Stafford	Glenn	Rockefeller		
	Grassley	Stevens	Gore	Sarbanes		
	Hatch	Symms	Harkin	Sasser		
	Hatfield	Thurmond	Hart	Simon		
	Hawkins	Trible				
	Hecht	Wallop				
	Helms	Warner				
	Humphrey	Weicker				
	Kassebaum	Wilson				
	Kasten					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—81%
Republicans—100%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (58)
Democrats—9 or 16%
Republicans—49 or 84%

Against (38)
Democrats—38 or 100%
Republicans—0 or 0%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 127

99th Congress
1st Session

June 18, 1985, 2:11 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-8305

ENERGY POLICY AND CONSERVATION (EPCA)

BILL NO.: S. 979 (H.R. 1699)

AMENDMENT NO.: 348

TITLE: "Energy Policy and Conservation Amendment Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Bradley amendment which requires the President to prepare and authorizes him to implement a standby program of emergency block grants to States to enable them to deal with the effects of suddenly higher oil prices during an oil shortage.

NOTE: Proponents stated that this amendment was a modest attempt to assure help will be available to those segments of society which cannot quickly adapt to suddenly higher prices for gasoline, heating oil, and food. State governors, they contended, are better able to deal with the various problems and hardships caused by suddenly higher oil prices than a national program. Emergency preparedness is the most neglected aspect of energy policy, and Americans are still as vulnerable as they were in 1973 and 1979 to gas price shocks. Now is the time to prepare for future energy crises. Funding for block grants would come from general fund revenues and would likely be offset by additional revenues from the existing windfall profit tax and revenues from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) sales revenues.

Opponents questioned whether large scale financial assistance in the form of a new State block grant program would be appropriate or needed at this time. They reminded the Senate that the Congress had tried to enact standby emergency petroleum allocation authority but that President Reagan had vetoed it, not wanting such authority. The SPR is much more effective than it was earlier in ameliorating the effect of an import cutback. In the event of an oil disruption, an early drawdown of SPR would flood the market with new supplies and sharp price increases would be dampened.

S. 979 (H.R. 1699): Vote Nos. 127, 128.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (44)			NAYS (55)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (35 or 76%)		Republicans (9 or 17%)	Democrats (11 or 24%)	Republicans (44 or 83%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (0)
Bentsen	Kerry	Chafee	Baucus	Abdnor	Kasten	Boren— ²	
Biden	Lautenberg	Cohen	Dixon	Andrews	Laxalt		
Bingaman	Leahy	D'Amato	Ford	Armstrong	Lugar		
Bradley	Levin	Danforth	Glenn	Boschwitz	Mattingly		
Bumpers	Matsunaga	Hatfield	Heflin	Cochran	McClure		
Burdick	Melcher	Heinz	Hollings	Denton	McConnell		
Byrd	Metzenbaum	Mathias	Johnston	Dole	Murkowski		
Chiles	Mitchell	Specter	Long	Domenici	Nickles		
Cranston	Moynihan	Weicker	Proxmire	Durenberger	Packwood		
DeConcini	Nunn		Stennis	East	Pressler		
Dodd	Pell		Zorinsky	Evans	Quayle		
Eagleton	Pryor			Garn	Roth		
Exon	Riegle			Goldwater	Rudman		
Gore	Rockefeller			Gorton	Simpson		
Harkin	Sarbanes			Gramm	Stafford		
Hart	Sasser			Grassley	Stevens		
Inouye	Simon			Hatch	Symms		
Kennedy				Hawkins	Thurmond		
				Hecht	Trible		
				Helms	Wallop		
				Humphrey	Warner		
				Kassebaum	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—76%
Republicans—83%


Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (44)
Democrats—35 or 80%
Republicans—9 or 20%

Against (55)
Democrats—11 or 20%
Republicans—44 or 80%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 130

99th Congress
1st Session

June 20, 1985, 12:30 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-8501

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, 1985

BILL NO.: H.R. 2577

AMENDMENT NO.: 368

TITLE: "Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985."

SUBJECT: Byrd, et al, perfecting amendment to establish an eight-member National Commission on Espionage and Security to conduct an investigation and assess the adequacy of counterespionage, counterintelligence, and security activities of the U.S. in the protection of vital secret defense, foreign policy, and intelligence information against the efforts of hostile foreign powers and report to the President and Congress no later than March 1, 1987.

NOTE: Proponents stated that the amendment would address the extremely serious national problem of maintaining the secrecy of classified information. The recent Walker case and others involving employees of the government and the armed services who have had access to classified information and who have betrayed their country for personal advantage, have pointed up the necessity for tightening security processes. A bipartisan commission is needed to scrutinize Federal law regarding these problems and to recommend improvements or modifications in Federal regulations regarding access to security information. The Select Intelligence Committee would not have the time or the resources to devote to such an exhaustive study of this sensitive issue, unlike a full-time commission created solely for that purpose.

Opponents agreed that the security processes in this country need reform, but deemed this proposal inappropriate. Statutory establishment of a commission to study this issue is unnecessary since there are existing mechanisms carrying out this function. The Select Intelligence Committee or others could be charged with proceeding with a careful examination. The creation of a commission might well retard progress in this area, they contended, rather than further it. They questioned whether outside entities would be able to force the existing bureaucracy to alter its usual patterns whereas those currently working on these matters within the government would be more willing to change if they themselves adopted the new procedures.

H.R. 2577: Vote Nos. 129-132.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (48)			NAYS (50)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (43 or 96%)	Republicans (5 or 9%)		Democrats (2 or 4%)	Republicans (48 or 91%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (0)
Baucus	Johnston	Andrews	Hollings	Abdnor	Humphrey	Boren—2	
Bentsen	Kennedy	Hatfield	Long	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Moynihan—4AY	
Biden	Kerry	Rudman		Boschwitz	Kasten		
Bingaman	Lautenberg	Stevens		Chafee	Laxalt		
Bradley	Leahy	Warner		Cochran	Lugar		
Bumpers	Levin			Cohen	Mathias		
Burdick	Matsunaga			D'Amato	Mattingly		
Byrd	Melcher			Danforth	McClure		
Chiles	Metzenbaum			Denton	McConnell		
Cranston	Mitchell			Dole	Murkowski		
DeConcini	Nunn			Domenici	Nickles		
Dixon	Pell			Durenberger	Packwood		
Dodd	Proxmire			East	Pressler		
Eagleton	Pryor			Evans	Quayle		
Exon	Riegle			Garn	Roth		
Ford	Rockefeller			Goldwater	Simpson		
Glenn	Sarbanes			Gorton	Specter		
Gore	Sasser			Gramm	Stafford		
Harkin	Simon			Grassley	Symms		
Hart	Stennis			Hatch	Thurmond		
Heflin	Zorinsky			Hawkins	Trible		
Inouye				Hecht	Wallop		
				Heinz	Weicker		
				Helms	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

Party Cohesion

Democrats—96%
Republicans—91%

For (48)

Democrats—43 or 90%
Republicans—5 or 10%

Against (50)

Democrats—2 or 4%
Republicans—48 or 96%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 153

99th Congress
1st Session

July 16, 1985, 4:33 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-9550

SBA AUTHORIZATION, FY 1986-88

BILL NO.: S. 408

AMENDMENT NO.: 524

SUBJECT: Bumpers, et al, amendment to extend the \$500 million cap on SBA disaster lending from FY 1986 through FY 1988 and to strike the section of the bill which excludes farmers from SBA disaster loan eligibility.

NOTE: Proponents asserted that this amendment would ensure that farmers who have no credit available elsewhere and can demonstrate an ability to repay, would remain eligible for SBA disaster related loans. The agricultural economy is unhealthy; the FmHA does not always provide the needed funds, and has higher interest rates than the SBA; thus, farmers tend to look to the SBA as a lender of last resort. Whatever short-run savings could be achieved by making farmers ineligible for SBA disaster loans, the long-run cost of allowing the deterioration of farms to continue would be far greater. Proponents also noted that this amendment would extend the \$500 million cap on SBA disaster loans. Without this, there would be no cap on the total of disaster loans in 1987 and 1988 and the budget deficit would grow larger.

Opponents maintained that the problems and needs of farmers should be handled by the Department of Agriculture, specifically the FmHA, which is an agency that has experience in and knowledge of the unique financial and business problems of agricultural enterprises. The SBA lacks the expertise in administering this specialized program and correcting the problems associated with SBA-administered disaster loans would require hiring many more loan officers and opening more offices nationwide which would only duplicate many FmHA services. By rejecting this amendment, 33 percent of the entire SBA budget reduction requirements would be satisfied, and SBA's essential credit and management functions still would be maintained.

S. 408: Vote Nos. 153-155.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (45)			NAYS (52)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (40 or 85%)		Republicans (5 or 10%)	Democrats (7 or 15%)		Republicans (45 or 90%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (3)
Baucus	Inouye	Abdnor	Bentsen	Boschwitz	Laxalt		Armstrong ⁻²
Biden	Johnston	Andrews	Bradley	Chafee	Lugar		Durenberger ⁻²
Bingaman	Kennedy	Grassley	Dodd	Cochran	Mathias		Stevens ⁻²
Boren	Kerry	Kasten	Lautenberg	Cohen	Mattingly		
Bumpers	Levin	Specter	Leahy	D'Amato	McClure		
Burdick	Long		Pell	Danforth	McConnell		
Byrd	Matsunaga		Proxmire	Denton	Murkowski		
Chiles	Melcher			Dole	Nickles		
Cranston	Metzenbaum			Domenici	Packwood		
DeConcini	Mitchell			East	Pressler		
Dixon	Moynihan			Evans	Quayle		
Eagleton	Nunn			Garn	Roth		
Exon	Pryor			Goldwater	Rudman		
Ford	Riegle			Gorton	Simpson		
Glenn	Rockefeller			Gramm	Stafford		
Gore	Sarbanes			Hatch	Symms		
Harkin	Sasser			Hatfield	Thurmond		
Hart	Simon			Hawkins	Trible		
Heflin	Stennis			Hecht	Wallop		
Hollings	Zorinsky			Heinz	Warner		
				Helms	Weicker		
				Humphrey	Wilson		
				Kassebaum			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—85%
Republicans—90%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (45)
Democrats—40 or 89%
Republicans—5 or 11%

Against (52)
Democrats—7 or 13%
Republicans—45 or 87%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 156

99th Congress
1st Session

July 18, 1985, 12:19 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-9706

LINE ITEM VETO (CLOTURE)

BILL NO.: S. 43

SUBJECT: Quayle, et al, motion to close further debate on the Dole motion to proceed to consideration of the bill which gives the President a form of line item veto authority over appropriations bills for a two-year period and maintains the current requirement of a two-thirds vote of each House to override a veto. (Under the bill, each numbered section or unnumbered paragraph of an appropriation bill or a joint resolution making supplemental, deficiency, or continuing appropriations which passes both Houses of Congress in the same form would be enrolled as a separate bill or joint resolution by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House (depending on the originating body) and signed by the presiding officers of both Houses for presentation to the President, who would be able to sign or veto the separate pieces of legislation. (See also Vote Nos. 157 and 158 for subsequent cloture votes.)

NOTE: The cloture petition, filed on July 16, 1985, was signed by Senators Quayle, Mattingly, Helms, Proxmire, Kasten, Thurmond, Chafee, Heinz, Cochran, Laxalt, Garn, Nickles, Kassebaum, Wilson, Danforth, Roth, McClure, Dole, Warner, Simpson, Grassley, Symms, Evans, Lugar, East, Biden, Hatch, Abdnor, Murkowski, Humphrey, Wallop, McConnell, Goldwater, Hecht, Tribble, Gramm, Boschwitz, Denton, and Durenberger.

S. 43: Vote Nos. 156-158.

RESULT: CLOTURE MOTION REJECTED, 3/5THS NOT HAVING VOTED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (57)			NAYS (42)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (12 or 26%)	Republicans (45 or 87%)		Democrats (35 or 74%)	Republicans (7 or 13%)		Democrats (0)	Republicans (1)
Biden	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Johnston	Andrews		Armstrong ²
Boren	Boschwitz	Kasten	Bentsen	Kerry	Durenberger		
DeConcini	Chafee	Laxalt	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Hatfield		
Dixon	Cochran	Lugar	Bradley	Levin	Mathias		
Exon	Cohen	Mattingly	Bumpers	Long	Packwood		
Hollings	D'Amato	McClure	Burdick	Matsunaga	Specter		
Kennedy	Danforth	McConnell	Byrd	Melcher	Weicker		
Leahy	Denton	Murkowski	Chiles	Metzenbaum			
Nunn	Dole	Nickles	Cranston	Mitchell			
Pell	Domenici	Pressler	Dodd	Moynihan			
Proxmire	East	Quayle	Eagleton	Pryor			
Zorinsky	Evans	Roth	Ford	Riegle			
	Garn	Rudman	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Gorton	Stafford	Harkin	Sasser			
	Gramm	Stevens	Hart	Simon			
	Grassley	Symms	Heflin	Stennis			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Inouye				
	Hawkins	Tribble					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—74%
Republicans—87%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (57)
Democrats—12 or 21%
Republicans—45 or 79%

Against (42)
Democrats—35 or 83%
Republicans—7 or 17%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 157

99th Congress
1st Session

July 23, 1985, 3:49 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-9878

LINE ITEM VETO (CLOTURE)

BILL NO.: S. 43

SUBJECT: Dole, et al, second motion to close further debate on the Dole motion to proceed to the consideration of the bill. (See also Vote Nos. 156 and 158.)

NOTE: The cloture petition, filed July 19, 1985, was signed by Senators Dole, McConnell, Simpson, Grassley, Denton, Hatch, Laxalt, Mattingly, Kasten, Proxmire, Evans, Warner, Thurmond, Tribble, Hecht, East, and Chafee.

S. 43: Vote Nos. 156-158.

RESULT: CLOTURE MOTION REJECTED, 3/5THS NOT HAVING VOTED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (57)			NAYS (41)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (12 or 26%)	Republicans (45 or 87%)		Democrats (34 or 74%)	Republicans (7 or 13%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (1)
Boren	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Johnston	Andrews	Biden ⁻²	Hawkins ⁻²
DeConcini	Armstrong	Kasten	Bentsen	Kerry	Durenberger		
Dixon	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Hatfield		
Fxon	Chafee	Lugar	Bradley	Levin	Mathias		
Heflin	Cochran	Mattingly	Bumpers	Long	Packwood		
Hollings	Cohen	McClure	Burdick	Matsunaga	Stafford		
Kennedy	D'Amato	McConnell	Byrd	Melcher	Weicker		
Leahy	Danforth	Murkowski	Chiles	Metzenbaum			
Nunn	Denton	Nickles	Cranston	Mitchell			
Pell	Dole	Pressler	Dodd	Moynihan			
Proxmire	Domenici	Quayle	Eagleton	Pryor			
Zorinsky	East	Roth	Ford	Riegle			
	Evans	Rudman	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Garn	Simpson	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Goldwater	Specter	Harkin	Sasser			
	Gorton	Stevens	Hart	Simon			
	Gramm	Symms	Inouye	Stennis			
	Grassley	Thurmond					
	Hatch	Tribble					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—74%
Republicans—87%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (57)
Democrats—12 or 21%
Republicans—45 or 79%

Against (41)
Democrats—34 or 83%
Republicans—7 or 17%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 158

99th Congress
1st Session

July 24, 1985, 12:35 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-9942

LINE ITEM VETO (CLOTURE)

BILL NO.: S. 43

SUBJECT: Dole, et al, third motion to close further debate on the Dole motion to proceed to the consideration of the bill. (See also Vote Nos. 156 and 157.)

NOTE: The cloture petition, filed July 22, 1985, was signed by Senators Dole, Stevens, Mattingly, Goldwater, Rudman, Cochran, Wilson, Warner, Grassley, Helms, Thurmond, Gramm, Denton, Armstrong, Hecht, and McConnell.

S. 43: Vote Nos. 156-158.

RESULT: CLOTURE MOTION REJECTED, 3/5THS NOT HAVING VOTED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (58)			NAYS (40)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (12 or 27%)	Republicans (46 or 87%)		Democrats (33 or 73%)	Republicans (7 or 13%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (0)
Biden	Abdnor	Humphrey	Baucus	Johnston	Andrews	Long—2PN	
Boren	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Bentsen	Kerry	Durenberger		
Dixon	Boschwitz	Kasten	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Hatfield		
Exon	Chafee	Laxalt	Bradley	Levin	Mathias		
Heflin	Cochran	Lugar	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Packwood		
Hollings	Cohen	Mattingly	Burdick	Melcher	Stafford		
Kennedy	D'Amato	McClure	Byrd	Metzenbaum	Weicker		
Leahy	Danforth	McConnell	Chiles	Mitchell			
Nunn	Denton	Murkowski	Cranston	Moynihan			
Pell	Dole	Nickles	Dodd	Pryor			
Proxmire	Domenici	Pressler	Eagleton	Riegle			
Zorinsky	East	Quayle	Ford	Rockefeller			
	Evans	Roth	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Garn	Rudman	Gore	Sasser			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Harkin	Simon			
	Gorton	Specter	Hart	Stennis			
	Gramm	Stevens	Inouye				
	Grassley	Symms					
	Hatch	Thurmond					
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					

LIVE PAIRS (1)
PRESENT AND
GIVING: RECEIVING:
DeConcini (PY)..... Long (PN)

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:
1—Official Business
2—Necessarily Absent
3—Illness
4—Other

SYMBOLS:
AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats— 73%
Republicans— 87%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (58)
Democrats— 12 or 21%
Republicans— 46 or 79%

Against (40)
Democrats— 33 or 82.5%
Republicans— 7 or 17.5%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 160

99th Congress
1st Session

July 24, 1985, 6:54 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-10010

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY

BILL NO.: S. 1077

AMENDMENT NO.: 540

SUBJECT: Danforth substitute amendment (for the Simon amendment) to establish a commission, chaired by the Director of the National Bureau of Standards, to study the safety of fixed site amusement parks and report its recommendations within 18 months and to permit the National Bureau of Standards to investigate serious accidents, if requested to do so by State authorities.

NOTE: Proponents of the substitute stated that, unlike the Simon amendment which allows the Federal government to supercede local authorities, the Danforth amendment would create an agency with technical engineering expertise to be on call to local governments if they desire help. The basic underlying question to be considered is whether the Federal government should have jurisdiction in this area. Unless proven to the contrary, State and local governments should be able to perform the necessary inspection jobs. In addition, for the past 12 years, not only has the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) never exercised its current authority for mobile amusement rides, but also has no expertise with the engineering problems of amusement parks. It would not be prudent to expect them to exercise authority for fixed rides.

Opponents of the Danforth substitute argued that it would effectively gut any enforcement provisions because the National Bureau of Standards could only inspect if there were an accident, not to prevent one, or if State and local governments specifically asked the Bureau to assist them. The Danforth amendment would establish another predisposed commission to reveal and study facts that are already common knowledge. In contrast, the Simon amendment would authorize the CPSC to inspect rides in States that have no regulation, but would not preempt States that do provide protection. Since CPSC has been without authority to inspect rides, the number of injuries has doubled. The children and adults of this country are entitled to safe amusement park rides.

S. 1077: Vote No. 160.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

YEAS (52)			NAYS (41)			NOT VOTING (7)	
Democrats (6 or 15%)	Republicans (46 or 88%)		Democrats (35 or 85%)	Republicans (6 or 12%)		Democrats (6)	Republicans (1)
Dodd	Abdnor	Humphrey	Bentsen	Kennedy	Cohen	Baucus—2	Heinz—2
Exon	Andrews	Kassebaum	Biden	Kerry	Hatfield	Bradley—2	
Ford	Armstrong	Kasten	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Mathias	Bumpers—2	
Gore	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Boren	Leahy	Roth	Long—2	
Sasser	Chafee	Lugar	Burdick	Levin	Rudman	Pryor—2	
Zorinsky	Cochran	Mattingly	Byrd	Matsunaga	Weicker	Stennis—2	
	D'Amato	McClure	Chiles	Melcher			
	Danforth	McConnell	Cranston	Metzenbaum			
	Denton	Murkowski	DeConcini	Mitchell			
	Dole	Nickles	Dixon	Moynihan			
	Domenici	Packwood	Eagleton	Nunn			
	Durenberger	Pressler	Glenn	Pell			
	East	Quayle	Harkin	Proxmire			
	Evans	Simpson	Hart	Riegle			
	Garn	Specter	Heflin	Rockefeller			
	Goldwater	Stafford	Hollings	Sarbanes			
	Gorton	Stevens	Inouye	Simon			
	Gramm	Symms	Johnston				
	Grassley	Thurmond					
	Hatch	Trible					
	Hawkins	Wallop					
	Hecht	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—85%
Republicans—88%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (52)
Democrats—6 or 12%
Republicans—46 or 88%

Against (41)
Democrats—35 or 85%
Republicans—6 or 15%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 171

99th Congress
1st Session

September 9, 1985, 4:08 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-11051

SOUTH AFRICAN ANTI-APARTHEID (CLOTURE)

BILL NO.: H.R. 1460 (S. 995)

SUBJECT: Weicker, et al, motion to close further debate on the conference report on the bill expressing opposition to the apartheid policies of the South African government through the imposition of immediate bans on the import of Krugerrands, extension of bank loans to the South African government, exports of computers to specified South African government agencies, and exports of nuclear technology and goods. (See also Vote Nos. 173 and 175.)

NOTE: The cloture petition, presented on August 1, 1985, was signed by Senators Weicker, Kassebaum, Specter, Durenberger, Cohen, Dole, Chafee, Simpson, Evans, Boschwitz, Packwood, Heinz, Murkowski, Mathias, and Andrews.

H.R. 1460 (S. 995): Vote Nos. 143-149, 168, 170, 171, 173-175.

RESULT: CLOTURE MOTION REJECTED, 3/5THS NOT HAVING VOTED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (53)			NAYS (34)		NOT VOTING (13)	
Democrats (41 or 100%)	Republicans (12 or 26%)		Democrats (0 or 0%)	Republicans (34 or 74%)	Democrats (6)	Republicans (7)
Baucus	Kennedy	Cohen	Abdnor	Helms	Burdick—2	Andrews—2
Bentsen	Kerry	D'Amato	Armstrong	Humphrey	DeConcini—2AY	Chafee—2
Biden	Lautenberg	Grassley	Boschwitz	Lugar	Dodd—2AY	East—2AN
Bingaman	Leahy	Hatfield	Cochran	McClure	Hart—2AY	Kassebaum—2
Boren	Levin	Heinz	Danforth	McConnell	Long—2	Laxalt—2
Bradley	Matsunaga	Kasten	Denton	Nickles	Riegle—2AY	Murkowski—2
Bumpers	Melcher	Mathias	Dole	Quayle		Specter—2
Byrd	Metzenbaum	Mattingly	Domenici	Roth		
Chiles	Mitchell	Packwood	Durenberger	Rudman		
Cranston	Moynihan	Pressler	Evans	Simpson		
Dixon	Nunn	Stafford	Garn	Stevens		
Eagleton	Pell	Weicker	Goldwater	Symms		
Exon	Proxmire		Gorton	Thurmond		
Ford	Pryor		Gramm	Trible		
Glenn	Rockefeller		Hatch	Wallop		
Gore	Sarbanes		Hawkins	Warner		
Harkin	Sasser		Hecht	Wilson		
Heflin	Simon					
Hollings	Stennis					
Inouye	Zorinsky					
Johnston						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—100%
Republicans—74%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (53)
Democrats—41 or 77%
Republicans—12 or 23%

Against (34)
Democrats—0 or 0%
Republicans—34 or 100%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 173

99th Congress
1st Session

September 11, 1985, 2:33 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-11241

SOUTH AFRICAN ANTI-APARTHEID (CLOTURE)

BILL NO.: H.R. 1460 (S. 995)

SUBJECT: Kennedy, et al, second motion to close further debate on the conference report on the bill expressing opposition to the apartheid policies of the South African government through the imposition of immediate bans on the import of Krugerrands, extension of bank loans to the South African government, exports of computers to specified South African government agencies, and exports of nuclear technology and goods. (See also Vote Nos. 171, 174, and 175.)

NOTE: The cloture petition, presented on September 9, 1985, was signed by Senators Kennedy, Weicker, Mathias, Cranston, Pell, Simon, Metzenbaum, Leahy, Sasser, Rockefeller, Bumpers, Sarbanes, Matsunaga, Mitchell, Gore, Bingaman, Johnston, Bradley, Glenn, Baucus, Exon, and Moynihan.

H.R. 1460 (S. 995): Vote Nos. 143-149, 168, 170, 171, 173-175.

RESULT: CLOTURE MOTION REJECTED, 3/5THS NOT HAVING VOTED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: NAY

YEAS (57)			NAYS (41)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (46 or 98%)		Republicans (11 or 22%)	Democrats (1 or 2%)		Republicans (40 or 78%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Johnston	Chafee	Byrd	Abdnor	Kassebaum		East-2
Bentsen	Kennedy	Cohen		Andrews	Laxalt		Wilson-2
Biden	Kerry	D'Amato		Armstrong	Lugar		
Bingaman	Lautenberg	Grassley		Boschwitz	Mattingly		
Boren	Leahy	Hatfield		Cochran	McClure		
Bradley	Levin	Heinz		Danforth	McConnell		
Bumpers	Long	Kasten		Denton	Murkowski		
Burdick	Matsunaga	Mathias		Dole	Nickles		
Chiles	Melcher	Packwood		Domenici	Quayle		
Cranston	Metzenbaum	Pressler		Durenberger	Roth		
DeConcini	Mitchell	Weicker		Evans	Rudman		
Dixon	Moynihan			Garn	Simpson		
Dodd	Nunn			Goldwater	Specter		
Eagleton	Pell			Gorton	Stafford		
Exon	Proxmire			Gramm	Stevens		
Ford	Pryor			Hatch	Symms		
Glenn	Riegle			Hawkins	Thurmond		
Gore	Rockefeller			Hecht	Trible		
Harkin	Sarbanes			Helms	Wallop		
Hart	Sasser			Humphrey	Warner		
Heflin	Simon						
Hollings	Stennis						
Inouye	Zorinsky						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—98%
Republicans—78%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (57)
Democrats—46 or 81%
Republicans—11 or 19%

Against (41)
Democrats—1 or 2%
Republicans—40 or 98%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 174

99th Congress
1st Session

September 11, 1985, 3:02 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-11242

SOUTH AFRICAN ANTI-APARTHEID

BILL NO.: H.R. 1460 (S. 995)

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the motion to reconsider Vote No. 173 by which the Senate rejected the second cloture motion on the conference report on the bill.

H.R. 1460 (S. 995): Vote Nos. 143-149, 168, 170, 171, 173-175.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE THE MOTION TO RECONSIDER AGREED TO

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (50)			NAYS (48)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (1 or 2%)	Republicans (49 or 96%)		Democrats (46 or 98%)	Republicans (2 or 4%)		Democrats (0)	Republicans (2)
Zorinsky	Abdnor	Humphrey	Baucus	Inouye	Mathias		East-2
	Andrews	Kassebaum	Bentsen	Johnston	Weicker		Wilson-2
	Armstrong	Kasten	Biden	Kennedy			
	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Bingaman	Kerry			
	Chafee	Lugar	Boren	Lautenberg			
	Cochran	Mattingly	Bradley	Leahy			
	Cohen	McClure	Bumpers	Levin			
	D'Amato	McConnell	Burdick	Long			
	Danforth	Murkowski	Byrd	Matsunaga			
	Denton	Nickles	Chiles	Melcher			
	Dole	Packwood	Cranston	Metzenbaum			
	Domenici	Pressler	DeConcini	Mitchell			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Dixon	Moynihan			
	Evans	Roth	Dodd	Nunn			
	Garn	Rudman	Eagleton	Pell			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Exon	Proxmire			
	Gorton	Specter	Ford	Pryor			
	Gramm	Stafford	Glenn	Riegle			
	Grassley	Stevens	Gore	Rockefeller			
	Hatch	Symms	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Hatfield	Thurmond	Hart	Sasser			
	Hawkins	Trible	Heflin	Simon			
	Hecht	Wallop	Hollings	Stennis			
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—98%
Republicans—96%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (50)
Democrats—1 or 2%
Republicans—49 or 98%

Against (48)
Democrats—46 or 96%
Republicans—2 or 4%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 187

99th Congress
1st Session

September 17, 1985, 6:27 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-11614

IMMIGRATION REFORM

BILL NO.: S. 1200

AMENDMENT NO.: 628

TITLE: "Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Simpson motion to table the Levin, et al, amendment to provide that illegal aliens who arrived prior to January 1, 1980 (who under the bill's provisions would be eligible for legalization in three years), may be employed during the two and one-half year interim period prior to their legalization.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment pointed out that while the bill will delay the legalization process for three years, sanctions on hiring people who are here illegally begin in six months. It puts those who are here in limbo, where they are promised legalization but cannot be employed legally. This will not only work an injustice on these people, but it will work a hardship on the American taxpayer who will have to pay for their welfare assistance. Without this amendment, INS would have to deport legalization-qualified individuals before the legalization program begins. Such qualified individuals long employed in the U.S. will be removed from their jobs; and limited INS resources will be eaten up by the expense of deporting legalization-qualified individuals.

Opponents of the amendment agreed that it would greatly weaken the concept of triggered legalization. It would, in effect, begin legalization immediately by giving certain apprehended aliens the right to stay in the U.S. and be legally employed. It would require adjudication by the INS for each alien apprehended who claims to qualify for legalization. Legalization should begin only when the new enforcement proves effective.

S. 1200: Vote Nos. 176-191.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (54)			NAYS (41)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (11 or 25%)	Republicans (43 or 84%)		Democrats (23 or 75%)	Republicans (8 or 16%)		Democrats (3)	Republicans (2)
Burdick	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Kennedy	Domenici	Inouye ⁻²	East ⁻²
Byrd	Andrews	Laxalt	Bentsen	Kerry	Gramm	Pryor ⁻²	Hatfield ^{-2AN}
Chiles	Armstrong	Lugar	Biden	Lautenberg	Hatch	Stennis ⁻²	
Ford	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bingaman	Leahy	Kassebaum		
Heflin	Chafee	Mattingly	Boren	Levin	McClure		
Hollings	Cochran	McConnell	Bradley	Matsunaga	Packwood		
Johnston	Cohen	Murkowski	Bumpers	Melcher	Symms		
Long	D'Amato	Nickles	Cranston	Metzenbaum	Wilson		
Nun.	Danforth	Pressler	DeConcini	Mitchell			
Proxmire	Denton	Quayle	Dixon	Moynihan			
Zorinsky	Dole	Roth	Dodd	Pell			
	Durenberger	Rudman	Eagleton	Riegle			
	Evans	Simpson	Exon	Rockefeller			
	Garn	Specter	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Goldwater	Stafford	Gore	Sasser			
	Gorton	Stevens	Harkin	Simon			
	Grassley	Thurmond	Hart				
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Weicker					
	Humphrey						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—75%
Republicans—84%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (54)	Against (41)
Democrats—11 or 20%	Democrats—33 or 80%
Republicans—43 or 80%	Republicans—8 or 20%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

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SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 193

99th Congress
1st Session

September 24, 1985, 2:28 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12003

SUPERFUND

BILL NO.: S. 51 (H.R. 2005)

AMENDMENT NO.: 674

TITLE: "Superfund Improvement Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Roth amendment to strike the five-year Victim Assistance Demonstration Program which would aid victims exposed to hazardous substances released into the environment.

NOTE: Proponents asserted that this pilot program represents the start of an entitlement program of undetermined breadth and staggering potential cost, which will drain away resources from the primary concern of Superfund—to clean up hazardous waste sites. The Finance Committee has refused to provide the \$30 million initially requested, therefore the authorizing language also should be deleted. Current medical research does not justify this program since there is no evidence showing a widespread pattern of chronic illness caused by exposure at these sites. Furthermore, the court system already provides redress in cases of provable injury. Another section of the bill currently mandates the health studies which would be a major justification of this program.

Opponents stated that \$30 million for a five-year pilot program did not represent an entitlement. The study of health hazards which was required by the original bill in 1980 recommended a national compensation program for medical expenses and lost wages. This program is much more limited, but would provide the necessary information to allow Congress to make an informed judgment about the need to compensate individuals who have been harmed by hazardous waste dumping. They cited a study showing that a private litigant faces substantial barriers in any action to recover damages, particularly where claims are small. Participants, who are restricted to individuals from selected sites who have no other form of insurance, will be compensated only for out-of-pocket medical expenses. The program represents a limited effort to assess what damage to the health of individuals has been caused by exposure to toxic wastes.

S. 51 (H.R. 2005): Vote Nos. 192-194, 196.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

YEAS (49)			NAYS (45)			NOT VOTING (6)	
Democrats (9 or 21%)	Republicans (40 or 78%)		Democrats (34 or 79%)	Republicans (11 or 22%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (2)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Laxalt	Biden	Kennedy	Chafee	Baucus—4AN	Andrews—2
Bingaman	Armstrong	Lugar	Bradley	Kerry	Cohen	Boren—2	East—2
Glenn	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Bumpers	Lautenberg	D'Amato	Moynihan—2	
Heflin	Cochran	McClure	Burdick	Leahy	Durenberger	Stennis—2	
Hollings	Danforth	McConnell	Byrd	Levin	Hatch		
Johnston	Denton	Murkowski	Chiles	Matsunaga	Heinz		
Long	Dole	Nickles	Cranston	Melcher	Humphrey		
Nunn	Domenici	Pressler	DeConcini	Metzenbaum	Mathias		
Zorinsky	Evans	Quayle	Dixon	Mitchell	Packwood		
	Garn	Roth	Dodd	Pell	Specter		
	Goldwater	Rudman	Eagleton	Proxmire	Stafford		
	Gorton	Simpson	Exon	Pryor			
	Gramm	Stevens	Ford	Riegle			
	Grassley	Symms	Gore	Rockefeller			
	Hatfield	Thurmond	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Hawkins	Trible	Hart	Sasser			
	Hecht	Wallop	Inouye	Simon			
	Helms	Warner					
	Kassebaum	Weicker					
	Kasten	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—79%
Republicans—78%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (49)
Democrats—9 or 18%
Republicans—40 or 82%

Against (45)
Democrats—34 or 76%
Republicans—11 or 24%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 203

99th Congress
1st Session

October 6, 1985, 4:27 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12757

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT (CLOTURE)

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

AMENDMENT NO.: 730

SUBJECT: Dole, et al, motion to close further debate on the Dole, et al, modified perfecting amendment embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment (to the Dole, et al, amendment No. 729) establishing a maximum allowable Federal deficit ceiling of \$180 billion for FY 1986, and providing a mechanism to reduce the allowable deficit by \$36 billion for each of the next five fiscal years until a balanced budget is achieved in 1991. (See also Vote Nos. 207-209, 213, and 285.)

NOTE: The cloture petition, presented on October 4, 1985, was signed by Senators Dole, Simpson, Packwood, Gramm, Boschwitz, Hecht, Garn, Wallop, Hollings, Hatch, Symms, Boren, Cochran, Rudman, Danforth, Gorton, Andrews, Humphrey, Thurmond, McConnell, Cohen, Zorinsky, Lugar, Warner, Murkowski, D'Amato, Stevens, Grassley, Evans, Helms, Goldwater, Cochran, Kasten, McClure, Laxalt, Nickles, Abdnor, Tribble, Wilson, and Domenici.

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: CLOTURE MOTION REJECTED, 3/5THS NOT HAVING VOTED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (57)			NAYS (38)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (10 or 25%)	Republicans (47 or 90%)		Democrats (33 or 77%)	Republicans (5 or 10%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (1)
Bingaman	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Lautenberg	Dole	Bentsen ⁻²	East ⁻²
Boren	Andrews	Kasten	Biden	Levin	Hatfield	DeConcini ⁻²	
Dixon	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bradley	Long	Mathias	Inouye ⁻²	
Dodd	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Pressler	Pell ⁻²	
Heflin	Chafee	Mattingly	Burdick	Melcher	Weicker		
Hollings	Cochran	McClure	Byrd	Metzenbaum			
Kerry	Cohen	McConnell	Chiles	Mitchell			
Leahy	D'Amato	Murkowski	Cranston	Moynihan			
Nunn	Danforth	Nickles	Eagleton	Proxmire			
Zorinsky	Denton	Packwood	Exon	Pryor			
	Domenici	Quayle	Ford	Riegle			
	Durenberger	Roth	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Evans	Rudman	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Garn	Simpson	Harkin	Sasser			
	Goldwater	Specter	Hart	Simon			
	Gorton	Stafford	Johnston	Stennis			
	Gramm	Stevens	Kennedy				
	Grassley	Symms					
	Hatch	Thurmond					
	Hawkins	Tribble					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—77%
Republicans—90%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (57)
Democrats—10 or 18%
Republicans—47 or 82%

Against (38)
Democrats—33 or 87%
Republicans—5 or 13%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 204

99th Congress
1st Session

October 6, 1985, 5:03 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12758

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Byrd motion to recommit the bill to the Finance Committee with instructions to report back with a Committee amendment in the nature of a substitute making the statutory limit on the public debt inapplicable during the period October 1-18, 1985.

NOTE: Proponents of the motion to recommit pointed out that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment was offered only two days ago, that no hearings were held on it nor did it undergo committee markup, and that there had been little time to discuss it, especially considering the major concerns it raises about legislative responsibility and the shift in power from the legislative to the executive branch. By extending the debt limit for a very short period, the Senate would have an opportunity to examine the consequences of the amendment.

Opponents of the motion to recommit urged Senators to vote to close debate so that the Senate could move closer to voting for the amendment that will provide a mechanism to control the deficit.

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE MOTION TO RECOMMIT AGREED TO

YEAS (59)			NAYS (36)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (10 or 23%)	Republicans (49 or 94%)		Democrats (33 or 77%)	Republicans (3 or 6%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (1)
Bingaman	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Lautenberg	Hatfield	Bentsen ⁻²	East ⁻²
Boren	Andrews	Kasten	Biden	Leahy	Mathias	DeConcini ⁻²	
Dixon	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bradley	Levin	Weicker	Inouye ⁻²	
Dodd	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bumpers	Matsunaga		Pell ⁻²	
Heflin	Chafee	Mattingly	Burdick	Melcher			
Hollings	Cochran	McClure	Byrd	Metzenbaum			
Kerry	Cohen	McConnell	Chiles	Mitchell			
Long	D'Amato	Murkowski	Cranston	Moynihan			
Nunn	Danforth	Nickles	Eagleton	Proxmire			
Zorinsky	Denton	Packwood	Eaton	Pryor			
	Dole	Pressler	Ford	Riegle			
	Domenici	Quayle	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Durenberger	Roth	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Evans	Rudman	Harkin	Sasser			
	Garn	Simpson	Hart	Simon			
	Goldwater	Specter	Johnston	Stennis			
	Gorton	Stafford	Kennedy				
	Gramm	Stevens					
	Grassley	Symms					
	Hatch	Thurmond					
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats— 77%
Republicans— 94%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (59)
Democrats— 10 or 17%
Republicans— 49 or 83%

Against (36)
Democrats— 33 or 92%
Republicans— 3 or 8%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 207

99th Congress
1st Session

October 8, 1985, 11:23 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12909

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

AMENDMENT NO.: 730

SUBJECT: Dole motion to proceed to the motion to reconsider Vote No. 203 by which the Senate failed to invoke cloture on the Dole, et al, modified perfecting amendment embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment—No. 213 (to the Dole, et al, amendment No. 729) to establish a maximum allowable Federal deficit ceiling of \$180 billion for FY 1986, and to provide a mechanism to reduce the allowable deficit by \$36 billion for each of the next five fiscal years until a balanced budget is achieved in FY 1991. (See also Vote Nos. 208-209, 213, and 285.)

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: MOTION TO PROCEED AGREED TO

YEAS (56)			NAYS (33)			NOT VOTING (11)	
Democrats (12 or 27%)	Republicans (44 or 98%)		Democrats (32 or 73%)	Republicans (1 or 2%)		Democrats (3)	Republicans (8)
Bingaman	Abdnor	Heinz	Baucus	Hart	Weicker	Inouye ²	East ²
Boren	Andrews	Helms	Bentsen	Johnston		Long ²	Goldwater ²
DeConcini	Armstrong	Humphrey	Biden	Kennedy		Stennis ²	Laxalt ²
Dixon	Boschwitz	Kassebaum	Bradley	Lautenberg			Mathias ²
Heflin	Chafee	Kasten	Bumpers	Levin			Pressler ²
Hollings	Cochran	Lugar	Burdick	Matsunaga			Stafford ²
Kerry	Cohen	Mattingly	Byrd	Melcher			Symms ²
Leahy	D'Amato	McClure	Chiles	Metzenbaum			Trible ²
Nunn	Danforth	McConnell	Cranston	Mitchell			
Pell	Denton	Murkowski	Dodd	Moynihan			
Proxmire	Dole	Nickles	Eagleton	Pryor			
Zorinsky	Domenici	Packwood	Exon	Riegle			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Ford	Rockefeller			
	Evans	Roth	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Garn	Rudman	Gore	Sasser			
	Gorton	Simpson	Harkin	Simon			
	Gramm	Specter					
	Grassley	Stevens					
	Hatch	Thurmond					
	Hatfield	Wallop					
	Hawkins	Warner					
	Hecht	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—73%
Republicans—98%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (56)
Democrats—12 or 21%
Republicans—44 or 79%

Against (33)
Democrats—32 or 97%
Republicans—1 or 3%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 208

99th Congress
1st Session

October 8, 1985, 11:58 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12909

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

AMENDMENT NO.: 730

SUBJECT: Dole, et al, motion to reconsider Vote No. 203, by which the Senate failed to invoke cloture on the Dole, et al, modified perfecting amendment embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment (to the Dole, et al, amendment No. 729) to establish a maximum allowable Federal deficit ceiling of \$180 billion for FY 1986, and to provide a mechanism to reduce the allowable deficit by \$36 billion for each of the next five fiscal years until a balanced budget is achieved in 1991. (See also Vote Nos. 207-209, 213, and 285.)

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: MOTION TO RECONSIDER AGREED TO

YEAS (56)			NAYS (35)			NOT VOTING (9)	
Democrats (12 or 26%)	Republicans (44 or 98%)		Democrats (34 or 74%)	Republicans (1 or 2%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (8)
Bingaman	Abdnor	Heinz	Baucus	Inouye	Weicker	Stennis ⁻²	East ⁻²
Boren	Andrews	Helms	Bentsen	Johnston			Goldwater ⁻²
DeConcini	Armstrong	Humphrey	Biden	Kennedy			Laxalt ⁻²
Dixon	Boschwitz	Kassebaum	Bradley	Lautenberg			Mathias ⁻²
Heflin	Chafee	Kasten	Bumpers	Levin			Pressler ⁻²
Hollings	Cochran	Lugar	Burdick	Long			Stafford ⁻²
Kerry	Cohen	Mattingly	Byrd	Matsunaga			Symms ⁻²
Leahy	D'Amato	McClure	Chiles	Melcher			Trible ⁻²
Nunn	Danforth	McConnell	Cranston	Metzenbaum			
Pell	Denton	Murkowski	Dodd	Mitchell			
Proxmire	Dole	Nickles	Eagleton	Moynihan			
Zorinsky	Domenici	Packwood	Exon	Pryor			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Ford	Riegle			
	Evans	Roth	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Garn	Rudman	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Gorton	Simpson	Harkin	Sasser			
	Gramm	Specter	Hart	Simon			
	Grassley	Stevens					
	Hatch	Thurmond					
	Hatfield	Wallop					
	Hawkins	Warner					
	Hecht	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—74%
Republicans—98%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (56)
Democrats—12 or 21%
Republicans—44 or 79%

Against (35)
Democrats—34 or 97%
Republicans—1 or 3%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 209

99th Congress
1st Session

October 9, 1985, 12:30 a.m.
Session of October 8, 1985
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12910

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT (CLOTURE)

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

AMENDMENT NO.: 730

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Vote No. 203 on the Dole, et al, motion to close further debate on the Dole, et al, modified perfecting amendment embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment (to the Dole, et al, amendment No. 729) to establish a maximum allowable Federal deficit ceiling of \$180 billion for FY 1986, and to provide a mechanism to reduce the allowable deficit by \$36 billion for each of the next five fiscal years until a balanced budget is achieved in 1991. (See also Vote Nos. 207-209, 213, and 285.)

NOTE: The cloture petition, presented on October 8, 1985, was signed by Senators Dole, Simpson, Packwood, Gramm, Boschwitz, Hecht, Garn, Wallop, Hollings, Hatch, Symms, Boren, Cochran, Rudman, Danforth, Gorton, Andrews, Humphrey, Thurmond, McConnell, Cohen, Zorinsky, Lugar, Warner, Murkowski, D'Amato, Stevens, Grassley, Evans, Helms, Goldwater, Kasten, McClure, Laxalt, Nickles, Abdnor, Trible, Wilson, and Domenici.

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: CLOTURE MOTION REJECTED, 3/5THS NOT HAVING VOTED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE

ADMINISTRATION POSITION: YEA

YEAS (53)			NAYS (39)			NOT VOTING (8)	
Democrats (9 or 20%)	Republicans (44 or 96%)		Democrats (37 or 80%)	Republicans (2 or 4%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (7)
Bingaman	Abdnor	Helms	Baucus	Johnston	Hatfield	Stennis ²	East ²
DeConcini	Andrews	Humphrey	Bentsen	Kennedy	Weicker		Goldwater ²
Dixon	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Biden	Kerry			Laxalt ²
Heflin	Boschwitz	Kasten	Boren	Lautenberg			Mathias ²
Hollings	Chafee	Lugar	Bradley	Levin			Pressler ²
Leahy	Cochran	Mattingly	Bumpers	Long			Stafford ²
Pell	Cohen	McClure	Burdick	Matsunaga			Symms ²
Proxmire	D'Amato	McConnell	Byrd	Melcher			
Zorinsky	Danforth	Murkowski	Chiles	Metzenbaum			
	Denton	Nickles	Cranston	Mitchell			
	Dole	Packwood	Dodd	Moynihan			
	Domenici	Quayle	Eagleton	Nunn			
	Durenberger	Roth	Exon	Pryor			
	Evans	Rudman	Ford	Riegle			
	Garn	Simpson	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Gorton	Specter	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Gramm	Stevens	Harkin	Sasser			
	Grassley	Thurmond	Hart	Simon			
	Hatch	Trible	Inouye				
	Hawkins	Wallop					
	Hecht	Warner					
	Heinz	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—80%
Republicans—96%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (53)
Democrats—9 or 17%
Republicans—44 or 83%

Against (39)
Democrats—37 or 95%
Republicans—2 or 5%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 210

99th Congress
1st Session

October 9, 1985, 11:36 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12950

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

AMENDMENT NO.: 747

SUBJECT: Exon-Kerry amendment (to the Dole modified amendment No. 730 embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment—Vote No. 213) requiring OMB/CBO reports on October 1 (except for the first report for FY 1986 which shall remain at November 1), February 15, and May 1 and lowering the excess deficit trigger for FY 1986 from seven percent to five percent. (See also Vote No. 221.)

NOTE: Proponents described the amendment as a "test vote" on whether the Senate truly believes in the basic tenets of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal to control Federal spending and reduce the deficit or is simply trying to fool the public into thinking that it is realistically dealing with these issues. There is no great courage in voting for legislation, as in the underlying amendment, which sets deficit targets for FY 1986 and 1987 at precisely the same levels as estimated by CBO and OMB. The deficit must be dealt with now—not in FY 1988 after everyone is safely re-elected. This amendment would simply help the Senate to address its budget problems responsibly by requiring more periodic reports and guidelines on important fiscal matters. Those opponents who argue that lowering the excess deficit trigger would cause "great hardship" on the American people must realize that some sacrifices are going to be required. It would be far better to begin the hardship now and "prescribe smaller and more evenhanded doses of the bitter-tasting herb," than to wait and have to take drastic actions after the 1986 election.

Opponents stated that this amendment would work an unfair hardship on the American public and that Congress is already too far into the budget process to implement it. If this amendment were adopted, the President would have to veto every appropriation bill that is one penny over budget and, possibly, the farm bill and Superfund legislation as well. The provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal should be "eased into," they asserted, with everyone totally cognizant of and accountable for the ramifications of any budget actions, including the potential triggering of across-the-board cuts in vital programs.

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (46)			NAYS (52)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (44 or 94%)		Republicans (2 or 4%)	Democrats (3 or 6%)		Republicans (49 or 96%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Johnston	Nickles	Bradley	Abdnor	Helms		Laxalt ²
Bentsen	Kennedy	Weicker	Hollings	Andrews	Humphrey		Mathias ¹
Biden	Kerry		Long	Armstrong	Kassebaum		
Bingaman	Lautenberg			Boschwitz	Kasten		
Boren	Leahy			Chafee	Lugar		
Bumpers	Levin			Cochran	Mattingly		
Burdick	Matsunaga			Cohen	McClure		
Byrd	Melcher			D'Amato	McConnell		
Chiles	Metzenbaum			Danforth	Murkowski		
Cranston	Mitchell			Denton	Packwood		
DeConcini	Moynihan			Dole	Pressier		
Dixon	Nunn			Domenici	Quayle		
Dodd	Pell			Durenberger	Roth		
Eagleton	Proxmire			East	Rudman		
Exon	Pryor			Evans	Simpson		
Ford	Riegle			Garn	Specter		
Glenn	Rockefeller			Goldwater	Stafford		
Gore	Sarbanes			Gorton	Stevens		
Harkin	Sasser			Gramm	Symms		
Hart	Simon			Grassley	Thurmond		
Heflin	Stennis			Hatch	Trible		
Inouye	Zorinsky			Hatfield	Wallop		
				Hawkins	Warner		
				Hecht	Wilson		
				Heinz			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:


Party Cohesion

Democrats—94%
Republicans—96%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (46)
Democrats—44 or 96%
Republicans—2 or 4%

Against (52)
Democrats—3 or 6%
Republicans—49 or 94%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 211

99th Congress
1st Session

October 9, 1985, 12:30 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-12953

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

AMENDMENT NO.: 743

SUBJECT: Chiles-Byrd-Johnson, et al, amendment (to the Dole modified amendment No. 730 embodying the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment—Vote No. 213) which establishes deficit ceilings beginning with \$170 billion in FY 1986 and declining in four equal steps to a balanced budget in FY 1990; requires the President's budget and the Congressional budget resolution to conform to the deficit ceilings; requires the President to send a deficit control message to Congress specifying the spending and revenue changes he would recommend to eliminate any excess deficit; requires Congress to act on a reconciliation bill to achieve that goal within 45 days; triggers automatic deficit reductions if Congress fails to act; requires defense and non-means-tested domestic programs (except Social Security) to be cut proportionate to their share of current outlays; requires spending to be reduced by uniform percentages as determined by CBO rather than OMB; and suspends the deficit reduction procedures in the event of a war, recession, or national emergency.

NOTE: Proponents stated that their proposal builds on the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal but avoids its pitfalls. It is fairer than the Gramm-Rudman plan and preserves the Constitutional power of the Congress and the President. This Chiles-Byrd-Johnson leadership amendment allows the President and the Congress to participate in the sequestering process in an equal way. The Gramm proposal would cut outlays as well as budget authority on a percentage basis, which would devastate such programs as public housing and water and sewer programs that spend out slowly. While Gramm-Rudman exempts social security COLA's from an across-the-board cut, it does nothing for means-tested programs serving the poorest in society, veteran pensioners, or women, infants and children feeding programs. The debate on this proposal has resulted in important changes to Gramm-Rudman and has certainly not resulted in a futile delay by those characterized as opposing a balanced budget. This

(OVER)

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (40)		NAYS (59)		NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (40 or 85%)	Republicans (0 or 0%)	Democrats (7 or 15%)	Republicans (52 or 100%)	Democrats (0)	Republicans (1)
Baucus	Kennedy	Boren	Abdnor	Humphrey	Mathias ⁻¹
Bentsen	Kerry	Bradley	Andrews	Kassebaum	
Biden	Lautenberg	Dodd	Armstrong	Kasten	
Bingaman	Leahy	Heflin	Boschwitz	Laxalt	
Bumpers	Levin	Hollings	Chafee	Lugar	
Burdick	Matsunaga	Long	Cochran	Mattingly	
Byrd	Melcher	Moynihan	Cohen	McClure	
Chiles	Metzenbaum		D'Amato	McConnell	
Cranston	Mitchell		Danforth	Murkowski	
DeConcini	Nunn		Denton	Nickles	
Dixon	Pell		Dole	Packwood	
Eagleton	Proxmire		Domenici	Pressler	
Exon	Pryor		Durenberger	Quayle	
Ford	Riegle		East	Roth	
Glenn	Rockefeller		Evans	Rudman	
Gore	Sarbanes		Garn	Simpson	
Harkin	Sasser		Goldwater	Specter	
Hart	Simon		Gorton	Stafford	
Inouye	Stennis		Gramm	Stevens	
Johnston	Zorinsky		Grassley	Symms	
			Hatch	Thurmond	
			Hatfield	Trible	
			Hawkins	Wallop	
			Hecht	Warner	
			Heinz	Weicker	
			Helms	Wilson	

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—85%
Republicans—100%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (40)
Democrats—40 or 100%
Republicans—0 or 0%

Against (59)
Democrats—7 or 12%
Republicans—52 or 88%

pending amendment preserves the constitutional right of both houses to make its own rules, unlike the Gramm proposal which makes it possible to waive those rules or amend them by joint resolution. The hastily drawn up and ill considered Gramm proposal will produce a raft of unintended results, including making it near impossible to pass supplemental appropriations bills. The leadership proposal is both stronger and less ambiguous. It is stronger because it requires Congress to make deficit savings this year and next—not after the 1986 elections. It is less subject to mischief because CBO, rather than a politically swayable OMB, would ensure that automatic cuts are made across-the-board, including defense spending as well as domestic programs.

Opponents described the amendment as a political proposal aimed at derailing an effort worked on by 60 Senators to refine a vehicle to come to grips with the primary concern of the American people—the growing deficit. Others complained that the amendment was part of a delaying tactic so that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment would not be passed by the Senate and sent over to the House before the Columbus Day recess next week.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 221

99th Congress
1st Session

October 10, 1985, 8:36 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-13100

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

AMENDMENT NO.: 773

SUBJECT: Packwood motion to table the Eagleton-Exon-Kerry amendment adding additional reporting dates on February 15 and May 1 of each fiscal year for the reporting of expected deficit levels and possible sequestering of government spending; and allowing a maximum deficit of \$175 billion in FY 1986, with automatic across-the-board reductions being triggered if the maximum allowable deficit is exceeded by five percent or more (instead of allowing a maximum deficit of \$180 billion, not to be exceeded by seven percent, as in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment).

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment declared that the Senate must summon up the courage to address this Administration's disastrous budget deficits now rather than waiting until after next year's elections. If the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment is the "all-purpose answer to the deficit problem that it is advertised to be," the Senate should not wait to implement its remedies. The fiscal year is only 10 days old and it is not too late to start reducing the FY 1986 deficit which is estimated to be at least \$192 billion. Congress recently adopted a budget resolution with a deficit target of \$172 billion and there is no possible justification for increasing that amount to \$180 billion with a seven percent trigger—except perhaps to allow more deficit spending to get us past the 1986 elections. The \$175 billion limit included in this amendment is the CBO reestimate of the cost of all items included in the FY 1986 budget resolution. If the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal is a genuine effort to deal with the deficit, and not simply an election ploy, then Congress should act immediately to begin the difficult task of balancing the budget by 1991.

Opponents of the amendment described it as an unrealistic, "killer amendment." The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings proposal did not establish its deficit reduction targets, which 75 percent of the Senate approved, just to "get through" FY 1986. It encompassed a reasonable and fiscally-responsible plan which realistically took into account the current budgetary situation. The \$180 billion deficit limit and seven percent trigger will be hard enough to meet and will force Congress to make some very difficult choices and unpopular funding cuts. It would be impossible for Congress to deal with this amendment's maximum deficit levels considering the current state of Federal economic affairs.

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (46)			NAYS (43)			NOT VOTING (11)	
Democrats (3 or 7%)	Republicans (43 or 93%)		Democrats (40 or 93%)	Republicans (3 or 7%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (7)
Bradley	Abdnor	Humphrey	Baucus	Inouye	Kasten	Bentsen ⁻²	Cochran ⁻²
Hollings	Andrews	Kassebaum	Biden	Johnston	Nickles	Metzenbaum ⁻²	Durenberger ^{-2AY}
Long	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bingaman	Kennedy	Weicker	Pell ^{-2AY}	East ⁻²
	Boschwitz	Lugar	Boren	Kerry		Stennis ⁻²	Hatfield ⁻²
	Chafee	Mattingly	Bumpers	Lautenberg			Mathias ⁻¹
	Cohen	Murkowski	Burdick	Leahy			McClure ⁻²
	D'Amato	Packwood	Byrd	Levin			McConnell ⁻²
	Danforth	Pressler	Chiles	Matsunaga			
	Denton	Quayle	Cranston	Melcher			
	Dole	Roth	DeConcini	Mitchell			
	Domenici	Rudman	Dixon	Moynihan			
	Evans	Simpson	Dodd	Nunn			
	Garn	Specter	Eagleton	Proxmire			
	Goldwater	Stafford	Exon	Pryor			
	Gorton	Stevens	Ford	Riegle			
	Gramm	Symms	Glenn	Riefel			
	Grassley	Thurmond	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Hatch	Trible	Harkin	Sasser			
	Hawkins	Wallop	Hart	Simon			
	Hecht	Warner	Heflin	Zorinsky			
	Heinz	Wilson					
	Helms						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—93%
Republicans—93%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (46)
Democrats—3 or 7%
Republicans—43 or 93%

Against (43)
Democrats—40 or 93%
Republicans—3 or 7%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 222

99th Congress
1st Session

October 10, 1985, 9:01 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-13114

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

SUBJECT: Passage of the bill which increases the public debt limit by \$155 billion to \$2.0787 trillion; establishes a maximum allowable Federal budget deficit ceiling of \$180 billion for FY 1986, and provides a mechanism to reduce the allowable deficit by \$36 billion for each fiscal year until a balanced budget is achieved in 1991.

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: BILL PASSED

YEAS (51)			NAYS (37)		NOT VOTING (12)	
Democrats (13 or 31%)	Republicans (38 or 83%)		Democrats (29 or 69%)	Republicans (8 or 17%)	Democrats (5)	Republicans (7)
Biden	Abdnor	Heinz	Bentsen	Grassley	Baucus—2AN	Cochran—2
Boren	Andrews	Helms	Bingaman	Humphrey	Dixon—2	Durenberger—2AY
Chiles	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bradley	Kassebaum	Metzenbaum—2	East—2
Eagleton	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bumpers	Kasten	Pell—2AN	Hatfield—2
Ford	Chafee	Mattingly	Burdick	Nickles	Stennis—2	Mathias—1
Glenn	Cohen	Murkowski	Byrd	Symms		McClure—2
Gore	D'Amato	Packwood	Cranston	Warner		McConnell—2
Hollings	Danforth	Pressler	DeConcini	Weicker		
Kennedy	Denton	Quayle	Dodd			
Kerry	Dole	Roth	Exon			
Levin	Domenici	Rudman	Harkin			
Rockefeller	Evans	Simpson	Hart			
Simon	Garn	Specter	Heflin			
	Goldwater	Stafford	Inouye			
	Gorton	Stevens	Johnston			
	Gramm	Thurmond	Lautenberg			
	Hatch	Trible	Leahy			
	Hawkins	Wallop	Long			
	Hecht	Wilson	Matsunaga			
			Melcher			
			Mitchell			
			Moynihan			
			Nunn			
			Proxmire			
			Pryor			
			Riegle			
			Sarbanes			
			Sasser			
			Zorinsky			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—69%
Republicans—83%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (51)
Democrats—13 or 25%
Republicans—38 or 75%

Against (37)
Democrats—29 or 78%
Republicans—8 or 22%

MAJOR PROVISIONS

Increases the public debt limit by \$155 billion to \$2.0787 trillion.

Amends the budget process to establish a maximum allowable deficit ceiling beginning with a \$180 billion ceiling in FY 1986 and reducing the allowable deficit in five equal steps to zero in FY 1991; requires the President to submit budgets with deficits no greater than the maximum allowable deficit set out in law; makes it out of order on the floor of either House to consider any budget that violates these deficit ceilings or to offer a floor amendment to the budget resolution which is not a zero-sum amendment; requires the President, if a projected deficit exceeds the maximum deficit limit, based on a joint OMB/CBO estimate, to withhold sufficient funds to eliminate the excess deficit; and mandates that half of the funds be withheld from automatic spending increases—largely cost-of-living adjustments—except for social security, and half from controllable spending, including defense spending.

Directs the Finance Committee to report to the Senate by July 1, 1986, legislation providing for payment of an alternative minimum corporate tax on corporations, based on the broadest feasible definition of "income;" makes this corporate tax effective for corporate tax years beginning October 1, 1986, and requires that revenue raised by the tax to be applied to reduce the Federal deficit.

Expresses the sense of the Senate that any funding reductions or sequestering of controllable expenditures implemented by the various Federal agencies as a result of the Act shall be made uniformly and shall not be made disproportionately in the funding of programs targeted for rural and lesser populated areas.

Prohibits reconciliation with respect to the old age, survivors, and disability insurance program (social security); assures that social security COLA's will not result in a reduction of supplemental security income (SSI) payments; requires uniform reductions in projects, programs, and activities; and directs the CBO to conduct a study on tax compliance.

Prohibits the President from recommending actions to increase borrowing authority or to increase the public debt limit by more than the applicable amount; provides that no concurrent budget resolution for any fiscal year after September 30, 1986, may provide for an increase in total outlays or the deficit, unless this requirement is waived by a two-thirds majority vote in both Houses of Congress; ensures that Commodity Credit Corporation loans and guaranteed student loans are included in a sequester order; provides for savings from inflation adjustments in contracts.

Expresses the sense of the Senate urging the prosecution of the terrorists responsible for the Achille Lauro hijacking.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 229

99th Congress
1st Session

October 17, 1985, 12:40 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-13430

HUD-INDEPENDENT AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS, 1986

BILL NO.: H.R. 3038

AMENDMENT NO.: 785

TITLE: "Department of Housing and Urban Development and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1986."

SUBJECT: Proxmire-Armstrong amendment implementing the Administration's proposed moratorium on public housing by eliminating \$7.2 billion in FY 1986 budget authority and reducing outlays by \$135 million in FY 1986, \$394 million in 1987, \$483 million in 1988, \$514 million in 1989, and \$555 million in 1990, for a total outlay savings of over \$2 billion in the next five years.

NOTE: Proponents stated that this amendment would cancel this year's expansion of public housing and gradually curtail spending for this major Federal assistance program, eventually saving over \$7 billion. This certainly would help ease the burden of paying interest on the public debt over the next five to ten years. Since the early 1970's, the housing assistance rolls have grown by an average of 200,000 each year, and HUD now pays rent subsidies for nearly four million households—an estimated 15 million persons. Total HUD and rural housing assistance has increased from \$7.8 billion to \$14.2 billion since 1979, and Congress must act now to bring these "snowballing" costs under control. Even if this amendment is enacted, 180,000 additional units will become eligible for HUD assistance which, in conjunction with the normal occupancy turnover, should provide adequate assistance for the "housing-poor." Everyone would like to provide more housing, but this program already is one of the most expensive programs in the Federal government, and we can no longer afford its massive costs. The Senate must start now to make these painful spending cuts if it is going to address the deficit problem seriously.

No opposing statements were offered.

H.R. 3038: Vote Nos. 227-234.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (44)			NAYS (52)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (10 or 22%)	Republicans (34 or 68%)		Democrats (36 or 78%)	Republicans (16 or 32%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (3)
Bentsen	Armstrong	Kasten	Baucus	Hollings	Abdnor	Levin— ⁴	Goldwater— ²
Boren	Boschwitz	Lugar	Biden	Inouye	Andrews		Laxalt— ²
DeConcini	Cochran	Mattingly	Bingaman	Johnston	Chafee		Mathias— ²
Exon	Danforth	McClure	Bradley	Kennedy	Cohen		
Long	Denton	McConnell	Bumpers	Kerry	D'Amato		
Nunn	Dole	Murkowski	Burdick	Lautenberg	Evans		
Proxmire	Domenici	Nickles	Byrd	Leahy	Gorton		
Pryor	Durenberger	Pressler	Chiles	Matsunaga	Hatfield		
Sasser	Fast	Quayle	Cranston	Melcher	Hawkins		
Zorinsky	Garn	Roth	Dixon	Metzenbaum	Heinz		
	Gramm	Rudman	Dodd	Mitchell	Packwood		
	Grassley	Simpson	Eagleton	Moynihan	Specter		
	Hatch	Symms	Ford	Pell	Stafford		
	Hecht	Thurmond	Glenn	Riegle	Stevens		
	Helms	Trible	Gore	Rockefeller	Weicker		
	Humphrey	Wallop	Harkin	Sarbanes	Wilson		
	Kassebaum	Warner	Hart	Simon			
			Heflin	Tenniss			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—78%
Republicans—68%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (44)
Democrats—10 or 23%
Republicans—34 or 77%

Against (52)
Democrats—36 or 69%
Republicans—16 or 31%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 231

99th Congress
1st Session

October 17, 1985, 5:55 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-13475

HUD-INDEPENDENT AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS, 1986

BILL NO.: H.R. 3038

AMENDMENT NO.: 794

TITLE: "Department of Housing and Urban Development and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1986."

SUBJECT: Garn motion to table the Armstrong-Proxmire amendment implementing the proposed termination of the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program by eliminating \$352 million in FY 1986 funding.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment asserted that the UDAG program is a low priority, inefficient program that has failed in its purpose of helping distressed areas become revitalized and that it should be phased out. Most UDAG projects would have been handled more appropriately by the private sector; it is not the Federal government's responsibility to build hotels or resort facilities. Because the monies were not targeted, the program has benefited middle and upper income groups rather than disadvantaged persons. Fiscal necessity also demands that \$352 million be saved by terminating this program.

Opponents of the amendment contended that UDAG is one of the few Federal programs that has been a success. The UDAG program is a very small program with a great number of participants competing for its funding, and it already has suffered the 20 percent reduction suggested by the HUD Appropriations Subcommittee. The purpose of the UDAG grant is to promote investments in locations where investments otherwise would not be made because the area is marginal or in economic distress. UDAG has been successful in this goal and caused local businesses, elected leaders, and other interested parties to work together with minimal Federal involvement to promote the revitalization of cities and towns and to generate jobs and economic growth. Finally, the UDAG program also promotes the Administration's philosophical viewpoint by stimulating the private sector to solve public problems.

H.R. 3038: Vote Nos. 227-234.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (53)			NAYS (42)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (39 or 87%)		Republicans (14 or 28%)	Democrats (6 or 13%)		Republicans (36 or 72%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)
Baucus	Kennedy	Abdnor	Bentsen	Armstrong	Lugar	Cranston ⁻²	Hatch ⁻²
Biden	Kerry	Andrews	Bingaman	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Levin ⁻⁴	Laxalt ⁻²
Boren	Lautenberg	Cohen	Bumpers	Chafee	McClure		Mathias ⁻²
Bradley	Long	D'Amato	Johnston	Cochran	McConnell		
Burdick	Matsunaga	Denton	Leahy	Danforth	Nickles		
Byrd	Melcher	Grassley	Proxmire	Dole	Packwood		
Chiles	Metzenbaum	Hatfield		Domenici	Fressler		
DeConcini	Mitchell	Hawkins		Durenberger	Quayle		
Dixon	Moynihan	Heinz		East	Roth		
Dodd	Nunn	Kasten		Evans	Rudman		
Eagleton	Pell	Murkowski		Garn	Simpson		
Exon	Pryor	Specter		Goldwater	Stafford		
Ford	Riegle	Stevens		Gorton	Symms		
Glenn	Rockefeller	Weicker		Gramm	Thurmond		
Gore	Sarbanes			Hecht	Trible		
Harkin	Sasser			Helms	Wallop		
Hart	Simon			Humphrey	Warner		
Heflin	Stennis			Kassebaum	Wilson		
Hollings	Zorinsky						
Inouye							

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats— 87%
Republicans— 72%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (53)
Democrats— 39 or 74%
Republicans— 14 or 26%

Against (42)
Democrats— 6 or 14%
Republicans— 36 or 86%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 266

99th Congress
1st Session

October 30, 1985, 5:20 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-14434

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 930

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Lugar amendment which freezes the target prices for the 1986 crops of wheat, corn, upland cotton, and rice for one year at the present 1985 level of \$4.38 per bushel for wheat, \$3.03 per bushel for corn, 81 cents per pound for cotton, and \$11.90 per hundredweight for rice; and allows their target prices for 1987-89 to be reduced by no more than five percent per year.

NOTE: Proponents asserted that this amendment would help to contain the enormous cost overruns of this bill, save \$2.4 billion as estimated by CBO, and discourage farmers from producing crops which cannot be marketed for profitable prices. It would freeze target prices this year keeping the situation stable and would give the Secretary the flexibility to reduce it even more, yet not greater than by five percent per year over the next five years in order to achieve cost containment. Target prices, they pointed out, are no more than guaranteed minimum prices fixed by law that trigger uncontrollable and unpredictable Federal outlays. If target prices are not reduced in this gradual but steady manner, they will result in greater surpluses of commodities, the further over-valuation of the dollar, and the unnecessary inflation of interest rates. A one-year, rather than a three-year, freeze would be more sensible since the Senate cannot knowingly predict the farming situation for 1989 and should not attempt to establish the minimum price levels for a tenuous scenario.

Opponents declared that passage of this amendment would tell the Nation's farmers that the congressional solution to the farm crisis is to maintain the bleak status quo. This amendment would give more farmers less ability to deal with low prices, high interest rates, and devalued assets because target prices would be phased down creating lower farmers' salaries, and availability of credit for capital dependent farmers also would decrease. The U.S. supplies over 50 percent of the grain in the world markets. Other countries then use U.S. grain prices to obtain their prices. The higher the U.S. prices, the better the third world farmers' price and the better their ability to pay back debts on loans. Agriculture, they noted, comprises only two percent of the budget, but it has been subjected to some of the largest reductions. It would be unfair to make additional cuts in an already beleaguered account. Passage of this amendment would be made under the guise of deficit reduction. In reality, it contradicts the goal of helping farmers in the present economy and would result in many farmers going bankrupt.

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (48)			NAYS (51)			NOT VOTING (1)	
Democrats (8 or 17%)			Democrats (39 or 83%)			Democrats (0)	
Republicans (40 or 77%)			Republicans (12 or 23%)			Republicans (1)	
Bradley	Armstrong	Lugar	Baucus	Inouye	Abdnor	Mathias ²	
Cranston	Chafee	Mattingly	Bentsen	Johnston	Andrews		
Dodd	Cochran	McClure	Biden	Kennedy	Boschwitz	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE: 1—Official Business 2—Necessarily Absent 3—Illness 4—Other	
Lautenberg	Cohen	McConnell	Bingaman	Kerry	Danforth		
Mitchell	D'Amato	Murkowski	Boren	Leahy	Denton		
Moynihan	Dole	Packwood	Bumpers	Levin	Durenberger		
Pell	Domenici	Quayle	Burdick	Long	Gorton		
Proxmire	East	Roth	Byrd	Matsunaga	Grassley		
	Evans	Rudman	Chiles	Melcher	Kassebaum		
	Garn	Simpson	DeConcini	Metzenbaum	Kasten		
	Goldwater	Specter	Dixon	Nunn	Nickles		
	Gramm	Stafford	Eagleton	Pryor	Pressler		
	Hatch	Stevens	Exon	Riegle		SYMBOLS: AY—Announced Yea AN—Announced Nay PY—Paired Yea PN—Paired Nay	
	Hatfield	Symms	Ford	Rockefeller			
	Hawkins	Thurmond	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Hecht	Trible	Gore	Sasser			
	Heinz	Wallop	Harkin	Simon			
	Helms	Warner	Hart	Stennis			
	Humphrey	Weicker	Heflin	Zorinsky			
	Laxalt	Wilson	Hollings				

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—83%
Republicans—77%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (48)
Democrats—8 or 17%
Republicans—40 or 83%

Against (51)
Democrats—39 or 76%
Republicans—12 or 24%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 267

99th Congress
1st Session

October 30, 1985, 6:59 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-14442

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 931

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Harkin perfecting amendment (to the Pressler-Helms amendment—Vote No. 268) striking the three-tier target price for wheat (\$4.48 per bushel for the first 7,500 bushels, \$4.33 per bushel for production between 7,500 and 15,000 bushels, and \$4.18 per bushel for production over 15,000 bushels), thereby retaining the bill's two-tier target pricing system for wheat of \$4.55 per bushel on the first 20,000 bushels and \$4 per bushel thereafter.

NOTE: Proponents of the perfecting amendment stated that it only would strike the section of the Pressler-Helms amendment which pertains to wheat. This would provide a five percent increase in income for wheat family farmers that is so desperately needed. The original Pressler-Helms amendment would benefit the least needy farmers—those who farm as a hobby because it defines the size of the family incorrectly. The proper way to create a tier level system of payments would be to lower the price for the first few 1,000 bushels raised on about 50-60 acres and then to charge about \$4.55 for the next 18,000 bushels. The Harkin amendment would delete the provisions concerning wheat, thus effectively neutralizing the amendment. This amendment, they pointed out, would merely return the language for wheat back to that originally formulated in the Agriculture Committee.

Opponents of the amendment claimed that by adding the Harkin amendment, the original intent of the Pressler-Helms amendment is lost. The Pressler-Helms amendment would direct deficiency payments for corn and wheat to family size farmers rather than compensating the largest corporate farms as the current program does. They claimed that almost half of the payments made under the present target price program go unfairly to the largest five percent of the farmers. The original amendment would make no reduction in the national average target price; it would merely redistribute benefits more equitably. The Pressler-Helms amendment also would reduce the incentive for farmers to produce more corn or wheat than necessary so that the U.S. feed grain surplus would be reduced without harming farm income. With the Harkin amendment added, Pressler-Helms only achieves half of its goal.

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

YEAS (57)			NAYS (41)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (44 or 96%)		Republicans (13 or 25%)	Democrats (2 or 4%)		Republicans (39 or 75%)	Democrats (1)	Republicans (1)
Baucus	Hollings	Andrews	Mitchell	Abdnor	Lugar	Stennis ²	Goldwater ²
Bentsen	Inouye	Armstrong	Proxmire	Chafee	Mathias		
Biden	Johnston	Boschwitz		Cochran	Mattingly		
Bingaman	Kennedy	Dole		Cohen	McConnell		
Boren	Kerry	Durenberger		D'Amato	Murkowski		
Bradley	Lautenberg	Evans		Danforth	Packwood		
Bumpers	Leahy	Gorton		Denton	Pressler		
Burdick	Levin	Grassley		Domenici	Quayle		
Byrd	Long	Kassebaum		East	Roth		
Chiles	Matsunaga	McClure		Garn	Rudman		
Cranston	Melcher	Nickles		Gramm	Simpson		
DeConcini	Metzenbaum	Symms		Hatch	Specter		
Dixon	Moynihan	Wilson		Hatfield	Stafford		
Dodd	Nunn			Hawkins	Stevens		
Eagleton	Pell			Hecht	Thurmond		
Exon	Pryor			Heinz	Trible		
Ford	Riegle			Helms	Wallop		
Glenn	Rockefeller			Humphrey	Warner		
Gore	Sarbanes			Kasten	Weicker		
Harkin	Sasser			Laxalt			
Hart	Simon						
Heflin	Zorinsky						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—96%
Republicans—75%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (57)
Democrats—44 or 77%
Republicans—13 or 23%

Against (41)
Democrats—2 or 5%
Republicans—39 or 95%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 272

99th Congress
1st Session

November 1, 1985, 11:41 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-14623

COMMERCE-JUSTICE-STATE-JUDICIARY APPROPRIATIONS, 1986

BILL NO.: H.R. 2965

AMENDMENT NO.: 943

TITLE: "The Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1986."

SUBJECT: Chafee-Proxmire, et al, amendment eliminating the Economic Development Administration by striking the \$160 million in program funding and \$9.45 million in salaries and expenses for FY 1986.

NOTE: Proponents contended that the Economic Development Administration (EDA) is an unnecessary agency that our Nation can no longer afford. EDA was termed a "renegade agency" since it has not been reauthorized for several years. Some indicated that the Appropriations Committee had exceeded its authority by continuing to fund it without an authorization. In these times of budget crisis, this program must be terminated as wasteful and counterproductive in battling the deficit. In setting spending priorities, its funding clearly is not needed as much as other programs such as child nutrition or Head Start.

Opponents contended that until there is a suitable alternative, EDA must be kept alive. Although the President has sought elimination of EDA since 1981, he offers the National Enterprise Zones concept without sufficient support to have it enacted. EDA is the only lifeline to rural areas to bring about economic development, and there are 458 counties throughout the country where unemployment exceeds 12 percent. Vital public works projects have prospered in 46 States because of EDA. While critics make complaints, they refuse to try to make the program more effective.

H.R. 2965: Vote Nos. 248, 249, 255, 271-275, 353, 354.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (39)			NAYS (57)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (6 or 13%)	Republicans (33 or 65%)		Democrats (39 or 87%)	Republicans (18 or 35%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (2)
Boren	Armstrong	Lugar	Baucus	Lautenberg	Abdnor	Bentsen—2	Humphrey—2
Cranston	Boschwitz	Mattlingly	Biden	Leahy	Andrews	Johnston—2	Wallop—2
DeConcini	Chafee	McClure	Bingaman	Levin	Cochran		
Exon	Danforth	McConnell	Bradley	Long	Cohen		
Glenn	Dole	Murkowski	Bumpers	Matsunaga	D'Amato		
Proxmire	Domenici	Nickles	Burdick	Meicher	Denton		
	East	Pressler	Byrd	Metzenbaum	Durenberger		
	Evans	Quayle	Chiles	Mitchell	Grassley		
	Garn	Roth	Dixon	Moynihan	Hatfield		
	Goldwater	Rudman	Dodd	Nunn	Hawkins		
	Gorton	Simpson	Eagleton	Pell	Heinz		
	Gramm	Stafford	Ford	Pryor	Kasten		
	Hatch	Symms	Gore	Riegle	Mathias		
	Hecht	Trible	Harkin	Rockefeller	Packwood		
	Helms	Warner	Hart	Sarbanes	Specter		
	Kassebaum	Wilson	Heflin	Sasser	Stevens		
	Laxalt		Hollings	Simon	Thurmond		
			Inouye	Stennis	Weicker		
			Kennedy	Zorinsky			
			Kerry				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—87%
Republicans—65%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (39)
Democrats—6 or 15%
Republicans—33 or 85%

Against (57)
Democrats—39 or 68%
Republicans—18 or 32%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 274

99th Congress
1st Session

November 1, 1985, 1:17 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-14632

COMMERCE-JUSTICE-STATE-JUDICIARY APPROPRIATIONS, 1986

BILL NO.: H.R. 2965

AMENDMENT NO.: 884

TITLE: "The Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1986."

SUBJECT: Helms motion to table the Rudman point of order that the Helms-Armstrong amendment (to prohibit Federal funding of abortions in prisons except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term) violates the Constitution and is out of order. (Subsequently, the amendment was rejected by voice vote. See also Vote No. 255.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that it would continue to be offered as long as Federal funds are used for "the deliberate termination of innocent human life." This amendment simply applies the Hyde amendment to the Bureau of Prisons so that Federal funds cannot be used for abortion. Historically, the question of unconstitutionality has been raised on every proposal seeking to restrict funding for abortions. This is a policy issue, not a constitutional issue, they maintained.

Opponents of the amendment contended that it violates the eighth amendment to the Constitution. The Supreme Court held in Estelle v. Gamble that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" which is in violation of the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. It is clear that "serious medical needs" are not limited to life threatening illness, and it is also clear that a Federal prisoner has no access to alternative medical treatment (for an abortion) and must rely on prison authorities to treat her medical needs or have them go unmet.

H.R. 2965: Vote Nos. 248, 249, 255, 271-275, 353, 354.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE FAILED

YEAS (47)			NAYS (48)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (12 or 28%)	Republicans (35 or 67%)		Democrats (31 or 72%)	Republicans (17 or 33%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (1)
Biden	Abdnor	Helms	Baucus	Lautenberg	Chafee	Bentsen ⁻²	Wallop ⁻²
Boren	Andrews	Humphrey	Bingaman	Leahy	Cochran	DeConcini ⁻²	
Dixon	Armstrong	Kasten	Bradley	Levin	Cohen	Johnston ⁻²	
Eagleton	Boschwitz	Laxalt	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Evans	Long ⁻²	
Exon	D'Amato	Lugar	Burdick	Metzenbaum	Goldwater		
Ford	Danforth	Mattingly	Byrd	Moynihan	Gorton		
Gore	Denton	McClure	Chiles	Nunn	Heinz		
Heflin	Dole	McConnell	Cranston	Pell	Kassebaum	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
Melcher	Domenici	Murkowski	Dodd	Pryor	Mathias		
Mitchell	Durenberger	Nickles	Glenn	Riegle	Packwood		
Proxmire	East	Pressler	Harkin	Rockefeller	Rudman		
Zorinsky	Garn	Quayle	Hart	Sarbanes	Simpson	SYMBOLS:	
	Gramm	Roth	Hollings	Sasser	Specter		
	Grassley	Symms	Inouye	Simon	Stafford		
	Hatch	Thurmond	Kennedy	Stennis	Stevens		
	Hatfield	Trible	Kerry		Warner	AY—Announced Yea	
	Hawkins	Wilson			Weicker	AN—Announced Nay	
	Hecht					PY—Paired Yea	
						PN—Paired Nay	

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—72%
Republicans—67%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (47)
Democrats—12 or 26%
Republicans—35 or 74%

Against (48)
Democrats—31 or 65%
Republicans—17 or 35%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 276

99th Congress
1st Session

November 1, 1985, 3:21 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-14649

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 939

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Dole motion to recommit the bill to the Committee, with instructions to report back forthwith, with the Dole amendment freezing price supports on feed grains, cotton, and rice for one year and reducing their target prices by five percent per year thereafter, while instituting a "flexible target price parity" system for wheat.

NOTE: Proponents of the motion to recommit asserted that this vote would signify whether the Senate is willing to take decisive action with respect to the farm bill. If the motion to recommit is not tabled, then the Committee will be forced to return to study each program and revise and reduce the maximum amount for all crops. No sector should be exempt. This amendment, they claimed, would save approximately \$7.6 billion, and represents the best possible compromise on the farm bill.

Opponents of the motion to recommit declared that if the Senate is so anxious to pass a farm bill, it should debate the Committee-reported bill. This vote represents a maneuver in game playing on this issue. The Dole amendment is meant to be a major compromise or entirely new measure, and it has been available for only 24 hours. More time for study should be allowed, and considerable time should be given to debate it.

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE MOTION TO RECOMMIT REJECTED

YEAS (45)			NAYS (49)			NOT VOTING (6)	
Democrats (41 or 95%)	Republicans (4 or 8%)		Democrats (2 or 5%)	Republicans (47 or 92%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Kerry	Danforth	Cranston	Abdnor	Kasten	Bentsen ⁻²	Hatfield ⁻²
Bingaman	Lautenberg	Durenberger	Proxmire	Andrews	Laxalt	Biden ⁻²	Wallop ⁻²
Boren	Leahy	Grassley		Armstrong	Lugar	DeConcini ⁻²	
Bradley	Levin	Nickles		Boschwitz	Mathias	Johnston ⁻²	
Bumpers	Long			Chafee	Mattingly		
Burdick	Matsunaga			Cochran	McClure		
Byrd	Melcher			Cohen	McConnell		
Chiles	Metzenbaum			D'Amato	Murkowski		
Dixon	Mitchell			Denton	Packwood		
Dodd	Moynihan			Dole	Pressler		
Eagleton	Nunn			Domenici	Quayle		
Exon	Pell			East	Roth		
Ford	Pryor			Evans	Rudman		
Glenn	Riegle			Garn	Simpson		
Gore	Rockefeller			Goldwater	Specter		
Harkin	Sarbanes			Gorton	Stafford		
Hart	Sasser			Gramm	Stevens		
Heflin	Simon			Hatch	Symms		
Hollings	Stennis			Hawkins	Thurmond		
Inouye	Zorinsky			Hecht	Trible		
Kennedy				Heinz	Warner		
				Helms	Weicker		
				Humphrey	Wilson		
				Kassebaum			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:


Party Cohesion

Democrats—95%
Republicans—92%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (45)
Democrats—41 or 91%
Republicans—4 or 9%

Against (49)
Democrats—2 or 4%
Republicans—47 or 96%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 280

99th Congress
1st Session

November 5, 1985, 2:13 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-14790

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

AMENDMENT NO.: 961

SUBJECT: Packwood motion to table the Chiles, et al, amendment (to the Packwood substitute amendment to the House amendment—Vote No. 285) prohibiting reductions in medicare, except in cost-of-living increases in reimbursement of health care providers, in the event of an across-the-board cut as required under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment to meet deficit reduction targets, thereby restoring the medicare provisions of the Senate-passed Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment asserted that it would assure that Medicare would be exempt from unplanned, automatic, across-the-board cuts in the future. Originally, in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment, Medicare was considered one of the highest priority entitlement programs and, therefore, subject to only cost-of-living reductions. Since Medicare is a self-funded trust fund entitlement and is paid for by payroll taxes, it should not be slashed as if it were the same as other budget programs. If Medicare were to be further reduced, then physicians would be able to unfairly pass the leftover expenses on to the beneficiaries. The quality of life of approximately 30 million aged and disabled Americans depends on the adoption of this amendment. Medicare has done more, they claimed, to bring dignity and security to the lives of America's senior citizens than any social innovation since Social Security. Opponents of the amendment stated that Medicare is an expensive program that affects principally middle income people; the poor receive Medicaid. This amendment, they claimed, would protect hospitals and doctors—not the poor. It should be rejected because there is no logic to reimbursing health care providers with money received from reductions imposed on every other on-budget program under this bill. If this amendment is adopted, all other programs will have to be cut by 30 percent more. The existing provision merely would settle a question of budget equity.

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (54)			NAYS (44)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (9 or 20%)	Republicans (45 or 87%)		Democrats (37 or 80%)	Republicans (7 or 13%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (1)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Laxalt	Baucus	Inouye	Andrews	Zorinsky ³	Weicker ²
Bingaman	Armstrong	Lugar	Biden	Kennedy	Chafee		
Boren	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bradley	Kerry	Durenberger		
Hollings	Cochran	Mattingly	Bumpers	Lautenberg	Hawkins		
Johnston	Cohen	McClure	Burdick	Leahy	Heinz		
Long	D'Amato	McConnell	Byrd	Levin	Kassebaum		
Nunn	Danforth	Murkowski	Chiles	Matsunaga	Specter		
Proxmire	Denton	Nickles	Cranston	Melcher			
Stennis	Dole	Packwood	DeConcini	Metzenbaum			
	Domenici	Pressler	Dixon	Mitchell			
	East	Quayle	Dodu	Moynihan			
	Evans	Roth	Eagleton	Pell			
	Garn	Rudman	Exon	Pryor			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Ford	Riegle			
	Gorton	Stafford	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Gramm	Stevens	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Grassley	Symms	Harkin	Sasser			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Hart	Simon			
	Hatfield	Trible	Heflin				
	eHecht	Wallop					
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey	Wilson					
	Kasten						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—80%
Republicans—87%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (54)
Democrats—9 or 17%
Republicans—45 or 83%

Against (44)
Democrats—37 or 84%
Republicans—7 or 16%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 281

99th Congress
1st Session

November 5, 1985, 3:40 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-14798

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

AMENDMENT NO.: 963

SUBJECT: Packwood motion to table the Riegle, et al, amendment (to the Packwood substitute amendment to the House amendment—Vote No. 285) establishing a Federal budget deficit ceiling of \$171.9 billion for FY 1986 (the same deficit amount contained in the FY 1986 budget resolution) and requiring automatic across-the-board reductions if the maximum allowable deficit is exceeded by any amount. (The Packwood amendment contains a pro rata provision establishing a maximum FY 1986 deficit of \$175.2 billion.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that it would establish a maximum FY 1986 deficit target of \$171.9 billion—the amount the Senate voted for when it passed the Budget Resolution. It would mandate the Senate to act now to bring the deficit down. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendment set up a complicated procedural mechanism which would have the effect of delaying serious budget cuts until after next year's election. All this amendment would do is begin immediately the process to bring the economy under fiscal control.

Opponents of the amendment asserted that it was an attempt to sabotage and destroy the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings measure. The whole idea behind Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was that Congress would have nine months in which to work its will and in which the President could act. Only after the nine month period has expired would the sequestering process begin. It would be unwise to cut indiscriminately before cautious deliberation takes place. Because of Congress' own actions and inactions, the \$171.9 billion target figure is unattainable this year. If this amendment were to pass, it is highly unlikely that any agreement would be reached about where and how to cut in such a short amount of time for this year and next.

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (55)			NAYS (43)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (5 or 11%)	Republicans (50 or 96%)		Democrats (41 or 89%)	Republicans (2 or 4%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (1)
Bradley	Abdnor	Helms	Baucus	Kennedy	Mathias	Zorinsky ³	Weicker ²
Ford	Andrews	Humphrey	Bentsen	Kerry	Nickles		
Heflin	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Biden	Lautenberg			
Hollings	Boschwitz	Kasten	Bingaman	Leahy			
Long	Chafee	Laxalt	Boren	Levin			
	Cochran	Lugar	Bumpers	Matsunaga			
	Cohen	Mattingly	Burdick	Melcher			
	D'Amato	McClure	Byrd	Metzenbaum			
	Danforth	McConnell	Chiles	Mitchell			
	Denton	Murkowski	Cranston	Moy nihan			
	Dole	Packwood	DeConcini	Nunn			
	Domenici	Pressler	Dixon	Pell			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Dodd	Proxmire			
	East	Roth	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Evans	Rudman	Exon	Riegle			
	Garn	Simpson	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Goldwater	Specter	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Gorton	Stafford	Harkin	Sasser			
	Gramm	Stevens	Hart	Simon			
	Grassley	Symms	Inouye	Stennis			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Johnston				
	Hatfield	Trible					
	Hawkins	Wallop					
	Hecht	Warner					
	Heinz	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—89%
Republicans—96%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (55)
Democrats—5 or 9%
Republicans—50 or 91%

Against (43)
Democrats—41 or 95%
Republicans—2 or 5%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 282

99th Congress
1st Session

November 5, 1985, 5:24 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-14811

BUDGET BALANCED/PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 372

AMENDMENT NO.: 964

SUBJECT: Packwood motion to table the Riegle-Cranston modified amendment (to the Packwood substitute amendment to the House amendment—Vote No. 285) exempting Veterans' Administration service-connected compensation benefits from COLA reductions as a result of a sequester order and prohibiting any reduction below current outlays in Veterans' Administration medical care.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that it would exempt, from any Presidential order, the reduction or elimination of COLA's in various veterans' programs, VA compensation payments to service-connected disabled veterans, and to the survivors of those veterans who die from service-connected causes; and it would protect the basic outlay level for veterans' health care. The Federal government has a contract with the military people of this country who gave time to their country, suffered a disability, and now receive a benefit to make up for earnings lost and who receive COLA's to protect them against inflation. It would be grossly inequitable to permit VA compensation COLA's to be reduced while a similar contract program, social security retirement and disability COLA's, are ensured. This amendment also would provide much needed year-to-year stability by preventing the VA's medical care outlays from being reduced to an amount less than the preceding year's outlay plus any pay cost rise during the year in question. It would enable the VA to keep qualified personnel desiring job security and good working conditions. If this amendment is tabled, cutbacks will result, causing many non-service-connected VA patients to be referred back to Medicare and Medicaid which also are being cut back. The end result could be that many low-income veterans would be denied any health care.

Opponents of the amendment declared that the Gramm-Rudman amendment represents a serious attempt by the Senate to come to grips with the uncontrollable deficit. A key element in the process of Gramm-Rudman is to keep the ability to control the budgets of every sector of the economy. A vote against

(OVER)

H.J. Res. 372: Vote Nos. 203-222, 277, 279-282, 284, 285, 369-371.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (52)			NAYS (44)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (6 or 13%)	Republicans (46 or 90%)		Democrats (39 or 87%)	Republicans (5 or 10%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (2)
Bingaman	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Baucus	Johnston	Abdnor	Biden ⁻²	Humphrey ⁻²
Boren	Boschwitz	Kasten	Bentsen	Kennedy	Andrews	Zorinsky ⁻³	Weicker ⁻²
Dodd	Chafee	Laxalt	Bradley	Kerry	Hawkins		
Long	Cochran	Lugar	Bumpers	Lautenberg	Pressler		
Nunn	Cohen	Mathias	Burdick	Leahy	Specter		
Proxmire	D'Amato	Mattingly	Byrd	Levin			
	Danforth	McClure	Chiles	Matsunaga			
	Denton	McConnell	Cranston	Melcher			
	Dole	Murkowski	DeConcini	Metzenbaum			
	Domenici	Nickles	Dixon	Mitchell			
	Durenberger	Packwood	Eagleton	Moynihan			
	East	Quayle	Exon	Pell			
	Evans	Roth	Ford	Pryor			
	Garn	Rudman	Glenn	Riegle			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Gore	Rockefeller			
	Gorton	Stafford	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Gramm	Stevens	Hart	Sasser			
	Grassley	Symms	Heflin	Simon			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Hollings	Stennis			
	Hatfield	Trible	Inouye				
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—87%
Republicans—90%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (52)
Democrats—6 or 12%
Republicans—46 or 88%

Against (44)
Democrats—39 or 89%
Republicans—5 or 11%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

this amendment will signify a vote for fiscal responsibility which in the long run, would benefit veterans and the entire Nation more than any individual exemption. This amendment would not mean a restoration of dollars for veterans, it would mean a shifting of the burden to other programs that also affect veterans' livelihood. If all favorite programs are exempted, then those few that remain subject to reductions will be decimated unfairly. While veterans' programs are among the most important programs undertaken by the Federal government, no individual interest is greater than the national interest.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 286

99th Congress
1st Session

November 7, 1985, 11:45 a.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-15002

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS, 1986

BILL NO.: H.R. 3327

TITLE: "Military Construction Appropriations Act, 1986."

SUBJECT: Mattingly question of germaneness of the Committee amendment (section 128) to exempt military construction contracts of \$1 million or more (rather than \$2,000 or more) from compliance with the prevailing wage requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act, thereby reducing the prevailing wage rate base. The question is: "Is the Committee amendment germane?"

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that the Davis-Bacon Act is out of touch with economic realities and is a burden to the taxpayer. Existing law also places a tremendous administrative burden on the Federal government and small contractors. Increasing the threshold on military construction projects to \$1 million would free thousands of contracts from government-mandated wage determinations. Small businesses would have a greater opportunity to enter into defense construction, resulting in greater competition and more jobs. Furthermore, taxpayers would save an estimated \$51 million in FY 1986 if this provision is adopted.

Opponents of the amendment pointed out that not only does this proposal lack the benefit of committee consideration, but it is legislation on an appropriations bill. Earlier this year, an identical provision was flatly rejected by House conferees on the DOD Authorization bill, and there is no indication that this feeling has changed. The facts remain the same. Raising the threshold for military construction projects would exempt 95 percent of all defense construction contracts from the Davis-Bacon Act, resulting in lower wages and increased use of unskilled labor, thus jeopardizing the quality of military construction projects.

H.R. 3327: Vote Nos. 286, 287.

RESULT: AMENDMENT NOT GERMANE

YEAS (45)			NAYS (49)			NOT VOTING (5)	
Democrats (5 or 12%)	Republicans (40 or 78%)		Democrats (38 or 88%)	Republicans (11 or 22%)		Democrats (3)	Republicans (2)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Humphrey	Baucus	Johnston	Andrews	Matsunaga ²	Evans ²
Boren	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Biden	Kennedy	D'Amato	Rockefeller ² PN	Heinz ² AN
Bumpers	Boschwitz	Kasten	Bingaman	Kerry	Danforth	Zorinsky ³	
Hollings	Chafee	Laxalt	Bradley	Lautenberg	Durenberger		
Pryor	Cochran	Lugar	Burdick	Leahy	Mathias		
	Cohen	Mattingly	Byrd	Levin	Murkowski		
	Denton	McClure	Chiles	Long	Packwood		
	Dole	McConnell	Cranston	Melcher	Specter		
	Domenici	Nickles	DeConcini	Metzenbaum	Stafford		
	East	Pressler	Dixon	Mitchell	Stevens		
	Garn	Quayle	Dodd	Moy nihan	Weicker		
	Goldwater	Roth	Eagleton	Nunn			
	Gorton	Rudman	Ford	Pell			
	Gramm	Simpson	Glenn	Proxmire			
	Grassley	Symms	Gore	Riegle			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Hatfield	Trible	Hart	Sasser			
	Hawkins	Wallop	Heflin	Simon			
	Hecht	Warner	Inouye	Stennis			
	Helms	Wilson					

LIVE PAIRS (1)

PRESENT AND
GIVING:

RECEIVING:

Exon (PY)..... Rockefeller (PN)

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—88%
Republicans—78%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (45)
Democrats—5 or 11%
Republicans—40 or 89%

Against (49)
Democrats—38 or 78%
Republicans—11 or 22%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 288

99th Congress
1st Session

November 7, 1985, 2:00 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-15038

NOMINATION OF JUDGE ALEX KOZINSKI TO BE JUDGE FOR NINTH CIRCUIT

POSITION: U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit

SUBJECT: Confirmation of the nomination of Alex Kozinski, of California, to U.S. Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit.

NOTE: Proponents of the nomination noted that Judge Kozinski is extremely well qualified academically and professionally. He graduated cum laude from UCLA in 1972 and, in 1975, graduated first in his law class at UCLA. He served as law clerk to Judge Anthony M. Kennedy of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1976 and became Chief Justice Warren Burger's law clerk in 1977. He also has served as assistant counsel in the Office of the Counsel to the President and as special counsel to the Merit Systems Protection Board. Since 1981, in his position as chief judge of the newly-created U.S. Claims Court, Judge Kozinski has earned the respect and loyalty of the judges and staff as a result of his diligent efforts to establish that court's reputation as a first class judicial institution. Allegations made against him are groundless, they maintained, and the Senate should be honored to confirm an individual of his caliber for the Federal bench.

Opponents pointed out that Judge Kozinski's academic qualifications are not in question, but rather his consistent lack of compassion, sensitivity, and commitment to fairness—qualities inherent to a Federal judge. He has been described by former employees as "cruel and harsh and sadistic." He has given misleading, inaccurate, and evasive testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on controversial matters related to his nomination. Judge Kozinski, they claimed, lacks the necessary judicial temperament and does not meet the standards set for Federal appellate judges.

Vote No. 288.

RESULT: NOMINATION CONFIRMED

YEAS (54)			NAYS (43)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (5 or 11%)	Republicans (49 or 94%)		Democrats (40 or 89%)	Republicans (3 or 6%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (1)
DeConcini	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Inouye	Cohen	Rockefeller ²	Heinz ²
Dixon	Andrews	Laxalt	Bentsen	Johnston	Goldwater	Zorinsky ³	
Heflin	Armstrong	Lugar	Biden	Kennedy	Weicker		
Long	Boschwitz	Mathias	Bingaman	Kerry			
Stennis	Chafee	Mattingly	Boren	Lautenberg			
	Cochran	McClure	Bradley	Leahy			
	D'Amato	McConnell	Bumpers	Levin			
	Danforth	Murkowski	Burdick	Matsunaga			
	Denton	Nickles	Byrd	Melcher			
	Dole	Packwood	Chiles	Metzenbaum			
	Domenici	Pressler	Cranston	Mitchell			
	Durenberger	Quayle	Dodd	Moynihan			
	East	Roth	Eagleton	Nunn			
	Evans	Rudman	Exon	Pell			
	Garn	Simpson	Ford	Proxmire			
	Gorton	Specter	Glenn	Pryor			
	Gramm	Stafford	Gore	Riegle			
	Grassley	Stevens	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Hatch	Symms	Hart	Sasser			
	Hatfield	Thurmond	Hollings	Simon			
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey	Wilson					
	Kassebaum						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—89%
Republicans—94%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (54)
Democrats—5 or 9%
Republicans—49 or 91%

Against (43)
Democrats—40 or 93%
Republicans—3 or 7%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 306

99th Congress
1st Session

November 13, 1985, 7:50 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-15350

BUDGET RECONCILIATION

BILL NO.: S. 1730 (H.R. 3128)

AMENDMENT NO.: 1031

TITLE: "The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1986."

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Evans, et al, amendment striking the provision increasing fiscal sanctions on States for error rates in their food stamp program, imposing a two-year moratorium on the collection of error rate penalties from the States, and requiring a study on the quality control system used for the food stamp program. (See also Vote Nos. 330 and 331.)

NOTE: While there was no time remaining for debate under the statutory 20-hour time limit on reconciliation bills, statements supporting and opposing the amendment were inserted.

Proponents of the amendment contended that the food stamp program should be handled in a manner consistent with the management of AFDC and Medicaid, both of which have had moratoriums on error rate penalties established under the reconciliation bill. While agreeing that the States should be accountable for errors, they maintained that the current system is so administratively cumbersome, due to changes in rules and regulations, that elimination of errors is impossible. This amendment would permit development of an effective quality control system for eliminating errors and insuring that funds are properly spent without harming those who depend on these benefits.

Opponents of the amendment argued that the moratorium is viable in the case of Medicare and AFDC because their error rates are substantially below those in the food stamp program. States have no incentive to lower their error rates in food stamps because this program is Federally funded, in total, and no loss of the States' funds is involved. A moratorium would signal that a more lenient system will be developed, and could jeopardize support for food stamps if the Congress is not clear in its determination to reduce these error rates.

S. 1730 (H.R. 3128): Vote Nos. 240, 241, 251-254, 293-297, 306-314, 379-381.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (52)			NAYS (45)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (9 or 20%)		Republicans (43 or 83%)	Democrats (36 or 80%)		Republicans (9 or 17%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (1)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Inoué	D'Amato	Chiles— ³	Armstrong— ²
Boren	Andrews	Laxalt	Biden	Kennedy	Durenberger	Stennis— ²	
Bumpers	Boschwitz	Lugar	Brigman	Kerry	Evans		
Dixon	Chafee	Mattingly	Bradley	Lautenberg	Goldwater		
Johnston	Cochran	McClure	Burdick	Leahy	Hatfield		
Long	Cohen	McConnell	Byrd	Levin	Mathias		
Melcher	Danforth	Nickles	Cranston	Matunaga	Murkowski		
Proxmire	Denton	Packwood	DeConcini	Metzenbaum	Stevens		
Zorinsky	Dole	Pressler	Dodd	Mitchell	Weicker		
	Domenici	Quayle	Eagleton	Moynihan			
	East	Roth	Exon	Nunn			
	Garn	Rudman	Ford	Pell			
	Gorton	Simpson	Glenn	Pryor			
	Gramm	Specter	Gore	Riegle			
	Grassley	Stafford	Harkin	Rockefeller			
	Hatch	Symms	Hart	Sarbanes			
	Hawkins	Thurmond	Heflin	Sasser			
	Hecht	Trible	Hollings	Simon			
	Heinz	Wallop					
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey	Wilson					
	Kassebaum						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—80%
Republicans—83%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (52)
Democrats—9 or 17%
Republicans—43 or 83%

Against (45)
Democrats—36 or 80%
Republicans—9 or 20%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 312

99th Congress
1st Session

November 14, 1985, 4:25 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-15455

BUDGET RECONCILIATION

BILL NO.: S. 1730 (H.R. 3128)

AMENDMENT NO.: 1046

TITLE: "The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1986."

SUBJECT: Durenberger motion to table the Bumpers-Gore-Sasser amendment limiting the power of the Secretary of HHS to exercise the new authority granted by this Act until he/she rules that liver transplants are not classified as an experimental procedure, thereby allowing payment under Medicare for such procedures when reasonable and medically necessary, as determined on a case-by-case basis. (Presently, any person over age 18 is ineligible for Medicare coverage for a liver transplant.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that it would overturn an improper bureaucratic decision which denies Medicare coverage of liver transplants for persons over 18 years of age. An NIH Consensus Development Conference in 1983 concluded that no medical justification exists for the age distinction. The survival rate is 70 percent for liver transplant recipients over 18 and the procedure should be treated as any other life-saving medical treatment. Even though liver transplants cost \$135,000 to \$238,000 each, this amendment would cost only between \$1 million and \$3 million because few individuals selected for treatment would qualify for Medicare coverage.

Opponents of the amendment declared that it was outrageous for the Senate to think that the Finance Committee would fail to address this problem if it were as clear as the proponents would have everyone believe. The Department of Health and Human Services limited the coverage of transplants to persons under 18 because sufficient information to justify coverage was available only on the success of this operation on younger persons. The potential cost of this amendment also is highly underestimated. According to the Administration, it could cost as much as \$125 million annually, because eligibility is not specifically restricted to the disability insured population.

S. 1730 (H.R. 3128): Vote Nos. 240, 241, 251-254, 293-297, 306-314, 379-381.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (51)			NAYS (47)			NOT VOTING (2)	
Democrats (6 or 13%)	Republicans (45 or 87%)		Democrats (40 or 87%)	Republicans (7 or 13%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (1)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Hollings	Chafee	Chiles— ³	Hatfield— ²
Long	Andrews	Kasten	Biden	Inouye	Cohen		
Moynihan	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bingaman	Johnston	D'Amato		
Proxmire	Boschwitz	Lugar	Boren	Kennedy	Mathias		
Stennis	Cochran	Mattingly	Bradley	Kerry	Nickles		
Zorinsky	Danforth	McClure	Bumpers	Lautenberg	Weicker		
	Denton	McConnell	Burdick	Leahy	Wilson		
	Dole	Murkowski	Byrd	Levin			
	Domenici	Packwood	Cranston	Matsunaga			
	Durenberger	Pressler	DeConcini	Melcher			
	East	Quayle	Dixon	Metzenbaum			
	Evans	Roth	Dodd	Mitchell			
	Garn	Rudman	Eagleton	Nunn			
	Goldwater	Simpson	Exon	Pell			
	Gorton	Specter	Ford	Pryor			
	Gramm	Stafford	Glenn	Riegle			
	Grassley	Stevens	Gore	Rockefeller			
	Hatch	Symms	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Hawkins	Thurmond	Hart	Sasser			
	Hecht	Trible	Heflin	Simon			
	Heinz	Wallop					
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—87%
Republicans—87%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (51)
Democrats—6 or 12%
Republicans—45 or 88%

Against (47)
Democrats—40 or 85%
Republicans—7 or 15%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 317

99th Congress
1st Session

November 19, 1985, 3:06 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-15787

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 1059

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Boschwitz-Leahy-Kasten motion to table the Hawkins-Moynihan, et al, amendment authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to reduce the milk price support rate by 50 cents per hundredweight (from \$11.60 to \$11.10) as of January 2, 1986, if the Secretary estimates that net price support purchases of milk during calendar year 1986 will exceed ten billion pounds. (The bill reduces the milk price support by 50 cents in 1987 if purchases are between five and ten billion pounds and by \$1.00 in subsequent years if surplus purchases exceed ten billion pounds.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment noted that the Federal government is the reluctant owner of over 13 billion pounds of surplus dairy products with no commercial market and pays over \$110 million annually for storage and transportation. The government owns enough uncommitted dairy products to give every man, woman, and child in the U.S. a two-month supply of butter, a three-month supply of cheese, and almost a two-year supply of dried milk. Because of new technology and lower feed costs, dairy farmers are becoming more productive than ever. Maintaining the current price support level for another 12 months, as recommended in the Committee bill, would only encourage production of more unmarketable surplus milk. In light of the current budget deficit, it makes little sense to encourage overproduction, especially when it is costing taxpayers so much. If this amendment is adopted, the resulting drop in dairy production will save consumers \$1.2 billion over the next three years, increase commercial consumption by 920 million pounds, and shrink the amount of surplus dairy products. The amendment is pro-farmer, pro-consumer, and pro-taxpayer, and its adoption will show that Congress is serious about reducing the appalling budget deficit and setting the Nation's agriculture policy on a more reasonable course.

Opponents of the amendment stated that its adoption would put most of the burden for reducing the Nation's milk production on family farms—not on giant dairy operations. The January 1986 date set by this amendment could cause the demise of countless dairy farmers who would not have time to plan and adjust to new conditions. Barely five months have gone by since the last 50-cent price reduction. Cutting the support price prior to the Committee-recommended date of January 1987, would be unwise.

(OVER)

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (50)			NAYS (47)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (34 or 74%)		Republicans (16 or 31%)	Democrats (12 or 26%)	Republicans (35 or 69%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Baucus	Hart	Abdnor	Biden	Armstrong	Lugar	Stennis—2	East—2
Bentsen	Heflin	Andrews	Bradley	Chafee	Mattingly		Mathias—2
Bingaman	Inouye	Boschwitz	Chiles	Cochran	McClure		
Boren	Johnston	Cohen	Hollings	D'Amato	Murkowski		
Bumpers	Leahy	Durenberger	Kennedy	Danforth	Nickles		
Burdick	Levin	Evans	Kerry	Denton	Packwood	EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:	
Byrd	Long	Goldwater	Lautenberg	Dole	Quayle		
Cranston	Matsunaga	Gorton	Metzenbaum	Domenici	Roth		
DeConcini	Melcher	Grassley	Moynihan	Garn	Rudman		
Dixon	Mitchell	Heinz	Nunn	Gramm	Simpson	SYMBOLS:	
Dodd	Proxmire	Kasten	Pell	Hatch	Stevens		
Eagleton	Pryor	McConnell	Zorinsky	Hatfield	Symms		
Exon	Riegle	Pressler		Hawkins	Thurmond		
Ford	Rockefeller	Specter		Hecht	Trible	AY—Announced Yea	
Glenn	Sarbanes	Stafford		Helms	Wallop	AN—Announced Nay	
Gore	Sasser	Weicker		Humphrey	Warner	PY—Paired Yea	
Harkin	Simon			Kassebaum	Wilson	PN—Paired Nay	
				Laxalt			

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—74%
Republicans—69%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (50)
Democrats—34 or 68%
Republicans—16 or 32%

Against (47)
Democrats—12 or 26%
Republicans—35 or 74%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

resulting in increased farmer bankruptcies and added financial strain on farm lenders. Piecemeal cuts in the support price are not the solution to the problem. It would be better to freeze the price support level at \$11.50 for a year, thus giving farmers a break from the uncertainty created by constantly changing government policy. Some suggested there may be other methods to achieve greater equity, such as capping the amount of dairy products purchased by the government or greater uniformity in marketing orders.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 319

99th Congress
1st Session

November 20, 1985, 4:00 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-15919

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 1065

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Dole perfecting amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit with instructions) which contains both a four-year freeze for wheat, feed grains, cotton, and rice and a one-year freeze at the 1985 level and a subsequent five percent reduction for feed grains, cotton and rice and a four-year tiered program for wheat; ties the 1986-88 target prices for wheat to a specific acreage reduction percentage under which producers choose their own target price and corresponding acreage reduction; retains the Committee-approved maximum acreage limitations or set-asides of 15 percent for feed grains, 20 percent for cotton, and 35 percent for rice for the 1986-88 crop years; authorizes the Secretary to increase the maximum acreage limitations for wheat, feed grains, cotton, and rice by five percent if the estimated carryover would exceed annual usage of the particular commodity by 33 percent or more; calculates target price deficiency payments on a 12-month average price instead of the current five-month average market price; alters the conservation reserve program requirement to require the Secretary to enter no more than five million acres in 1986, ten million acres each in 1987-89, and five million acres in 1990; requires a 50 percent cost sharing in establishing the appropriate cover crops for the conservation reserve; reduces the intermediate term export credit program from \$1 billion in direct credits annually to \$500 million annually in loan guarantees; reduces from 25 percent to 20 percent the Secretary's authority to transfer FmHA guaranteed loan funds into direct loan funds; and gives the Secretary authority to make disaster payments on the 1985-89 crops of soybeans, sugar cane, and sugar beets; and makes certain changes regarding the soybean and sunflower programs. (See also Vote Nos. 266, 276, 318, 343, and 378.)

NOTE: Proponents noted that it would save \$10.1 billion by CBO estimates and \$11.5 by USDA estimates. This amendment will get a Senate bill to conference where the conferees will come up with a good bill. While complaining about inclusion of a four-year freeze along side a one-year freeze, some expressed their support after being assured that the one-year freeze would prevail.

(OVER)

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: AMENDMENT AGREED TO

YEAS (56)			NAYS (41)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (11 or 24%)	Republicans (45 or 88%)		Democrats (35 or 76%)	Republicans (6 or 12%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Bentsen	Andrews	Kassebaum	Baucus	Kennedy	Abdnor	Inouye ¹	East ²
Bumpers	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Kerry	Durenberger		Stafford ²
Chiles	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Grassley		
Cranston	Chafee	Mathias	Boren	Leahy	Kasten		
DeConcini	Cochran	Mattingly	Bradley	Levin	Nickles		
Johnston	Cohen	McClure	Burdick	Melcher	Pressler		
Long	D'Amato	McConnell	Byrd	Metzenbaum			
Matsunaga	Danforth	Murkowski	Dixon	Mitchell			
Nunn	Denton	Packwood	Dodd	Moynihan			
Proxmire	Dole	Quayle	Eagleton	Pell			
Pryor	Domenici	Roth	Exon	Riegle			
	Evans	Rudman	Ford	Rockefeller			
	Garn	Simpson	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Goldwater	Specter	Gore	Sasser			
	Gorton	Stevens	Harkin	Simon			
	Gramm	Symms	Hart	Stennis			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Heflin	Zorinsky			
	Hatfield	Trible	Hollings				
	Hawkins	Wallop					
	Hecht	Warner					
	Heinz	Weicker					
	Heims	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—76%
Republicans—88%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (56)
Democrats—11 or 20%
Republicans—45 or 80%

Against (41)
Democrats—35 or 85%
Republicans—6 or 15%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

Opponents called it a "painful face saving" proposal for the Administration, containing both a four-year and a one-year price freeze. With more majority conferees than minority conferees, however, the one-year freeze will prevail, lowering the income for average family-size wheat farmers by approximately six percent and by 14 percent below the Committee-reported bill. The effect on the corn farmer will be even more drastic. This 300-page amendment contains a hodgepodge of different and often conflicting proposals, whose budget impact has not been fully evaluated. It has been hastily conceived. Like Gramm-Rudman, no one really knows what is in it. Others objected to the excessively high acreage reduction for wheat farmers, the unreasonably expensive per acre payment option for soybean producers, and the sugar program which they termed harmful to consumers.

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 320

99th Congress
1st Session

November 20, 1985, 4:37 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-15920

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 1066

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Harkin-Boren, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit with instructions) freezing target prices for wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, and rice for four years, notwithstanding any other provision in the bill for a one-year freeze.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment emphasized that there ought to be a clearcut vote on whether the Senate wants a one-year target price freeze or a four-year target price freeze. Having both contradictory programs in the bill is ridiculous. While provisions have been added to accommodate the concerns of other crops, such as soybeans and sunflowers, the effect on corn producers in particular will be devastating. Over the next three years, they are going to lose 82 cents a bushel per year, and corn State farmers are already in dire straits.

Opponents of the amendment argued that the future of American agriculture compels the Senate to reduce loan rates in order to become competitive. By freezing target prices for more than one year, we will bust the budget and insure that the Secretary of Agriculture will be unable to use the loan adjustment tools we have provided him. Whatever extra Congress gives in target prices, they maintained, will be taken away in the form of acreage controls. Others claimed that this amendment was just an attempt to replot the same ground covered in the previous vote.

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (55)			NAYS (42)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (10 or 22%)	Republicans (45 or 88%)		Democrats (36 or 78%)	Republicans (6 or 12%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Bradley	Andrews	Kassebaum	Baucus	Heflin	Abdnor	Inouye-1	East-2
Cranston	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bentsen	Hollings	Durenberger		Stafford-2
Dodd	Boschwitz	Lugar	Biden	Johnston	Grassley		
Lautenberg	Chafee	Mathias	Bingaman	Kennedy	Kasten		
Metzenbaum	Cochran	Mattingly	Boren	Kerry	Nickles		
Mitchell	Cohen	McClure	Bumpers	Leahy	Pressler		
Moy nihan	D'Amato	McConnell	Burdick	Levin			
Nunn	Danforth	Murkowski	Byrd	Long			
Pell	Denton	Packwood	Chiles	Matsunaga			
Proxmire	Dole	Quayle	DeConcini	Melcher			
	Domenici	Roth	Dixon	Pryor			
	Evans	Rudman	Eagleton	Riegle			
	Garn	Simpson	Exon	Rockefeller			
	Goldwater	Specter	Ford	Sarbanes			
	Gorton	Stevens	Glenn	Sasser			
	Gramm	Symms	Gore	Simon			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Harkin	Stennis			
	Hatfield	Trible	Hart	Zorinsky			
	Hawkins	Wallop					
	Hecht	Warner					
	Heinz	Weicker					
	Helms	Wilson					
	Humphrey						

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:		
Party Cohesion		
Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on		
Democrats—78%	For (55)	Against (42)
Republicans—88%	Democrats—10 or 18%	Democrats—36 or 86%
	Republicans—45 or 82%	Republicans—6 or 14%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 323

99th Congress
1st Session

November 20, 1985, 9:45 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-15944

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 1068

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Melcher-Chiles amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit with instructions) increasing outlay savings by \$3.1 billion over three years, in addition to savings contained in the Dole amendment, by reinstating the farmer-owned grain reserve, saving \$200 million; increasing the required acreage reduction program for wheat to 23.5 percent and for feed grains to 17.5 percent and providing a 7.5 percent paid diversion, saving \$2.3 billion; increasing export sales, saving \$200 million; and providing for mandatory dairy sales assuming specified product levels, saving \$200 million—for a net saving in interest of an additional \$200 million.

NOTE: Proponents asserted that this amendment would accomplish the \$3.1 billion in further savings that is needed to bring the farm bill in compliance with the budget requirements. By reinstating the farmer-held reserves, prices would be boosted, thus helping farmers keep solvent, in addition to saving the U.S. government \$460 million. Farmer-owned reserves also could be beneficial in case of famine emergencies throughout the world. The second part of this amendment which places mandatory requirements on the wheat and feed grains acreage reduction programs would save \$2.3 billion as estimated by CBO. Targeted exports would be expanded to a reasonable level, and mandatory dairy sales for cash would be prescribed. With all these provisions, the required reductions would be achieved, and the concerns of the Administration would be met.

Opponents declared that the savings claimed to be realized by this amendment through the increased acreage limitation and paid diversion have already been achieved by the discretionary five percent acreage reduction language in the Dole II amendment passed by the Senate. The amendment also would reinstate the farmer-owned grain reserves which deceptively hold down farm prices. But it also would indiscriminately dump surplus government-owned commodities on the world market as across-the-board export subsidies without targeting them against unfair trading practices. This amendment, they claimed, is very controversial and complex, and more time should be allowed to study it and to determine if the savings are real.

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (46)			NAYS (50)			NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (45 or 98%)	Republicans (1 or 2%)		Democrats (1 or 2%)	Republicans (49 or 98%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (3)
Baucus	Kennedy	Andrews	Bradley	Abdnor	Kasten	Inouye ¹	Domenici ²
Bentsen	Kerry			Armstrong	Laxalt		East ²
Biden	Lautenberg			Boschwitz	Lugar		Stafford ²
Bingaman	Leahy			Chafee	Mathias		
Boren	Levin			Cochran	Mattingly		
Bumpers	Long			Cohen	McClure		
Burdick	Matsunaga			D'Amato	McConnell		
Byrd	Melcher			Danforth	Murkowski		
Chiles	Metzenbaum			Denton	Nickles		
Cranston	Mitchell			Dole	Packwood		
DeConcini	Moynihan			Durenberger	Pressler		
Dixon	Nunn			Evans	Quayle		
Dodd	Pell			Garn	Roth		
Eagleton	Proxmire			Goldwater	Rudman		
Exon	Pryor			Gorton	Simpson		
Ford	Riegle			Gramm	Specter		
Glenn	Rockefeller			Grassley	Stevens		
Gore	Sarbanes			Hatch	Symms		
Harkin	Sasser			Hatfield	Thurmond		
Hart	Simon			Hawkins	Trible		
Heflin	Stennis			Hecht	Wallop		
Hollings	Zorinsky			Heinz	Warner		
Johnston				Helms	Weicker		
				Humphrey	Wilson		
				Kassebaum			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:


Party Cohesion

Democrats—98%
Republicans—98%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (46)	Against (50)
Democrats—45 or 98%	Democrats—1 or 2%
Republicans—1 or 2%	Republicans—49 or 98%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 333

99th Congress
1st Session

November 21, 1985, 11:48 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-16163

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 1102

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Garn motion to table the Dixon-Johnston, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit with instructions) permitting banks to renegotiate agricultural loans from book value to fair market value and write off the difference between the book value and the fair market value over a period of up to 30 years, instead of one year as in current law.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that the ongoing agricultural crisis has already caused the demise of over 100 banks this year—many of which were agricultural banks. Under current law, banks must deduct the amount of loans written off from their capital all at once. Capital losses of this magnitude cannot be withstood by many banks, so they are forced to foreclose rather than write down the loan. A destructive cycle begins when reductions in capital cause the banks to call in more loans, generating more losses and forcing still further reductions in bank capital. This benefits neither the banks nor the farmers. This amendment, if enacted, would permit banks to negotiate with farmers on appropriate debt restructuring which will leave them with payments they can meet while bringing the banks greater financial returns than if they were forced to foreclose. American farmers need help, and this proposal would provide transitional assistance until more fundamental, long-term solutions are put into place. It costs nothing and has no budgetary impact. It does not require the FDIC to do one thing, but rather gives it permissive authority to help save some banks that are in trouble.

Opponents of the amendment complained that hearings on this proposal are incomplete and that it sends a false signal to farmers, deluding them and the agricultural banks into thinking that something is being done for them. The problem cannot be solved merely by changing accounting procedures—this was done for savings and loans, and it proved to be of no help. The issue is too important to be considered so late in the day when Senators cannot give it their full attention. It should be returned to committee for more complete hearings.

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (47)			NAYS (44)			NOT VOTING (9)	
Democrats (7 or 16%)	Republicans (40 or 83%)		Democrats (36 or 84%)	Republicans (8 or 17%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (5)
Bentsen	Armstrong	Kassebaum	Baucus	Hollings	Abdnor	Eagleton ⁻²	East ⁻²
Bradley	Chafee	Lugar	Biden	Johnston	Andrews	Kennedy ⁻²	Goldwater ⁻²
DeConcini	Cochran	Mathias	Bingaman	Kerry	Boschwitz	Leahy ⁻²	Laxalt ⁻²
Inouye	Cohen	Mattingly	Boren	Levin	Durenberger	Stennis ⁻²	Packwood ⁻²
Lautenberg	D'Amato	McClure	Bumpers	Long	Grassley		Weicker ⁻²
Proxmire	Danforth	McConnell	Burdick	Matsunaga	Kasten		
Riegle	Denton	Murkowski	Byrd	Melcher	Nickles		
	Doie	Quayle	Chiles	Metzenbaum	Pressler		
	Domenici	Roth	Cranston	Mitchell		EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE: 1—Official Business 2—Necessarily Absent 3—Illness 4—Other	
	Evans	Rudman	Dixon	Moy nihan			
	Garn	Simpson	Dodd	Nunn			
	Gorton	Specter	Exon	Pell			
	Gramm	Stafford	Ford	Pryor		SYMBOLS: AY—Announced Yea AN—Announced Nay PY—Paired Yea PN—Paired Nay	
	Hatch	Stevens	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Hatfield	Symms	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Hawkins	Thurmond	Harkin	Sasser			
	Hecht	Trible	Hart	Simon			
	Heinz	Wallop	Heflin	Zorinsky			
	Helms	Warner					
	Humphrey	Wilson					

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—84%
Republicans—83%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (47)
Democrats—7 or 15%
Republicans—40 or 85%

Against (44)
Democrats—36 or 82%
Republicans—8 or 18%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 336

99th Congress
1st Session

November 22, 1985, 3:30 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-16296

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 1134

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Wilson motion to table the Bumpers-Stennis, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit with instructions) prohibiting the Secretary of Agriculture from reducing the soybean price support level more than five percent per year, or below \$4.50 per bushel, whichever is higher.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that the support level on soybeans in 1986, based on the formula established by the compromise package, would be about \$4.40—resulting in a loss of more than \$40 an acre. This amendment would strengthen the farm bill by bringing the soybean program in line with other commodity programs. It would provide stability in the market by establishing a floor of \$4.50 for the soybean support level, thus allowing farmers to reduce their acreage voluntarily or allowing time for soybean prices to reach a level high enough to cover the cost of production. Soybean prices already have dropped considerably in the last couple of weeks merely as a result of the Senate's debate on this issue and, unless this amendment is adopted, producers will have no protection from such wide fluctuations in the marketplace.

Opponents of the amendment argued that the proposal would keep support levels too high, costing the Federal government \$300 to \$500 million and guaranteeing that the government will end up buying a large part of the soybean crop. The American Soybean Association does not support this amendment; it supports the compromise package. Soybean producers want to start their product moving in the marketplace again, even if it means lowering prices. In addition to the market-oriented plan in the compromise, soybean farmers also have the \$35 per acre bonus to supplement their income and help repay production loans. This amendment would undo the work done by the Agriculture Committee and representatives of the soybean industry and should not be adopted.

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (50)			NAYS (44)			NOT VOTING (6)	
Democrats (8 or 17%)	Republicans (42 or 88%)		Democrats (38 or 83%)	Republicans (6 or 13%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (5)
Bingaman	Andrews	Kasten	Baucus	Inouye	Abdnor	Glenn ²	Domenici ²
Bradley	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bentsen	Johnston	Cochran		East ²
Chiles	Boschwitz	Lugar	Biden	Kennedy	Denton		Goldwater ²
Lautenberg	Chafee	Mathias	Boren	Kerry	Grassley		Specter ²
Metzenbaum	Cohen	Mattingly	Bumpers	Leahy	Pressler		Weicker ²
Moynihan	D'Amato	McClure	Burdick	Levin	Thurmond		
Pell	Danforth	McConnell	Byrd	Long			
Proxmire	Dole	Murkowski	Cranston	Matsunaga			
	Durenberger	Nickles	DeConcini	Melcher			
	Evans	Packwood	Dixon	Mitchell			
	Garn	Quayle	Dodd	Nunn			
	Gorton	Roth	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Gramm	Rudman	Exon	Riegle			
	Hatch	Simpson	Ford	Rockefeller			
	Hatfield	Stafford	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Hawkins	Stevens	Harkin	Sasser			
	Hecht	Symms	Hart	Simon			
	Heinz	Trible	Heflin	Stennis			
	Helms	Wallop	Hollings	Zorinsky			
	Humphrey	Warner					
	Kassebaum	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—83%
Republicans—88%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (50)
Democrats—8 or 16%
Republicans—42 or 84%

Against (44)
Democrats—38 or 86%
Republicans—6 or 14%

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SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 337

99th Congress
1st Session

November 22, 1985, 5:18 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-16316

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 1138

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Harkin-Exon, et al, amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit with instructions) providing for a referendum which, if approved by 60 percent of the wheat and feed grain producers (including separate approval by at least 50 percent of each type of producer), would: eliminate the target price program for wheat and feed grains; raise the loan rate to \$4.86 per bushel for wheat and \$3.55 per bushel for corn, or 70 percent of parity for each commodity; and implement a voluntary marketing certificate program.

NOTE: Proponents stated that it is time for new policies and bold action to prevent family farmers from losing their land. Farmers have survived droughts and floods but cannot survive the continuing disastrous decline in farm prices, which are at their worst level since 1932. At present, the U.S. produces more grain than it consumes or sells abroad, leading to the accumulation of massive government surpluses, plummeting market prices, and skyrocketing government expenditures. Low market prices will cause nearly 100 percent of agriculture growers to sign up for government farm programs in 1986. The referendum proposed in this amendment is overwhelmingly supported by a broad coalition of farm and banking organizations. It would apply only to wheat and feed grains and, if approved, participation would not be forced. Instead of having farm policy dictated to them by the Federal government, farmers would have an opportunity to participate in the process, just as the Constitution gives voters the right to choose the Members in this body. The added cost in consumer food prices would be worth it if the demise of family farming is prevented. It is time to act together to avoid destruction of this Nation's farm economy instead of sitting idly by as its rural roots are severed. Opponents pointed out that a similar proposal was defeated in the House. The amendment would price U.S. wheat and corn out of export markets, forcing cutbacks of 55 percent and 20 percent respectively, and would increase costs to livestock producers. Although participation in this program is voluntary, it could mean bankruptcy for those who do not choose to participate.

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (36)			NAYS (56)			NOT VOTING (8)	
Democrats (32 or 73%)		Republicans (4 or 8%)	Democrats (12 or 27%)		Republicans (44 or 92%)	Democrats (3)	Republicans (5)
Baucus	Johnston	Grassley	Bentsen	Abdnor	Humphrey	Biden—2	Domenici—2
Bingaman	Kerry	Kasten	Bradley	Andrews	Kassebaum	Glenn—2	East—2
Boren	Leahy	McClure	Cranston	Armstrong	Laxalt	Kennedy—2	Goldwater—2
Bumpers	Levin	Pressler	DeConcini	Boschwitz	Lugar		Specter—2
Burdick	Long		Dixon	Chafee	Mathias		Weicker—2
Byrd	Matsunaga		Hollings	Cochran	Mattingly		
Chiles	Melcher		Lautenberg	Cohen	McConnell		
Dodd	Metzenbaum		Mitchell	D'Amato	Murkowski		
Eagleton	Moynihan		Nunn	Danforth	Nickles		
Exon	Pell		Proxmire	Denton	Packwood		
Ford	Pryor		Sarbanes	Dole	Quayle		
Gore	Riegle		Stennis	Durenberger	Roth		
Harkin	Rockefeller			Evans	Rudman		
Hart	Sasser			Garn	Simpson		
Heflin	Simon			Gorton	Stafford		
Inouye	Zorinsky			Gramm	Stevens		
				Hatch	Symms		
				Hatfield	Thurmond		
				Hawkins	Trible		
				Hecht	Wallop		
				Heinz	Warner		
				Helms	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—73%
Republicans—92%


Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (36)
Democrats—32 or 89%
Republicans—4 or 11%

Against (56)
Democrats—12 or 21%
Republicans—44 or 79%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 338

99th Congress
1st Session

November 22, 1985, 7:45 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-16337

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 1144

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Boschwitz-Boren amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit with instructions) adding an alternative six-year farm bill for wheat, feed grains, rice and cotton; reducing price support payments for these commodities by ten percent per year after 1986; eliminating all acreage reduction programs; giving the Secretary of Agriculture the discretionary authority to establish support levels; and providing for payment yields based on the average planted during the years 1981-85 which would be made even if the market price rises above the support level.

NOTE: Proponents stated that their amendment is a considerable departure from the farm bill currently under consideration in that it proposes a six-year, market-oriented farm program which would return farmers to the free enterprise system. Present farm policy makes the farmer a captive of the government. It encourages overproduction and impoverishes farmers and taxpayers at the same time. In the last four years, the government has spent more money on price supports than in the previous 20 years combined, yet farmers have never been so destitute. American farmers are the best educated in the world, yet they are given no flexibility to make their own decisions on how to run their farms. It is time for a change in agriculture, proponents claimed, and this amendment is a step in the right direction to get the government out of agriculture while keeping the farmer in business. Although this proposal is farmer-oriented, it also provides protection to the agriculture infrastructure a vast network employing more people than there are farmers, which is literally being shut down by the current farm program.

Opponents stated that if the alternative farm program proposed in this amendment were adopted, it would become just another part of the farm bill in direct conflict with other portions of the bill. It does not strike any provision previously agreed to, but rather adds to it, thus becoming an "option ticket" and creating more confusion for House-Senate conferees. Conferees should not be given a multiple choice of provisions representing the Senate version. This alternative proposal would only help to deadlock the conference.

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: AMENDMENT REJECTED

YEAS (42)			NAYS (48)			NOT VOTING (10)	
Democrats (3 or 7%)	Republicans (39 or 81%)		Democrats (39 or 93%)	Republicans (9 or 19%)		Democrats (5)	Republicans (5)
Boren	Armstrong	Laxalt	Baucus	Johnston	Abdnor	Biden ⁻²	Domenici ⁻²
Long	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bentsen	Kerry	Andrews	Bradley ⁻²	East ⁻²
Nunn	Chafee	Mattingly	Bingaman	Lautenberg	D'Amato	Glenn ⁻²	Goldwater ⁻²
	Cochran	McClure	Bumpers	Leahy	Denton	Kennedy ⁻²	Murkowski ⁻²
	Cohen	McConnell	Burdick	Levin	Grassley	Stennis ⁻²	Specter ⁻²
	Danforth	Nickles	Byrd	Matsunaga	Kasten		
	Dole	Packwood	Chiles	Meicher	Mathias		
	Durenberger	Quayle	Cranston	Metzenbaum	Pressler		
	Evans	Roth	DeConcini	Mitchell	Weicker		
	Garn	Rudman	Dixon	Moynihan			
	Gorton	Simpson	Dodd	Pell			
	Gramm	Stafford	Eagleton	Proxmire			
	Hatch	Stevens	Exon	Pryor			
	Hatfield	Symms	Ford	Riegle			
	Hawkins	Thurmond	Gore	Rockefeller			
	Hecht	Trible	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Heinz	Wallop	Hart	Sasser			
	Helms	Warner	Heflin	Simon			
	Humphrey	Wilson	Hollings	Zorinsky			
	Kassebaum		Inouye				

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—93%
Republicans—81%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (42)
Democrats—39 or 93%
Republicans—39 or 93%

Against (48)
Democrats—39 or 81%
Republicans—9 or 19%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 340

99th Congress
1st Session

November 22, 1985, 11:45 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-16383

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: S. 1714 (H.R. 2100)

AMENDMENT NO.: 1162

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade, and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Harkin-Exon-Hefflin amendment (to the Dole amendment No. 939 to the Dole motion to recommit with instructions) requiring the labeling of all fresh, chilled, or frozen meat products of foreign origin, effective one year after enactment of this bill.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that it was not intended to restrict or unduly hamper the importation of meat into the U.S., but merely to allow consumers the option of restricting their purchases to domestically-produced meat. The U.S. has the best meat inspection and labeling laws in the world. These laws currently apply to canned, processed, and prepared meats of foreign origin as well as domestic products. Imported fresh, chilled, or frozen meats are not covered by these laws, however, and are marketed in the U.S. without any indication of their foreign origin. American consumers have the right to know that these meats are foreign-produced and that they may be subjecting themselves to a potential health hazard by buying meats imported from countries which still use dangerous pesticides and chemicals. The cost of instituting this labeling would be a "drop in the bucket," they noted, compared to the cost of the 1.9 billion pounds of fresh, chilled, or frozen meats of foreign origin sold in the U.S. each year.

Opponents of the amendment maintained that it was unnecessary and would only cause confusion and higher prices for consumers. Current regulations already require the country of origin to be listed on the containers of all meat products distributed to U.S. consumers. It would cost the industry between \$18 and \$30 million, and \$1 million annually thereafter, to institute these new labeling changes. Millions of Federal tax dollars would have to be spent to ensure compliance as well. The increased cost would only cause higher meat prices, thereby making meat unaffordable for some consumers. Substandard meat which could pose a health hazard should not be marketed in the U.S. no matter how it is labeled. If the labeling of meats as "foreign" is merely designed to be informational, it probably would not significantly affect the consumers' choice but would significantly increase the administrative burden on processors and retailers. Others warned that the amendment's potential effect on trade and the possibility of counterrestrictions on U.S. products should be thoroughly explored before it is adopted.

S. 1714 (H.R. 2100): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (53)			NAYS (39)			NOT VOTING (8)	
Democrats (9 or 20%)	Republicans (44 or 92%)		Democrats (35 or 80%)	Republicans (4 or 8%)		Democrats (3)	Republicans (5)
Bradley	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Baucus	Hollings	Denton	Johnston ⁻²	Domenici ⁻²
Cranston	Andrews	Kasten	Bentsen	Inouye	Grassley	Kennedy ⁻²	East ⁻²
Dixon	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Kerry	Nickles	Stennis ⁻²	Goldwater ⁻²
Hefflin	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Pressler		Murkowski ⁻²
Leahy	Chafee	Mathias	Boren	Matsunaga			Specter ⁻²
Levin	Cochran	Mattingly	Bumpers	Melcher			
Long	Cohen	McClure	Burdick	Metzenbaum			
Moynihan	D'Amato	McConnell	Byrd	Mitchell			
Zorinsky	Danforth	Packwood	Chiles	Nunn			
	Dole	Quayle	DeConcini	Pell			
	Durenberger	Roth	Dodd	Proxmire			
	Evans	Rudman	Eagleton	Pryor			
	Garn	Simpson	Exon	Riegle			
	Gorton	Stafford	Ford	Rockefeller			
	Gramm	Stevens	Glenn	Sarbanes			
	Hatch	Symms	Gore	Sasser			
	Hatfield	Thurmond	Harkin	Simon			
	Hawkins	Trible	Hart				
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Weicker					
	Humphrey	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:


Party Cohesion

Democrats—80%
Republicans—92%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (53)
Democrats—9 or 17%
Republicans—44 or 83%

Against (39)
Democrats—35 or 90%
Republicans—4 or 10%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 341

99th Congress
1st Session

November 23, 1985, 1:34 a.m.
Session of November 22, 1985
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-16391

FARM BILL, 1985-89

BILL NO.: H.R. 2100 (S. 1714)

TITLE: "Agricultural, Food, Trade and Conservation Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Dole motion to table the Dole motion to proceed to the consideration of H.R. 2100. (See also Vote No. 342.)

NOTE: The Majority Leader tried to call up the House bill, as amended by the Dole II provisions already agreed to, as a means of avoiding objections being raised to calling up amendments by Republican Senators. Democratic Senators were frustrated at being blocked for weeks from offering any of their amendments because of the parliamentary situation.

H.R. 2100 (S. 1714): Vote Nos. 256-269, 276, 317-320, 322-343, 378.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE FAILED

YEAS (38)		NAYS (54)		NOT VOTING (8)		
Democrats (38 or 86%)	Republicans (0 or 0%)	Democrats (6 or 14%)	Republicans (48 or 100%)	Democrats (3)	Republicans (5)	
Baucus	Hart	Bingaman	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Johnston ⁻²	Domenici ⁻²
Bentsen	Heflin	Hollings	Andrews	Kasten	Kennedy ⁻²	East ⁻²
Biden	Inouye	Long	Armstrong	Laxalt	Stennis ⁻²	Goldwater ⁻²
Boren	Kerry	Pell	Boschwitz	Lugar		Murkowski ⁻²
Bradley	Lautenberg	Proxmire	Chafee	Mathias		Specter ⁻²
Bumpers	Leahy	Zorinsky	Cochran	Mattingly		
Burdick	Levin		Cohen	McClure		
Byrd	Matsunaga		D'Amato	McConnell		
Chiles	Melcher		Danforth	Nickles		
Cranston	Metzenbaum		Denton	Packwood		
DeConcini	Mitchell		Dole	Pressler		
Dixon	Moynihan		Durenberger	Quayle		
Dodd	Nunn		Evans	Roth		
Eagleton	Pryor		Garn	Rudman		
Exon	Riegle		Gorton	Simpson		
Ford	Rockefeller		Gramm	Stafford		
Glenn	Sarbanes		Grassley	Stevens		
Gore	Sasser		Hatch	Symms		
Harkin	Simon		Hatfield	Thurmond		
			Hawkins	Trible		
			Hecht	Wallop		
			Heinz	Warner		
			Helms	Weicker		
			Humphrey	Wilson		

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

1—Official Business
2—Necessarily Absent
3—Illness
4—Other

SYMBOLS:

AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:			
Party Cohesion		Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on	
Democrats—86%	For (38)	Against (54)	
Republicans—100%	Democrats—38 or 100%	Democrats—6 or 11%	
	Republicans—0 or 0%	Republicans—48 or 89%	

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—86%
Republicans—100%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (38)

Democrats—38 or 100%
Republicans—0 or 0%

Against (54)

Democrats—6 or 11%
Republicans—48 or 89%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 345

99th Congress
1st Session

December 3, 1985, 3:58 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-16715

FARM CREDIT

BILL NO.: S. 1884

AMENDMENT NO.: 1171

TITLE: "Farm Credit System Restructuring and Regulatory Reform Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Zorinsky motion to table the Baucus substitute amendment (for the Helms substitute amendment No. 1170) allowing each of the Production Credit Associations, the Banks for Cooperatives, and the Federal Farm Land Banks in the 12 farm credit regions to elect its own five-person board and making the district board (a seven-member board composed of two members each elected by the three regional banks' shareholders and one member appointed by the Farm Credit Administration Governor) of each region an advisory entity only.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment pointed out that separate boards of directors for each of the banks in a farm credit district would enhance local control of the Farm Credit System. Some stated that a well-managed Farm Credit System could be best achieved through greater reliance upon local control of system institutions rather than greater Federal regulatory involvement. Others contended that the structure of the district farm credit boards was partially responsible for the problems of the Farm Credit System. Currently, the seven-member district farm credit board acts as the board of directors of the Federal land bank, Federal intermediate credit bank, and the bank for cooperatives in its district with the voting stockholders of each bank electing two of the board members; the seventh member is appointed by the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration. Therefore, the holders of voting stock of a district bank—the land bank associations in the case of the land bank, the production credit associations in the case of the credit bank, and the farmer-cooperative borrowers in the case of the bank for cooperatives—can elect only two-sevenths of the board members of their respective bank. Because of this limitation, the stockholders of a bank cannot hold the majority of the board accountable for actions, such as overly-aggressive loan policies, that are not in the interest of the bank. If a separate board were established for each bank, the stockholders of a bank could hold the board accountable for its actions and thereby could prevent a recurrence of the circumstances that led to the present crisis in the Farm Credit System.

Opponents of the amendment pointed out that, if the district farm credit banks had separate boards of directors, the boards would likely provide for separate management of each of the banks. It was noted that such a result would reverse the policy in most farm credit districts under which the district land bank, intermediate credit banks, and bank for cooperatives are operated under joint management arrangements and would greatly increase the cost of operating these institutions.

S. 1884: Vote Nos. 345-351.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (48)			NAYS (44)			NOT VOTING (8)	
Democrats (12 or 27%)	Republicans (36 or 77%)		Democrats (33 or 73%)	Republicans (11 or 23%)		Democrats (2)	Republicans (6)
Biden	Armstrong	Laxalt	Baucus	Inouye	Abdnor	Bradley ¹	Durenberger ²
Dodd	Chafee	Lugar	Bentsen	Levin	Andrews	Chiles ³	East ²
Eagleton	Cochran	Mathias	Bingaman	Matsunaga	Boschwitz		Goldwater ²
Glenn	Cohen	Mattingly	Boren	Melcher	Denton		Hatfield ²
Johnston	D'Amato	McConnell	Bumpers	Metzenbaum	Gramm		Packwood ²
Kennedy	Danforth	Murkowski	Burdick	Mitchell	Grassley		Stevens ²
Kerry	Dole	Quayle	Byrd	Moynihan	Kasten		
Lautenberg	Domenici	Roth	Cranston	Nunn	McClure		
Leahy	Evans	Rudman	DeConcini	Pell	Nickles		
Long	Garn	Simpson	Dixon	Proxmire	Pressler		
Stennis	Gorton	Specter	Exon	Pryor	Weicker		
Zorinsky	Hatch	Stafford	Ford	Riegle			
	Hawkins	Symms	Gore	Rockefeller			
	Hecht	Thurmond	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Heinz	Trible	Hart	Sasser			
	Helms	Wallop	Heflin	Simon			
	Humphrey	Warner	Hollings				
	Kassebaum	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—73%
Republicans—77%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (48)
Democrats—12 or 25%
Republicans—36 or 75%

Against (44)
Democrats—33 or 75%
Republicans—11 or 25%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 348

99th Congress
1st Session

December 3, 1985, 6:19 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-16727

FARM CREDIT

BILL NO.: S. 1884

AMENDMENT NO.: 1183

TITLE: "Farm Credit System Restructuring and Regulatory Reform Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Zorinsky motion to table the Baucus substitute amendment (for the Helms substitute amendment No. 1170) limiting the amount of funds to be transferred at any one time to the Capital Corporation; limiting assessments to the amounts necessary to assist Farm Credit System institutions; limiting the powers of the Capital Corporation to those necessary (rather than necessary or expedient); and requiring repayment of any surpluses accumulated by the corporation.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment pointed out that the powers granted to the Capital Corporation would be very broad and contended that reasonable constraints on those powers were necessary to ensure the viability of the Farm Credit System. If excessive contributions were required from a bank, interest rates on loans would rise and many borrowers would seek financing from commercial lenders, thereby further weakening the capital base of the system. Others stated that restraints were necessary to ensure that the Corporation would serve the local farm credit institutions and would not become a bank holding company. It was noted that repayment of contributions made to the Corporation by farm credit institutions would be required whenever feasible and that the local farm credit associations would be involved in the management and leasing of property held by the Corporation.

Opponents of the amendment stated that limiting the amount of contributions that the Capital Corporation could require from a bank would greatly restrict the ability of the system to transfer needed funds from the financially-sound institutions to those experiencing financial distress. It was noted that the purpose of the legislation was to ensure that the Farm Credit System will take all reasonable steps to provide assistance to its financially-troubled institutions prior to receipt of Federal assistance.

S. 1884: Vote Nos. 345-351.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (47)			NAYS (45)			NOT VOTING (8)	
Democrats (9 or 20%)	Republicans (38 or 79%)		Democrats (35 or 80%)	Republicans (10 or 21%)		Democrats (3)	Republicans (5)
Biden	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Inouye	Andrews	Bradley ¹	East ²
Eagleton	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bentsen	Kerry	Chafee	Chiles ³	Goldwater ²
Exon	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bingaman	Lautenberg	Cohen	Kennedy ²	Hatfield ²
Johnston	Cochran	Mathias	Boren	Leahy	D'Amato		Packwood ²
Levin	Danforth	Mattingly	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Denton		Stevens ²
Long	Dole	McClure	Burdick	Melcher	Gramm		
Proxmire	Domenici	McConnell	Byrd	Metzenbaum	Nickles		
Riegle	Durenberger	Murkowski	Cranston	Mitchell	Roth		
Zorinsky	Evans	Pressler	DeConcini	Moynihn	Rudman		
	Garn	Quayle	Dixon	Nunn	Weicker		
	Gorton	Simpson	Dodd	Pell			
	Grassley	Specter	Ford	Pryor			
	Hatch	Stafford	Glenn	Rockefeller			
	Hawkins	Symms	Gore	Sarbanes			
	Hecht	Thurmond	Harkin	Sasser			
	Heinz	Trible	Hart	Simon			
	Helms	Wallop	Heflin	Stennis			
	Humphrey	Warner	Hollings				
	Kassebaum	Wilson					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yes
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yes
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—80%
Republicans—79%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (47)
Democrats—9 or 19%
Republicans—38 or 81%

Against (45)
Democrats—35 or 78%
Republicans—10 or 22%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 349

99th Congress
1st Session

December 3, 1985, 7:02 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-16729

FARM CREDIT

BILL NO.: S. 1884

AMENDMENT NO.: 1184

TITLE: "Farm Credit System Restructuring and Regulatory Reform Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Zorinsky motion to table the Harkin amendment (to the Helms substitute amendment No. 1170) requiring that the Capital Corporation sell or lease farmland under its control to operators of not larger than family-size farms, and limiting the rate of interest on any loan owned or made by the Capital Corporation to a rate which does not exceed the average rate of interest charged by the Farm Credit System Bank from which the loan originated.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment pointed out that the legislation did not provide for any limitation on the manner in which the Capital Corporation could dispose of farmland in its inventory. Concern was expressed that the Corporation could become the largest owner of farmland in the country and that it could lease or sell such land in whatever size parcels it deemed appropriate. Proponents contended that the lease or sale of large tracts of farmland to corporations and limited partnerships would not be in the public interest and, therefore, a requirement that the Capital Corporation give priority in the lease or sale of its land to family size farmers was necessary. Under the bill, a borrower from a farm credit institution could be treated unfairly if a loan were transferred to the Corporation since the Corporation could charge a higher interest rate on the loan than the rate charged by the originating institution. By providing that the rate charged by the Corporation would have to be equivalent to the average rate charged by the originating bank, this situation would be precluded.

Opponents of the amendment stated that the proposed limitations were similar to those imposed in other statutes upon government lending operations, and it was not appropriate to impose such limitations upon an institution owned by cooperative lending institutions. In addition, concern was expressed that the proposed limitations would impede the Corporation from managing its assets on a sound business basis.

S. 1884: Vote Nos. 345-351.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (48)			NAYS (44)			NOT VOTING (8)	
Democrats (8 or 18%)	Republicans (40 or 83%)		Democrats (36 or 82%)	Republicans (8 or 17%)		Democrats (3)	Republicans (5)
Boren	Armstrong	Laxalt	Baucus	Inouye	Abdnor	Bradley ¹	East ²
Eagleton	Chafee	Lugar	Bentsen	Johnston	Andrews	Chiles ³	Goldwater ²
Heflin	Cochran	Mathias	Biden	Kerry	Boschwitz	Kennedy ²	Hatfield ²
Lautenberg	Cohen	Mattingly	Bingaman	Levin	Durenberger		Packwood ²
Leahy	D'Amato	McClure	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Grassley		Stevens ²
Long	Danforth	McConnell	Burdick	Melcher	Kasten		
Stennis	Denton	Murkowski	Byrd	Metzenbaum	Pressler		
Zorinsky	Dole	Nickles	Cranston	Mitchell	Weicker		
	Domenici	Quayle	DeConcini	Moynihan		EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE: 1—Official Business 2—Necessarily Absent 3—Illness 4—Other	
	Evans	Roth	Dixon	Nunn			
	Garn	Rudman	Dodd	Pell			
	Gorton	Simpson	Exon	Proxmire			
	Gramm	Specter	Ford	Pryor		SYMBOLS: AY—Announced Yea AN—Announced Nay PY—Paired Yea PN—Paired Nay	
	Hatch	Stafford	Glenn	Riegle			
	Hawkins	Symms	Gore	Rockefeller			
	Hecht	Thurmond	Harkin	Sarbanes			
	Heinz	Trible	Hart	Sasser			
	Helms	Wallop	Hollings	Simon			
	Humphrey	Warner					
	Kassebaum	Wilson					

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—82%
Republicans—83%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (48)
Democrats—8 or 17%
Republicans—40 or 83%

Against (44)
Democrats—36 or 82%
Republicans—8 or 18%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 350

99th Congress
1st Session

December 3, 1985, 7:45 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-16733

FARM CREDIT

BILL NO.: S. 1884

AMENDMENT NO.: 1304

TITLE: "Farm Credit System Restructuring and Regulatory Reform Act of 1985."

SUBJECT: Helms motion to table the Melcher-Exon-Zorinsky amendment (to the Helms substitute amendment No. 1170) redeeming at par value "B" stock in liquidated production credit associations from the Farm Credit Association revolving fund.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment pointed out that seven production credit associations had been placed in liquidation during the preceding 12-month period resulting in the freezing of their assets, including funds representing stock in the associations that their member-borrowers were required by law to purchase in order to obtain financing from the Farm Credit System. Concern was expressed that, if a member-borrower's required investment in association stock were not protected, farmers and ranchers, who ordinarily obtain financing from the Farm Credit System, would seek financing from other sources where such investments are not required, thereby further eroding the financial stability of the system. Opponents of the amendment noted that the redemption of stock of liquidated Farm Credit associations through the use of revolving funds in the Treasury could result in substantial new outlays by the government.

S. 1884: Vote Nos. 345-351.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (57)			NAYS (34)			NOT VOTING (9)	
Democrats (12 or 28%)	Republicans (45 or 94%)		Democrats (31 or 72%)	Republicans (3 or 6%)		Democrats (4)	Republicans (5)
Biden	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Heflin	Andrews	Bradley ¹	East ²
DeConcini	Armstrong	Laxalt	Bentsen	Hollings	Domenici	Chiles ³	Goldwater ²
Dixon	Boschwitz	Lugar	Bingaman	Inouye	McConnell	Kennedy ²	Hatfield ²
Lautenberg	Chafee	Mathias	Boren	Johnston		Levin ²	Packwood ²
Long	Cochran	Mattingly	Bumpers	Kerry			Stevens ²
Metzenbaum	Cohen	McClure	Burdick	Leahy			
Mitchell	D'Amato	Murkowski	Byrd	Matsunaga			
Moynihan	Danforth	Nickles	Cranston	Melcher			
Pell	Denton	Pressler	Dodd	Nunn			
Proxmire	Dole	Quayle	Eagleton	Pryor			
Riegle	Durenberger	Roth	Exon	Rockefeller			
Simon	Evans	Rudman	Ford	Sarbanes			
	Garn	Simpson	Glenn	Sasser			
	Gorton	Specter	Gore	Stennis			
	Gramm	Stafford	Harkin	Zorinsky			
	Grassley	Symms	Hart				
	Hatch	Thurmond					
	Hawkins	Trible					
	Hecht	Wallop					
	Heinz	Warner					
	Helms	Weicker					
	Humphrey	Wilson					
	Kassebaum						

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—72%
Republicans—94%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (57)
Democrats—12 or 21%
Republicans—45 or 79%

Against (34)
Democrats—31 or 91%
Republicans—3 or 9%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 357

99th Congress
1st Session

December 9, 1985, 4:04 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-17169

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1986

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 465

AMENDMENT NO.: 1350

SUBJECT: Packwood motion to table the Kennedy appeal from the ruling of the Chair on the Helms point of order that the Kennedy-Burdick amendment (deferring the \$92 increase in the Medicare Part A hospital deductible for four and one-half months and raising the cigarette tax by one cent per pack for three years) is out of order as legislation on an appropriations bill. (See also Vote No. 358.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment maintained that eight million senior citizens should not be faced with an unintentional increase of \$92 in the Medicare hospital deductible as a result of the new Medicare prospective payment system. This increase would bring the amount which a Medicare beneficiary must pay out of his or her own pocket to \$492—an exorbitant increase of 173 percent since 1980. This amendment will delay imposition of the increase so that the Finance Committee can report legislation to correct this inequity.

Opponents objected that the amendment was legislation on an appropriations bill and in violation of Senate Rule XVI.

H.J. Res. 465: Vote Nos. 355-368.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (53)			NAYS (37)		NOT VOTING (10)	
Democrats (14 or 33%)	Republicans (39 or 81%)		Democrats (28 or 67%)	Republicans (9 or 19%)	Democrats (5)	Republicans (5)
Baucus	Abdnor	Kassebaum	Biden	Chafee	Chiles ³	Durenberger ²
Bentsen	Andrews	Kasten	Bingaman	Cohen	DeConcini ²	East ²
Ford	Armstrong	Lugar	Boren	Hawkins	Inouye ²	Garn ²
Gore	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Bradley	Heinz	Simon ²	Laxalt ²
Heflin	Cochran	McClure	Bumpers	Mathias	Stennis ²	Specter ²
Hollings	D'Amato	McConnell	Burdick	Nickles		
Long	Danforth	Murkowski	Byrd	Stafford		
Matsunaga	Denton	Packwood	Cranston	Weicker		
Melcher	Dole	Pressler	Dixon	Wilson		
Nunn	Domenici	Quayle	Dodd			
Proxmire	Evans	Roth	Eagleton			
Pryor	Goldwater	Rudman	Exon			
Sasser	Gorton	Simpson	Glenn			
Zorinsky	Gramm	Stevens	Harkin			
	Grassley	Symms	Hart			
	Hatch	Thurmond	Johnston			
	Hatfield	Trible	Kennedy			
	Hecht	Wallop	Kerry			
	Helms	Warner	Lautenberg			
	Humphrey		Leahy			
			Levin			
			Metzenbaum			
			Mitchell			
			Moynihan			
			Pell			
			Riegle			
			Rockefeller			
			Sarbanes			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—67%
Republicans—81%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (53)
Democrats—14 or 26%
Republicans—39 or 74%

Against (37)
Democrats—28 or 76%
Republicans—9 or 24%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 358

99th Congress
1st Session

December 9, 1985, 4:43 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-17171

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1986

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 465

AMENDMENT NO.: 1352

SUBJECT: Hatfield motion to table the Heinz appeal from the ruling of the Chair that the Heinz amendment (increasing the Medicare Part A hospital deductible by \$76 rather than \$92) is out of order as legislation on an appropriations bill. (See also Vote No. 357.)

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that raising the Medicare deductible to \$492 was a completely unintentional consequence of the new Medicare prospective payment system. The new payment system was intended to save the taxpayers billions of dollars—not place a burden on senior citizens. This amendment would cap the increase in the Part A premium at \$476, a 19 percent increase instead of 23 percent. It makes no sense, proponents claimed, to penalize Medicare beneficiaries as an unforeseen side effect of a successful saving initiative.

Opponents objected that the amendment was legislation on an appropriations bill and in violation of Senate Rule XVI.

H.J. Res. 465: Vote Nos. 355-368.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (45)			NAYS (41)		NOT VOTING (14)	
Democrats (14 or 33%)	Republicans (31 or 70%)		Democrats (28 or 67%)	Republicans (13 or 30%)	Democrats (5)	Republicans (9)
Baucus	Armstrong	McClure	Biden	Andrews	Chiles ³	Abdnor ²
Bentsen	Boschwitz	McConnell	Boren	Chafee	DeConcini ²	Cochran ²
Bingaman	Danforth	Murkowski	Bradley	Cohen	Glenn ²	D'Amato ²
Ford	Denton	Packwood	Bumpers	Grassley	Inouye ²	Dole ²
Johnston	Domenici	Pressler	Burdick	Hatch	Simon ²	Durenberger ²
Long	Evans	Quayle	Byrd	Hawkins		East ²
Matsunaga	Goldwater	Roth	Cranston	Heinz		Garn ²
Moynihan	Gorton	Rudman	Dixon	Kasten		Laxalt ²
Nunn	Gramm	Simpson	Dodd	Mathias		Specter ²
Proxmire	Hatfield	Stafford	Eagleton	Nickles		
Pryor	Hecht	Stevens	Exon	Warner		
Rockefeller	Helms	Symms	Gore	Weicker		
Stennis	Humphrey	Thurmond	Harkin	Wilson		
Zorinsky	Kassebaum	Trible	Hart			
	Lugar	Wallop	Heflin			
	Mattingly		Hollings			
			Kennedy			
			Kerry			
			Lautenberg			
			Leahy			
			Levin			
			Melcher			
			Metzenbaum			
			Mitchell			
			Pell			
			Riegle			
			Sarbanes			
			Sasser			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—67%
Republicans—70%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (45)
Democrats—14 or 31%
Republicans—31 or 69%

Against (41)
Democrats—28 or 68%
Republicans—13 or 32%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



NO. 364

December 10, 1985, 2:19 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-17289

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 465

AMENDMENT NO.: 1392

SUBJECT: Gorton motion to table the Hart amendment expressing the sense of the Senate that no funds appropriated in this bill should be used to provide permits for commercial activities within certain areas in Colorado proposed for wilderness designation.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stressed that because it was expected that parts of Colorado would be officially designated as wilderness areas by the mid-1980's, the State of Colorado was not included in provisions of the 1980 Wilderness Act which gave candidate lands protection against livestock grazing and oil, gas, and mineral exploration. Permits have already been approved for timbering and oil and gas exploration on these potential wilderness areas in Colorado. This amendment would provide needed protection against commercial activities which would encroach upon and despoil these lands while they await wilderness designation.

Opponents of the amendment declared that the continuing resolution is not the appropriate vehicle for wilderness legislation and that this issue should be debated on its own merits.

H.J. Res. 465: Vote Nos. 355-368.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee
Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

NO. 365

December 10, 1985, 4:25 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-17300

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 465

SUBJECT: Stevens motion to table the Kerry amendment prohibiting the use of funds to conduct, in connection with the SDI program, development, testing, or evaluation of a warhead, bomb, or other explosive device which uses fissionable material.

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment noted that \$28.6 million is included in the FY 1986 SDI request to supplement efforts by the Department of Energy to develop an X-ray laser—a weapon with destructive power derived through the detonation of a nuclear bomb in space. This amendment, if passed, would prohibit the use of these funds in an effort to keep the SDI program on course and in compliance with the President's often stated goal of achieving a nonnuclear defense against ballistic missiles. The amendment would not cause the U.S. to fall behind the Soviet Union in the arms race because it would still permit research. But it assures that the U.S. will not proceed to develop a new nuclear bomb device for outer space in violation of the treaty on outer space.

Opponents of the amendment stated that achievement of a nonnuclear defense against ballistic missiles should not mean foregoing research and testing in the field of nuclear-driven directed energy concepts. The Soviet Union already possesses a considerable capability in this area, they stressed, and adoption of this amendment would forestall U.S. exploration, through research projects, of the full spectrum of SDI concepts.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE AGREED TO

YEAS (64)			NAYS (32)		NOT VOTING (4)	
Democrats (15 or 33%)	Republicans (49 or 96%)		Democrats (30 or 67%)	Republicans (2 or 4%)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (2)
Bentsen	Abdnor	Kasten	Baucus	Chafee	Chiles— ³	East— ²
Bingaman	Andrews	Laxalt	Biden	Mathias	Stennis— ²	Goldwater— ²
Boren	Armstrong	Lugar	Bumpers			
Bradley	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Burdick			
Byrd	Cochran	McClure	Cranston			
DeConcini	Cohen	McConnell	Dodd			
Dixon	D'Amato	Murkowski	Eagleton			
Exon	Danforth	Nickles	Gore			
Ford	Denton	Packwood	Harkin			
Glenn	Dole	Pressler	Hart			
Heflin	Domenici	Quayle	Inouye			
Hollings	Durenberger	Roth	Johnston			
Long	Evans	Rudman	Kennedy			
Nunn	Garn	Simpson	Kerry			
Zorinsky	Gorton	Specter	Lautenberg			
	Gramm	Stafford	Leahy			
	Grassley	Stevens	Levin			
	Hatch	Symms	Matsunaga			
	Hatfield	Thurmond	Melcher			
	Hawkins	Trible	Metzenbaum			
	Hecht	Wallop	Mitchell			
	Heinz	Warner	Moynihan			
	Helms	Weicker	Pell			
	Humphrey	Wilson	Proxmire			
	Kassebaum		Pryor			
			Riegle			
			Rockefeller			
			Sarbanes			
			Sasser			
			Simon			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

1—Official Business
2—Necessarily Absent
3—Illness
4—Other

SYMBOLS:

AY—Announced Yea
AN—Announced Nay
PY—Paired Yea
PN—Paired Nay

Party Cohesion

Democrats— 67%
Republicans— 96%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (64)
Democrats—15 or 23%
Republicans—49 or 77%

Against (32)
Democrats—30 or 94%
Republicans—2 or 6%

SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 367

99th Congress
1st Session

December 10, 1985, 5:53 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-17312

CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS, 1986

BILL NO.: H.J. Res. 465

AMENDMENT NO.: 1399

SUBJECT: Wallop question of germaneness of the Wallop, et al, amendment earmarking \$50 million from the foreign operations section of the bill to assist the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The question is: "Is it the judgment of the Senate that the amendment is germane to the bill?"

NOTE: Proponents of the amendment stated that immediate, overt U.S. military assistance was essential to UNITA's survival. A major new Soviet-Cuban offensive is being waged in Angola and, unless the U.S. finally comes to the aid of the UNITA forces, their long struggling efforts to achieve freedom and self-determination may be defeated. Five years of American-backed negotiations have only resulted in the Marxist-oriented People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) growing stronger from American financial assistance while continuing its relentless Soviet-Cuban military buildup. The U.S. must, therefore, provide sufficient assistance to UNITA to force MPLA to realize that it must either negotiate toward national reconciliation and free, fair elections or face military defeat. We are not going to war there, but we can and must swiftly and effectively support the resistance forces. We openly aid freedom fighters in Afghanistan and Nicaragua and should do the same in Angola. There is no time for the complex implementation of covert action. Furthermore, for the U.S. to offer only secret assistance would intimate that our actions are questionable or even shameful. Those who assert that assisting the UNITA forces would constitute an "endorsement" of South Africa, which has aided UNITA, should heed Congressman Claude Pepper's remark that, "... if for once South Africa happens to have done something right and decent," it should not prevent others from doing the same.

Opponents of the amendment declared their opposition to any U.S. intervention in the Angolan war and lauded the American-sponsored negotiations as the only hope for reducing the Cuban presence and promoting national reconciliation in Angola. Giving aid to UNITA will only undermine our role as mediator, increase the threat of more Cuban troops being introduced, and damage our interests and prestige in the rest of the world. It might also be perceived as a decision to collaborate consciously with the policies of the South African government. Others stated that they would vote against the amendment, despite their sympathy with its aims, in order to facilitate action on the continuing resolution. They also noted their intention of offering a resolution to express support for UNITA and pave the way for material assistance and economic sanctions if the current Angolan situation persists.

H.J. Res. 465: Vote Nos. 355-368.

RESULT: AMENDMENT NOT GERMANE, AND THEREFORE FALLS

YEAS (39)			NAYS (58)			NOT VOTING (3)	
Democrats (4 or 9%)	Republicans (35 or 69%)		Democrats (42 or 91%)	Republicans (16 or 31%)		Democrats (1)	Republicans (2)
Ford	Abdnor	Humphrey	Baucus	Kennedy	Chafee	Chiles ⁻³	East ⁻²
Heflin	Andrews	Kasten	Bentsen	Kerry	Cohen		Goldwater ⁻²
Hollings	Armstrong	Laxalt	Biden	Lautenberg	Durenberger		
Sasser	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Bingaman	Leahy	Evans		
	Cochran	McClure	Boren	Levin	Hatfield		
	D'Amato	McConnell	Bradley	Long	Heinz		
	Danforth	Murkowski	Bumpers	Matsunaga	Kassebaum		
	Denton	Nickles	Burdick	Meicher	Lugar		
	Dole	Pressler	Byrd	Metzenbaum	Mathias		
	Domenici	Quayle	Cranston	Mitchell	Packwood		
	Garn	Rudman	DeConcini	Moynihan	Roth		
	Gorton	Symms	Dixon	Nunn	Simpson		
	Gramm	Thurmond	Dodd	Pell	Specter		
	Grassley	Trible	Eagleton	Proxmire	Stafford		
	Hatch	Wallop	Exon	Pryor	Stevens		
	Hawkins	Warner	Glenn	Riegle	Weicker		
	Hecht	Wilson	Gore	Rockefeller			
	Helms		Harkin	Sarbanes			
			Hart	Simon			
			Inouye	Stennis			
			Johnston	Zorinsky			

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—91%
Republicans—69%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (39)
Democrats—4 or 10%
Republicans—35 or 90%

Against (58)
Democrats—42 or 72%
Republicans—16 or 28%



SENATE VOTING RECORD

NO. 380

99th Congress
1st Session

December 20, 1985, 4:43 p.m.
Temp. Cong. Rec. p. S-18297

BUDGET RECONCILIATION

BILL NO.: H.R. 3128 (S. 1730)

TITLE: "The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1986."

SUBJECT: Johnston motion to table the Senate amendment (containing language adding back the Superfund value added tax) to the House amendment to the Senate amendment. (See also Vote No. 381.)

NOTE: Proponents of the motion to table pointed out that without the amendment, the bill would be in essentially the same form as it was when the Senate voted for it two times before. While some Senators may feel shortchanged regarding the funding for Superfund, a greater good would be accomplished if a reconciliation bill were enacted containing \$79 billion in cuts. By receding from the Senate amendment and passing a reconciliation bill, the President would be given a chance to sign a bill reducing the deficit now. If not, the measure will die because the House is operating under unanimous consent and would not be able to appoint conferees or meet in conference, and they have already rejected this amendment twice.

Opponents of the motion to table declared that this bill must go back to conference where the last few differences can be ironed out. The Senate can muster a quorum, and it is not our problem if the House cannot. If the amendment is tabled, the entire bill will be lost because the President will surely veto it. A further conference is needed to discuss the spending programs that were added in conference in bargaining to get the Superfund financing. These additions regarding a variety of domestic programs are not acceptable to the President or the Senate majority without the Superfund financing half of the bargain.

H.R. 3128 (S. 1730): Vote Nos. 240, 241, 251-254, 293-297, 306-314, 379-381.

RESULT: MOTION TO TABLE FAILED

YEAS (29)		NAYS (35)		NOT VOTING (36)	
Democrats (26 or 100%)	Republicans (3 or 8%)	Democrats (0 or 0%)	Republicans (35 or 92%)	Democrats (21)	Republicans (15)
Baucus	Armstrong	Abdnor	Laxalt	Biden-2	Cohen-2
Bentsen	McConnell	Andrews	Lugar	Boren-2	Denton-2
Bingaman	Nickles	Boschwitz	Mattingly	Burdick-2AY	Durenberger-2
Bradley		Chafee	Packwood	Chiles-3	East-2
Bumpers		Cochran	Pressler	Cranston-2	Evans-2
Byrd		D'Amato	Quayle	Dixon-2	Garn-2
DeConcini		Danforth	Roth	Dodd-2	Grassley-2
Exon		Dole	Rudman	Eagleton-2	Hatfield-2
Ford		Domenici	Simpson	Hart-2	Hawkins-2AN
Glenn		Goldwater	Specter	Kennedy-2	Humphrey-2
Gore		Gorton	Stafford	Lautenberg-2	Mathias-1
Harkin		Gramm	Stevens	Melcher-2	McClure-2
Heflin		Hatch	Symms	Metzenbaum-2	Murkowski-2
Hollings		Hecht	Thurmond	Moynihan-2	Trible-2
Inouye		Heinz	Wallop	Nunn-2	Weicker-2
Johnston		Helms	Warner	Pell-2AY	
Kerry		Kassebaum	Wilson	Pryor-2	
Leahy		Kasten		Riegle-2	
Levin				Sarbanes-2	
Long				Simon-2	
Matsunaga				Zorinsky-2	
Mitchell					
Proxmire					
Rockefeller					
Sasser					
Stennis					

EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness

SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay

ANALYSIS OF ISSUE VOTED ON:

Party Cohesion

Democrats—100%
Republicans—92%

Measure of Party Support on Issue as Voted on

For (29)
Democrats—26 or 90%
Republicans—3 or 10%

Against (35)
Democrats—0 or 0%
Republicans—35 or 100%

Prepared and Compiled by Senate Democratic Policy Committee

Robert C. Byrd, Chairman